共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
The formation of networks with transfers among players 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We vary three aspects of the game: (i) whether players can only make transfers to (and receive transfers from) players to whom they are directly linked, or whether they can also subsidize links that they are not directly involved in, (ii) whether or not transfers relating to a given link can be made contingent on the full resulting network or only on the link itself, and (iii) whether or not players can pay other players to refrain from forming links. We characterize the networks that are supported under these variations and show how each of the above aspects either accounts for a specific type of externality, or deals with the combinatorial nature of network payoffs. 相似文献
2.
Michael McBride 《Journal of Economic Theory》2006,126(1):97-119
Individuals in many social networks imperfectly monitor other individuals’ network relationships. This paper shows that, in a model of a communication network, imperfect monitoring leads to the existence of many inefficient equilibria. Reasonable restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others’ actions can, however, eliminate many of these inefficient equilibria even with imperfect monitoring. Star networks, known to be efficient in many settings, are shown to have desirable monitoring characteristics. More generally, this paper provides a formal framework in which to study incorrect perceptions as an equilibrium phenomenon in social networks. 相似文献
3.
We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments. 相似文献
4.
Sanjeev Goyal 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):460-492
We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally, while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus. Thus, individuals form links with others to create surplus, to gain intermediation rents, and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.Our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation. First, we show that, in the absence of capacity constraints on links, it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs. Second, we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links. In this case, distances between players must be long, which induces players who are “far off” to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents. A cycle network then emerges, payoffs being equal across all players. 相似文献
5.
Structural holes in social networks: A remark 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Nicolas Houy 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(1):422-431
In a recent article, [S. Goyal, F. Vega-Redondo, Structural holes in social networks, J. Econ. Theory 137 (1) (2007) 460-492] the authors (GVR) showed the importance of stars and cycles in a given network formation game. Implicitly, in their article, a network is called an equilibrium if it is generated by an equilibrium strategy. We extend the results of GVR to the case of a stronger requirement: namely, that a network can be called an equilibrium only if all the strategies generating it are equilibria. We also show, in a dynamic framework, that both definitions differ in crucial ways. 相似文献
6.
When the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the effects of corruption on efficiency, bidders’ welfare and expected revenue. Our results apply as well to the situation—unrelated to corruption—where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal. 相似文献
7.
Asymmetric partnerships 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Nicolás Figueroa 《Economics Letters》2012,115(2):268-271
We study asymmetric partnerships and show that efficient dissolution is possible if critical types (where participation constraints bind) are equal. Ownership structures guaranteeing equal critical types always exist, but can be extremely unequal. 相似文献
8.
HITOSHI MATSUSHIMA 《The Japanese Economic Review》2012,63(3):333-347
This paper investigates finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with explicit contractual devices. It shows that full collusion can be achieved in a unique manner by incentivizing the players' final‐period play with small fines. The incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if and only if he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. Using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the entire game and achieves full collusion without being invalidated by renegotiation. 相似文献
9.
Rahul Deb 《Journal of Economic Theory》2009,144(4):1804-1816
This paper presents a nonparametric model of interdependent preferences, where an individual's consumption may act as an externality on the preferences of other consumers. We assume that individual price consumption data is observed for all consumers. It is known that the general consumption model with externalities imposes few restrictions on the observed data, where the consistency requirement is Nash rationalizability. We motivate potential games as an important sub class of games where the family of concave potential games is refutable and imposes stronger restrictions on observed data. We use this framework to extend the analysis of Brown and Matzkin [D. Brown, R. Matzkin, Testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold, Econometrica 64 (1996) 1249-1262] on refutable pure exchange economies to pure exchange economies with externalities. Finally, we discuss an application of this model to inter-household consumption data. 相似文献
10.
Stochastic stability in networks with decay 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Francesco Feri 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):442-457
This paper considers a stylized model of network formation in which relations among agents are subject to frictions, as described in Bala and Goyal [A non cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68 (2000) 1181-1231]. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self-interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, make mistakes. Then, using stochastic stability, we identify the network structures to which the formation process will converge. 相似文献
11.
