现阶段寻租对国有商业银行竞争力的影响及其治理

寻租现象普遍存在于社会经济各个领域,具有非生产性的基本特征,其产生和存在与特定的制度、体制环境相关.在中国经济体制转轨的背景下,国有商业银行正处于商业化、市场化改革的特定发展阶段,这造成了在银行监管领域、银行与政府之间、国有企业与国有银行之间和银行内部普遍存在寻租行为.这些形式各异的寻租行为从多个方面制约着国有商业银行竞争力的提高.本文在对寻租的特性进行界定的基础上,对国有商业银行运营中的寻租行为及其对国有商业银行竞争力的影响机制进行了分析,并建议重点通过制度的完善和创新、引入竞争机制和优化社会环境三个方面对寻租行为加以治理.     

地方性银行产权结构、贷款供给与地方经济发展

从经济增长和经济效率两个维度衡量地方经济发展,在对地方性银行产权结构、贷款供给与地方经济发展关系进行理论分析的基础上,采用我国67家地方性银行的数据,实证研究在贷款供给促进地方经济发展方面,不同产权性质的地方性银行是否具有差异;并进一步分析城商行与农商行在促进城市和非城市经济发展方面的差异性。研究发现：地方性银行提供的贷款越多,地方经济增长速度越快,地方经济效率也越高。在贷款促进地方经济增长方面,国有与非国有控股银行的作用无明显差异,但在贷款促进地方经济效率提升方面,国有控股银行的作用弱于非国有控股银行。城商行和农商行的贷款均能有效促进市辖区的经济发展,且作用效果无明显差异,但它们均未能明显促进非市辖区的经济发展。     

基于DSGE模型的绿色信贷激励政策研究

在绿色金融政策实践与有关学术理论快速发展的背景下,本文以绿色信贷的激励政策为切入点,提供一种分析绿色金融政策的理论模型分析框架,并基于模型开展量化的政策效果分析。本文在真实商业周期框架的基础上引入银行部门,通过拆分厂商部门为“绿色”与“其它”两部分,并设置中央银行与财政部门的相关政策,纳入了绿色信贷激励政策。研究发现,针对绿色信贷的贴息、定向降准、再贷款(调整再贷款利率与质押率)均是有效且合意的激励政策,一定强度的政策不仅能够提高绿色信贷量,在绿色意义上优化经济结构,而且对总产出、总就业不会造成显著的负面影响,从而带来“经济”与“环境”双赢的结果。     

Bank fund reallocation and economic growth: Evidence from China

This paper examines bank fund reallocation and regional economic growth based on 1991–2005 provincial-level data of four state-owned commercial banks of China that practice fund reallocation nation-wide. We find no correlation between bank fund reallocation and regional economic growth or between bank loans and regional economic growth. We find, however, a positive association between bank deposits and growth. It appears economic growth leads financial development in China, not the other way around. Furthermore, as China’s market-oriented reforms deepen, fund reallocation and loans start to manifest positive effects on growth even though the banks are government owned.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

The bank loan distribution effect of government spending expansion: Evidence from China

Rather than focusing on the spread of enterprises' bank loans, we focus on the impact of government spending expansion on the amount of bank loans obtained by enterprises. We first build a theoretical model to show that there are the demand effect and loan cost effect of government spending expansion on the bank loans and then use the fixed effects approach to analyze the bank loan distribution effect of government spending expansion by using the data of enterprises listed on the China Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2019. Empirical results show that the demand effect plays a leading role for the central government state-owned enterprises (SOEs), helping them obtain more bank loans from banks. In contrast, for private enterprises, the loan cost effect plays a leading role, hurting them in obtaining bank loans from banks. Further research shows that government spending expansion's crowding-in or crowding-out effect differs from Neoclassicism and (new) Keynesianism. This paper provides a new explanation for why the financing problem of private enterprises is getting worse in China. The policy implication is that when the government implements expansionary fiscal policies, it should also provide convenience for private enterprise financing through window guidance to prevent the expansionary fiscal policies from crowding out private enterprise bank loans.     

An analysis of intra-industry differences in the effect of regulation: The case of deposit rate ceilings

This study examines the impact of deposit rate ceiling changes on the market value of commercial banks and stock savings and loan associations. Statistically significant increases in market value are found on announcement of the removal of ceilings on large denomination certificates of deposit. In contrast, retail commercial banks and savings and loans experienced declines in value on announcement of the elimination or relaxation of deposit rate ceilings on small denomination consumer accounts. In addition, for all events analyzed, significant differences were found in the effect of ceiling changes on the market value of wholesale and retail commercial banks.     

