消费者寻求多样化与企业定价竞争

消费者寻求多样化的购买行为会对寡头企业之间的价格竞争和经济效率产生重要影响。文章研究发现,针对消费者寻求多样化的购买行为,企业会对忠诚的消费者给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;消费者寻求多样化购买行为弱化了企业两期价格竞争,导致"默契合谋";而以两期统一定价为基准的经济效率分析显示,歧视定价机制促进了企业间竞争,导致消费者剩余增加,企业利润减少。     

滞留成本、竞争性定价歧视和定价机制选择

在很多市场环境下,消费者重复消费同一种商品会产生效用折扣或者消费者喜欢尝试不同的商品特性,因此消费者追求消费多样化,重复消费同一种商品会产生滞留成本。文章采用两期动态博弈框架,研究滞留成本的存在对于企业竞争性歧视定价行为和市场绩效的影响,此后又进一步研究了企业的定价机制选择问题。文章的研究结果表明:(1)在歧视定价机制下,企业会奖励忠诚的消费者,即企业会对重复购买自己产品的消费者(忠诚消费者)给予价格优惠,而对新顾客索取高价;(2)与统一定价相比,歧视性定价降低了企业利润和社会福利,增加了消费者剩余;(3)当企业可以在歧视定价和统一定价两种机制之间进行选择时,每个企业选择歧视性定价机制是均衡结果。     

转移成本、价格歧视和非对称寡头竞争

通过在Hotelling空间差异模型的基础上结合转移成本构建非对称企业竞争博弈模型.主要研究在非对称情况下,两企业在一致定价与价格歧视下竞争的均衡结果.还对两种不同定价体制下的均衡结果进行了比较,分析价格歧视是否强化竞争.研究发现价格歧视对竞争的效应是不确定的,很大程度受到两企业不对称程度的影响.     

市场歧视、区际边界效应与经济增长

跨区域商品价格差被认为是研究国内区际贸易的有效替代指标,文章首先以我国12个样本城市六大类商品价格为考察对象,经回归分析认为:除了距离等控制因素外,"樊纲指数"和"政府支出占GDP的比率"较好地解释了我国六大类商品价格偏差的边界效应,说明市场化进程落后的地区更可能筑起商品贸易的政策壁垒,而具有"父爱"意识的政府在高财政支出比率情形下更有能力实施保护战略,从而验证了文章的边界效应假说.实证分析还获取了两个层次的边界效应(包括品类边界效应和省份边界效应),并作为市场一体化指标被纳入文章的经济增长方程进行回归;结果显示:地方保护壁垒造成的省份市场分割,影响到保护战略实施省份的自身经济绩效.     

价格歧视对市场定价的重要性分析

在市场经济中,市场势力是普遍存在的,许多行业只有少数几个生产商,从而各生产商产生一些垄断势力。并且,许多厂商作为原材料、劳动或者特定的资本货物的买方,在这些要素投入品的市场上具有一定的买方垄断势力。如何更有效的利用他们的市场势力,取决于如何定价、选择要素投入量以及决定产量,以使得企业利润最大化。因此,价格歧视在市场定价中的作用显得十分重要。本文首先介绍了价格歧视的经济学含义,之后描述了价格歧视在市场中的具体运作方式,希望能使读者对其有一个深入的了解。     

价格歧视在旅游产品定价中的应用

文章在阐述消费者剩余理论和价格歧视理论的基础上 ,结合旅游产品的特点 ,把价格歧视理论应用到旅游产品的定价分析中 ,提出了旅游产品定价的四种模式。强调只要应用恰当的旅游产品定价模式 ,最终达到供求双赢的局面是可能的     

价格歧视战略与福利效应分析

在完全竞争市场条件下 ,竞争均衡可实现帕累托最优效率。垄断市场一般很难提供价格等于边际成本的产量水平 ,其产量与价格选择对社会来说不是最优的。垄断厂商以内生范畴和外生范畴为基础对消费者进行分类 ,使得价格歧视成为一种可行战略。由于定价策略存在差异 ,不同类型的价格歧视便具有不同的福利效应。     

医药消费者多样化寻求的影响因素

在医药企业数目逐年增长的大背景下,医药消费者获得了更多的治疗方案,但同时也导致消费者多样化寻求的行为.而医药企业如何减少消费者多样化的寻求行为,留住消费者,提高销售额成为目前医药企业必须要重视的问题.探讨影响医药消费者多样化寻求行为的因素,主要包括价格促销力、口碑影响力、社区情感营销.受试者中有将近80％的受试者没有了...     

