Bounded rationality,expectations, and child labour

This paper develops a model with overlapping generations, where the household's optimal fertility, child labour, and education decisions depend on the parents’ expectations or beliefs about the return to education. It is shown that there exists a range of parental income where the fertility rate is high and children participate in the labour market and receive an incomplete education if a parent believes the return to education is low. The act of participating in the labour market reduces the child's ability to accumulate human capital; thus, the action of sending a child into the labour market is sufficient to ensure that the parents’ initially pessimistic expectations are fulfilled. It is then shown that a one‐time policy intervention, such as banning child labour and mandatory education, can be enough to move a country from the positive child labour equilibrium to an equilibrium with no child labour.     

A uniqueness proof for monetary steady state

The framework in Lagos and Wright (2005) [20] combining decentralized and centralized markets is used extensively in monetary economics. Much is known about that model, but there is a loose end: only under special assumptions about bargaining power or decentralized market preferences has it been shown that the monetary steady state is unique. For general decentralized market utility and bargaining, I prove uniqueness for generic parameters with fiat money, and for all parameters with commodity money. As a corollary, I get monotone comparative statics.     

On the coexistence of money and higher-return assets and its social role

This paper adopts mechanism design to investigate the coexistence of fiat money and higher-return assets. We consider an economy with pairwise meetings where fiat money and risk-free capital compete as means of payment, as in [28]. The trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen among all individually rational, renegotiation-proof mechanisms to maximize society?s welfare. We show that in any stationary monetary equilibrium capital commands a higher rate of return than fiat money.     

Credit and inflation under borrower?s lack of commitment

In this paper we study the effects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in model economies where money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans cannot participate in the credit market but are allowed to accumulate money. In our deterministic benchmark economy where agents alternate in productivity, credit has the role of smoothing consumption. We show that deflation crowds out credit completely. The reason is that deflation increases the value of being excluded from the credit market and eliminates the incentive to repay loans. When inflation is positive but low, credit, consumption smoothing and welfare increase with inflation, until inflation reaches a threshold at which the allocation is efficient and money becomes superneutral.     

Interest Rate Pass-Through: Empirical Results for the Euro Area

Abstract. This paper empirically examines the interest rate pass‐through at the euro area level. The focus is on the pass‐through of official interest rates, approximated by the overnight interest rate, to longer‐term market interest rates, which, in turn, are a proxy for the marginal costs for banks to attract deposits or grant loans, and therefore passed through to retail bank interest rates. Empirical results, on the basis of a (vector) error‐correction and vector autoregressive model, suggest that the pass‐through of official interest to market interest rates is complete for money market interest rates up to three months, but not for market interest rates with longer maturities. Furthermore, the immediate pass‐through of changes in market interest rates to bank deposit and lending rates is found to be at most 50%, whereas the final pass‐through is typically found to be close to 100%, in particular for lending rates. Empirical results for a sub‐sample starting in January 1999 show qualitatively similar findings and are supportive of a quicker interest rate pass‐through since the introduction of the euro. It is shown that the difference between the adjustment speed of bank deposit and lending rates (typically around one versus three months since the common monetary policy) can to a large extent significantly be explained by credit risk considerations.     

Strategic experimentation and disruptive technological change

This paper studies the diffusion of a new technology that is brought to market while its potential is still uncertain. We consider a dynamic game in which an incumbent and a startup firm improve both a new and a rival old technology while learning about the relative potential of both technologies. The main findings are that (i) risk considerations make incumbents with higher market shares more likely to adopt the new technology and (ii) changes in market power are often preceded by a subpar performance of the new technology. We also show that introducing a better new technology or confronting a worse old technology may hurt the startup firm as its new technology is then adopted earlier by incumbents.     

Intrinsic bubbles and asset price volatility

Summary Under what conditions is the price of a bubbly asset more (less) volatile than the asset's market fundamental? The answer depends on agents' attitudes towards risk. If higher current consumption makes agents more (less) risk averse in the future, then the bubbly asset price fluctuates less (more) than the fundamental. This result shows that the interaction between intrinsic bubbles and asset fundamentals critically depends on a feature of the utility function that does not appear in standard models with time-separable utility.Financial support from the Department of Economics at Texas A&M University, the Office for International Coordination at Texas A&M University, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.     

Identifying monetary policy shocks with changes in open market operations

In this paper, we reexamine the effects of monetary policy shocks by exploiting the information contained in open market operations. A sticky price model is developed where money is the counterpart of securities deposited at the central bank. The model's solution reveals that a rise in central bank holdings of open market securities can be interpreted as a monetary expansion. Estimates of vector autoregressions for US data are further provided showing that reactions to an unanticipated rise in open market securities are consistent with common priors about a monetary expansion, i.e., a decline in the federal funds rate, a rise in output, and inertia in price responses. Compared to federal funds rate shocks, prices do not exhibit a puzzling behavior and a larger fraction of the GDP forecast error variance can be attributed to open market shocks. However, the explanatory power of the latter has decreased since federal funds rate targets have been announced.     

论人民币远期外汇市场的发展方向

随着我国人民币汇率机制的逐步完善,汇率波动幅度增大,汇率风险加剧.为了规避风险,人民币远期外汇市场的作用日益重要,但由于商业银行远期汇率定价能力缺乏,风险抵补不畅等原因,现阶段,我国远期外汇市场的发展状况并不尽如人意.针对这些不利因素,我们应采取增加市场流动性、完善风险控制机制等措施来促进其发展和完善.     

Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets

Summary. The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A new technique is used for establishing existence and characterizing the unique outcome of a non-stationary market equilibrium. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. The results are useful for examining such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomic output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks. Received: July 22, 1994; revised version: January 21, 1998     

Essential interest-bearing money

I examine optimal monetary policy in a Lagos and Wright [R. Lagos, R. Wright, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113 (2005) 463-484] model where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary. I identify a class of incentive-feasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero intervention. Any policy in this class necessarily entails a non-negative inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate. Despite the absence of a lump-sum tax instrument, there exists an incentive-feasible policy that implements the first-best allocation.     

A search model of centralized and decentralized trade

This paper presents a search model of centralized and decentralized trade. In a centralized market, trades are intermediated by market makers at publicly posted bid–ask prices. In a decentralized market, traders search counterparties. Prices are negotiated and transactions are conducted in private meetings among traders. Traders can choose which market to enter. The determinants of bid–ask spreads and liquidity are analyzed. The welfare consequence of the market fragmentation is also analyzed. It is shown that compared to the competitive market-making, monopolistic market-making may improve social welfare.     

Investment options and the business cycle

This paper extends [R. Mehra, E.C. Prescott, Recursive competitive equilibrium: The case of homogeneous households, Econometrica 48 (1980) 1365-1380] to a production economy with two capital goods. It is an RBC model in which each unit of investment requires a new idea, an ‘option.’ When options are scarce, new capital is harder to put in place and the value of old capital rises. Thus the stock market and Tobin's Q are negative indexes of intangibles. During a boom, Q rises gradually, as options are used up. Because investment represents an exercise of options, it has an intertemporal substitution tradeoff that is absent from the adjustment-cost model. Equilibrium may be efficient even without markets for knowledge; the stock market may suffice.     

PERIODIC,COMPLETE‐PARTICIPATION TRADE IN THE LAGOS‐ROCHETEAU MODEL

This paper contributes to a recent policy discussion regarding the costs and benefits of setting up a centralized electronic trading platform to replace over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets. We modify the Lagos and Rocheteau (2009, henceforth LR) asset trading model by replacing their investor‐dealer random matching and bilateral trade with a centralized competitive market that opens periodically. This arrangement preserves the main tension and trade‐off in LR. We then analyse and quantify when to introduce a centralized market and how frequently it should open in order to make it as efficiently as the decentralized OTC market in LR.     

Book Review

The authors present a simple diagrammatic exposition of a pollution-permit market in which both firms that generate pollution and consumers who are harmed by pollution are allowed to purchase permits at a single market price. They show that the market equilibrium is efficient if and only if the endowment of permits is equal to the efficient level of pollution. Furthermore, if consumers actually participate in the market, then the equilibrium is not efficient. Welfare can be improved by decreasing the endowment of permits and thereby pricing consumers out of the market.     

Search, money, and inflation under private information

I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.     

Stochastic dominance and behavior towards risk: The market for Internet stocks

Internet stocks registered large gains in the late 1990s, followed by large losses from early 2000. Using stochastic dominance theory, we infer how investor risk preferences have changed over this cycle, and relate our findings to utility theory and behavioral finance. Our major findings are as follows. First, risk averters and risk seekers show a distinct difference in preference for Internet versus “old economy” stocks. This difference is most evident during the bull market period (1998–2000) where Internet stocks stochastically dominate old economy stocks for risk seekers but not risk averters. In the bear market, risk averters show an increased preference for old economy stocks, while risk seekers show a reduced preference for Internet stocks. These results are inconsistent with prospect theory and indicate that investors exhibit reverse S-shaped utility functions.     

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the model's equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.     

政府向NGO购买服务对慈善事业发展的影响

NGO的存在,对以中华慈善总会为主体的官方救助体系形成有利的补充。NGO自身的特质也决定其在为弱势群体提供服务时更便捷、更专业。因此,在NGO行业中引入＂竞争＂的经济学概念,改变原先由政府全方位提供社会救助的模式,形成由政府主导、NGO参与、政府择优购买NGO提供服务这样的自由竞争市场,使得政府由原先＂制定者＂、＂实施者＂逐渐转变为＂主导者＂、＂购买者＂的角色,可以极大地调动NGO的积极性,激活市场动力,并且通过自发的市场调节,形成对有限行政资源配置的最佳效果,同时推动中国的慈善组织蓬勃发展,使社会救助事业取得跨越式进步。     

The pricing and hedging of structured notes with systematic jump risk: An analysis of the USD knock-out reversed swap

Most of the interest rate derivative pricing models are jump-diffusion models, where the jump risk is assumed diversifiable. In this paper, we propose a Heath–Jarrow–Morton model with systematic jump risk to derive the no-arbitrage condition using Esscher transformation. Based on the Heath–Jarrow–Morton model with systematic jump risk, the dynamic process of the LIBOR market model with systematic jump risk is then developed. By decomposing the USD knock-out reversed swap into three derivative components, i.e., interest rate swap, interest rate digital call (IRDC) and cap, the pricing of the swap can be obtained from the dynamic process of the LIBOR market model with systematic jump risk. We show how the swap issuers/investors can hedge the swap risk using these three derivative components. The numerical analyses are conducted to show the impact of jump risk on the values of IRDC, cap and swap.