The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.     

Does venture capital investment enhance corporate innovation? Evidence from Korea

We examine whether venture capital (VC) investment enhances corporate innovation in Korea. Using a matched sample of 802 firms from 1998 to 2012, we find that after the first round of VC investment, VC-backed firms are more innovative than non-VC-backed firms. Our results suggest that the positive influence of VC investment largely comes from the ability of VC firms to reduce information asymmetry between investors and ventures: VC funds managed by independent venture capitalists significantly enhance corporate innovation, whereas those managed by governmental venture capitalists do not. Furthermore, this positive influence becomes more pronounced where there is greater information asymmetry. Finally, we show that funds with profit-based compensation structures are more likely to encourage corporate innovation than those with fee-based compensation structures.     

Institutional affiliation and the role of venture capital: Evidence from initial public offerings in Japan

The presence of venture capital in the ownership structure of U.S. firms going public has been associated with both improved long-term performance and superior “certification” at the time of the initial public offerings (IPOs). Many of the major venture capital firms in Japan are subsidiaries of securities firms that may face a conflict of interest when underwriting the venture capital-backed issue. In Japan, we find the long-run performance of venture capital-backed IPOs to be no better than that of other IPOs, with the exception of firms backed by foreign-owned or independent venture capitalists. When venture capital holdings are broken down by their institutional affiliation, we find that firms with venture backing from securities company subsidiaries do not perform significantly worse over a 3-year time horizon than other IPOs. On the other hand, we find that IPOs in which the lead venture capitalist is also the lead underwriter have higher first-day returns than other venture capital-backed IPOs. The latter result suggests that conflicts of interest influence the initial pricing, but not the long-term performance, of IPOs in Japan.     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

Venture Capital and Private Equity: A Review and Synthesis

This paper reviews the existing literature on venture capital and private equity. The paper emphasises the importance of examining venture capital in the light of recent developments in corporate finance and its distinctiveness from other forms of finance. In order to understand current developments, the paper adopts a framework which combines industry/market and firm levels of analysis. Existing literature is reviewed using this framework. Industry level issues relate to rivalry between firms, the power of suppliers and customers, and the threats from new entrants and substitutes. Firm level issues concern deal generation, initial and second screening, valuation and due diligence, deal approval and structuring, post-contractual monitoring, investment realisation, and entrepreneurs' exit and recontracting with venture capitalists. This is followed by a review of the evidence on the performance of venture capital firms. The paper suggests potentially fruitful areas for further research including the extension of analysis to cover all stages of venture capital investment, examination of the inter-linkages between industry and firm level issues and between stages in the venture capital process, as well as further analysis of deal structuring issues and investment realisation and recontracting.     

Institutional investor type,earnings management and benchmark beaters

This paper classifies institutional investors into transient or long-term by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results support the view that long-term institutional investors constrain accruals management among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This suggests long-term institutional investors can mitigate aggressive earnings management among these firms. Transient institutional ownership is not systematically associated with aggressive earnings management and is evident only among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings benchmarks. This indicates transient institution-associated managerial myopia may not be as prevalent as posited by critics. This study highlights the importance of explicitly considering the type of institutional investor and the specific setting when investigating the association between institutional ownership and corporate earnings management.     

How Do Capital Structure Policies of Emerging Markets Differ from Those of Developed Economies? Survey Evidence from Korea

We examine the capital structure policies of Korean firms using survey data for business group (chaebol) firms and independent firms. Our results are compared with findings in earlier studies for developed economies: Graham and Harvey (2001) for the United States and Brounen et al. (2004, 2006) for Europe. Korean chief financial officers are concerned about financial flexibility and volatility of earnings when issuing debt; they are concerned about target debt ratio maintenance and recent stock price increases when issuing equity. In contrast to independent firms, chaebol firms are more concerned about differences in corporate tax rates between foreign and domestic markets and the risk of refinancing in bad times. Chaebol firms are less likely to issue debt when faced with insufficient internal funds, which indicates that active internal capital markets are at work among the firms in a business group. Our results suggest that, compared to U. S. and European firms, Korean firms are under more pressure from their peers in formulating capital structure policies, consider equity a cheap source of financing, are less concerned with the dilution of earnings per share, and less frequently provide shares to employees as compensation.     

Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms

In this study, we document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that despite differences in institutional environments, corporate board independence is important to ensure high-quality financial reporting. The findings also show that the monitoring effectiveness of corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, either through ownership concentration or the presence of family members on corporate boards. The results based on firms reporting small earnings increases provide additional support for our finding that the monitoring effectiveness of independent corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms.     

Ownership structure and earnings informativeness: Evidence from Korea

This paper examines the relationship between corporate ownership structure in Korea and the informativeness of earnings. Korean ownership structure is characterized by the dominance of one primary owner who also participates in firm management. Existing literature offers two alternative perspectives on the behavior of such owner-manager firms, convergence of interests, and management entrenchment hypotheses. We tested the alternative views to see how they are reflected in earnings informativeness. The results show that earnings are more informative as holdings of the owner increase, supporting the convergence of interest explanation for the owner-manager structure. Second, we examine the role of institutional investors and blockholders. On the one hand, institutions/blockholders have incentives to actively monitor management. However, on the other hand, institutions/blockholders may not render effective monitoring because they lack expertise, suffer from freerider problems, or strategically ally with management. These opposing views predict conflicting signs on the relation between the earnings informativeness and holdings of institutions/blockholders. We find that earnings informativeness increases with the holdings of institutions and blockholders. This supports the active monitoring role of institutions/blockholders. Finally, we test the relationship between earnings informativeness for chaebol (Korean business group)-affiliated companies vs. that for nonchaebol-affiliated companies, and find no significant relationship between the owner-largest shareholder's holdings and earnings informativeness. This provides evidence that for chaebol companies, the negative effect of management entrenchment/expropriation of minority shareholders offsets the positive effects. This phenomenon is stronger for chaebol-affiliated companies than for nonchaebol affiliates.     

