Indra-Industry Trade,Endogenous Technical Change,Wage Inequality and Welfare

By using alternative intra-industry trade models (1. New goods cannot be introduced into the economy; 2. The possibility for a set of capital goods available in the economy to vary; the models consider the existence of intersectoral linkages), I show by means of Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) analysis that trade rises wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers; but the impact on wage inequality is far larger, when countries are assumed to exchange differentiated capital goods. The latter result has been obtained by using an imperfect competitive model, which embodies a sector bias technological change that arises from trade. In addition, the gains from trade, insignificant under the standard trade hypotheses, are extraordinarily large when endogenous technological change is taken into account. The main policy conclusion is that if policy makers of flexible wage economies introduce trade barriers to reduce wage inequality, these protective measures, by affecting the diffusion of technology, would cause a large welfare loss. [D58, f12, F43, J3, O3]     

Trade agreements,domestic environmental regulation,and transboundary pollution

This paper investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries that takes the distortion arising from their non-coordinated environmental policies into consideration. In a reciprocal-markets model with bidirectional transboundary pollution, we find that if the transboundary pollution is sufficiently strong, the second-best trade agreement requires that both countries subsidize the imported goods whose consumption gives rise to pollution. We also find that a bilateral tariff reduction is beneficial to the global environment.     

The Welfare Effects of Environmental Taxation

Recent literature has investigated whether the welfare gains from environmental taxation are larger or smaller in a second-best setting than in a first-best setting. This question has mainly been addressed indirectly, by asking whether the second-best optimal environmental tax is higher or lower than the first-best Pigouvian rate. Even this indirect question has itself been approached indirectly, comparing the second-best optimal environmental tax to a proxy for its first-best value, marginal social damage (MSD). On closer examination, however, MSD becomes ambiguously defined and variable in a second-best setting making it an unreliable proxy for the Pigouvian rate. Given these observations, the current analysis reevaluates these welfare questions and finds that when compared directly to its first-best value, the second-best optimal environmental tax generally rises with increased revenue requirements. Even in cases where the second-best environmental tax is lower than its first-best value, the welfare gains may be greater than in a first-best setting. These results suggest that the marginal fiscal benefit (revenue recycling effect) exceeds the marginal fiscal cost (tax base effect) over a range of environmental tax rates that, for benchmark models, extends above the first-best Pigouvian rate. These findings reinforce the intuition that environmental policy complements rather than competes with the provision of other public goods.     

Time-consistent protection with learning by doing

Can a government induce efficiency gains in his domestic industry by protecting it against foreign competition? Would such trade protection be time consistent? The present paper builds a dynamic equilibrium model that accounts for learning-by-doing effects that link firms’ strategies over time. The model shows that the existence of dynamic economies of scale suffices to overcome the traditional government's lack of commitment of its tariff policy. This paper compares the infinite horizon Markov perfect equilibrium of this game with the dynamic equilibrium under commitment as well as the static Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium strategies are derived in closed form by solving a linear-quadratic differential game. Optimal trade policy involves higher tariff levels than in the static setup in order to account for future gains in efficiency. Under reasonable assumptions, the unique stable MPE is characterized by a domestic price and tariff that decrease as experience accumulates, thus supporting the future liberalization of trade as an equilibrium feature of this dynamic game.     

International Integration and Growth: A Further Investigation on Developing Countries

The paper examines empirically the linkages between international integration and economic growth in a panel of 47 developing countries and 18 trade blocs over the period 1970–1989. Specifically, it attempts to identify through which channel(s) – notably, specialization according to comparative advantage and increased efficiency, exploitation of increasing returns from larger market, and technology spillovers through investment and trade–trade blocs can affect the economic growth of their member countries. The results suggest that (1) intra-bloc trade does not affect growth significantly; (2) income diversion among member countries contributes positively and significantly to growth; and (3) the size of the trade bloc does matter in the sense that the bigger is not always the better for the welfare of the member countries.     

Reassessing the productivity gains from trade liberalization

This paper reassesses the impact of trade liberalization on productivity. We build a new, unique database of effective tariff rates at the country‐industry level for a broad range of countries over the past two decades. We then explore both the direct effect of liberalization in the sector considered, as well as its indirect impact in downstream industries via input linkages. Our findings point to a dominant role of the indirect input market channel in fostering productivity gains. A 1 percentage point decline in input tariffs is estimated to increase total factor productivity by about 2 percent in the sector considered. For advanced economies, the implied potential productivity gains from fully eliminating remaining tariffs are estimated at around 1 percent, on average, which do not factor in the presumably larger gains from removing existing non‐tariff barriers. Finally, we find suggestive evidence of complementarities between trade and FDI liberalization in boosting productivity. This calls for a broad liberalization agenda that cuts across different areas.     

Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations

Some recent literature has explored physical and policy linkages between trade and the environment. This paper explores linkage through leverage in bargaining, whereby developed countries can use trade threats to achieve improved developing-country environmental management, while developing countries can use environmental concessions to achieve trade discipline in developed countries. A global numerical simulation model is used to compute bargaining outcomes from linked trade and environment negotiations. Results indicate joint gains from expanding the trade bargaining set to include the environment. However, compared with bargaining with cash side-payments, linked negotiations on policy instruments provide significantly inferior outcomes for developing countries.     

Model uncertainty,economic development,and welfare costs of business cycles

Some researchers argue that the welfare gains from eliminating consumption fluctuations for the United States are not small once model uncertainty is taken into account. This paper presents new evidence on the welfare gains from eliminating model uncertainty using a data set from a broad range of countries. It quantifies exactly the effect of model uncertainty on the welfare gains using an analytical formula. The results indicate that most countries derive much larger gains from the reduction of model uncertainty compared with the United States. Countries at higher stages of economic development tend to have lower welfare gains because their gains from eliminating model uncertainty become smaller. This relationship does not depend on country size or trade openness.     

Residential location: A comparative econometric analysis

This paper deals with the interaction between procurement and production management. The production costs crucially depend on the materials, components and subassemblies purchased by the procurement department, and on the effort expended by the production department. An agency model is utilized based on the scanlon-Atkinson plans which share gains from production cost improvement after attaining pre-specified cost standard. The materials' quality is used to adjust the cost standards for the prodcution department. It is shown that in both the first-best and second-best cases, profit-sharing compensation is always preferred to fixed salary by the risk-averse principal. Comparing with the first-best case, the principal has to provide a greater sharing pool in order to induce the managers' efforts, and each manager, in fact, works less hard in the second-best case. The agents' compensations are tied to their positions as well as their risk attitudes when all principal lacks a costless benefits the most from such a circumstances. Agency cost is then considered as the expected value of getting a perfect monitoring mechanism. detailed comparative statics are provided to suggest the principal ways of modifying existing compensation plans due to the changes of structural parameters.     

Rules of origin and gains from trade

Free trade areas (FTAs) involve unharmonized tariffs and rules of origin that have prevented proving the formal general equilibrium existence of a welfare-enhancing FTA. This paper identifies the most restrictive limit that rules of origin can enforce and still continue to guarantee gains from trade for FTA formation. We note that many commonly used rules of origin exceed this condition in practice. We apply the identified welfare-supporting rules of origin and prove the existence of a FTA general equilibrium involving only within-FTA transfers that is at least as satisfactory for every consumer as an arbitrary original world trade allocation. The analysis also helps to explain why hub-and-spoke extensions of FTAs cannot be expected to guarantee gains from trade for all participants in general.     

Can Trade Agreements Curtail Trade Creation and Prevent Trade Diversion?

This paper investigates how pre‐existing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) dilute the trade creation effect and shield the trade diversion effect of new PTAs. Countries having pre‐existing PTAs enjoy smaller gains in intra‐bloc trade because of the dilution effect and experience smaller losses or even gains in extra‐bloc trade because of the shielding effect. The findings support the proposition that PTAs could be used to fend off future trade diversion.     

Correcting Trade Distortions in a Small Open Economy

This paper considers the second-best strategy of correcting a wide variety of trade distortions in a small open economy with perfect competition in all markets. Using the tools of duality, we obtain some general properties of the structure and the levels of the optimal taxlsubsidy rates. The paper also analyzes the welfare effects of unilateral piecemeal trade policy reforms when some of the quota distortions—imposed by the foreign countries—are unalterable. It is shown that the merits of unilateral trade policy reforms that are emphasized in the literature crucially depend on the absence of unalterable foreign imposed quotas.     

GATT,Preferential/Regional Trading Blocs and Agricultural Trade*

Agricultural trade impasses have again frustrated the GATT process. Interest in preferential/regional trading blocs is increasing. the paper probes the theoretical and empirical consequences of preferential arrangements instead of multilateral liberalization. It concludes that in a second-best world preferential arrangements could either improve or decrease global welfare. For agricultural trade, previous experience suggests that in regional groupings such as the EC trade diversion exceeded trade creation. This results from trade distorting domestic policies. Prospects for liberalization of agricultural trade under either GATT or preferential arrangements are limited. the consequences for small agricultural exporters are not positive.     

Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines the various aspects of trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms using the Melitz (2003 ) model. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper–Samuelson‐like result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. We also analyze what might be called an anti‐variety effect as the result of trade liberalization. We show that this effect is most pronounced for small countries. This resonates with the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that globalization leads the world to become more homogeneous by eliminating local specialties. Nevertheless, we find that trade liberalization always leads to welfare gains in the model.     

