Endogenous buyer-seller choice and divisible money in search equilibrium

In the Lagos-Wright model [R. Lagos, R. Wright, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113 (2005) 463-484], the quasi-linear preferences assumption is not necessary to generate simple distributions of money holdings if individuals choose endogenously to go to the search market as buyers or as sellers. The non-convex buyer-seller choice provides an incentive for gambling in lotteries, and, as a result, the value function has a linear interval. As long as this interval is the relevant one for evaluating their future utilities, individuals behave as if their preferences were quasi-linear. In the stationary equilibrium, individuals remain inside this linear interval if the money supply does not decline.     

The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods

A quasi-linear social choice problem is defined as selecting one (among finitely many) indivisible public decision and a vector of monetary transfers among agents to cover the cost of this decision. This decision is based upon individual preferences, which are assumed to be additively separable and linear in money. The Separability axiom is a consistency property for choice methods on societies with variable size: the decision is not affected if we remove an arbitrary agent under the condition that he be guaranteed his original utility level and the cost to the remaining agents is modified accordingly. Thus the utility level assigned by the social choice function to agent i is the price at which the other agents are unanimously willing to buy agent is share of the decision power. A general characterization of choice methods satisfying this axiom is provided. Three subclasses of particular interest are characterized by additional milder axioms. Those are: (i) equal sharing of the surplus left over some reference utility (e.g., the utility at a status quo decision), (ii) utilitarian methods that merely select the efficient public decision and perform no monetary transfers, and (iii) equal allocation of nonseparable costs, which divides equally the surplus left over from the utility derived from the pivotal mechanism (also known as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism).     

A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good

A benevolent Planner wishes to assign an indivisible private good to n claimants, each valuing the object differently. Individuals have quasi-linear preferences. Therefore, the possibility of transfers is allowed. A second-best efficient mechanism is a strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism that is not Pareto dominated by another strategy-proof and anonymous mechanism. In this context, we identify three conditions that are necessary and, together with Voluntary Participation, sufficient for a mechanism to be second-best efficient. This set includes mechanisms that destroy the good at certain profiles. For domains comprising two individuals we provide an explicit characterization of the family of second-best efficient mechanisms.     

Status Quo Bias in Bargaining: An Extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem with an Application to the Coase Theorem

We generalize the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study inefficiencies in bilateral bargaining over a divisible good, with two-sided private information on the valuations. For concave quasi-linear preferences, the ex ante most efficient Bayes equilibrium of any mechanism always exhibits a bias toward the status quo. If utility functions are quadratic every Bayes equilibrium is ex post inefficient, with the expected amount of trade biased toward the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D23, D62, D82.     

Implementation with partial provability

We extend implementation theory by allowing the social choice function to depend on more than just the preferences of the agents and allowing agents to support their statements with hard evidence. We show that a simple condition on evidence is necessary for the implementation of a social choice function f when the preferences of the agents are state independent and sufficient for implementation for any preferences (including state dependent) with at least three agents if the social planner can perform small monetary transfers beyond those called for by f. If transfers can be large, f can be implemented in a game with perfect information when there are at least two players under a boundedness assumption. For both results, transfers only occur out of equilibrium. The use of evidence enables implementation which is robust in the sense that the planner needs little information about agents? preferences or beliefs and agents need little information about each others? preferences. Our results are robust to evidence forgery at any strictly positive cost.     

The loanable funds fallacy: exercises in the analysis of disequilibrium

This essay analyses the core proposition of loanable funds theorythat changes in technology and time preferences directly andimmediately affect interest rates. Applying what may be seenas a generalised financial-buffers approach to the analysisof disequilibrium, we find that loanable funds theory is flawedand should therefore be abandoned. A challenge to the neo-Walrasiangeneral equilibrium approach to monetary theory remains: thatof justifying the idea that—by some mechanism— intertemporalprices correctly reflect technology and time preferences.     

A Backward Induction Experiment

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C78.     

Are you being served? A general-equilibrium analysis of flexibility in production

In this paper firms may deviate from standard product specifications by investing in flexible production. In a two-sector general-equilibrium model that features consumer preferences with a desire for customization and in which the fixed cost of manufacturing production depend on the extent of flexibility chosen, we find that flexibility in production increases aggregate welfare. Moreover, we find that the symmetric equilibrium with positive (excess) profits welfare dominates the equilibrium with zero profits.     

Quasi-linear preferences in the macroeconomy: Indeterminacy,heterogeneity and the representative consumer

We use aggregation theory to investigate the link between one-consumer and multi-consumer economies under a quasi-linear class of preferences. Our study is carried out in the context of the neoclassical growth model. The quasi-linear preferences considered are additive in consumption and leisure and linear in leisure. We first show that in a homogeneous agents economy, the individual hours worked are not uniquely determined. We then demonstrate that the indeterminacy can be resolved by introducing heterogeneity. For example, idiosyncratic shocks to productivities or imperfect substitutability of labor restore the uniqueness of equilibrium. As a special case, our analysis includes the indivisible labor model by Hansen (1985).JEL Classification: C73, D90, E21We are grateful to Morten Ravn for his guidance. We have benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee, Jordi Caballé, Finn Kydland, Franck Portier, Michael Reiter, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, William Schworm and Andrew Scott. Any remaining errors are ours. This research was supported by the Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas and the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología de España, the Ramón y Cajal program, and BEC 2001-0535.     