试论国有商业银行助学贷款的发展策略

当前助学贷款存在着风险大、收益低以及不良率居高不下等问题,不仅严重制约了国有商业银行发展助学贷款的积极性,而且也影响了国家科教兴国、加快高等教育事业发展策略的实施.为了防范和化解我国国有商业银行助学贷款风险,有必要探究助学贷款陷于困境的原因,并借鉴和吸取国际上助学贷款的成功经验及教训,在用足用好国家对于助学贷款的有关政策,进一步强化国家助学贷款风险管理的同时,通过把社会效益和经济效益有机结合起来,把助学贷款风险控制与建立健全个人信用体系结合起来,把国家助学贷款与商业性助学贷款结合起来,为国有商业银行的长远发展创造良好的条件.     

Bank ownership,lending, and local economic performance during the 2008–2009 financial crisis

Although government banks are frequently associated with political capture and resource misallocation, they may be well-positioned during times of crisis to provide counter-cyclical support. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, Brazil׳s government banks substantially increased lending. Localities in Brazil with a high share of government banks received more loans and experienced better employment outcomes relative to localities with a low share of government banks. While increased government bank lending mitigated an economic downturn, we find that this lending was politically targeted, inefficiently allocated, and reduced productivity growth.     

Are New Tigers supplanting Old Mammoths in China’s banking system? Evidence from a sample of city commercial banks

“New Tigers” (including city commercial banks) outperform state-owned commercial banks burdened with non-performing loans from unprofitable state-owned enterprises. We study whether this is solely due to superior corporate governance (multiple shareholders versus total government ownership) or also to the favorable environment (the New Tigers target affluent China, while state-owned commercial banks operate nationwide).     

2014年二季度吉林省经济金融形势分析及预测

从二季度区域经济运行情况来看：我省工业生产总体增速放缓,全省多数市/州工业出现下滑,民营经济显著回落,工业用电和铁路货运持续低位运行;三大需求全面回落,消费需求回落至中低速增长区间,固定资产投资增速下降明显,净出口增速持续收窄,外贸形势较为严峻;劳动力市场低位运行,就业和用工整体形势不容乐观,但企业一线用工情况有所改善;财政收支压力持续加大,收入减速和支出加速并存;房地产市场下行压力加大,商品房销量下滑显著,库存压力不断加大,商品房价格环比持续下降;消费者价格指数小幅回升,工业生产者价格低位企稳。从金融运行情况来看：各项贷款增速略有回落,受临储粮贷款投放减少影响,短期贷款增势放缓,中长期贷款增幅回升,单位中长期贷款呈增长势头,单位固定资产贷款强势增长;二产贷款增速、增量占比均有所提升,但信贷集中投向三产的格局并未改变;分企业规模类型看,小型企业贷款同比显著增长;单位存款增速持续放缓,存款定期化趋势增强预示宏观经济偏冷;居民投资结构有所调整,理财产品发放导致储蓄存款分流明显。     

我国金融发展与经济增长关系的区域差异分析——兼论分税制改革对金融发展与经济增长关系的影响

本文利用1979～2003年的省级面板数据,将我国分为东、中、西三大区域,考察了金融发展对经济增长的影响,结果表明:把国有商业银行贷款占GDP的比例作为金融发展的衡量指标对三大地区人均GDP均具有显著的正相关性,金融发展促进经济增长的理论在我国同样成立;但金融发展与实体经济部门之间均不存在良性互动的关系,其对经济增长的贡献仅仅停留在增加资本积累上,对资本配置效率的改善作用不大;1994年的分税制改革对金融发展促进经济增长的作用造成了显著的负面影响。因此,我国的金融体制改革需要将金融体制改革、国有企业改革、财税体制改革和政府体制改革纳入同一个分析框架中进行。     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

经济政策不确定性与企业贷款成本

基于大样本微观银行信贷数据,本文研究经济政策不确定性对企业的银行贷款成本的影响。研究发现,经济政策不确定性升高导致企业的银行贷款成本增加,且使得在中小型银行贷款的企业成本增加更多。异质性分析表明,经济政策不确定性升高对受政策因素影响较大的企业如小微企业、私营企业等的银行贷款成本的影响更为明显。进一步,对企业的银行贷款违约风险的研究发现,随着经济政策不确定性升高,企业的银行贷款违约风险反而降低。这表明,经济政策不确定性升高使得银行选择风险评级更低的贷款,符合谨慎性动机。本文研究结论表明,经济政策不确定性升高时,银行“自我保险”动机的增强使得企业的银行贷款成本增加,这在中小型银行中表现得更加明显,同时也更多地转嫁给中小企业。本文为经济政策不确定性对企业投资、宏观经济波动等的研究提供了微观解释机制,并揭示了政府经济政策的一致性、稳定性对维护金融稳定的重要作用。     

