论经营者主导型的国有企业改制模式

经营者主导型的国有企业改制模式是一种以经营者持大股为主要特征,并以有限责任公司为基本形式的改制模式,经营者主导型的国有企业改制模式与其他改制模式相比,更有利于实现股权多元化,更有利于建立现代企业制度。     

国有改制企业公司治理低效原因探析

我国国有企业公司化改制后经营效率并没有明显提高,其原因主要是：(1)由于股本结构和股权行使方式的不合理,导致公司内部治理结构失衡;(2)我国市场竞争机制不足,法制建设滞后,公司外部治理手段缺乏是改制企业经营效率欠佳的原因之所在。文章最后提出了完善公司治理机制,提高国有改制企业公司治理效率的途径。     

关于国有公路运输企业规范化改制若干问题探讨

当前国有公路运输企业正进入实质性改制阶段 ,总体情况处于一种胶着的状态 ,但深层次改制有些艰难。究其原因 ,是改制没有规范化操作。文章对法人治理结构、企业注册资本和股权设计、经营者持大股、职工身份置换和返聘等规范化操作问题进行了分析     

经济结构战略调整期企业并购融资绩效

以2009-2012年沪深两市发生并购的公司为样本,从融资方式的视角,实证分析了企业各种融资方式与并购绩效的相关性以及相关程度顺序。结果表明:股权融资与并购绩效显著负相关,债务融资、内部融资与并购绩效显著正相关;通过回归系数比较,得到融资方式与并购绩效的相关程度强弱顺序为内部融资、债务融资、股权融资。     

对邯郸部分市属企业改制情况的调查

为进一步规范完善邯郸市国有企业改制工作,我们对不同类型的10户市属企业改制情况进行了入户重点调查。其中9户改制企业,1户未改制企业。9户改制企业的类型分布是,股份有限公司3户,有限责任公司5户,股份合作公司1户;其中基本由内部职工持股的公司7户。同时,对另外15户改制企业发放了调查表。从调查企业改制情况看,主要有以下几点变化:一是改制后实现了产权清晰,理清了企业与政府的关系,彻底改变了企业是政府附属物的地位。初步搭起了现代企业制度的基本框架,在一定程度上调动了经营者和员工的积极性。在15户调查企业中,有8户企业得到了稳步…     

改制上市前后我国国有商业银行效率比较分析

我国国有商业银行改制上市前后效率的变化十分显著.改制能使银行的股权合理分散,建立有效的公司治理架构和完善的金融企业制度,促进科学的经营决策.上市有利于引进战略投资者,增强资源配王能力,井形成对银行的外部压力.完善资本结构和治理结构,转变发展模式和增长方式,改进内部控制机制和风险防御能力,是改制上市银行提高效率的根本举措.     

乡镇企业产权制度改革模式与股权结构的研究

本文通过 30家样本企业实地调查所掌握的材料 ,实证分析了苏南乡镇企业改制的过程、措施和实际效果 ,并运用产权理论和企业组织理论 ,对乡镇企业的改制模式和改制中普遍遵循的两大原则“经营者持大股”和“集体股权退出越多越好”进行了理论上的探讨。文章认为 ,股份合作制财产组织上的制度缺陷是乡镇企业改制中放弃股份合作制而采取公司制的原因 ;经营者持大股的股权结构 ,不仅可以在产权理论上得到支持 ,而且实践也证明其是有效的。经营者持大股所要解决的问题 ,一是建立有效的经营者选拔机制 ,二是形成比较完善的经营者退出机制 ,做到优胜劣汰。地方政府在改制中出于成本和收益的比较 ,对改制采取了支持的态度 ,满足了乡镇企业进一步发展的需要。     

我国企业家股权激励制度的改进研究

<正> 一、企业家股权激励计划和模式分析 企业家股权激励是指在某一特定时间内,企业以某种约定的方式使企业的经营管理者得到一定数量和一定形式的企业股份,促使其从“雇佣劳动者”向“雇佣劳动者+所有者”发生角色位移。由于企业家股权激励制度能够较好地把企业经营者个人利益和企业利益“捆”在一起,并往往使之成为具有剩余索取权的股东,一荣俱荣,一损俱损,从而激发企业经营者努力提升企业长期价值来增加自己财富的积极性和创造性,带来企业与经营者双赢局面。企业家股权激励制度的实质是以个人角色位移和长远利益约束经营者的短期行     

政府角色定位与企业改制的成败

由产权不清和政府寻租导致的企业家努力水平低下是造成乡镇企业经营困难的根本原因 ,企业改制是解决这一问题的主要手段。但是 ,如果改制仅仅局限于所有权易手 ,不去触动地方政府事后寻租的权力基础 ,不形成对产权的有效保护 ,那么考虑到政府的事后寻租 ,企业家仍然不会提供高水平的努力。只有进行政府机构改革 ,使企业家确立政府不会事后寻租的信念 ,企业家的激励问题才能真正得到解决。本文通过构造一个两阶段不完全博弈信号传递模型 ,解释了造成改制后地区间经济绩效差异的原因 ,阐明了机构改革是政府传递改制决心、企业家识别政府类型的关键信号。而是否进行政府机构改革则决定了改制的成败     

改制企业产权结构研究

建立现代企业制度是国有企业改革的方向,"明晰产权"是改制的核心.按照De Alessi的定义:"产权是人们拥有的对资源的用途、收入和可让渡性的权利."产权决定了所有者承受的结果、影响他们的选择和资源的用途.明晰的产权不仅指产权关系的明确,而且还意味着建立合理的产权结构.所谓产权结构是指产权所有者及其相互关系.它有两层含义:第一,谁是产权所有者;第二,在占有产权的基础上,所有者之间结成什么样的关系.不同的产权结构将产生不同的激励机制,影响企业资源配置的效率.     

