美国证券投资者索赔的司法障碍

行政监管和司法救济是保护投资者利益和证券市场规制的两种重要手段。美国证券投资者因证券市场发生的虚假陈述而受到损失,必须通过诉讼索赔,此举就表明美国行政监管并没有发挥有效作用。美国司法救济也并没有发挥有效作用,美国法官并不支持证券投资者索赔,通过许多判例给投资者索赔设置重重障碍。美国法官别出心裁,想出各种理由判证券投资者败诉,相关判例又将相关理由确定为规则,其中一些重要判例在中国尚未得到关注。美国证券诉讼的司法实践与中国的专业人士和非专业人士的通常假定正好相反:证券投资者胜诉的概率甚小。     

试论行为金融理论对我国证券市场监管的启示

证券市场监管一直是金融监管的重点,目前我国证券市场监管的理论和实践尚处于起步阶段.本文简要阐述了行为金融理论的发展和主要观点,从行为金融角度出发,就合理界定政府角色,建立有中国特色的监管微观理论,实施以风险管理为核心的有效市场监管模式进行了探讨.     

中国证券市场监管能力和监管效率分析

证券市场的高风险和市场监管的复杂性，呼唤着更高的监管能力和监管效率。尤其是对正处于转型期的新兴的中国证券市场，需要以更严格和有效的监管作为呵护市场的基本手段。     

香港证券市场监管经验对发展国内证券市场的启示

证券市场监管体系由监管法律体系、监管架构及其运作机制组成。鉴于国内证券市场与香港证券市场参与主体的相似性，本文以中小投资者保护理论为出发点，对香港证券市场的监管特征进行了分析，并针对国内证券市场的监管状况，提出了借鉴香港证券市场监管经验的具体建议。     

中国证券市场监管效率研究

根据证券监管的中间目标和最终目标可以建立证券市场监管效率的指标体系,本文通过对各项指标(如证券市场的发展和运行情况,市场内各类参与主体受到监管的影响等)的具体分析来研究中国证券市场的监管是否有效。结论是中国证券市场监管的效率与市场发展的要求还存在明显的差距。     

证券市场监管与投资者利益保护——基于执法力度的研究

公众投资者利益保护是公司治理的核心问题,通过有效的证券监管设计和实现,打击证券市场违法违规行为,保护投资者的合法权益,已经成为理论界和监管层的共识。但在我国证券市场上,违法、违规操作,造成公众投资者利益遭到损害的现象却屡见不鲜。本文主要针对上市公司控股股东为追求控制权私人收益、损害广大公众投资者利益的现象,对执法力度与我国公众投资者利益关系进行探讨,以期为证券市场监管体制的完善提出有益的政策建议。     

中国证券市场的监管困境及解除

本文通过对中国证券市场的一般性描述和回顾，指出证券市场监管的困境所在；然后在相关的文献基础上，分析了中国证券市场制度缺陷的由来及展开，即外生性的证券市场是如何产生的以及由之而来的制度缺陷，证券市场的制度缺陷又是如何影响市场主体行为的，从而得出产生监管困境的内在原因。最后对证券市场制度重建和监管困境的解除提出一些设想。     

会计监管的新视角——从法学看监管

安然事件之前，人们普遍认为，行为自律是保证注册会计师制度有效运行的最优安排。而之后发现，必须加进政府监管。本文从法学角度分析法律的不完备理论对会计监管的必要性，并对法律的不完备理论与我国证券市场中会计监管的结合进行了阐述。     

我国证券市场发展的回顾与前瞻

我国证券市场发展的回顾与前瞻陈耀先我国证券市场是在邓小平建设有中国特色社会主义理论指引下，在以江泽民同志为核心的党中央领导下，按照国务院“法制、监管、自律、规范”的八字方针，逐步建立和发展起来的。７年来，证券市场同经济建设的关系日益紧密，已成为我国社...     

