Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock‐in?

This paper demonstrates that the equilibrium impact of capital gains taxes reflects both the capitalization effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease demand) and the lock‐in effect (i.e., capital gains taxes decrease supply). Depending on time periods and stock characteristics, either effect may dominate. Using the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 as our event, we find evidence supporting a dominant capitalization effect in the week following news that sharply increased the probability of a reduction in the capital gains tax rate and a dominant lock‐in effect in the week after the rate reduction became effective.     

Asymmetric news responses of high‐frequency and non‐high‐frequency traders

Using NASDAQ trade and Reuters news data, I show that the response of aggressive non‐high‐frequency traders (nHFTs) to news is stronger than that of aggressive high‐frequency traders (HFTs). Classifying news into quantitative (“hard”) and less quantitative (“softer”) news, the trading response of aggressive nHFTs to softer news exceeds HFTs’ response. Positive news elicits greater return and nHFT responses than negative news during the 2008 financial crisis period. As this phenomenon persists even after excluding the 2008 short‐sale ban, the results support the hypothesis of nHFTs exhibiting stronger asymmetric responses during crisis periods.     

An Information‐Based Theory of Time‐Varying Liquidity

We propose an information‐based theory to explain time variation in liquidity and link it to a variety of patterns in asset markets. In “normal times,” the market is fully liquid and gains from trade are realized immediately. However, the equilibrium also involves periods during which liquidity “dries up,” which leads to endogenous liquidation costs. Traders correctly anticipate such costs, which reduces their willingness to pay. This foresight leads to a novel feedback effect between prices and market liquidity, which are jointly determined in equilibrium. The model also predicts that contagious sell‐offs can occur after sufficiently bad news.     

Conditional conservatism and cost of capital

We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. Conditional conservatism imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition of economic gains than economic losses, resulting in earnings that reflect losses faster than gains. This asymmetric reporting of gains and losses is predicted to lower firm cost of equity capital by increasing bad news reporting precision, thereby reducing information uncertainty (Guay and Verrecchia 2007) and the volatility of future stock prices (Suijs 2008). Using standard asset-pricing tests, we find a significant negative relation between conditional conservatism and excess average stock returns over the period 1975–2003. This evidence is corroborated by further tests on the association between conditional conservatism and measures of implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ forecasts.     

Inflation,Taxation, and Interest Rates

This paper demonstrates that the response of nominal interest rates to changes in inflationary expectations should lie between that predicted by the “Fisher” and “Darby” effects. The exact nature of the response will depend on the relative size of the income and capital gains tax rates, and the relative size of the derivatives of investment and savings to their respective after-tax real rates. The other major conclusion of this paper is that capital gains taxation offsets the negative effect on investment produced by treating depreciation on a historic rather than a replacement cost basis.     

Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?

Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.     

Media heterogeneity and post‐earnings announcement drift: evidence from China

This paper examines how the Chinese stock market acts differently towards state‐controlled and market‐oriented media coverage. Using a setting of post‐earnings announcement drift, we find that information from state‐controlled media enters the stock price in a timelier manner, while the message from market‐oriented media needs more time to get a response from investors. The effect is also influenced by whether the type of news coverage is good or bad. Our findings suggest that the capital market underreacts when good news is reported by the market‐oriented media.     

Safety‐Net Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions

This paper evaluates the redistribution of gains surrounding regulatory relaxations in 1996 and 1997 and ultimate passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act (FSMA) of 1999. Gains in financial institution stocks may come from projected increases in efficiency, increases in the bargaining power of financial institutions, or greater access to the federal safety net. For customers seeking improved access to capital markets, gains in efficiency should result in increased benefits, but increases in bank bargaining power could increase funding costs and/or decrease capital market access. Customers may also lose as taxpayers who support the federal safety net. This paper finds evidence of potential taxpayer losses and increased bank bargaining power, especially vis‐à‐vis credit‐constrained customers for whom safety‐net subsidies are unlikely to be shifted forward. The stock prices of credit‐constrained customers declined during FSMA event windows and in event windows associated with regulatory relaxations.     

