Contingent value of director identification: The role of government directors in monitoring and resource provision in an emerging economy

Research summary: Although previous studies have explored the value of government directors, less attention has been directed at the antecedents of government directors' engagement in value‐adding activities, such as managerial monitoring and resource provision. Drawing on social identity theory, we offer a novel model that specifies how a government director's dual identifications with the focal firm, and with the government individually and interactively affect his or her governance behavior. An investigation of government directors in China shows that their identification with the focal firm enhances monitoring and resource provision, while their identification with the government affects monitoring and resource provision differently. depending on the dominance of state ownership. The synergistic/substitutable effects between the two types of identification are contingent on state ownership and governance roles. Managerial summary: This study examines how a government director's dual identities—as a government official and as a board member of a focal firm affect his or her engagement in managerial monitoring and resource provision. Using data of Chinese listed firms, we find that government directors who strongly identify with the focal firm or with the government are highly motivated to fulfill their fiduciary obligations. However, the positive effects of their identification with the government differ between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and non‐SOEs. The combination of the two identifications offers a further boost to monitoring in non‐SOEs, and to resource provision in both SOEs and non‐SOEs, but it acts as a disincentive to monitoring in SOEs. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO duality,organizational slack,and firm performance in China

CEO duality, organizational slack, and ownership types have been found to affect firm performance in China. However, existing work has largely focused on their direct relationships with firm performance. Advancing this research, we develop an integrative framework to address an important and previously underexplored question: How do CEO duality and organizational slack affect the performance of firms with different ownership types? Specifically, we compare the moderating effects of CEO duality on the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-owned enterprises (POEs). Findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between organizational slack and firm performance, and that CEO duality negatively moderates this relationship in SOEs, but positively in POEs.     

Subnational institutional contingencies and executive pay dispersion

This paper investigates the impact of subnational institutional contingencies on executive pay dispersion structure and the relationship between pay dispersion and firm performance. Using executive compensation data on Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2011, we find that executive pay dispersion is significantly lower in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while is significantly higher in cross-listed firms and to a smaller degree in firms located in developed regions. There is also evidence that executive pay dispersion is smaller during the voluntary compensation disclosure period. After controlling for endogeneity of pay determination, we find that executive pay dispersion is positively associated with firm performance. In addition, the positive link between executive pay dispersion and firm performance is stronger in non-SOEs than in SOEs, and stronger in firms located in more developed regions than those not. Our findings are also robust to alternative measures of pay dispersion and firm performance.     

Further Evidence on the Capital Structure of REITs

This study examines the determinants of real estate investment trust (REIT) capital structure decisions from 1990 to 2008. Using a broad sample of 2,409 firm‐year observations, we find that asset tangibility is positively related to leverage, whereas profitability and market‐to‐book ratios are negatively related. Additional evidence suggests that firm debt capacity varies systematically with the unique operating and financing mechanisms employed by REITs. These results are robust across both aggregate firm debt levels and marginal security issuance decisions. Finally, our results provide further insight into competing capital structure theories, generally supporting empirical predictions derived from the market timing and trade‐off theories, although failing to support pecking order theory predictions.     

Labor Flexibility,Ownership and Firm Performance in China

Developed and developing countries alike areprivatizing or corporatizing state owned enterprises(SOEs), often citing the flexibility to hire and shedlabor as an advantage. However, there is littleempirical evidence on the extent to which thisimproves firm performance. This paper investigates thelinkage between labor flexibility, ownership and firmperformance using China as a case study. We find thatSOEs are much less able to adjust quickly to demandshocks than are other ownership forms and that thedegree of worker input into hiring and firingdecisions slows the ability of firms to adapt,negatively affecting firm performance.     

不完全合约理论的逻辑悖论与企业理论的创新

主流企业理论是企业的合约理论，而合约的“不完全性”又是其逻辑前提。例如：委托代理理论、股东至上论、剩余控制权的“独享”或“分享”论等都离不开合约的“不完全性”命题。但是，这些理论之间是存在矛盾的。研究发现，矛盾根源于“不完全合约”理论自身存在逻辑上的“悖论”。进一步分析发现，合约理论的“悖论”又根源于企业产权理论中的“两权分离”说。本文提出“资本分裂”说，以解决“两权分离”导致的矛盾。“资本分裂”说要求对企业的本质及其相关企业理论做重新解释，进行企业理论创新。     

Behind organizational slack and firm performance in China: The moderating roles of ownership and competitive intensity

Extensive studies of the organizational slack–performance relationship offer mixed findings in developed economies while little research attends to transition economies. Replicating and extending earlier work by Tan and Peng (2003), this study examines the relationship between organizational slack and firm performance in China and focuses on the moderating effects of firm ownership and competitive intensity. Empirical findings based on longitudinal data from 60,945 firms during 1998–2002 suggest that the impact of organizational slack on performance is stronger for private enterprises than for SOEs and foreign-invested enterprises. Furthermore, industry competitive intensity positively moderates the effect of organizational slack on performance. In a three-way interaction effect, the moderating effect of competitive intensity on the organizational slack–performance relationship is weaker in SOEs than in private enterprises and foreign invested enterprises.     