中国证券市场监管博弈问题研究

在世界经济全球化和金融自由化日益发展的今天，在我国已加入WTO的背景下，实现中国证券市场的有效监管，完善资本市场体系对于我国经济的稳定发展具有重要作用。首先对证券市场违规行为进行了静态博弈分析；最后对监管政策博弈分析的应用进行了研究。     

金融监管信号传递与金融市场有效运行

金融市场是金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间动态博弈、合作共生的信息不对称系统。通过把信号博弈和重复博弈思想引入金融监管理论研究,构建以金融市场有效运行为反馈信号的金融监管当局与金融市场参与者之间的监管信号传递模型,分析金融市场治理中有效监管信号的传递机制。结果表明：金融监管力度与金融市场有效运行水平之间存在分离、混同两种均衡关系;在金融监管声誉效应的驱动下,金融监管当局倾向于选择混同均衡策略,而不是分离均衡。因而只有建立通畅的金融监管信号传递及反馈机制,强化并放大金融监管信号显示,增大监管乘数效应,形成良性的监管声誉效应,才能保障金融市场的有效运行。     

One size fits all? Safety management regulation of ship accidents and personal injuries

Safety management regulation is an important supplement to market forces to establish a sufficient safety level in high-risk industries. The accident statistics in Norwegian maritime passenger transportation display a paradox: personal injuries have decreased while ship accidents have increased in the period during which safety management has been regulated (the International Safety Management Code was effectuated in the late 1990s). We interview regulators, shipping company management, and crewmembers about their practices and opinions regarding safety management regulation and use these data to explore how this regulation influences safety management practices to prevent different types of accidents. This study underlines earlier research showing that regulation serves to ‘raise the bar’ by heightening the industry levels of safety investments and organizational safety awareness. In addition, our results suggest that safety management regulation in maritime transportation is mostly effective for preventing personal injuries in cases in which the personal have sufficient time and resources available, and the procedures are consistent with seafarers’ professional values. For ship accidents, such as groundings, other causal factors come into play. We find that the negative consequences of regulation (proceduralization) in particular influence the performance of safety-critical tasks, such as navigation. This may explain why personal injuries have decreased while ship accident frequencies have continued to increase in spite of the regulations aimed at improving safety.     

Role of Collateral and Personal Guarantees in Relationship Lending: Evidence from Japan's SME Loan Market

This paper investigates the determinants of the use of collateral and personal guarantees in Japan's SME loan market. We find that firms' riskiness does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that collateral is used. We find, however, that main banks whose claims are collateralized monitor borrowers more intensively and that borrowers who have a long-term relationship with their main banks are more likely to pledge collateral. These findings are consistent with the theory that the use of collateral is effective in raising the bank's seniority and enhances its screening and monitoring. This incentive effect for the bank becomes tenuous for personal guarantees.     

Measuring systemic risk-adjusted liquidity (SRL)—A model approach

Little progress has been made so far in addressing—in a comprehensive way—the negative externalities caused by excessive maturity transformation and the implications for effective liquidity regulation of banks. The SRL model combines option pricing theory with market information and balance sheet data to generate probabilistic measure of systemic liquidity risk. It enhances price-based liquidity regulation by linking a bank’s maturity mismatch impacting the stability of its funding with those characteristics of other banks, subject to individual changes in risk profiles and common changes in market conditions impacting funding and market liquidity risk. This approach can then be used (i) to quantify an individual institution’s time-varying contribution to expected losses from system-wide liquidity shortfalls and (ii) to price insurance premia that provide incentives for banks to internalize the social cost of their individual funding decisions.     

票据承兑和贴现业务差异化发展的特征、影响与政策建议

进入新世纪以来,人民银行货币政策调控的有效性、针对性和前瞻性不断增强,我国票据市场整体保持稳健发展,但票据承兑和贴现业务发展存在差异化现象,表现为票据承兑业务稳步增长,而贴现业务受金融调控影响显著。文章分析了其中的原因,探讨了两者差异化发展对市场运行的影响,并就票据市场的协调健康发展提出相关政策建议。     

