Monopoly,intermediate goods and the pure theory of international trade

Conclusion In a model with two traded good sectors between which intersectoral flows of intermediate goods are allowed and with a monopolized non-traded good sector, the wage rate in terms of two traded goods increases and the rental of capital in terms of two traded goods decreases when the price of relatively more labor intensive traded good sector increases, though nothing definite can be said about the direction of change in the wage rate and rental in terms of the non-traded good. When prices of traded goods are kept constant and labor and/or capital increase(s), output of the non-traded good sector increases provided that the non-traded good is not inferior, having income elasticity of demand less than unity. The factor intensity condition for the traded goods is in general not sufficient for the validity of the Rybczynski theorem to hold with respect to net outputs of the traded goods. We have derived sufficient conditions for the magnification effect to be observed with respect to net outputs of the traded good sectors. Specifically, we have shown that the factor intensity condition (23) is sufficient for the magnification effect to prevail when only labor increases.     

The public and private provision of pure public goods and the distortionary effects of income taxation: a political economy approach

Abstract .  A pure public good is provided by the government and the voluntary contributions of two types of households. The government finances its contribution by means of income taxation. The latter has distortionary effects. A third type of household never makes contributions. We analyse the effects of changes in the income tax rate on (a) the provision of the public good, (b) the private contributions of the households, and (c) changes in the distribution of income and welfare between contributing and non-contributing households. We derive a simple and testable condition under which the lowering of the income tax entails a Pareto improvement.     

Budget-constrained Pareto-efficient allocations

This paper is concerned with a study of budget-constrained Pareto-efficient (BCPE) allocations, i.e., allocations which given a price system satisfy a given income distribution. We prove existence, show structural stability, and establish a sufficient condition for uniqueness of BCPE allocations. These properties of the BCPE allocations are deduced from similar properties of Walrasian equilibria by a duality theory which is of independent interest.     

Optimal saving in the presence of two risks

We examine optimal saving in the presence of two small risks: income risk and a background risk. First, we compute the necessary and sufficient condition for a positive precautionary saving, showing that it depends on two terms capturing respectively the direct effect of income risk and the interaction between the two risks. Second, we examine the necessary and sufficient condition for a positive extra-saving due to the contemporaneous presence of the two risks. We show that this condition also depends on a term capturing the direct effect of background risk and that it can hold independently of the previous one.      

Tax Competition, Capital Mobility, and Public Good Provision Within a Trading Block

The authors examine a two–country general–equilibrium model of a two–country trading block where governments through tax policies attract mobile capital and provide an imported public consumption good. Within this framework the authors examine, among other things, how preferences over the public good and the size (population) of a country affect the Nash or cooperative equilibrium values of income tax rates in the two countries. The analysis identifies sufficient conditions under which (i) the Nash/cooperative equilibrium income tax rates are strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) the Nash equilibrium income tax rates may be greater than the cooperative rates.     

Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status

We examine the effects of changes in the income distribution in an economy where agents' utility depends both on consumption and on their rank in the distribution of conspicuous consumption. We introduce a new methodology to compare the behavior of agents that occupy the same rank in the two different income distributions but typically have different levels of incomes. Here, an increase in incomes of the least endowed improves their welfare, yet it also increases social competition, making those in the middle to be worse off—even if they have higher incomes as well. As social competition can be lowered by spreading agents apart in income space, we find that an increase in incomes for all, augmented by (weakly) increased income dispersion, constitutes a sufficient condition for Pareto-improvement. We also show that one can have an increase both in income and relative position but still be worse off.     

A Test for Granger-sausality in a multivariate ARMA model

The objective of this paper is to present a parametric test of Granger causality in a multivariate ARMA model. We derive the necessary and sufficient condition for Granger causality. We then relate our method to previous studies by examining Sims' nominal income and money data.     

农村人力资本外溢与中国城乡居民收入差距关系的实证分析

笔者采用协整检验和误差修正模型,考察了中国农村人力资本外溢对城乡居民收入差距的影响。研究表明,农村人力资本的大规模外溢引起了城乡居民收入差距的扩大,而城乡居民收入差距的扩大又会导致农村人力资本的进一步外溢;由于农村人力资本外溢,农村劳动力转移并不是缩小城乡收入差距的充分条件。要缩小城乡收入差距,必须采取有效措施,为农村人力资本作用的充分发挥创造条件。     

Incentives and income taxation: the implementation of individual revenue requirement functions

Consider an economy where a fixed amount of revenue is to be raised, perhaps to finance a public good, by a tax on income. The only two goods in the economy are labour (or capital) and a consumption good, and workers are differentiated by only one parameter. A map describing ability to pay, from the agent types to tax liability, is given. Under what conditions on preferences can such a map be implemented by an income tax, in the sense that each agent pays exactly what is desired, after all behavioural adjustments? We find sufficient conditions on preferences and the map, as well as necessary conditions. The only restriction on tax functions is that they be measurable; bunching and gaps are allowed. Applications to both normative and positive public finance are discussed.     

A Sufficient Condition for Generalized Lorenz Order

In this paper, a sufficient condition for non-negative random variables to be ordered in the Generalized Lorenz sense is presented. This condition does not involve inverse distribution functions. Applications of this result to several income distribution models are given. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D36, D69.     

