Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy

Brennan and Hamlin [(2002) Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299–311] noted that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch.     

A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan

James Buchanan advocated the market mechanism for allocating resources because it is based on voluntary exchange. People engage in market transactions only when they believe they benefit from doing so. Buchanan depicted the political process the same way. People engage in collective activities to accomplish together ends that they would be unable to accomplish individually, or through bilateral exchange. Buchanan’s vision of politics as exchange is a normative framework for evaluating the rules within which political activity takes place. Rules that meet the criterion of agreement are desirable constitutional rules, and Buchanan recognized that not all government activity satisfies that criterion. Buchanan is the father of the subdiscipline of constitutional political economy, and his “politics as exchange” approach provides the foundation for much work in that area. Buchanan has created a foundation that is rich in ideas, but leaves behind a number of unanswered questions that point the way toward a further development of the research program in constitutional political economy.     

Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment

We implement the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the laboratory. Our design allows analyzing the effects of risk and social preferences behind the veil of ignorance. Behind the veil of ignorance subjects choose more equal distributions than in front of the veil, but only a minority acts according to maximin preferences. Many subjects prefer more equal allocations not only for insurance purposes but also due to impartial social preferences for equality. Our results imply that behind the veil of ignorance maximin preferences are compatible with any degree of risk aversion if impartial social preferences for equality are sufficiently strong.     

The political sustainability of a basic income scheme and social health insurance

This paper studies within a two‐stage framework the political economy of a basic income (BI) and social health insurance (SHI) scheme. At the constitutional stage, individuals decide whether these schemes are implemented behind a veil of ignorance about their future income and risk type. This decision is made in anticipation of the outcome at the second stage in which individuals vote on the payroll tax to finance a BI and the contribution rate of a SHI scheme provided these schemes have been implemented. Depending on the amount of healthcare expenditure and the inequalities in income and risk, only a social health insurance scheme is implemented at the constitutional stage.     

The Distributional Impact of Public Goods Provision: A Veil of Ignorance Approach

The "veil of ignorance" approach is used to consider the redistribution implied by different tax-benefit systems. Assuming a (hypothetical) ex-ante situation in which individuals lack any knowledge about their future income, redistribution from rich to poor can be seen as a form of insurance. Taking redistribution and insurance as synonymous, the analysis derives cases of redistributionally neutral systems of taxation and public good provision.
JEL classification : H 23; D 30;, H 41     

Rawls,rules and objectives: A critique of the two principles of justice

John Rawls has made two large claims for the two principles of justice: that they are what everyman would choose behind the veil of ignorance as the foundation for laws and institutions, and that they are the rock bottom requirement for the stability of political liberalism. I argue here that these claims are altogether unsubstantiated. The two principles are more like a social welfare function than like what we ordinary think of as justice. They are a false social welfare function in the sense that everyman would not choose them behind the veil of ignorance. Their connection with the stability of liberal democratic government is tenuous at best. Stability is dependent on the entire corpus of rules by which a society is guided, rules that are no more identifiable behind the veil of ignorance than when the veil is lifted. There no basis for supposing that the appropriate rules can be derived from the two principles of justice, and there is some question as to whether they can be derived from any well-specified social welfare function. What remains valid in the two principles was recognized long before the two principles were enunciated. The exaggeration of common ideas in the two principles is not enlightening.     

The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled

A central assumption of constitutional economics is that in the process of constitutional decisionmaking the players' uncertainty about their post-constitutional positions (veil of uncertainty) serves the useful purpose of making unanimity and fairness at the constitutional level more rather than less probable. The paper argues that this assertion is false if the conventional assumption holds true that social contracts are threatened by a prisoners' dilemma incentive structure. By means of a simple two-person game-model it is shown that, if players are fully aware of all their partial interests, agreement on a Pareto-efficient rule will be the iterated dominance equilibrium of the game played at the constitutional level. A veil of uncertainty cannot do better. It may, however, induce disagreement or discrimination, if the prisoners' dilemma violates the cardinal property often assumed. This raises the question why the choice of rules which typically takes place in full knowledge of the players' post-constitutional positions poses so many problems although, from a theoretical point of view, unanimity seems so easy to achieve. Finally, it is examined, if there is any salutary role the veil of uncertainty is able to play in view of a post-constitutional prisoners' dilemma.     

Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited

Buchanan and Tullock's original trade-off model of constitutional design is used to analyze how constitutional design affects post-constitutional rent seeking, and, in turn, how the anticipation of post-constitution rent seeking should lead to modification of constitutional design — specifically with respect to imposing and maintaining effective (composite) supermajority decision rules.     

Constitutional Economics--Constitutional Politics

Why does the treatment of American constitutional politics presented in We the People depart so radically from models of constitutional deliberation developed in the type of constitutional economics pioneered by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock? The paper defines three premises that account for the divergence, and concludes by proposing an inquiry into constitutional design that requires insights from both traditions.     

Explaining constitution-makers’ preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States

This article is concerned with the effects of the kinds of framers involved in constitution-making on the content of constitutional provisions proposed during the drafting process. It tests the hypotheses that predict framers’ constitutional preferences on the basis of their institutional position, partisan background and constitutional expertise with two specific cases: the Constitutional Assembly of Estonia (1991–1992) and the Federal Convention (1787) of the United States. The case studies show that most of the hypotheses find only partial confirmation in both instances of constitution-making. The institutional position of a framer (being a member of existing legislature or executive) and constitutional expertise does not necessarily influence his or her constitutional preferences in the predicted way. The only theoretical proposition that is corroborated in both cases concerns the importance of group interest in a constitutional choice of electoral system and modes of representation: in the Estonian case, the design of the constitutional electoral rules was strongly influenced by partisan interest; in the US case, the interests of territorial subunits played a major role.     

