政府间财力分配与中国地方财政能力的差异

近些年来,我国地方财政能力的差异呈现不断扩大的趋势。财政分权改革过程中政府间财力分配体制设计的缺陷,是导致我国地方财政能力差异扩大的体制性原因。本文从中国政府间财力分配的两次过程,来分析这一制度对地方财政能力差异的影响,并对如何完善我国政府间财力分配体制、缩小地方财力差异提出对策建议。     

Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from a Fiscal Reform in China

This paper uses a fiscal decentralisation reform in China – namely, the province‐managing‐county (PMC) reform – to examine the effects of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth. The PMC reform abolished the subordinate fiscal relationship between prefectures and counties and transferred much of the tax and spending authority from the prefecture to the county level. Exploiting a county‐level panel data set over 2001–11, we find that the reform has led to a significant increase in the GDP growth rate. The effect is considerably more pronounced in regions with superior initial institutional quality. We also identify channels: the PMC reform induced county governments to exert lower tax burdens on firms and increase spending on infrastructure construction.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Arrangements: Evidence from the Caribbean

This paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have a larger incentive to overspend or "free ride" than those under other exchange rate regimes, owing to the agencies' ability to spread the costs of overspending in inflation tax across both time, given the fixed exchange rate, and space, given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency union regimes demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than do countries with more flexible regimes in fifteen Caribbean countries from 1983 to 2004.     

Growth Effects of Fiscal Decentralization: Empirical Evidence from China's Provinces

In this paper, we revisit the fiscal decentralization-economic growth nexus in the case of China's provinces using autoregressive distributed lag bounds tests and pooled mean group estimators with time series data from the period 1979-2009. Using principal component analysis, we build a novel composite fiscal decentralization indicator consisting of five different fiscal decentralization measures and use it in the models in addition to conventional fiscal decentralization variables. The results suggest that there is a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in most provinces in China in both the short run and the long run.     

The Impact of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Shocks on Stock Markets: Evidence from China

We study the impact of Chinese monetary and fiscal policy shocks and the interaction of the two policies on stock markets. We find that, first, when we focus on the contemporaneous correlation, Chinese fiscal policy has significant, negative contemporaneous relationships with stock market performance, while monetary policy’s impact on stock market performance varies, depending on the fiscal policy. Second, with respect to the lagged variables, Chinese monetary and fiscal policy both have a significant and direct positive effect on stock market performance. Meanwhile, interaction between the two policies plays an extremely important role in explaining the development of stock markets.     

我国小微企业金融服务的考核评价

本文借鉴美国CRA法案的考核评价方法,提出完善我国小微企业金融服务水平考核评价的相关建议：完善小微企业金融服务监管数据的系统支持和共享机制;建立分区域的小微企业金融服务考核评价机制;根据被监管机构规模分类制定考核评价内容：增强对被监管对象考核评价的软约束。     

Intergovernmental Fiscal Arrangements and Provincial Consumption Risk Sharing in China

This paper utilizes a panel data set on two major fiscal reforms in China—the fiscal contract system (FCS) in 1980-93 and the tax-sharing system (TSS) after 1994—to examine how the various aspects of intergovernmental fiscal arrangement affect the ability of the fiscal system to facilitate risk sharing. The high revenue decentralization and the proliferation of extrabudgetary revenue items in the FCS generally weakened the central government's ability to support interprovincial risk sharing. This situation was reversed in the TSS period. In addition, the effect of central-to-local transfer (transfer-in) and local-to-central transfer (transfer-out) on risk sharing was asymmetric in the sense that transfer-out enhances risk sharing but transfer-in does not.     

关于积极财政政策的若干认识

积极财政政策是反周期扩张性财政政策的中国式表述，代表性事项是政府举借长期建设国债筹资而用于投资、扩大内需，投资的重点体现了政府职能的优化调整和短期目标与中长期目标的结合衔接。我国这一扩张性政策在支持发展的同时，赤字控制在可接受范围内，其在过去五年内对国民经济的贡献应充分肯定，其成效将会发生长久影响。2003年这一政策继续实行，在实现反周期基本目标之后这一政策必然要淡出。     

The Sustainability of Indian Fiscal Policy: A Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence

This paper reassesses the sustainability of fiscal policy in India from 1950 to 2010. Overall, the evidence broadly supports the hypothesis that the fiscal policy is "weakly" sustainable and documents a higher speed of adjustment to the intertemporal budget constraint than earlier papers do. Notwithstanding this improvement in the fiscal outlook, the author suggests that India should pursue a policy of fiscal consolidation in the years ahead, both because the ratio of public debt to the gross domestic product is still high compared to other emerging market countries and because "weak" fiscal solvency implies potential adverse consequences on the management of public debt.     