Positive feedback mechanisms in Adam Smith's theories of international trade

Smith understood and focused attention on dynamic growth explanations of trade patterns, and the gains from trade often ignored by subsequent theorists. This paper highlights the positive feedback mechanisms central to such an assessment of trade. The analysis invites a question that would appear out of place in a static gains from trade analysis: are rich countries afforded greater opportunities to gain from trade than poor countries? It is found that Smith's answer is yes. The gains from trade are systematically skewed toward rich countries in two ways. First, specialization according to a comparative advantage in a good characterized by limited increasing returns can result in a persistent state of slow growth or complete stagnation. Second, the gains available to the poor country from the transfer of technology are limited by the extent of the division of labor. Many technologies produced in rich countries cannot be utilized by poor countries without the technological expertise (which the division of labor creates) necessary to incorporate the technology into the productive structure of the poor country. Both of these results suggest that trade can help to perpetuate and even widen existing technology and productivity gaps between rich and poor countries.     

Measuring the Impacts of Global Trade Reform with Optimal Aggregators of Distortions

Aggregation of trade distortion measures is essential in applied work, but traditional trade‐weighted average measures are egregiously flawed. This paper shows how appropriate tariff aggregation can overcome underestimation of both efficiency and terms‐of‐trade gains from reform. The improvement is shown to result from better measurement of a distortion effect that is most important in the early stages of reform and a weighting effect that becomes more important as protection is reduced. Applications confirm that the technique can be applied relatively easily, and—with elasticity estimates suggested by the available econometric evidence—point to close to a doubling of the global welfare gains from global trade reform, and dramatic changes in the measured welfare impacts in many individual cases. Sensitivity analysis suggests that, for global trade reform, the ease of substitution between tariff lines is much more important than that between varieties from different countries. We provide an online aggregation tool to allow replication of our analysis or investigation of alternative scenarios for global reform. We hope that this paper will contribute both to wider use of optimal aggregators and improved estimates of the key elasticity parameters.     

Institutionalism and New Trade Theory: Rethinking Comparative Advantage and Trade Policy

Gomory and Baumol (2000), and Samuelson (2004) have raised concerns about international trade’s future impact on U.S. national income. The focus is how globalization may affect the size and distribution across countries of gains from trade. Though their analysis is developed using a pure trade theoretical framework, it has strands in common with institutionalist thinking. Their findings spotlight the need for a new U.S. trade policy agenda aimed at maximizing the U.S. share of gains from trade, and complementing conventional Keynesian open economy macroeconomic analysis.     

Free trade: what are the terms-of-trade effects?

Changes in trade policy affect a nation’s economic welfare through terms-of-trade and volume-of-trade effects. A move to global free trade would imply higher world economic welfare equal to the sum of all nations’ volume-of-trade, or efficiency, effects. Since the sum of the terms-of-trade effects across all nations is zero, terms-of-trade effects are contentious. Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström (2003) have shown that if customs unions do not affect trade with non-member countries, immediate global free could be achieved if free trade were proposed together with international sidepayments equal to the terms of trade effects. How large would these terms of trade effects, and hence transfers, be? This paper presents estimates from a simple computable general equilibrium model of a world economy of perfect competition. We show that, in some cases, terms-of-trade effects are small compared to efficiency gains, and transfers are not necessary for free trade. In other cases, terms-of-trade gains may account for more than 50% of a country’s gains from free trade and transfers could be large.     

CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS OF CONSISTENCY IN TERMS-OF-TRADE ANALYSIS*

The debate on how to deal with changes of relative prices in national accounts has, so far, remained inconclusive, especially with regard to the question of how to measure gains from changes of terms of trade. Keeping the experiences of the 1970s in mind (i.e. substantial changes of relative prices sparked off by increased oil prices), this state of affairs is not considered tenable. On this background, the paper takes up the old debate on how to deflate figures of domestic product, total as well as by industries. It tries to argue that deflated figures should be presented not only as real product figures by industries (using the double deflation method), but also as real income figures, obtained by deflating the current-prices figures of a certain year by the same general price index. When this is done according to procedures spelled out in detail, gains/losses from changes of the terms of trade in foreign trade will show up as an integral part of the framework. In the paper, special attention is given to the concept of industry terms of trade. On the basis of simplifying assumptions (which are, however, relaxed in the final part of the paper), it is shown how the ratio of real income divided by real product of a certain industry will be proportionate to the terms of trade of the industry concerned, when the latter concept is defined in the appropriate way. Furthermore, the sum of the industry gains/losses from changes of their terms of trade will be equal to the gain/loss of the economy taken as a whole from changes of the terms of trade in foreign trade.     

Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy Towards Dynamic Oligopolies

We characterise optimal trade and industrial policy in dynamic oligopolistic markets. If governments can commit to future policies, optimal first-period intervention should diverge from the profit-shifting benchmark to an extent which exactly offsets the strategic behaviour implied by Fudenberg and Tirole's 'animal spirits' taxonomy of business strategies. Without government commitment, there is an additional basis for intervention, whose sign depends on the strategic substitutability between future policy and current actions. We consider a variety of applications (to R&D spillovers, consumer switching costs, etc.) and also extensions to constrained second-best policies.