基于RFM模型的个人客户忠诚度研究

本文在总结个人客户忠诚研究理论的基础上,提出了基于RFM模型的多层级个人客户忠诚度衡量指标及评估模型。作者利用商业银行数据仓库积累的数据,对个人客户忠诚度进行了实证研究,分析和评价了个人客户的总体忠诚度,以及活期存款、信用卡、定期存款、理财类和贷款的分产品忠诚度;结合客户的收入贡献,将个人客户划分为"挚友、藤壶、蝴蝶、陌生人"四类客户群体,并建议在实际业务应用中,对"挚友"客户重点维系;对"藤壶"客户重点营销,提升其价值;对"蝴蝶"客户进行维护时侧重挽留;而对"陌生人"客户要及时辨识,努力唤醒,降低维系成本。     

新企业所得税法对证券市场的影响及配套法规的完善

本文在分析《中华人民共和国企业所得税法》(以下简称"新企业所得税法")的实施对证券市场影响的基础上,对新企业所得税法在规范证券市场所得课税方面存在的不足予以剖析,指出为实现证券市场所得课税的有效性,应针对其特殊性而制定相应的配套法规。     

Accounting-based regulation in emerging markets: The case of China's seasoned-equity offerings

In China, listed companies are required to achieve a minimum return on equity (ROE) before they can apply for permission to issue additional shares through seasoned-equity offerings (SEO). We document two benefits of this accounting-based regulation in China. First, this regulation limits the increase in the supply of shares and the dilution of existing share prices. The Chinese stock market reacted positively to the announcement of this accounting-based regulation. Moreover, investors' reactions to SEO, announcements are less negative since the accounting-based regulation was introduced than before the regulation was enacted. The second benefit is that the regulation reduces adverse selection in SEO, as shown by the finding that prior to this regulation, firms below the ROE threshold underperformed the market after their SEO, much like what has been observed in other markets; while those above the threshold outperformed the market. Thus, although positive accounting theory predicts that regulations based on accounting numbers create incentives for managers to manipulate their accounting numbers, accounting-based regulations in China seem to serve some useful purposes.     

再融资监管促进企业理性投资了吗？——来自中国上市公司的证据

本文以2007-2016年的A股上市公司为样本,实证检验中国再融资监管制度是否促进了企业的理性投资行为。研究发现:上市企业投资决策符合资本成本约束的理性准则,表明中国权益市场中存在普遍的市场约束力量;但企业再融资后投资理性程度明显降低;对监管失效的原因分析表明,企业投资理性程度下降受到事前融资动机和事后募资投向变更的影响:监管规则对事前再融资动机缺乏有效把控,导致再融资资格出现错配;而对事后募资用途的监管不严,则导致部分企业对募集资金的用途进行随意变更,使得企业投资理性程度降低。研究结论为完善企业投资决策自治机制、优化权益再融资监管、促进资本市场改革提供了实证依据和一定的现实启示。     

The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency)

This article explores the roles of reputation, efficient capital markets, and capital market regulation in preserving and creating economic value. Each of these three mechanisms serves as a substitute for the other two, with each playing a role in maintaining the credibility and reliability of markets. While efficient markets and effective regulation are market-wide phenomena that affect all firms, reputation is a firm-specific corporate asset. Companies develop reputational capital by treating customers and counterparties fairly (while forgoing the temptation to achieve short-term profits at their expense). At the same time, companies seeking access to the capital markets but lacking a reputation must typically employ reputational intermediaries. Investment banks, credit rating agencies, accounting firm s, law firms, and organized stock exchanges have all served as reputational intermediaries at various times during the last 200 years. One contributor to the recent financial crisis was a kind of experimentation by some reputational intermediaries with an opportunistic and two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy in which some customers were treated very well, while others were treated with little or no regard for their legitimate expectations as to how they would be treated. This strategy has proved to be a failure, imposing significant costs on those organizations as well as their customers. The available substitutes for reputation, capital market effciency and effective regulation, did not provide sufcient offsetting protection for investors. While the two-tiered “customer differentiation” strategy has failed, the central message of the economic theory of reputation remains intact. This message is that a company's reputation is a valuable asset that must be preserved to ensure the future of the organization. For all financial intermediaries that rely heavily on their reputations when selling their products and services, the author recommends large and continuous investment in maintaining those reputations. For investment banks in particular—a group whose reputations have held up reasonably well—the author suggests that they continue to view their role as reputational intermediaries as a core part of their businesses.