财政纵向失衡、要素价格扭曲与绿色全要素生产率 ——来自266个地级市的证据

从理论层面系统地诠释了财政纵向失衡对绿色全要素生产率的作用机理,然后利用2004-2016年266个地级市的面板数据,采用两阶段最小二乘法考察了财政纵向失衡对中国绿色全要素生产率损失的影响机制.研究发现:财政纵向失衡显著抑制了我国城市绿色全要素生产率水平;中间机制分析表明,资本价格扭曲和劳动力价格扭曲是财政纵向失衡阻碍绿色全要素生产率水平提高的主要中介变量;财政纵向失衡对绿色全要素生产率水平的抑制作用存在着地区和时间差异.     

土地出让收入、地方财政支出对我国房价影响的区域差异性研究

利用2002～2011年30个省市面板数据分析土地出让收入、地方财政支出对我国房价影响的区域差异性。研究结果表明,东中西部三个区域的土地出让收入与地方财政支出对房价的影响均存在不同程度的时滞效应;短期内土地出让收入与地方财政支出对房价的作用效果并无显著的区域差异性,但就长期发展趋势来看,东部与西部地区仍以地方财政支出影响为主,而中部地区的情况却出现了逆转,土地出让收入对房价的刺激作用要显著大于财政支出。     

Risk-Adjusted Performance of Mutual Funds: Evidence from China

In this article, we evaluate the performance of mutual funds in China between 2006 and 2014. We first estimate time-varying abnormal returns of each mutual fund using an active peer benchmark-augmented factor pricing model. An index of riskiness is then estimated and used to calculate the augmented performance measure (APM). By construction, the APM separates the managerial premium of the fund from systematic risk premium, so it is better than the economic performance measure. The APM incorporates information beyond the first and second moments of the distribution of fund abnormal return; therefore, it is more informative than the Sharpe ratio.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.     

Geographic Cross-Sectional Fiscal Spending Multipliers and the Role of Local Autonomy: Evidence from European Regions

Using a panel of 268 European regions during 1990–2014, we document that the degree of local government's autonomy, measured with the “Local Autonomy Index,” has a significant positive effect on the fiscal spending multiplier. The estimated geographic cross-sectional fiscal spending multiplier is on average close to zero in countries with the lowest degree of local autonomy, and around unity in countries with the highest degree of local autonomy. Multipliers are state-dependent: larger when gross domestic product is below trend and when there is slack in the labor market; in those states, local autonomy has a particularly large positive effect on the multiplier. To interpret the empirical findings, we build a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model where both local and central government spending contribute to a public good that enhances private labor productivity. Local governments are more efficient in producing the public good and the multiplier is higher in countries where local government spending has a larger share in the production of the public good.     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

我国积极财政政策风险实证分析

本文从宏观经济运行和财政运行两个方面对我国积极财政政策的风险问题进行实证分析。基本结论是：(1)积极财政政策在一定程度上实现了部分预期目标，实施该政策要比不实施该政策要好。如果企图通过一直实施该政策来实现预期目标，则财政风险是存在的；(2)我国国债在总量上不存在风险问题，财政风险主要存在于结构上。     

Common ownership and executive pay-for-performance sensitivity: Evidence from China

This study focuses on the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity using a sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2020. We find common ownership significantly improves executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and plays a monitoring and governance role. Meanwhile, the impact of common ownership on executive pay-for-performance sensitivity is more significant in non-state-owned firms (non-SOEs) and when a firm faces a highly competitive product market. The mechanism tests indicate that common ownership affects executive pay-for-performance sensitivity through the information and governance mechanisms. Further analyses show that the portion of compensation explained by common ownership significantly enhances future firm performance. Overall, our findings validate the positive role of common ownership in corporate governance.     

Fiscal Forecasting: Lessons from the Literature and Challenges*

While fiscal forecasting and monitoring has its roots in the accountability of governments for the use of public funds in democracies, the Stability and Growth Pact has significantly increased interest in budgetary forecasts in Europe, where they play a key role in EU multilateral budgetary surveillance. In view of the increased prominence and sensitivity of budgetary forecasts, which may lead to them being influenced by strategic and political factors, this paper discusses the main issues and challenges in the field of fiscal forecasting from a practitioner's perspective and places them in the context of the related literature.     

我国转轨时期财政转移支付制度的目标体系及其分层问题

政府设计实施转移支付制度有着多重目标:实现纵、横平衡和矫正外溢及其他经济政治目标,这些目标之间相互联系、相互制约.规范的转移支付所追求的终极目标是区域间财政能力或公共服务水平均等化,但在实施过程中不同阶段不同时期对不同项目应分别制定不同的标准.我国现阶段政府转移支付的具体政策目标既受政府转移支付的最终目标制约,更服从于现阶段的国家宏观经济社会目标.     

Common auditors and internal control similarity: Evidence from China

This study investigates how important common auditors are to internal control similarity between two firms. Based on a less concentrated audit market in China, we find that firm-pairs with common auditors enforce a similar internal control system. This inference holds after accounting for other social connections, examining internal control components, using alternative measures of internal control, adopting finer industry classifications, constructing alternative internal control similarity, running auditor switch tests, and addressing endogeneity problems. Additional analyses indicate that auditor style and information sharing serve two underlying mechanisms to undergird the documented relationship. Finally, our evidence suggests that high-centrality firms in auditor networks are associated with better financial reporting.