Where are the big bills? Escaping the endogenizer’s dilemma

The continual expansion of rational choice theory to a greater range of social phenomena—from markets to politics and institutions—is a testament to its success. Each further application, however, simultaneously forecloses a potential source of inefficiency in economic systems. Abdicating efficiency considerations impairs economics’ explanatory power as much as its normative relevance. In this paper I explore the interconnected roles of subjectivism and knowledge problems in accounting for inefficiency. I conclude that the knowledge-generating properties of institutions allow for efficiency comparisons, but only in the embrace of a thoroughgoing subjectivism.     

On the efficiency of fair trade

The first part of this paper reviews five major theoretical approaches that describe the fundamental causes of poverty, with particular attention to what these theories imply about government policy towards markets and the need for immediate poverty alleviation. Different causal theories have very different policy implications; it is difficult to recommend specific anti-poverty policies with making assumptions about the nature of economic markets and of individual behavior. The paper ends with comments about how to make these choices, arguing that the greater moral onus one associates with poverty, the more willing one should be to adopt less efficient strategies that do more to raise incomes among the poor. The interconnections between markets and social and political systems—which often disadvantage poor populations—suggests that some market regulations and targeted programs may be necessary to reduce poverty, especially if these can be implemented with minimal corruption and monitored for effectiveness.     

Political markets? Politics and economics in the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets

This paper analyses the relationship between politics and performativity of economics in the emergence of markets for biodiversity offsets. While the role of economics in constructing markets has been demonstrated by sociology and social studies of science, it has also become apparent that politics plays an important role in the material outcome of economic experiments. Two case studies of the creation of markets for biodiversity offsets are analysed, in the United States and England. The findings suggest that the creation of both markets is rooted in the language, concepts and models of economics. Politics, on the other hand, functions as a mediator of the material expression of those models. Through this mediation effect, similar economic models are performed differently, resulting in a variety of markets. This suggests that the material outcomes of processes of market creation are not defined at the outset, but can be influenced by political processes.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

The evolution of debt and equity markets in economic development

Summary. As noted by Gurley and Shaw, there is a typical pattern of economic development in which the evolution of the financial system is an essential aspect of the growth process. We focus on one component of this evolution: the increasing importance of equity markets as an economy grows. We develop a growth model where capital accumulation is financed externally through a combination of debt and equity. We illustrate why equity market activity might grow – often very rapidly – as an economy develops. We also illustrate why access to equity markets may not be needed in the early stages of economic development. Received: December 30, 1997; revised version: May 26, 1998     

Testing of unit roots and other fractionally integrated hypotheses in the presence of structural breaks

Tests of unit roots and other nonstationary hypotheses that were proposed by Robinson (1994) are applied in this article to the Nelson and Plosser's (1982) series. The tests can be expressed in a way allowing for structural breaks under both the null and the alternative hypotheses. When applying the tests to the same dataset as in Perron (1989), we observe that our results might be consistent with those in Perron (1989) when testing the nulls of trend-stationarity or a unit-root. However, we also observe that fractionally integrated hypotheses may be plausible alternatives in the context of structural breaks at a known period of time. Final version received: August 2000/Final version accepted: August 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the European TMR grant No. ERBFMRX-CT-98-0213. Comments of two anonymous referees are also acknowledged.     

Deregulation,innovative entry and structural diversity as a source of stable and rapid economic growth

The importance of free innovative entry (deregulation) for diversity of structure and competition is studied. I demonstrate quantitatively that even with a narrow definition of entry (firms), and given observed entry behavior, successful entrants completely dominate the long-run performance characteristics of the economy. Rapid and stable long-run macro economic growth can only be achieved if innovative competitive entry is vigorous. Free access to markets alone is a necessary condition, with competence a sufficient condition. It is probably wrong to believe that the (ex ante) threat of entry is sufficient for dynamic competition. A growing economy requires a steady showering with optimistic entrants, a few of which turn out ex post to be superior performers. Failing and exiting firms are part of the innovation costs to society for steady and rapid economic growth. The benefits of financial innovations like junk bonds are to reduce barriers to competitive entry to make both successes and failures possible.     

Dynamic comparative advantage: Some implications for trade policy in North America

This paper explores the implications of changing North American trade policies for dynamic comparative advantage and shows, with examples from the energy and high-technology sectors, how a new policy based on interdependence might work. Newly industrializing countries such as Mexico should aim to break into industries with progressively higher technological and value-added components, such as computer manufacturing—industries that are entering a period of expanded demand and going beyond the period of greatest capital intensity. Although few Mexican firms might be expected to enter such oligopolistic markets alone (at least in the short run), they could combine forces with established enterprises abroad in order to permit gradual market penetration. The examples in the paper illustrate the need for a stable macroeconomic framework for policymaking that includes exchange rates, investment incentives, relative price behavior, taxes, intellectual property rights, labor and environmental regulations, capital market policies, harmonization of standards, and other measures. There is also a need for policies that anticipate the potential private and social returns of activities that might be overlooked in a static framework.     

Foundational explorations for a normative theory of political economy

I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.     

The emergence of convergent price clusters in China

This paper reports new evidence on the existence of both large and small price divergent clusters for China's energy markets, 2000–2009. The largest convergent price clusters suggest that the coal and gasoline markets are well integrated, however, small convergent price clusters suggest that electricity and diesel markets are proving harder to integrate. The paper argues that the traditional approach to price convergence analysis should be applied with caution, especially in a transitional economy such as China where questions to be asked should relate to the ‘degree of market‐orientation’ and not simply whether it is a market‐based economy or not.     