We study the impact of public information and shared information on traders' trading behavior in the context of Kyle's (1985) speculative market. We suppose that there are four types of traders in our model: one insider, M outsiders, liquidity traders, and market makers. We explicitly describe the unique linear Nash equilibrium and find that public information harms the insider but benefits the outsiders and noise traders. Also, the market is more efficient because of the existence of public information. 相似文献
12.
We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs. 相似文献
13.
Andrés Perea 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):572-586
We present a theory of rationality in dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents’ utility functions. The theory is based upon the following three principles: (1) the players’ initial beliefs about the opponents’ utilities should agree on some profile u of utility functions, (2) every player should believe, at each of his information sets, that his opponents are carrying out optimal strategies and (3) a player at information set h should not change his belief about an opponent's ranking of strategies a and b if both a and b could have led to h. Scenarios with these properties are called preference conjecture equilibria for the profile u of utility functions. We show that every normal form proper equilibrium for u induces a preference conjecture equilibrium for u, thus implying existence of preference conjecture equilibrium. 相似文献
14.
Paulo Klinger Monteiro 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,134(1):566-575
We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players’ strategies. We show that if any such compact game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure compact game G has a mixed extension with reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide several economic examples of compact games satisfying uniform payoff security. 相似文献
15.
Curtis R. PriceRoman M. Sheremeta 《Economics Letters》2011,111(3):217-219
We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings. 相似文献
16.
Wiji Arulampalam Sugato Dasgupta Amrita Dhillon Bhaskar Dutta 《Journal of development economics》2009
We construct a model of redistributive politics where the central government is opportunistic and uses its discretion to make transfers to state governments on the basis of political considerations. These considerations are the alignment between the incumbent parties at the central and state levels and whether a state is a swing state or not. A testable prediction from the model is that a state that is both swing and aligned with the central government is especially likely to receive higher transfers. We test this prediction using Indian data for 14 states from 1974–75 to 1996–97. We find that a state which is both aligned and swing in the last state election is estimated to receive 16% higher transfers than a state which is unaligned and non-swing. 相似文献
17.
We show that if agents are risk‐neutral, prizes outperform wages if and only if there is sufficient pride and envy relative to the noisiness of performance. If agents are risk‐averse, prizes are a necessary supplement to wages (as bonuses). 相似文献
18.
We analyze bidding behavior in large discriminatory-price auctions in a common value setting where the number of objects is a non-trivial proportion of the number of bidders. We show that the average price paid in the auction is biased downward from the expected value of the objects, even in the competitive limit. We show that conditional on a signal that falls below a threshold, a bidder bids no more than the expected value of an object conditional on the signal and winning; while conditional on any signal that lies above the threshold the bid is strictly lower than the expected value conditional on the signal and winning. 相似文献
19.
Job contact networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Antoni Calvó-Armengol 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(1):191-206
Many workers hear about or obtain their jobs through friends and relatives. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we relate both individual and aggregate labor market outcomes to the network structure of personal contacts. Second, we study strategic network formation. To this purpose, we develop a model specifying at the individual level both the decision to form contacts with other agents, and the process by which information about jobs is obtained and transmitted. We show that equilibrium networks always exist and that only moderate levels of network asymmetry can be sustained at equilibrium. Also, we establish a general non-monotonicity result on information flow and unemployment with respect to network size in symmetric networks. 相似文献
20.
A.W. Beggs 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,132(1):383-410
This paper uses the theory of large deviations to analyse equilibrium selection in one-dimensional games with large populations where the system evolves according to a jump Markov process. The equilibria selected maximise a quasi-potential function which can be determined by solving a polynomial equation. Estimates of waiting times are also given. It shows that the equilibria about which there is more noise are less likely to be selected and clarifies the role of the limiting deterministic dynamic in selection. 相似文献