Block trades and the benefits of control in Slovenia1

Ownership and control have been concentrating in most transition countries. The consolidation of control introduces changes in the power distribution within privatized firms and, most importantly, redirects the corporate governance problem to a conflict between large and small shareholders. In this study, we evaluate the ownership changes in Slovenian privatized firms through an analysis of stock price reactions to the entrance of a new blockholder (the shared benefits of control) and through an estimation of the premiums paid for large blocks (the private benefits of control). We provide evidence of and discuss the reasons for the failures of the privatization investment funds in implementing control over firm managers and in promoting the restructuring of firms in the first post‐privatization years.     

国有企业改制对就业的影响——来自11个城市的证据

在20世纪90年代中后期,中国工业企业的就业规模大幅度下降,许多人认为,企业改制是其主要原因。本文通过对11个城市386家企业从1995年到2001年的面板数据的研究,评估了企业改制对就业的影响。我们的面板数据回归结果显示,和一般印象相反,改制显著地减缓了就业的下降趋势。我们还发现,改制对企业的就业增长有持续的和递增的积极作用。即使在控制了企业的绩效、就业条件、资产结构以及改制前就业历史之后,我们仍然得到相同的结论。另外,我们还使用了倾向分值匹配基础上的差分内差分方法对我们的结果进行了验证,也得到了相似的结论。     

The choice of ownership structure: Evidence from Russian mass privatization

We use a large data set of Russian manufacturing firms to describe the ownership structure in the Russian industry at the end of the mass privatization program in 1994 and its subsequent evolution. The data shows a high, but gradually decreasing ownership stakes of firm insiders (managers and workers). We estimate the effect of a wide range of firm characteristics on the decision to privatize, the initial ownership structure after privatization, and on subsequent changes of ownership stakes. We test and find support for several predictions of the model by Aghion and Blanchard (1998). For example, collusion among workers makes them more reluctant to sell shares to outsiders. Firms in financial distress show a higher incidence of insiders selecting the option of privatization leading to high insider ownership. This can be explained by their desire to insure against unemployment in the case of restructuring by outsiders. No evidence is found of a sequencing in privatization according to the performance of firms before privatization. A methodological novelty of this paper is the application of a tobit model with sample selection to the choice of ownership stakes.     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Priorities and sequencing in privatization: Evidence from Czech firm panel data

While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.     

POLITICAL SELECTION OF FIRMS INTO PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS. EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIAN COMPREHENSIVE DATA

Exploiting a unique institutional feature of early Romanian privatization, when a group of firms was explicitly barred from privatization and another was partially privatized by management–employee buyouts, we test how politicians select firms into privatization programs. Using comprehensive firm data, we estimate the relation between preprivatization firm characteristics – the information known to politicians at the time of decision‐making – and the effect of privatization on employment, efficiency, and wages. With the estimated coefficients we simulate the effect of privatization on non‐privatizable and privatizable firms. We find that politicians expected privatization to increase employment in the privatizable group by 7%–10%, while to decrease it in the non‐privatizable group by 10%–30%, depending on the first‐stage estimation method, ordinary least squares with or without matching. We do not find such discrepancies in the expected change in firm efficiency; the simulated efficiency effect of privatization is large and positive for both groups of firms, and it is 52%–65% for non‐privatizable and 41%–43% for privatizable firms. The analysis does not support the hypothesis that wages played an important role in privatization decisions. Our study suggests that employment concerns played the key role in selecting firms for privatization, even if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed.     

PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: TECHNOLOGY AND GENDER IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This paper examines the impact of privatization on gender discrimination in China across firms with different technology intensities. Using a comprehensive firm‐level survey, the paper identifies gender wage‐productivity differentials by directly estimating the relative productivity levels of workers from the production function of firms. The panel structure of the survey is taken advantage of by following firms that were fully state‐owned in the initial year, and distinguishing them from firms that were later privatized. The main results show that privatization was associated with an increase in relative productivity of female workers in high technology industries, and a reduction in relative productivity of female workers in low technology industries. Time varying coefficient results suggest that the improvements in gender outcomes in high technology industries may not be maintained in the long run as the relative wage and productivity ratios tend to deteriorate, potentially due to low supply of highly educated female workers. At the same time, outcomes in privatized low technology industries increase over time, lowering the wage and productivity gaps between male and female workers. (JEL J16, J31, P20)     

Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy

This paper investigates how the presence of foreign investors in privatized firms affects privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly. We find that an increase in the stockholding ratio of foreign investors in a privatized firm increases the optimal degree of privatization, whereas an increase in the penetration of foreign firms in product markets reduces it. These results imply that the degree of openness of financial markets and that of product markets have contrasting implications for the optimal privatization policy.     

PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCES IN SLOVENIA

ABSTRACT*: Slovenia has not avoided disputes over privatization: two major concepts competed. The controversies between them resulted in a compromise, and the Law on the Transformation of Social Ownership encompassed features of both: decentralization and a gradual approach from one, and predominantly distributive privatization by ownership certificates to all citizens from the other. Insiders (workers and managers) retained majority ownership of most privatized companies by bringing their certificates to their 'own' company. Slovenia has thus encouraged a continuation of self-management. Ownership by insiders has advantages over transfer of ownership rights to formally private institutions established by the state. Actual development confirms that a normal macroeconomic framework, hardening of the soft-budget constraint, independence of companies, and managers' loyalty matter more than formal property links.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.