The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information

This paper addresses the relationship between competitive equilibria and efficient allocations in an insurance market with asymmetric information. Using the definition of second-best efficiency proposed by Harris and Townsend (1981) for environments characterized by informational assmmetry, the efficiency properties of several proposed market equilibria are examined. We find an analogue to the First Optimality Theorem: A Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium always results in a second best allocation.     

Word-of-mouth reputations in auto insurance markets

A model is developed of the diffusion of information concerning stochastic quality levels of firms under assumptions of highly imperfect consumer knowledge. An equilibrium analysis finds that an increase in the rate of diffusion of information results in a decline in the elasticity of demand with respect to quality. A dynamic analysis indicates, however, that under certain conditions short-term elasticity increases with an increased rate of diffusion of information. The importance of dynamic analysis is underscored by the length of time often required for convergence to the steady state.     

The weak form market efficiency investigation of American,European and Asian stock markets

This paper investigates the empirical validity of the Weak Form Efficient Market Hypothesis for American, European and Asian stock markets. Random Walk Hypothesis is used to prove weak form efficiency in American, European and Asian stock indices. ADF and PP Unit Root Tests have been used to test unit root in time series of daily data of American, European and Asian stock indices. Results show that sample of stock markets are weak-form efficient in terms of the Random Walk Hypothesis.     

在国际工程市场如何选择保险经纪

工程保险的险种、投保程序、保单内容等十分复杂,不仅需要耗费承包商大量的精力,而且不易得到优惠的保险条件和价格。虽然现在很多中国承包商已经意识到保险在工程风险管理中的重要地位,但在保险索赔中仍然会遇到很多困难。本文作者建议承包商采用国际通行的办法,即聘请保险经纪或保险咨询公司做顾问来解决上述问题。     

Paradoxical price effects on insurance markets

In this paper we analyze a paradox phenomenon in certain insurance markets of some countries: in spite of there being strong competition, increasing prices can be found in some submarkets. As a reason for this, we need to note the special distribution of insurance products, a distribution primarily based on intermediaries — and, as a result, there is an increasing part for ‘intermediation’ costs within insurance products' cost structure due to competition for the intermediaries. We build an oligopolistic model assuming that the market is saturated, which is able to explain the overemployment of intermediaries and the high commissions involved. We analyze possible interventions and laws/regulations and suggest that the problem can be solved only with major regulation. Finally, we have come up with an empirical analysis to test the model.     

The relationship between the markets for health insurance and medical malpractice insurance

This article evaluates the interdependence of medical malpractice insurance markets and health insurance markets. Prior research has addressed the performance of these markets, individually, without specifically quantifying the extent to which they are linked. Increasing levels of health insurance losses could increase the scale of potential malpractice claims, boosting medical malpractice losses, or could embody an improvement in medical care quality, which will reduce malpractice losses. Our results for a state panel data set from 2002 to 2009 demonstrate that health insurance losses are negatively related to medical malpractice insurance losses. An additional dollar of health insurance losses is associated with a $0.01–$0.05 reduction in medical malpractice losses. These findings have potentially important implications for assessments of the net cost of health insurance policies.     

Price regulation in insurance markets with asymmetric information

The paper presents and discusses a regulatory policy in insurance markets. It is based upon a two-sided rule: each company must propose at least one contract with full coverage and a ceiling is imposed on the level of premiums.     

Performance of European insurance firms in the single insurance market

The deregulation and liberalization process towards establishing a single European financial market has some important implications for the insurance industries. Due to the increased competition, insurance firms have to adjust their costs and operate efficiently to survive in this new environment. This paper attempts to analyze the cost efficiency and scale economies in the single European insurance market. Considering the ongoing enlargement process of the EU, our sample includes the insurance industries of the major EU‐15, four new members and a candidate country, Turkey, over the period 1995–2005. We use the firm‐level financial data and estimate a stochastic cost frontier that controls for differences in environmental conditions. All insurance systems display significant levels of cost inefficiency. The results further indicate that there are significant economies of scale, particularly for small‐ and medium‐size insurance firms. Finally, the analyses suggest similar results for major EU countries, new members and the candidate.     

Market efficiency in agricultural futures markets

Market efficiency and unbiasedness are tested in four agricultural commodity futures markets - live cattle, hogs, corn, and soybean meal - using cointegration and error correction models with GQARCH-in-mean processes. Results indicate each market is unbiased in the long run, although cattle, hogs and corn futures markets exhibit short-run inefficiencies and pricing biases. Models for cattle and corn outperform futures prices in out-of-sample forecasting. Results also suggest short-run time-varying risk premiums in cattle and hog futures markets.     

Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets

This paper analyzes the equilibrium of an insurance market where applicants for insurance have a duty of good faith when they reveal private information about their risk type. Insurers can, at some cost, verify the type of insureds who file a claim and they are allowed to retroactively void the insurance contract if it is established that the policyholder has misrepresented his risk when the contract was taken out. However, insurers cannot precommit to their risk verification strategy. The paper analyzes the relationship between second-best Pareto-optimality and the insurance market equilibrium in a game theoretic framework. It characterizes the contracts offered at equilibrium, the individuals' contract choice as well as the conditions under which an equilibrium exists.     

Informational efficiency: ranking markets

Summary. The paper studies informational properties of three types of imperfectly competitive markets: a one-signal speculative market (OSS market) in which agents have only private information about the fundamental value (v) of the risky asset traded, a two-signal speculative market (TSS market) in which agents have private information about both v and the asset supply, and a market in which agents are endowed with both information about v and shares of the risky asset traded. In this last market (JA market), agents have joint activities: they trade for both speculative and hedging purposes. It is shown that (i) the JA market and the OSS market are the most and the least efficient, respectively, and (ii) the levels of informational efficiency in the three markets are inversely correlated with the intensities with which traders use their private information about the fundamental value of the asset. Received May 28, 1999; revised version: May 28, 1999     

Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity

We examine equilibria in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection when wealth differences arise endogenously from unobservable savings or labor supply decisions. The endogeneity of wealth implies that high-risk individuals may ceteris paribus exhibit the lower marginal willingness to pay for insurance than low risks, a phenomenon that we refer to as irregular-crossing preferences. In our model, both risk and patience (or productivity) are privately observable. In contrast to the models in the existing literature, where wealth heterogeneity is exogenously assumed, equilibria in our model no longer exhibit a monotone relation between risk and coverage. Individuals who purchase larger coverage are no longer higher risks, a phenomenon frequently observed in empirical studies.     

Adverse selection in health insurance markets? Evidence from state small-group health insurance reforms

The past decade witnessed major changes in state laws governing the sale of health insurance to small employers. States took measures to restrict insurers' ability to distinguish between high and low-risk customers because of concern about the low rate of coverage among workers in small firms, the high prices in the small-group market and the absence of federal health reform. Using both individual-level and employer-level data, I test predictions about the effect of reforms on the employer-provided health insurance market. I estimate these effects for small firms and their workers using large firms and their workers in the same states, as well as large and small firms and their workers in non-reform states, as comparison groups. I find the reforms decreased the rate of employer coverage on average for workers in small firms by less than two percentage points. Within small firms, low-expenditure individuals experienced a larger decline in the rate of coverage through their employer, while the coverage rate of high-expenditure individuals rose slightly in some specifications. There is also evidence that comprehensive reforms increased premiums slightly for small employers, and that most of this increase was passed on to workers through higher employee contributions.     

Economic efficiency and social insurance reforms in China

This study discusses efficiency issues related to social insurance provisions and their implications for the newly established three-pillar pension system and three-tier health insurance system in China. It shows that these new systems can be improved substantially through some restructuring to reduce efficiency losses. The discussion of efficiency consequences focuses on correction for market failure and alternative mechanisms for financing and providing social insurance benefits. Alternative methods for financing the transition are also discussed.     

Choice, price competition and complexity in markets for health insurance

The United States and other nations rely on consumer choice and price competition between competing health plans to allocate resources in the health sector. While a great deal of research has examined the efficiency consequences of adverse selection in health insurance markets, less attention has been devoted to other aspects of consumer choice. The nation of Switzerland offers a unique opportunity to study price competition in health insurance markets. Switzerland regulates health insurance markets with the aim of minimizing adverse selection and encouraging strong price competition. We examine consumer responses to price differences in local markets and the degree of price variation in local markets. Using both survey data and observations on local markets we obtain evidence suggesting that as the number of choices offered to individuals grows, their willingness to switch plans given a set of price dispersion differences declines, which allows large price differences for relatively homogeneous products to persist. We consider explanations for this phenomenon from economics and psychology.     

A model of insurance markets with incomplete information

The paper investigates how a competitive market would allocate insurance policies if firms were not able to determine the riskiness of individual consumers. It is demonstrated that if all firms have static expectations with regard to the policy offers of other firms, no stationary equilibrium may exist. A second equilibrium concept is then introduced which incorporates a different expectation rule. Each firm assumes that any policy will be immediately withdrawn which becomes unprofitable after that firm makes its own policy offer. This equilibrium is shown to exist and some of its welfare properties are investigated.