Behavioral political economy: A survey

In explaining individual behavior in politics, economists should rely on the same motivational assumptions they use to explain behavior in the market: that is what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, individuals who play the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested, unlike the benevolent despot of traditional welfare economics. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a “benevolent” way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of “behavioral political economy” and considers the scope for further research.     

Economic Justice: Confronting Dilemmas

Abstract:

This article uses a simple economic model to study important issues in debates about distributive justice. What role do non-labor productive assets play? What role does private ownership play? What role does scarcity play? What role do credit and labor markets play? The model is used to address these questions, and in the process explain why even if those who acquire scarce productive assets do so fairly, and in a manner that deserves compensation, there is reason to believe (1) that when people own productive assets privately outcomes will become unfair, and (2) credit and labor markets will aggravate inequities. The article concludes that distributive justice requires compensation commensurate with the economic sacrifices people make and acknowledges important challenges that must be overcome to achieve this.     

THE ROLE OF MICRODATA IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTS*

Microdata sets—samples of data relating to individual reporting units—can provide a valuable extension of the national economic accounts as they presently exist, making it possible to meet many of the criticisms being leveled at the accounts over their failure to include much nontransactions information that is essential to the evaluation of economic and social performance. To serve this purpose, however, the microdata sets must be integrated with the aggregate accounts, and with one another. A microdata sets relating to any given sector should add up (with appropriate weighting) to the economic constructs for that sector in the national accounts, and the microdata set for one sector should be articulated as appropriate with those of other sectors. This paper discusses techniques for constructing such microdata sets, including necessary adjustments of the macro accounts, techniques of alignment of microdata with the macro accounts and the creation and development of synthetic microdata sets. Synthetic matching and other techniques of merging data sets are discussed. The paper concludes with a consideration of the methodological implication of the integration of microdata and national accounts.     

Toward a Political Economy of Markets

In the post-Washington Consensus era, increasing emphasis on private sector-led strategies for economic growth has contributed to the focus of policymakers on entrepreneurship. However, many programs designed to support entrepreneurship are based on an erroneous and biased image of the entrepreneur, with important consequences for development processes and outcomes. Longstanding ideology underlying the entrepreneur as a rugged individual hero shapes not only the masculinist notion of entrepreneurship in most societies, but also the narrow focus and structure of entrepreneurship programs. Microfinance, however, is generally conceptualized as being "different" from other programs, particularly given its informal sector reach and common group lending model. This paper investigates the extent to which microfinance is able to build community, and to sustain individual entrepreneurs' attention to social solidarity economy. Alternative approaches to microfinance, which fundamentally restructure the way it works — specifically considering the issue of community-building — are discussed as a possible "next evolution" of this form of social enterprise.     

经纬度延伸:发展劳动价值论

依据卫兴华教授的《劳动价值论需要创新与发展》一文的结构框架,提出用“经纬度延伸”这一核心思路来解决劳动价值论的矛盾问题。本文认为,传统的关于“商品生产”的劳动价值论是狭隘的,应该经度由生产延伸到流通,纬度由商品延伸到服务,从而形成完整意义上的劳动价值论。在构建了新框架体系基础上,还探讨了其它相关问题,证明根据“经纬度延伸”这一思路能够对劳动价值论中现有的矛盾进行合理的解释。     

Stranded Costs,Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts

Economic Analysis can help resolve the stranded cost controversy that has arisen in debates over electricity market deregulation. "Stranded costs" are costs electric utilities will not recover as power markets move from protected monopolies to an open, competitive environment. We describe the stranded cost problem, its magnitude and the prominent arguments for and against recovery. An economic analysis of implicit contracts can clarify whether there should be a legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for unrecovered costs. However, efficient approaches to electricity deregulation should rely on more than analysis of contracts. The politics of deregulation, as reflected in optimal compensation for regulatory "takings" of property, also affects the desirability of stranded cost recovery.     

Economic Data,Conventions, and Replication in Laboratory Asset Markets

Data extracted from naturally occurring markets and other economic environments often suffer from problems like data confounds and intercorrelations. We report results from a series of experimental markets that suggest some of the data problems can be overcome by using experimental techniques. We use predetermined (videotaped) draws to replicate results from prior research. This is contrary to the conventional wisdom in the literature, which holds that draws should be "live." Our results suggest that the price and allocation behavior of markets can be replicated using predetermined draws to initiate trading. Furthermore, the primary strength of the experimental method-control-is maintained.     

社会资本在农村集体经济改革中的演变与构建

狭义上的社会资本指网络关系、社会规范以及信任程度,中国农村集体经济在这些方面具有不同于西方国家的特点。论文分析了在中国改革开放这一制度变迁的过程中社会资本发生变化的机理及其对农村集体经济的影响。根据理论研究提出应重构农村集体经济社会资本,这对于建设和谐社会、实现经济转型和提高农民收入等具有重意义。政策含义是：培育农村经济中介和社会中介组织,建立发挥合作经济的作用,明确供销社和信用社合作性质,同时,基层政府和社区的互动应该有边界。     

The animal spirits hypothesis and the Benhabib–Farmer condition for indeterminacy

This paper provides a self-contained review of the introduction of the animal spirits hypothesis into the infinite horizon optimal‐growth model. The analysis begins with an economic discussion of Pontryagin's maximum principles. Thereafter, I develop a version of the increasing-returns Benhabib–Farmer model by showing the possible sub-optimality of the central planner solution and deriving the bifurcation condition for indeterminacy. Moreover, I give some insights on how to model intrinsic and extrinsic uncertainty. Finally, analyzing the equilibrium condition of the labor market, I provide an intuitive rationale for the mechanism that in this model might lead prophecies to be self-fulfilling.