Slack and the performance of state-owned enterprises

Organizational slack has been recognized as critical to firm performance, although its impact is not always positive. Slack may be used to fuel innovation or alternatively excess resources may be squandered on pet projects. However, most research on slack is rooted in studying private firms in developed economies, especially the United States. Whether prior research on organizational slack can readily inform our understanding of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) behavior is questionable since SOEs prioritize goals such as social welfare and full employment differently than do the privately owned enterprises (POEs). The differences between SOEs and POEs influence their sources and use of slack due to the nature of their ownership, budget constraints, and agency relations. To bring insight to this issue we develop an institutional change lifecycle model to study the relationship between slack and the economic and social aspects of SOE performance.     

Envy,comparison costs,and the economic theory of the firm

An economic theory of the firm must explain both when firms supplant markets and when markets supplant firms. While theories of when markets fail are well developed, the extant literature provides a less than adequate explanation of why and when hierarchies fail and of actions managers take to mitigate such failure. In this article, we seek to develop a more complete theory of the firm by theorizing about the causes and consequences of organizational failure. Our theory focuses on the concept of social comparison costs that arise through social comparison processes and envy. While transaction costs in the market provide an impetus to move activities inside the boundaries of the firm, we argue that envy and resulting social comparison costs motivate moving activities outside the boundary of the firm. More specifically, our theory provides an explanation for ‘managerial’ diseconomies of both scale and scope—arguments that are independent from traditional measurement, rent seeking, and competency arguments—that provides new insights into the theory of the firm. In our theory, hierarchies fail as they expand in scale because social comparison costs imposed on firms escalate and hinder the capacity of managers to optimally structure incentives and production. Further, hierarchy fails as a firm expands in scope for the simple reason that the costs of differentially structuring compensation within the firm to match the increasing diversity of activities also rises with increasing scope. In addition, we explore how social comparison costs influence the design of the firm through selection of production technologies and compensation structures within the firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

State Ownership, Privatization and Performance in Singapore: An Exploratory Study from a Strategic Management Perspective

This paper considers the ownership debate with regard to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performance, that is, whether superior performance of SOEs can be achieved under state ownership. While the traditional belief has been, supported by empirical work, that private ownership is generally associated with superior performance, the experience of Singapore is a clear example to the contrary. We outline global privatization trends and discuss the impact of privatization programs. We then discuss Singapore Telecom as a case where state ownership combined with several contextual and firm-related factors, especially firm strategy, has led to sustained world-class performance. We develop a theoretical framework for this analysis based on the strategic management field. We lastly outline some theoretical and practical implications of the analysis.     

An empirical study of SOEs' market orientation in transitional China

Using institutional theory, this paper investigates the antecedents and outcomes of market orientation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in transitional China. A survey of 274 SOEs demonstrates a strong positive relationship between market orientation and various measures of organizational performance. Additionally, market competitive pressure, formalized corporate governance, and less government control are found to promote market orientation of SOEs in the transitional period. These results support the views that market orientation leads to better performance and that institutional factors should be considered in studies of strategy in Chinese firms. This paper was supported by NSFC (70472039, 70272023).     

Today's state‐owned enterprises of China: are they dying dinosaurs or dynamic dynamos?