Consumer Information and Firm Pricing: Negative Externalities from Improved Information

We analyze the effect of consumer information on firm pricing in a model where consumers search for prices and matches with products. We consider two types of consumers. Uninformed consumers do not know in advance their match values with firms, whereas informed consumers do. Prices are lower the greater the proportion of uninformed consumers. Hence uninformed consumers exert a positive externality on the others, in contrast to standard results. This leads to socially excessive investment in gathering prior information when aggregate demand is price-sensitive.     

A Discriminatory Mechanism to Reduce Urban Congestion

In this article, we propose an optimal mechanism to reduce congestion when information is asymmetric. Each car driver receives a quantity of traffic rights such that his adjusted marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of congestion and payments are based on willingness to pay. We show that the level of congestion achieved is lower and each car user can receive more or fewer rights than under complete information. With symmetric beliefs, the payment rule results from a second‐degree price discrimination. When beliefs are asymmetric, it results simultaneously from a second‐degree price discrimination and from a third‐degree price discrimination and high willingness‐to‐pay car users are discriminated against. The revenue raised can be used to reduce distortionary taxes, thereby gaining public acceptability.     

拥挤收费、边际成本定价与福利

交通拥挤收费是利用价格机制来调节城市道路高峰期交通量的一种手段.本文通过经济学分析指出:交通拥挤不仅给消费者带来直接损失,而且还伴随着多种外部不经济;征收拥挤费可以减少社会福利损失;拥挤收费增加的收入应该用于缓解拥挤的交通投资上.     

Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing

We consider an implementation problem faced by a planner who manages a roadway network. The problem entails both hidden information and hidden actions. We solve the planner's problem by introducing a new class of mechanisms and a new notion of implementation. The mechanisms, called price schemes, attach transfers to the available routes; they do not involve direct revelation. The method of implementation is evolutionary, requiring that players who follow any reasonable myopic adjustment process eventually learn to behave as the planner desires. We show that efficient behaviour can be guaranteed using simple, decentralized price schemes.     

Opportunity Costs,Competition, and Firm Selection

Abstract

The paper questions the standard economic assumptions that competing economic agents have identical reservation utility levels, and that when differences in opportunity costs exist, they can be conveniently represented by fixed costs. Asymmetries in opportunity costs are considered in relation to current efficiency. The effect of this interchangeability of skills is studied in the context of the effect of entry on firm selection in a Cournot setting. It is found that inefficient firms are more likely to crowd out efficient ones when the relationship between current efficiency and opportunity costs is strong, and when the fixed costs of changing markets are high. Moreover, in the long-run, firms with intermediate cost levels are likely to induce the exit of low and high cost firms. The model sheds light on the benefits of diversification by multiproduct and multinational firms, and their relationship to skill transferability.     

股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性

以相对净资产收益率和主营业务利润率为被解释变量 ,以股权构成为解释变量 ,本文系统考察了股权结构对上市公司业绩的影响。在对行业、公司规模和宏观经济条件等因素加以控制后 ,使用来自电子电器、商业和公用事业三个行业上市公司的数据 ,我们的回归分析和假设检验表明法人股和流通股对企业业绩有正面影响、国有股有负面影响的预期只在竞争性较强的电子电器行业成立 ,在竞争性相对较弱的其他两个行业则不成立。这一研究发现的政策含义在于 ,为了使通过上市实现国有企业股权结构多元化的政策发挥所期望的作用 ,首先应尽量提高行业的竞争性。     

从博弈论的角度分析交通拥堵和拥堵收费问题

本文从博弈论角度考察了交通拥堵的微观经济学问题,并从出行者的出发时间决策入手,通过建立简单的两人拥堵博弈模型,分析了参与者在互动行为影响下,由自己和他人的行动共同决定的得益情况,并进一步将模型应用到拥堵收费定价研究中.     

Congestion Pricing and Learning in Traffic Network Games

A stochastic model describing the learning process and adaptive behavior of finitely many users in a congested traffic network with parallel links is used to prove convergence almost surely toward an efficient equilibrium for a related game. To prove this result, we assume that the social planner charges on every route the marginal cost pricing without knowing what is the efficient equilibrium. The result is a dynamic version of Pigou’s solution, where the implementation is made in a decentralized way and the information about players gathered by the social planner is minimal. Our result and setting may be extended to the general case of negative externalities.     

Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.