Short-term overreaction to specific events: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates the short-term overreaction to specific events and whether stock prices are predictable in the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX). We find evidence of the short-term overreaction in the EGX. Losers (“bad news” portfolios) significantly outperform winners (“good news” portfolios) and investors can earn abnormal return by selling the winners and buying losers. Terrorist attacks have negative and significant abnormal returns for three days post event followed by price reversals on day four post event. Whereas, the tensions in the Middle East region have a negative and significant abnormal returns on event day followed by price reversals on day one post event. Moreover, the formation of a new government has no effect on the average abnormal returns post event in the EGX. The results also show that small firms tend to have greater price reversals compared to large firms. Overall, our results provide evidence of the leakage of information in the EGX.     

Why effective spreads on NASDAQ were higher than on the New York stock exchange in the 1990s

Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain why spreads on NASDAQ were substantially higher than those on the NYSE in the 1990s: “collusion” and “preferencing and payment for order flow.” We present data on all actively traded stocks in these markets of relative effective spreads (RES), aggregated monthly over 1987–1999 and advance a third hypothesis: NASDAQ “SOES-day-trading.” We estimate NASDAQ and NYSE informed-trade losses and gains to market makers and other liquidity providers on six trade sizes, and find that losses on trades we ascribe to SOES day traders were substantially greater than those on other trades, offset somewhat by gains from small-trade-size investors. NASDAQ market makers' response to these losses and additional operations costs incurred to reduce the losses resulted in greater RES and increased trading within the best quotes, predominantly on larger trade sizes. The data are consistent with the “SOES-day-trading” hypotheses, but not with the other two. Furthermore, the mandatory SOES “experiment” provides insights into the negative effects of automated trading systems (such as ECNs, which now dominate NASDAQ) when their design does not adequately consider opportunistic traders.     

High Idiosyncratic Volatility and Low Returns: A Prospect Theory Explanation

The well‐documented negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is puzzling if investors are risk‐averse. However, under prospect theory, while investors are risk‐averse in the domain of gains, they exhibit risk‐seeking behavior in the domain of losses. Consistent with risk‐seeking investors’ preference for high‐volatility stocks in the loss domain, we find that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is concentrated in stocks with unrealized capital losses, but is nonexistent in stocks with unrealized capital gains. This finding is robust to control for short‐term return reversals and maximum daily return, among other variables.     

Capital Inflows and the U.S. Housing Boom

We estimate an open‐economy vector autoregressive (VAR) model to study the effect of capital‐inflow shocks on the U.S. housing market. We look at different external shocks that generate capital inflows to the U.S., in particular “saving‐glut” shocks and foreign monetary‐policy expansions. The shocks are identified with theoretically robust sign restrictions derived from an open‐economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Our findings suggest that capital inflows that result from “saving‐glut” shocks have a positive and persistent effect on real house prices and real residential investment.     

News and Business Cycles in Open Economies

We study the effects of news about future total factor productivity (TFP) in a small open economy. We show that an open‐economy version of the neoclassical model produces a recession in response to good news about future TFP. We propose an open‐economy model that generates comovement in response to TFP news. The key elements of our model are a weak short‐run wealth effect on the labor supply and adjustment costs to labor and investment. We show that our model also generates comovement in response to news about future investment‐specific technical change and to “sudden stops.”     

Stock Returns and Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements

Recent studies document stock price underreactions and overreactions. This evidence is extended by studying open-market stock repurchase announcements. Repurchase announcements were chosen for the study because of the uncertainty regarding the appropriate interpretation of the repurchase announcement. Cross-section regression models are used to test the relation between the reaction to the repurchase announcement and returns in subsequent periods. The results indicate that the market overreacts to repurchase announcements that are deemed to be “good news” by the market. Neither reversal nor drift is observed following repurchase announcements considered to be “bad news” by the market. The results are robust and are not driven by a few influential observations, beta shifts, or bid-ask bounce.     

Abnormal investor response to the index effect for daily and intraday data

Events that directly affect stock indices are of considerable importance to various index instruments such as ETFs and index funds. One of the most important of such events involves updating the index, which takes place once or twice per year. The effect this has on the capital markets is known as the “index effect”, and it is one of the strongest and most influential long-term effects. Using two different methods, I examine how the index effect impacts the Israeli capital markets. I examine the three leading market indices—the Tel-Aviv 25, the Tel-Aviv 75, and the Tel-Tech 15—for firms whose stocks enter and exit their respective index for both daily and intraday data. In the first examination, I divide the sample based on firms entering/exiting each of these three market indices and examine the index effect using daily data. This analysis shows that the market responds differently for firms entering and exiting the Tel-Aviv 25 than it does for the two other indices. For the second examination, the sample is divided based on each stock’s volatility during the period prior to the event using intraday data. This analysis shows that more volatile stocks respond more strongly to the indexing event.     

Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and “Super Poison Put” Bond Covenants

Ten percent of the investment-grade industrial bonds that were associated with major capital restructurings between 1983 and 1988 had already been downgraded to speculative grade as of August 1989. In response to these downgrades, and the corresponding wealth losses for bondholders, over 40 percent of recently issued investment-grade industrial bonds are protected from this type of “event risk” by virtue of specialized covenants. These event-risk convenants may have initially reduced interest costs for borrowers by roughly 20 to 30 basis points. However, the magnitude of the effect appears to have declined along with the general decline in corporate restructurings.     

Lessons from the Financial Crisis on Risk and Capital Management: The Case of Insurance Companies

This article proposes that risk management be viewed as an integral part of the corporate value‐creation process— one in which the concept of economic capital can provide companies with the financial cushion and confidence to carry out their strategic plans. Using the case of insurance and reinsurance companies, the authors discuss three main ways that the integration of risk and capital management creates value:

• 1 strengthening solvency (by limiting the probability of financial distress);
• 2 increasing prospects for profitable growth (by preserving access to capital during post‐loss periods); and
• 3 improving transparency (by increasing the “information content” or “signaling power” of reported earnings).

Insurers can manage solvency risk by using Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) models to limit the probability of financial distress to levels consistent with the firm's specified risk tolerance. While ERM models are effective in managing “known” risks, we discuss three practices widely used in the insurance industry to manage “unknown” and “unknowable” risks using the logic of real options—slack, mutualization, and incomplete contracts. Second, risk management can create value by securing sources of capital that, like contingent capital, can be used to fund profitable growth opportunities that tend to arise in periods following large losses. Finally, the authors argue that risk management can raise the confidence of investors in their estimates of future growth by removing the “noise” in earnings that comes from bearing non‐core risks, thereby making current earnings a more reliable guide to future earnings. In support of this possibility, the authors provide evidence showing that, for a given level of reported return on equity (ROE), (re)insurers with more stable ROEs have higher price‐to‐book ratios, suggesting investors' willingness to pay a premium for the stability provided by risk management.     

Global systemically important banks regulation: Blessing or curse?

Do market participants believe that recent regulations will curb moral hazard at global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)? We analyze market returns to three events: the 2011 designation of certain banks as G-SIBs, the November 2014 identification of banks subject to additional capital surcharges, and the November 2015 announcement of Total Loss Absorption Capacity (TLAC) requirements. We find that reaction to the “designation event” fits the profit-based-reaction hypothesis, reaction to the “additional capital surcharges event” fits the regulatory burden hypothesis, and reaction to the “TLAC event” fits the irrelevance hypothesis. Weaker banks benefited more from being designated as G-SIBs, while EU banks suffered more from the additional capital surcharges.     

The Effects of Liquidity Shocks on Corporate Investments and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Actuarial Pension Gains/Losses

This paper investigates how anticipated liquidity shocks affect corporate investment and cash holdings by examining the impacts of actuarial pension gains/losses that do not reduce current internal resources but will reduce those available in the future. Using a sample from Japanese manufacturing firms in which pension deficits had a huge impact on the internal resources of sponsoring firms, I show that pension losses significantly decrease the capital expenditures of sponsoring firms. Pension losses also increase corporate cash holdings, suggesting precautionary demands for cash prepared for future pension contributions. Overall, the results indicate that managers consider anticipated liquidity shocks in determining current investment and cash‐saving policies.     

How Did the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?

We test the hypothesis that the 2003 dividend tax cut boosted US stock prices and thereby lowered the cost of equity capital. Using an event‐study methodology, we attempt to identify an aggregate stock market effect by comparing the behavior of US common stock prices with that of foreign equities and the equities of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We also examine the relative cross‐sectional response of prices of high‐ and low‐dividend‐paying stocks. We do not find any imprint of the dividend tax cut news on the value of the aggregate US stock market. On the other hand, high‐dividend stocks outperformed low‐dividend stocks by a few percentage points over the event windows, suggesting that the tax cut may have induced asset reallocation within equity portfolios. Finally, the positive abnormal return on nondividend paying US stocks in 2003 does not appear to be tied to tax cut news.