The dynamics of earnings management in IPOs and the role of venture capital

We investigate the dynamics of earnings management (EM) in IPOs and the role of venture capitalist (VC) in hampering such practice. We study the behavior of EM in four phases: Pre-IPO, IPO, Lock-up and Post-lock-up. We find that VC-sponsored firms tend to do more EM in the Pre-IPO period, and less in two subsequent periods. These results are distinct for those of Wongsunwai (2013), for which, VC-sponsored firms do less EM only in the IPO period. We also find that VC and non-VC-sponsored firms do EM around the IPO in distinct fashions. Non-VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings during the IPO period and deflate in the Lock-up and Post-lock-up periods. VC-sponsored firms inflate earnings in the Pre-IPO period and deflate earnings only in the Lock-up period. Our results are robust with respect to how one measures EM and the statistical methods used.     

Foreign institutional investment horizon and earnings management: Evidence from around the world

This paper investigates whether and how the investment horizon relates to foreign institutional monitoring in constraining the self-interested managerial use of earnings management for a sample of firms from 29 countries. We find that equity ownership by long-term foreign institutional investors, irrespective of the strength of institutional controls in their home countries, is associated with lesser earnings management. Accounting for the significance of information asymmetry in earnings management and the ability of long-term foreign institutional investors to mitigate the information disadvantage associated with cross-border equity investments, we find that the constraining effect is stronger in firms with weaker information environments. Finally, using multiple proxies for the country- and firm-level agency, we find that monitoring by long-term, rather than short-term, foreign institutional investors is significantly effective in limiting earnings management in environments of severe agency conflicts. Overall, our findings draw attention to the heterogeneity in the monitoring role played by foreign institutional investors in influencing the financial reporting quality.     

欧洲创业投资发展及启示

本报告基于对欧洲创业投资业发展历程的考察,从创业环境、政府基金支持、税收优惠政策、退出机制、监管体制和行业协会作用等六个方面,全面总结了欧洲主要国家发展创业投资业的经验。结合中国国情,我国发展创业投资须从创业环境、政府基金支持、税收优惠等方面加以促进和完善。     

Firms’ innovation strategy under the shadow of analyst coverage

We study the effect of analyst coverage on firms’ innovation strategy and outcome. Using data of US firms from 1990 to 2012, we find evidence that an increase in financial analysts leads firms to cut research and development expenses, acquire more innovative firms, and invest in corporate venture capital. We attribute the first result to the effect of analyst pressure and the others to the informational role of analysts. We also find that financial analysts encourage firms to make more efficient investments related to innovation, which increases their future patents and citations and influences the novelty of their innovations.     

An empirical study of the effect of venture capital participation on the accounting information quality of IPO firms

Using a sample of IPO companies on the Shenzhen Small and Median Enterprise Board and the ChiNext Stock Market between 2005 and 2009, this paper analyzes the effect of venture capital participation on accounting information quality. We find that venture capitalists have a significant effect on earnings management, with reduced discretionary accruals before the expiration of the equity lock-up period and enhanced discretionary accruals after the expiration of the equity lock-up period. Our findings support the moral hazard hypothesis of venture capital, but not the certification/monitoring role of venture capital in IPOs. In addition, we find that venture capital plays a more important role in the earnings management of non-state-owned IPO companies than of state-owned companies.     

International comparative analysis of the association between board structure and the efficiency of value added by a firm from its physical capital and intellectual capital resources

This study investigates the link between corporate board features and corporate performance for a sample of 286 publicly traded firms from South Africa (84 firms), Sweden (94 firms), and the UK (108 firms). Corporate board features considered are board composition, inside director ownership, duality and board size. In contrast to prior literature, performance is defined as the efficiency of value added (VA) rather than in financial terms. Further, the analysis examines the association between board features and efficiency of VA and each of the firm's physical capital (PC) and intellectual capital (IC), respectively. Finally, the present study analyzes the association between board features and corporate performance conjointly. Comparable to general findings from studies using U.S. data, the empirical analysis as a whole did not discern consistent significant link between the four board features and corporate performance across the three nations. However, individual board features are found to influence corporate performance in isolated cases. Overall, results provide evidence that even under different sociopolitical and economic conditions, governance needs vary across firms. Consequently, these findings do not lend support to the notion that uniform board structures should be mandated.     

The Effects of Ownership Structure and Intragroup Loans on Leverage: Evidence from Family Firms in Chile

This article examines the effects of family control and pyramidal ownership on firms’ capital structure decisions. After studying a sample of listed family and nonfamily firms in Chile, we find that families take a conservative approach to debt and financial risk exposure. We test the hypothesis that family firms restrict the use of debt in order to avoid the monitoring role of creditors, which could limit their enjoyment of the private benefits of control. In keeping with this hypothesis, we find a U-shaped relationship between leverage and the degree of pyramidal ownership that is more pronounced among family firms than nonfamily firms. We do not find any evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that family-controlled firms have low leverage ratios due to their access to internal capital markets. In fact, conversely, we find that listed family firms provide more loans to related companies than comparable nonfamily firms.