This paper raises the question and provides empirical evidence regarding the status of the evolution of the state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China today. In this study, we compare the SOEs to domestic private‐owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign‐controlled businesses (FCBs) in the context of their organizational cultures. While a new ownership form, many of the POEs evolved from former collectives that reflect the traditional values of Chinese business. Conversely, the FCBs are much more indicative of the large global MNCs. Therefore, we look at the SOEs in the context of these two reference points. We conclude that the SOEs of today have substantially transformed to approximate a configuration desired by the Chinese government when it began the SOE transformation a couple of decades ago to make them globally competitive. The SOEs of today appear to be appropriately described as China's economic dynamic dynamo for the future. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial ownership and the role of privatization in transition economies: The case of China

Within transition economies, a popular tactic for revitalizing large and inefficient stateowned enterprises (SOEs) is to privatize them. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence related to this issue is equivocal. This study, therefore, explores more deeply what the relationship may be between privatization efforts of SOEs and their financial performance in transition economies. Specifically, we seek to better understand whether privatization reforms per se, or other corporate governance mechanisms that complement or substitute for this effort, are most effective. Using a panel sample of Chinese state-owned public firms over an eight year period from 1999 to 2006, we find that managerial ownership has a more significant impact on firm performance than privatization does. This finding suggests that internal incentives to managers may be more effective than external market mechanisms in economies transitioning from centralized planning to market control. Our results are robust using a wide variety of performance measures and different model specifications.     

零售企业规模无边界的理论与实证分析--以沃尔玛为例

企业规模理论在企业战略联盟及企业网络化环境下受到质疑，学术界提出了企业无边界理论．零售企业尤其是沃尔玛的快速扩张又提出了另一种无边界理论。这是两种不同性质的无边界理论。就单个企业的边界来说．生产企业和流通企业存在本质的区别．生产企业的资产专用性和技术跳跃所带来的沉没成本制约了生产企业的规模扩张．而流通企业的资产通用性和技术稳定性使流通企业避免了威廉姆森的企业“复制和有选择性控制的不可能性”命题的局限。本文通过沃尔玛的规模扩张的案例．建立影响企业规模因素的模型并进行实证分析．提出了零售企业规模无边界的命题。     

Business mating: Who chooses and who gets chosen?

What is the interrelation between the characteristics of two firms that form a relationship with each other, especially successful relations? Surprisingly there is little work addressing this issue. This paper reviews and interrelates previous literature on assortative mating among people and animals, the theory of sexual selection that underlies it, and theories of relational balance the complement these. We then apply this to business relation formation and present the results of an analysis of the relations of firm characteristics those involved in customer-supplier relations, using the IMP2 European database. The results indicate that partners in relationships that are performing well have characteristics which are similar and complementary, i.e., effectively combining different attributes into a relationship also matters. Similarities in the business environment faced and market position with respect to innovativeness and technology are consistently important for relationships that perform well. Diverse complementarities across a range of market position factors also characterise relationships that perform well. Overall, the results demonstrate the appropriateness and value of combining theories of assortative mating, sexual selection, and relational balance to explore the characteristics of business relationships.     

人力资本密集型企业研究:一个挑战传统理论的话题

世界经济步入知识经济时代以来,人力资本的重要性已不彰自显。伴随经济形态的变迁,企业形态也发生了巨变,人力资本密集型企业已成为重要的新兴企业形态。本文通过比较人力资本密集型企业与物质资本密集型企业的差异,指出传统企业理论在解释这类新型企业性质时的不足,因此,我们无法站在以往视角上来理解这类新型企业的边界和一体化问题,需要用全新的理论重新审视。此外,人力资本密集型企业的治理问题也具有其独特之处,企业治理目标的重心从解决专用性资产的敲竹杠问题转变为协调企业的各类互补性资源,同时古老的合伙制治理模式在人力资本密集型行业中优势显著。文章最后给出一个简短小结和研究展望。     

企业网络研究综述

现代企业网络研究呈现出多学科交叉、多角度切入的特点。文章对企业网络研究进行了脉络梳理,划分出企业网络研究的四个视角,即基于交易成本理论的资源配置方式,基于资源基础理论的企业战略选择,基于社会网络理论的企业生存方式以及基于多理论整合的价值创造和实现机制。在整理和综述的基础上分析了现有研究存在的问题,并对未来研究进行了展望。     

Online RPM and MFN Under Antitrust Law and Economics

The legal framing of a firm’s pricing strategy can determine whether it constitutes online resale price maintenance (RPM) or online most favored nation (MFN). Together, cases that involve online RPM and MFN can be viewed as a natural experiment of how antitrust economics and law may adapt to an online world. Thus far, legal theories that have been inconsistent with economic theories have dictated enforcement across jurisdictions, which has led to confusion that thwarts potentially efficient business practices. This paper distinguishes issues of online RPM from traditional RPM and online RPM from online MFN. We apply the economics learning to RPM and analyze the antitrust cases of online RPM and MFN to date in the United States, Europe, and Australia. Finally, we offer policy recommendations that reduce the confusion in current legal doctrine.     

Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.