On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle

Consider a standard mechanism design setting with quasi-linear preferences and private valuations. From Holmström (1979), we know that if the valuations are smooth with respect to types then any efficient, dominant strategy mechanism is in the class of Groves mechanisms. Here I show that, given regular assumptions on the primitives of the design problem, a weaker condition that includes the case of non-smooth valuations is sufficient and necessary for the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms among all efficient, dominant strategy mechanisms. This condition, which imposes a restriction on the behavior of the one-sided directional derivatives of the valuation functions with respect to individual types, is also shown to be sufficient and necessary to obtain the Payoff Equivalence principle for dominant strategy mechanisms whose choice rules are affine maximizers.     

货币模型中时间偏好与经济稳定性的分析

传统经济理论假设经济人是完全理性的,具有完备记忆、稳定的偏好,然而这样的理性假设实际上超越了人的内在特性。本文建立了一个货币管理机构采取利率反馈规则的货币模型,并假定个体的时间偏好依赖于整个经济的收入、平均消费和货币量,运用动态法研究了具有社会属性的时间偏好是如何影响经济长期均衡处的稳定性的。结论是异质的时间偏好对于货币政策的实现效果起着重要作用,不同的货币政策会对市场能否恢复到均衡状态产生影响。只有当个体的效用函数满足本文给出的充分条件时,调节利率的经济政策才不会对均衡处的稳定性产生影响,否则政策会失效甚至起到副作用。     

Monetary policy with uncertain central bank preferences

This paper considers monetary policy when policy makers’ preferences are private information. I show that in the first period of a two-period term, all policy makers but the least inflation averse inflate less - but respond more to shocks - than if there were no private information. Moderately inflation-averse policy makers may reduce their inflation most. A tendency toward increased conservatism in their second period increases inflation in the first. With T<∞ period terms, inflation depends solely on the policy maker's time left in office. With unchanging preferences and no discounting, inflation is lower the longer he has left.     

Are incentives against economic justice?

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the “preference revelation game form” associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions “naturally implement” the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria.     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71.     

The (quantity) theory of money and credit

The Theory of Money and Credit (1912) is rightly regarded as a seminal book in the development of the Austrian school approach to monetary theory. We argue that Mises’ understanding of the equation of exchange differs from both of the conventional textbook versions, and warrants recognition as being a distinct contribution. After supporting this claim we discuss it in light of expectations, monetary regimes, and the microfoundations of the quantity theory.     

The monetary autonomy of Finland: What can the time series analysis tell us?

The effectiveness of domestic monetary policy under fixed exchange rates is highly dependent on the response of the foreign exchange reserves to a monetary expansion or contraction. Domestic monetary conditions, in turn, can be expected to be subject to shocks emerging from changes in reserves. These shocks can badly harm stabilization objectives if they are not neutralized. This paper analyzes the monetary autonomy of the Finnish economy during the 1970's and early 1980's using a data-oriented approach suggested byGeweke. A purely empiristic interpretation of the results would indicate that the degree of monetary autonomy is high and increasing over time. However, incorporating theoretical considerations turns this conclusion upside down. The Finnish financial system has in all likelihood experienced structural changes that have reduced the potential for effective monetary policies. On the other hand, we do not find any evidence of strong effects of reserve shocks on the domestic money and credit markets, though the importance of such shocks may have increased slightly. Methodologically, the analysis highlights that economic theory is needed in organizing empirical observations even when the point of departure is data-oriented.     

Population Monotonicity and Egalitarianism for Binary Social Choice Problems

We consider the class of binary social choice problems. A society must choose one of two public projects, money being available to perform side payments and each agent having quasi-linear preferences. Moulin (1987, Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 , 769–783) formulates the problem and characterizes the egalitarian solution on the basis of agreement . This axiom requires that changes in the preferences of some members of the society should affect the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction; all gain or all lose. In this paper, we present an alternative characterization of the egalitarian solution on the basis of population monotonicity. This axiom requires that upon the arrival of new agents, all of the original agents should be affected in the same direction; all gain or all lose.     

Monetary policy,fiscal policy and cross signal jamming

This paper considers the issue of rule versus discretion when the central bank and the government share private information but have different preferences over inflation and output. We demonstrate that if the monetary policy is rule-based, Intuitive Criterion selects the unique separating equilibrium in which the central bank signals a low supply shock by a low interest rate. Interestingly, discretion may be better than the rule for the central bank, contrary to the case of complete information. Also, we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the monetary and fiscal policy mix. We show that cross signal jamming whereby the monetary authority and the fiscal authority successfully jams an unfavorable signal of each other does not occur in equilibrium.     

Loss aversion

Loss aversion is traditionally defined in the context of lotteries over monetary payoffs. This paper extends the notion of loss aversion to a more general setup where outcomes (consequences) may not be measurable in monetary terms and people may have fuzzy preferences over lotteries, i.e., they may choose in a probabilistic manner. The implications of loss aversion are discussed for expected utility theory and rank-dependent utility theory as well as for popular models of probabilistic choice such as the constant error/tremble model and a strong utility model (that includes the Fechner model of random errors and Luce choice model as special cases).