绿色信贷政策得不偿失还是得偿所愿？——基于资源配置视角的PSM-DID成本效率分析

党的十九大报告聚焦生态文明体制改革,明确提出了发展绿色金融的战略要求。商业银行作为实施绿色信贷政策的主体,更加关注因此而产生的成本效率问题,即考量银行自身是得不偿失抑或得偿所愿？本文基于2005—2017年间73家中国商业银行的数据,首先,运用SFA模型测算商业银行的成本效率;其次,运用倾向得分匹配—双重差分法(PSM-DID)实证分析绿色信贷政策对银行成本效率影响的净效应;最后,采用边际动态检验方法考察绿色信贷政策净效应的影响趋势。文章发现绿色信贷政策的实施会通过成本效应机制降低银行成本效率,但同时因其改善了银行的信贷风险管理、提升了银行的声誉,从而对银行成本效率施加正向影响。此外,文章还发现绿色信贷政策的净效应呈现U型趋势,表现为2007—2013年绿色信贷政策净效应负向影响加深,2014年后出现转好信号,现已越过U型谷底。因此,从长期看,绿色信贷政策将有利于银行成本效率提升。     

The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.     

关于中国经济增长模式的一个解释框架--基于“土地财政”的演进分析北大核心

本文建立了一个新的模型尝试解释中国经济的近中期增长模式。在考虑“土地财政”作用的基础上,首先建立两期世代交叠(OLG)模型说明基本原理,随后将两期模型扩展到多期OLG模型,进行参数校准和模型求解。研究表明,在城镇化过程中政府将通过“土地财政”机制获得的资本用于基础设施建设,使得企业部门资本重新配置、均衡条件重构,推动形成国有企业与民营企业相对占比的稳定均衡。在这一机制下,GDP和全要素生产率不断上升但增速逐渐下降;资本的总体投资效率和资源配置优化速度出现下降,民营企业占比先增后稳。多期模型较好地刻画了我国1998—2017年期间经济结构变化趋势以及储蓄率、投资率、对外投资与外汇储备等宏观指标。随着“土地财政”作用的进一步弱化,持续推动技术进步、深化国企改革、深化金融改革等是实现我国经济长期可持续发展的关键举措。     

产权结构与商业银行贷款中的风险行为

产权结构是集中反映当前中国银行业公司治理特征的重要变量。基于我国14家代表性商业银行1994-2004年的面板数据，本文实证检验了产权结构差异对银行贷款中风险行为的影响。分析结果表明：在放贷过程中，非国有银行比国有银行更加谨慎，上市银行比非上市股份制银行更为谨慎。此外，国民经济的持续增长显著增加了商业银行贷款中的风险行为。银行贷款风险对存贷利差的变化并不敏感，对此尚未完成的利率市场化进程可作为部分解释。     

中国渐进转轨中银行不良贷款与经济增长研究

本文分析了渐进转轨中我国经济增长无法回避和跨越的问题——银行的不良贷款及其对经济增长的制约,并把不良贷款分为政策性不良贷款和经营性不良贷款,分别讨论他们对经济增长的影响。在此基础上,就如何防范化解不良贷款风险,支持可持续经济增长,分别从政府、银行、监管当局方面提出消除软预算约束,改变经济增长方式;推进银行综合改革,实现信贷行为优化,防范不良贷款风险;以《新巴塞尔资本协议》为基准,实行审慎贷款风险监管等政策建议。     

Chairman’s government background,excess employment and government subsidies: Evidence from Chinese local state-owned enterprises

Local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China continue to face government interference in their operations. They are influenced both by the government’s “grabbing hand” and by its “helping hand.” Our study examines how SOE chairmen with connections to government influence their firm’s employment policies and the economic consequences of overstaffing. Using a sample of China’s listed local state-owned enterprises, we find that the scale of overstaffing in these SOEs is negatively related to the firms’ political connections to government. However, this relationship turns positive when the firm’s chairman has a government background. Appointing chairmen who have government backgrounds is a mechanism through which the government can intervene in local SOEs and influence firms’ staffing decisions. We also find that in compensation for the expenses of overstaffing, local SOEs receive more government subsidies and bank loans. However, the chairmen themselves do not get increased pay or promotion opportunities for supporting overstaffing. Further analysis indicates that whereas the “grabbing hand” of government does harm to a firm’s economic performance, the “helping hand” provides only weak positive effects, and such government intervention actually reduces the efficiency of social resource allocation.