THE OUTLOOK FOR 1988

We have updated our October forecast to take into account recent events in equity and foreign exchange markets as well as the Autumn Statement. As far as the prospects for the world economy are concerned, we have taken a gloomier view than the Treasury. On this basis we also obtain slower growth in the UK next year: output is forecast to rise 2.2 per cent compared with 2.8 per cent in October and 2.7 per cent in the official forecast. Inflation and the balance of payments are little changed from October. For next year's Budget we continue to assume a cut in the standard rate of income tax to 25 per cent though, on our calculations, this requires a PSBR it 1988–9 of newly £2bn whereas the Autumn Statement forecast assumed a constant PSBR of £1bn     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The Autumn Statement updated the government's spending plans and its forecast from those announced in the Budget in March. On both counts there is very little difference between the Treasury view and our own forecast released in October. The Treasury supports our projection that output and demand will decelerate in 1989, that inflation will peak in the first half of the year at about 7 per cent and fall back to 5 per cent by the end of the year and that the deficit on the current account of the balance of payments will narrow only marginally over the next 12 months. On public spending in 1989–90, our October forecast was close to the unchanged official figures. It was clear to us - though not to most City commentators - that savings on unemployment benefit, debt interest and elsewhere would enable greater spending on programmes within an unchanged planning total. In later years the government has upped its expenditure plans from those announced a year ago, as we had assumed it would. As a result, the Autumn Statement projects significant increases in real public spending from now on. We show that, under a more appropriate inflation forecast, public spending rises nearly 2 per cent next year but falls back in 1990–92. Finally we argue that, unless the Chancellor decides to run an even larger PSDR (public sector debt repayment) than the £12bn built into our forecast - and the Autumn Statement forecast assumes a PSDR in 1989–90 similar to the expected outturn in 1988–9 of £10bn - the scope for tax cuts remains intact.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Collapsing oil prices and a falling dollar set the background to a Budget in which the Chancellor, hamstrung by lower oil revenues, was seen as having little room for manoeuvre. In fact the sharp fall in the sterling price of oil has provided him with the perfect excuse for not making significant cuts in personal income tax that were largely irrelevant to the needs of the economy. Instead of a boost to household demand we have had, thanks to OPEC, a transfer to companies in the form of a reduction in costs. This should enable them to expand output against a background of falling inflation. Our post-Budget assessment of macroeconomic prospects (Section I), made on the Treasury's assumption of a $15 oil price, shows output growing by 2 1/2 per cent this year and inflation falling below 3 per cent in 1987. We are thus less optimistic than the Treasury about output but more optimistic about inflation. How was the Chancellor able, within the confines of the Medium-Term Financial Strategy, to give anything away having lost so much oil revenue? A detailed analysis of the PSBR forecast (Section II) reveals good reasons why non-oil tax revenues should be some £3 1/2n higher than forecast this time last year. But, because we still expect public spending to be above the official figures, our PSBR forecast is £1bn higher than the Treasury's. Although the macroeconomic impact of the Budget was small (especially in relation to that of the fall in oil prices which preceded it), it continued the process of tax reform. We focus, in Section III, on the new proposals to deal with the problem of the pension fund surpluses to which we drew attention in the November issue of Financial Outlook. We conclude that the proposed measures could have a larger effect on tax revenues in the longer term than is indicated by the Treasury's Budget estimates.     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The Treasury's forecast, published with the Autumn Statement, has been widely heralded as showing a surprisingly cheerful picture for next year as far as both output and inflation are concerned. In fact it is close to the forecast which we produced in October. Here we compare the two forecasts and then consider how our forecast is affected when we adopt the Treasury assumptions on asset sales and the exchange rate. We find that the Treasury is more optimistic than we are on investment and that holding the exchange rate - which is needed to produce the official inflation forecast - requires rather higher interest rates than we assumed in October and this widens the gap between our forecast for GDP and the Treasury's forecast.
We also consider how the government should respond to lower North Sea oil revenues. Taking a permanent income approach, we suggest that the PSBR should be allowed to rise by £2bn on this basis. The same approach, however, suggests that an extra £71/2bn of asset sales should be used to cut the PSBR not taxes. On balance therefore this analysis indicates that next year's PSBR target should be lowered by £1/2bn from the £71/2 bn contained in the 1985 MTFS.     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The Treasury's forecasts, published with the Autumn Statement, are close to those we presented in October. For domestic demand the main difference is that the Treasury has consumption growing by 3 per cent next year whereas we had forecast a growth of only 2 percent. Behind this difference lies a significant different in policy assumptions. In October we estimated that there was no scope for tux cuts, yet the Treasury's forecast assumes that there will be net cuts in taxation (over and above indexation) of £11/2bn in the next Budget. In this Forecast Release we show that the main differences are (a) that the government has raised its forecasts of sales of assets and council houses arid (b) that it expects more North Sea Oil Revenue than we do. The latter forecast depends critically on what happens to the exchange rate.
We present a revised forecast based on the new information in the Autumn Statement and incorporating the £1 1/2bn tax cuts. It is very close to the Treasury's forecast.
We also discuss the relevance of changes in North Sea oil revenue to fiscal policy and we suggest that it is misleading to treat it on a par with other sources of revenue. We then show that the suggested tax cuts of £11/2bn in the next Budget are effectively £4bn less than was indicated last March. Finally we argue that the Chancellor's claim to have kept within his Planning Totals for spending in the last three years has only been achieved by increased asset sales.     