Observable preferences for public goods

This paper discusses the circumstances under which it is possible to use the market or aggregate demand functions generated from individual utility maximization to obtain consumers' preferences for certain classes of public goods, and thus obtain the information needed to satisfy the Samuelsonian efficiency conditions for these public goods. The restrictions on the preferences of all consumers which are sufficient to use the aggregate demand function are: (i) there exists a price vector such that the level of public good provisiion is valueless, and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution of the private good price for the level of public good provision is independent of income.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

A STABLE NASH MECHANISM FOR QUASI-ADDITIVE PUBLIC-GOOD ENVIRONMENTS*

In this paper we present a simple game form implementing Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibrium outcomes, which has nice stability properties. we show that if the preferences of eaach consumer are representable by a utility function of the form a(y)x_i+b_i(y), where x_i(y), where x_i is the amount of private good and y, the amount of public good, then the Nash equilibrium of our geme is locally stable under the gradient adjustment process. This restriction on the preferences has been known in hte literature as the necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto optimal amount of pukic goods to be independent of the private goods distribution. This type of preference includes quasi-linear preferences as a special case. but unlike quasi-linearity, this allows a non zero income effect of demand for public goods as well as private goods, which is often supported by empirical evidence. Our result shows how an equilbirium can be achieved over time by a decentralized strategy adjustement process for a fairly general class of environments, even in the absence of a dominant-strategy equilibrium.     

Violation of the Law of Demand

Following the classic work of Mitjuschin, Polterovich and Milleron, necessary and sufficient as well as sufficient conditions have been developed for when the multicommodity Law of Demand holds. We show when the widely cited Mitjuschin and Polterovich sufficient condition also becomes necessary. Using this result, violation regions for the very popular Modified Bergson (or hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) class of utility functions are fully characterized in terms of preference parameters. For a natural extension of the constant elasticity of substitution member of the Modified Bergson family that is neither homothetic nor quasihomothetic, we create the first simple, explicit example of which we are aware that (i) fully characterizes violation regions in both the preference parameter and commodity spaces and (ii) analyzes the range of relative income and price changes within which violations occur.     

Efficiency Wages and Nominal Income Targeting in an Open Economy

Abstract. This paper considers the choice between nominal income and money supply targeting in an open economy with efficiency wages. The results show that, when real unemployment benefits are rigid, both nominal income and money supply targeting have the same stabilizing performance. On the contrary, if nominal unemployment benefits are rigid, then we come to a conclusion that either in the face of goods demand shocks or aggregate supply shocks, a sufficient condition for nominal income targeting to be preferable is that the income elasticity of money demand be less than unity.     

Aggregation and the existence of a social utility function

In a well-known paper Gorman (Econometrica21 (1953)) established that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an aggregate, or social, utility function, independent of the distribution of income, is that all individuals' income consumption paths be parallel straight lines. Recently Chipman (J. Econ. Theory8 (1974)), building on the paper of Hurwicz and Uzawa (in “Preference Utility and Demand”) has shown that if the distribution of income is proportional and individual preferences are homothetic, aggregate consumption behavior obeys the necessary integrability conditions. It is shown here that the consistency of aggregate behavior can be derived from more general conditions than the ones used by Chipman and Gorman. Examples of demand systems from which aggregate behavior implies a social utility function are provided. It is then shown that if individual demand functions are linear in income—a form employed by both Gorman and Chipman—it is not necessary that the distribution of income be fixed.     

A new interpretation for the precautionary saving motive: a note

This paper proposes a new interpretation for the precautionary saving motive: when future income is uncertain, agents increase saving in order to cause a reduction in the disutility due to uncertainty. Furthermore, the paper shows that the usual necessary and sufficient condition for precautionary saving is the condition ensuring this effect to occur and gives new insights into the relationship between risk aversion indexes and precautionary saving.      

Production Efficiency and the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix

In the design of the optimal direct/indirect tax mix, the canonical view was laid by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who showed that commodity taxes are unnecessary in an economy in which there is an optimal nonlinear income tax provided that commodities are separable from labor in the utility functions of all taxpayers, that the aggregators over these commodities are ordinally equivalent and that wages are fixed. When wages are endogenous, Naito (1999) showed that this result may not hold and in addition that production efficiency may not be Pareto optimal. Given an optimal nonlinear income tax, we show that production inefficiency is Pareto optimal if the aggregate technology set is strictly concave. The Atkinson–Stiglitz condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for zero commodity taxation and commodity taxes are part of almost all Pareto optima.     

Has Canada's 21st-Century Grand Gender Convergence Stalled? Male and Female Income and Human Resource Stock Distributions Viewed Through an Equal Opportunity Lens

The increasing similarity of male and female labor market roles in advanced economies over the past 50 years, dubbed the “Grand Gender Convergence” by Goldin (2014), appears to have stalled. Given commonality of preferences for work and human resource acquisition across the gender divide, women and men with similar human resources and efforts should have similar income distributions in a non-discriminatory equal opportunity equilibrium. However, income convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a “Grand Gender Convergence” as similarities in incomes could be achieved with differences in human resources and efforts given discriminatory rewards. In this study, using new tools for examining distributional convergence processes, the progress of Canada's 21-st Century “Grand Gender Convergence” is examined in the context of an equal opportunity paradigm. While income convergence is almost universally apparent, human resource stock distributions appear to be diverging, with women having increasingly superior resources to men, evidence that the grand convergence is not progressing.     

Income inequality and economic growth in an open economy

Income inequality has a strong impact on fiscal policy when majority voting enables those individuals with less-than-average income to decide on tax rates. This study analyzes the impact on economic growth of income inequality in an open economy where tax revenues are partially used for international transfers. In any case, income inequality is harmful for growth. In an economic union, positive effects of international integration raise the growth rate as long as net transfers do not grow proportionally. In a political union, unionwide voting makes distributive politics depending on the union's median voter. In this case, additional output growth on aggregate level is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a majority of voters to accept union membership.