CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment

We argue that managerial overconfidence can account for corporate investment distortions. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Thus, they overinvest when they have abundant internal funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing. We test the overconfidence hypothesis, using panel data on personal portfolio and corporate investment decisions of Forbes 500 CEOs. We classify CEOs as overconfident if they persistently fail to reduce their personal exposure to company‐specific risk. We find that investment of overconfident CEOs is significantly more responsive to cash flow, particularly in equity‐dependent firms.     

Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data

The corporate finance literature argues that overconfident managers tend to hold less cash, and this leads to a significant deviation from optimal cash levels. We analyse the impact of executive overconfidence on the corporate cash holdings of listed Vietnamese firms. To quantify managerial overconfidence, a novel core measure used in our analyses is voice pitch, which is obtained from interviews with top-line managers. Other measures of managerial overconfidence are also used to support the results and confirm the validity of the voice pitch measure. Our empirical evidence, with economically significant results, reveals that higher levels of overconfidence amongst managers are associated with lower cash holdings. Surprisingly, the findings show that overconfident managers tend to be associated with a low level of deviation from optimal cash holding levels. In addition, our findings also provide evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase cash levels and deviations from target cash holdings for overinvesting firms.     

CEO overconfidence and corporate cash holdings

This study proposes chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to be an alternative explanation to corporate cash holdings. We find positive effects of CEO overconfidence on the level of cash holdings and the value of cash, which are mainly due to the investment environments faced by firms. The positive effects of CEO overconfidence on cash holdings level and cash value are barely affected by the traditional motives of cash holdings based on trade-off and agency theories. The analysis of cash sources further explains why firms with overconfident CEOs can aggressively pursue risky investments and maintain large cash holdings at the same time. Although the prior literature indicates that overconfident CEOs tend to avoid equity issues for their capital investments, the contribution to cash savings from equity is higher than that from debt. Additional robustness tests also support our empirical findings.     

Terrorist attacks and corporate investment: The beneficial value of CEO overconfidence

This study examines whether terrorist attacks influence corporate investments and firm value. We expect that overconfident CEOs can mitigate the underinvestment problem caused by terrorist attacks because they overestimate the returns on investment. Using measures of terrorist attack proximity in the U.S., we find that firms with non-overconfident CEOs significantly decrease their investment growth when terrorist attacks affect them, while firms with overconfident CEOs do not. Consequently, the impact of terrorist attacks on firm value varies between firms with overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Overall, this study suggests that CEO overconfidence can benefit shareholder value under certain conditions, such as terrorist attacks.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?

Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason: overconfidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options‐ and press‐based proxies for CEO overconfidence, we find that over the 1993–2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. Our findings suggest that overconfidence helps CEOs exploit innovative growth opportunities.     

Time-varying managerial overconfidence and pecking order preference

This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and directors’ trading) overconfidence measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (J Financ Econ 51:219–244, 1999) regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high earnings volatility and small firms.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism

Overconfident managers overestimate future returns from their firms’ investments. Thus, we predict that overconfident managers will tend to delay loss recognition and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect. Our findings add to the growing literature on overconfidence and complement the findings by Schrand and Zechman [2011] that overconfidence affects financial reporting behavior.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

The Responsiveness of Corporate Investments to Changes in Corporate Income Taxation During the Financial Crisis: Empirical Evidence from Slovenian Firms

I examine the responsiveness of corporate investments to changes in corporate income taxation during the financial crisis. When investigating tax effects in financially constrained firms, the model of investment demand needs to be extended to include an additional channel through which taxes could affect investments. I model the tax effects via two transmission channels, the traditional user cost of capital channel and the cash flow channel, which is crucial for financially constrained firms. The empirical results show that corporate investments in financially constrained firms do not respond to changes in corporate income taxation through the user cost of capital channel, but there is strong evidence of the effect that materializes through the cash flow channel.     

A bright side of financial constraints in cash management

This paper tests whether financial constraints play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation in the presence of agency problems. We hypothesize that when firms have difficulty raising external funds, empire-building managers of cash-rich firms will be less likely to spend cash on negative NPV projects as compared to unconstrained managers. Empirically, we examine firm performance after cash dissipation and associate it with the degree of financial constraints. We find that cash spending by managers in financially constrained firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by managers in unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that the positive effect of financial constraints on firm performance is not driven by differences in corporate governance. Financial constraints actually substitute for good governance in disciplining managers. We find that corporate governance improves the efficiency of cash dissipation in unconstrained firms, but not in constrained firms. Likewise, financial constraints' disciplinary effect is found to be concentrated in firms that are poorly governed.     

Investment Opportunities,Free Cash Flow and Stock Valuation Effects of Corporate Investments: The Case of Taiwanese Investments in China

This paper examines the importance of investment opportunities and free cash flow in assessing the stock market reaction to announcements of cross-border investments in China by Taiwanese firms. Our results support the investment opportunities hypothesis that Taiwanese firms with favorable investment opportunities have significantly positive response to the announcements of their investments in China whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have negative response to such announcements. In contrast, we find no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. Our findings add to the understanding of the determinants of the wealth effect of cross-border investment decisions in the Asia-Pacific region.     

Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism,reputation, and shareholder interests

Corporate managers often invest in activities that are deemed to be socially responsible. In some instances, these investments enhance shareholder value. However, in other cases, altruistic managers or managers who privately benefit from the positive attention arising from these activities may choose to make socially responsible investments even if they are not value enhancing. Given this backdrop, we investigate the various factors that motivate firm managers to make socially responsible investments. We find that larger firms, firms with greater free cash flow, and higher advertising outlays demonstrate higher levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We also find that companies with stronger institutional ownership are less likely to invest in CSR — which casts doubt on the argument that these investments are designed to promote shareholder value. Consistent with the literature that explores how CEO personal attributes influence corporate decision making, we find that female CEOs, younger CEOs, and managers who donate to both Republican and Democratic parties are significantly more likely to invest in CSR. This latter result suggests that CSR investments may not be driven solely for altruistic reasons, but instead may be part of a broader strategy to create goodwill and/or help maintain good political relations. Finally, we find a strong positive connection between the level of media scrutiny surrounding the firm and its CEO, and the level of CSR investment. This finding suggests that media attention helps induce firms to make socially responsible investments.     

Asymmetric cash flow sensitivity of cash holdings

Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009) offer contrasting conclusions regarding the corporate cash flow sensitivity of cash. We use an augmented empirical model to affirm the conclusion in Riddick and Whited that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is generally negative. In addition, we contend that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is asymmetric to cash flow. The asymmetry may be due to several reasons, including binding project contracts, bad news withholding, and agency costs. Using a sample of manufacturing firms from 1972 to 2006, we document that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is negative when a firm faces a positive cash flow environment, supporting Riddick and Whited (2009), but the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive when a firm faces negative cash flows. We further divide firms into financially constrained and unconstrained ones and find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash asymmetry continues to hold in both groups. When we use institutional holding as a control for the agency problem, we find that firms with better outside monitoring dissave to capture good investment opportunities. All the results support our hypotheses that firms have different levels of responses to their cash holdings when facing positive and negative cash flows.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

The impact of cash flows and firm size on investment: The international evidence

This paper examines the degree to which cash flow availability influences firm investment in six OECD countries. In particular, we are interested in the extent to which the reliance on internal funds is affected by firm size, since there is general agreement that smaller firms have less access to external capital markets and, thus, should be more affected by the availability of internal funds. Earlier work has concluded that the documented positive relationship between cash flow and investment is evidence of the existence of financial constraints. We first examine all firms, regardless of size, in each country, and we find that the amount of corporate investment is affected by internal resources in all six countries; that is, internal financing affects firm investment. We then repeat the analysis segmenting the sample using three measures of firm size. Contrary to our a priori expectations, we find that the cash flow-investment sensitivity is generally highest in the large firm size group and smallest in the small firm size group. We deduce that the explanations for these findings are grounded in managerial agency considerations, and in the greater flexibility enjoyed by large firms in timing their investments. Thus, we conclude that the degree of sensitivity of a firm's investments to its cash flows cannot be interpreted as an accurate measure of its access to capital markets (as do Kaplan, S., Zingales, L., 1997. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 169–215), since small firms are known to have less access to external markets.     

政治关联、过度自信与非效率投资

通过运用2006～2010年上市公司的管理者个人背景数据以及投资数据样本,对不同政治关联形式对管理者过度自信心理形成的影响,以及在不同产权性质下,政治关联所导致的过度自信心理同企业非效率投资之间的相关关系进行实证研究。结果表明,对于管理者而言,具有政府部门工作背景比担任人大或政协代表更易引发其过度自信心理的形成。同时,在政治关联所引起的管理者过度自信心理的作用下,企业会加剧其过度投资水平,而缓解其投资不足状况。     

股权激励对企业非效率投资行为的影响研究——基于高管过度自信中介效应的视角

基于高管过度自信的视角考量我国上市公司股权激励实施对企业非效率投资行为的影响,结果表明,我国上市公司普遍存在过度投资和投资不足的现象,股权激励能有效抑制过度投资行为,但对企业投资不足现象具有显著的促进作用,同时,高管过度自信会导致企业过度投资行为的发生,相应地会降低投资不足行为的产生;高管过度自信是导致股权激励效果弱化的重要原因,股权激励的实施会在高管过度自信的作用下加剧企业过度投资行为,而对投资不足表现出不显著的抑制效果;良好的公司治理环境能有效抑制高管过度自信概率,也是激励效果得以发挥的重要前提。     

Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

We investigate the investment‐cash flow sensitivity of a large sample of the UK listed firms and confirm that investment is strongly cash flow‐sensitive. Is this sensitivity a result of agency problems when managers with high discretion overinvest, or of asymmetric information when managers owning equity are underinvesting if the market (erroneously) demands too high a risk premium? We find that investment‐cash flow sensitivity results mainly from the agency costs of free cash flow. The magnitude of the relationship depends on insider ownership in a non‐monotonic way. Furthermore, we obtain that outside blockholders, such as financial institutions, the government, and industrial firms (only at high control levels), reduce the cash flow sensitivity of investment via effective monitoring. Finally, financial institutions appear to play a role in mitigating informational asymmetries between firms and capital markets. We corroborate our findings by performing additional tests based on the stochastic efficient frontier approach and power indices.