THE BUDGET

Mr Clarke's first unified budget is politically highly astute. He has skilfully defused the household fuel VAT row. As we predicted in the October Economic Outlook, he has taken advantage of lower inflation and the public pay freeze to cut public spending with tough curbs on social security. This, together with the absence of measures against the pensions industry, has pleased the markets. But it will prove hard, though not impossible, to hit the new public spending targets beyond next year, particularly if inflation picks up. The further reduction in mortgage tax relief, the modest extension of the tax base, the action on tax avoidance and the introduction of road charges all make good economic sense, though the absence of measures to give the Bank of England more freedom for manoeuvre in monetary policy is disappointing. There is still the risk that the large tax increases on consumers bequeathed by Mr Lamont will slow recovery in 1994, but overall this is a budget that is good for the economy and good for Mr Clarke. It paves the way for further interest rate cuts of ½-1%. In this forecast release we consider the details of the Budget, dissect the Treasury forecast, and consider the plausibility of the spending targets, especially in later years.     

THE AUTUMN STATEMENT

The short-term prospects for output are weaker than our October forecast suggested - manufacturing output fell 1.8per cent in the third quarter and the CBI survey indicates a sharp decline in business confidence. This is reflected in the Treasury's Autumn Statement forecast of GDP growth this year of only 1 per cent followed by 0.5per cent in 1991. With inflation now passing its peak, there would be a case for lowering interest rates but this is not possible with the pound below DM2.90 - the ill-judged reduction in base rates on ERM entry combined with the challenge to Mrs. Thatcher's leadership has pushed sterling deep into its lower ERM band. The principal unknown in the Autumn Statement forecast is the level of interest rates which, in the Treasury's judgement, will be necessary to keep sterling at or close to DM2.95. The Treasury may envisage only a very modest decline in base rates to 13 per cent next year. This could explain why their forecast is relatively gloomier than ours; alternatively the Treasury's underlying view could simply be more pessimistic. Nevertheless we show that the gap between the two forecasts can be eliminated if we change a limited number of assumptions - notably on interest rates, North Sea oil output, general government consumption and stock-building.     

纳税心理取向、方式及反措施

经测算我国每年税收流失额在4000亿元以上，面对这种局面，笔者认为在对纳税人分析研究的基础上，有针对性地通过立法、宣传、管理等手段，才能有效扼制税收流失，保证税款及时上缴国库。     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

Brexit deal and demographics drag on long-term outlook

• ▀ We have revised down our long-term forecast for GDP growth based largely on our expectation that the UK is headed for a much looser relationship with the EU. This will result in damage to trade and lower FDI inflows.
• ▀ We now expect potential output growth to slow to 1.4% a year from 2020–2030 down from 1.6% a year from 2010–2020. In the two decades after 2030 we expect the drag from Brexit-related effects to fade, but weaker contributions in labour supply and human capital will cut output growth to 1.2% a year.
• ▀ Demographics have been a key contributor to potential output growth over the past 30 years. But an ageing population and a more restrictive immigration regime are likely to mean the workforce grows far more slowly in the future.
• ▀ Our long-term growth forecast is weaker than the OBR's and implies that future governments will face a combination of disappointing growth in tax revenues and increasing demands for government spending from an ageing population.