Constraining Leviathan

This article commemorates James M. Buchanan and his contributions to public choice and constitutional political economy. It focuses on what Buchanan had to say about constraining the State, or as he often referred to it, Leviathan. It concentrates on a handful of his major works that I think capture important elements of his thinking. It discusses Buchanan’s writings on public debt and government deficits; the size of the state; federalism; and taxation, among other things. It is argued that the main emphasis in Buchanan’s work as it pertained to constraining the State was to include provisions in the constitution that could achieve this end. These included a balanced budget amendment, rules governing the expansion of the money supply, constraints on the types of taxes that could be levied, linking expenditure proposals to the taxes that would finance them, earmarked taxes, and a generality principle, which would avoid a majority coalition’s exploitation of a minority. The article also includes a discussion of the current constitutional crisis in the United States.     

A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls's Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications

The purpose of this paper is to provide a reinterpretation of the maximin principle in Rawls's theory of justice. As we discuss the issue of social justice, we differentiate the point in time at which rectifying practices are discussed and the time intervals in which these practices are implemented; we explore the information content for people behind the veil of ignorance; and we distinguish the means and ends for social justice. With these points clarified, we interpret the veil of ignorance in Rawls's theory as a form of Knightian uncertainty, and show that Rawls's maximin criterion would be chosen by rational individuals behind the veil of ignorance.     

James M. Buchanan’s contractarianism and modern liberalism

This paper contrasts Buchanan’s contractarian–constitutional liberalism with Hayek’s evolutionary liberalism and Rothbards free-market liberalism as representative branches of the classical liberal tradition. While Hayek and Rothbard focus on individual liberty as private autonomy, Buchanan posits that individual sovereignty should be recognized as the fundamental normative premise of liberalism. He insists that a consistent application of this premise requires liberals to respect individuals as sovereigns not only in their capacity as private law subjects but also at the constitutional level of choice where, as sovereign citizens, they choose, jointly with their fellow citizens, the rules under which they wish to live. It is argued that by supplementing the notion of individual liberty as private autonomy with the concept of individual sovereignty in constitutional matters Buchanan lays the theoretical foundation for complementing the well-developed liberal theory of the market with a consistent liberal theory of democracy.     

Social contracts for real moral agents: a synthesis of public reason and public choice approaches to constitutional design

Citizens in contemporary democratic societies disagree deeply about the nature of the good life, and they disagree just as profoundly about justice. In building a social contract theory for diverse citizens, then, we cannot rely as heavily on the theory of justice as John Rawls did. I contend that Rawlsian liberals should instead focus on developing an account of constitutional choice that does not depend on agreement about justice. I develop such an account by drawing on the contractarian approach to constitutional choice pioneered by public choice theorists, especially James Buchanan. With some modifications, public choice can help identify mutually justifiable constitutional rules based on the extent to which these constitutional rules produce appropriate laws under normal conditions. This new, synthetic approach to constitutional choice also helps to explain the moral significance of contractarian agreement for the public choice theorist.     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

Natura naturans,natura naturata

In this paper, which is concerned with philosophical methodology as it might affect social science and ethics, the endeavor is to explore the depth and implications of Buchanan’s interest in Spinoza. After establishing their connection, the paper explores the parallels between Spinoza’s “dualism” and Buchanan’s own dualism and how that can shed light on Buchanan’s distinction between constitutional and operational modalities. Given their analogous perspectives, the paper then considers the possibility of dimensional shifts in the dualism, such that what was once a constitutional perspective becomes operational and how that ability to shift might affect various research agendas in the social sciences and ethics. Finally, we raise the question of how separate are the two levels and can they be brought together. In a Spinozistic framework, they ultimately would collapse into a monism, but the conclusion here is that for Buchanan there must always be a gap between them. As a result, the effort to resolve the tension between the dimensions may signal future research agendas in ethics and political economy.     

We start from here

As James Buchanan often asserted, in constitutional design “we start from here” which is to say we design a constitution to fit the institutions, social practices and so forth that we already have. Comparison of the complicated case of the US constitution and the failed attempt at constitutionalism in contemporary Egypt suggest that many societies are not yet ready for serious constitutional design. The English civil wars were about religion; the US constitution ignores religion and thereby avoids the grim conflict of church and state.     

An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules

Buchanan and Tullok (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962) argued that the optimal k-majority rule should minimize the sum of external costs and decision costs. Dougherty et al. (Public Choice, 163(1–2):31–52, 2015) formalized their approach using various groups of voters. In this study, we analyze the optimal k-majority rule in terms of expected utility and compare our results to Dougherty et al. (2015), which focuses on costs alone. Specifically, we replace Buchanan and Tullock’s external cost function with an external utility function that accounts for both the benefits and costs of enacting proposals. We find that analyzing k-majority rules in terms of utility, rather than costs, affects the optima. Furthermore, in terms of utility, the optimal k-majority rule can vary depending on the group one expects to be in during a vote. With some interesting exceptions, individuals from groups that favor the proposal often find small k-majority rules optimal. Individuals from groups that oppose the proposal often find large k-majority rules optimal.