     

Forecast Summary

Backed by the lowest interest rates in fifteen years and a competitive exchange rate, we see the economy moving off the corrugated bottom of last year and recovery gathering pace as this year progresses. We expect output to rise 1.4 per cent this year, 0.5 per cent more than we forecast in October when we were expecting a far more cautious approach on interest rates, and 3 per cent in 1994. Here we have factored in another 1 per cent cut in base rates to coincide with the Budget on 16 March but this may prove to be the floor, especially if, as is rumoured, the Prime Minister has vetoed tax increases in the Budget for fear of derailing a fragile recovery. By the end of the year, however, we expect the trend in interest rates to be upwards to halt a sliding exchange rate and to cap the devaluation-induced price increases that will be feeding into domestic prices by then. On this basis we believe that inflation can be contained at 4 per cent underlying this year, 5 per cent in 1994 - outside the Chancellor's target range. While we are more sanguine than before on the outlook for output and inflation, major problems remain on the PSBR and the balance of payments. Beginning in the December Budget, the Government will have to raise taxes to avoid a debt spiral on the budget deficit and channel resources into net exports. Even on the basis of a £4bn tax hike in the first of the unified Budgets, we expect the PSBR to run along close to £50bn and the current account deficit in the £15bn-20bn range.     

New and Current Evidence on Determinants of Aggregate Federal Personal Income Tax Evasion in the United States

Using the most current data available, this study seeks to identify any new as well as traditional determinants of personal income tax evasion. A variety of empirical estimates find that income tax rates, the IRS audit rate and IRS penalty interest rates, and the unemployment rate all influence tax evasion. In addition, rarely investigated variables including the tax‐free interest rate, the public's job approval rating of the president, and the public's dissatisfaction with government, along with previously unstudied variables, namely, the real interest rate yield on Moody's Baa‐rated long‐term corporate bonds and the real interest rate yield on three‐year Treasury notes, also affect income tax evasion.     

Forecast Summary

A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent     

Planning Feature The Forecast in Detail: (2) Assumptions

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming ' unchanged policies '. This forecast differs from our July forecast in that we have not assumed any income tax cuts; nor have we assumed, as we did in July, that National Insurance contributions would be increased. We do, however, continue to assume the abolition of the national insurance surcharge in two equal stages during the 1984-5 fiscal year, as well as the usual indexation of tax allowances and bands and revalorisation of indirect taxes. This change in assumptions about policy reflects our guess that the new Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, will attempt to hit his monetary targets by a combination of tighter fiscal policy and lower interest rates than we had previously assumed. In this forecast interest rates are on average about 2 points lower than in July.     

Executive Summary

Our assessment of the outlook for the UK economy over the next two years has not changed dramatically from February's forecast. Growth now appears to be stronger prior to the tax increases coming into force than we then anticipated. We have therefore revised upwards our forecast for GDP growth for this year to 3% and made a small upwards revision - to 2.3% - for 1995. Inflation is still forecast to remain historically low, with the annual increase in the RPI excluding mortgage interest keeping within the 4% target ceiling. However, underlying inflation is stuck in the 3-3.5% range for most of the forecast period and a rise in interest rates over the course of next year will be required to contain inflation. After peaking at 7.5% in early 1996, we then expect interest rates to fall back. Unemployment should continue to decline this year, though not at the rate seen over the last year, levelling off at around 2.5 million in 1995 and then falling again in late 1996 and 1997.     

THE 1987 BUDGET

Our pre-Budget forecast published last month correctly anticipated the main Budget measures (with the exception of the decision not to re-valorise excise duties) and is very close to the Treasury's own forecast. We have updated the forecast for the Budget measures and other new information. Compared with the February Economic Outlook, our post-Budget assessment has revised down slightly the short-term forecast for output, inflation and the current account deficit. Consequently we share the Treasury's view that output will rise 3 per cent this year, but we are a little more optimistic on the outlook for inflation and the current account.
In holding the PS BR to last year's expected outturn of £4bn, and more particularly in cutting the PSFD by £11/2zbn, the Budget represents a tightening in fiscal policy. Whether the overall policy stance is tightened depends on the response of the monetary authorities. Early indications are that the government will prevent interest rates from falling as far or as fast as they would otherwise do and that the exchange rate will be allowed to rise. This implies a tightening of policy in order to head off problems on inflation or the balance of payments. This argument is supported by the Treasury's own forecast, which is more pessimistic on both inflation and the current account than its predecessor in the Autumn Statement, and explains the Chancellor's decision not to re-valorise excise duties. The post-Budget forecast incorporates this change in policy. We now assume that the sterling index averages 70 this year and that base rates fall to 9 per cent by the end of the year.     

Is the Economy Overheating?

In the last year total output has risen 4 per cent and manufacturing is up 6 per cent. Unemployment has fallen by 400,000. The current account, which was in surplus in the first half of the year, has moved back into deficit. Does this mean that the economy is “over- heating”? In the context of our forecast we examine this issue; we consider how rapidly supply can increase and how fast demand is increasing. We conclude that the growth of output in the last year was initially driven by supply and that, more recently, domestic demand has been growing very rapidly. The emergence of a current account deficit is evidence of excess domestic demand but from now on we expect demand to grow less rapidly. With non-oil supply expanding at a rate in excess of 3 per cent, we forecast steady output growth and little change in either inflation or the current account. In our judgement, the economy, though hot, is not overheating.     

An exploratory empirical inquiry into the impact of federal budget deficits on the ex post real interest rate yield on ten year Treasury notes over the last half century

Using over a half century of data, this exploratory empirical study adopts a simple loanable funds to investigate the impact of the federal budget deficits on the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year Treasury notes. For the period 1960–2012, an autoregressive 2SLS estimate finds that the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year U.S. Treasury notes is an increasing function of the ex post real interest rate yield on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds, the ex post real interest rate yield on 3 year Treasury notes, and the ex post real interest rate yield on high grade municipal bonds. This exploratory analysis also finds that federal budget deficit (relative to the GDP level) exercised a positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yield on 10 year Treasury notes, a finding consistent with a number of earlier studies of shorter time periods     

What is the potential impact of a taxation system reform on carbon abatement and industrial growth in China?

Economists have long argued that market-based environmental policy such as an environmental tax is beneficial to abate pollution emissions. This study aims at investigating the impact of carbon tax levy on carbon dioxide (CO₂) abatement and industrial growth in China. To this end, the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of industrial CO₂ emissions is estimated as the benchmark of setting the carbon tax rate by using the directional distance function (DDF). This paper employs the polynomial dynamic panel model to forecast the impact of carbon tax levy on target variables such as sectoral value-added and CO₂ intensity. The results reveal that the levy of a CO₂ tax has a negative impact on industrial output only in the short term. In the long term, the impact of CO₂ tax levy on output will become positive. The levy of a CO₂ tax is always beneficial to reduce CO₂ intensity. Corresponding policy suggestions for an environmental taxation system reform are given in the concluding section.     

Assumptions–Central Forecast

We continue to make our best guesses about likely policy developments rather than assuming 'unchanged' policies. In the central forecast we assume that the broad thrust of policy is unchanged, i.e. we have made the technical assumption that the present government is returned in the next General Election. But, because an election must be held within the next 15 months, we also consider the medium-term prospects under alternative economic policies. (For details see p. 19.) In the central forecast. e herefore. we assume that policy will continue to be guided-though not completely determined-by an extended Medium- Term Financial Strategy (MTFS). For 1983-4 the MTFS requires the PSBR to be 23/4% per cent of GDP at market prices. Given official inflation and output forecasts, the Chancellor is therefore aiming for a 1983-4 PSBR of £8bn (Autumn Statement, p. 13). In the central forecast. however, we have assumed that the Budget of 15 March will give greater weight to the political objectives of cutting income tax and maintaining the attack on inflation, even if this implies slippage from the MTFS targets. Specifcally we have assumed that the standard rate of income tax will be cut by lp. that personal tax allowances will be raised by 12 per cent and that indirect taxes will be raised by only half the amount required for full revalorisation. This amounts to a total tax giveaway (compared with unchangedpolicy) of £1 1/2 and results in a PSBR of just over £9bn. 3.1 per cent of GDPat market prices.