简析以权证作为股权分置改革对价的会计处理

进行股权分置改革,非流通股股东向流通股股东支付对价,以获取所持股份的流通权。作为股权分置改革对价方式之一的权证,有认购权证和认沽权证两种,其按发行方式分为赠送和出售,按行权方式分为购买/出售股份和支付差价。本文对这几种权证的会计处理进行简要的分析。     

补偿流通股股东的理想方案

老流通股股东为获得股票流通的权利支付了高昂的代价即高溢价入股，现在非流通股股东也想成为流通股股东并让其股票上市流通，也应高溢价入股，这才是真正的同股同权。但是非流通股股东的现金支付压力太大，因此应采用按流通股股东与非流通股股东的股东权益，平衡流通股股东与非流通股股东的股票数量之方法，对流通股股东进行合理补偿。     

我国上市公司流通股的内在价值构成

一、上市公司流通股内在价值构成 无论是流通股还是非流通股,其对上市公司的收益权都是相同的,每当上市公司分派股利的时候,流通股和非流通股拥有相同的收益权,但流通股具有在市场上流通的权利,而非流通股虽然可以在场外进行拍卖或协议转让,但对于非流通股其流通的权利几乎可以忽略不计,流通股具有的这种流通的权利使股东可以在需要资金的时候立刻变现,也可以在股票价格高于其购买价的时候选择行使其流通权获得资本利得,流通权给流通股股东提供的种种便利使得流通权具有相应的价值,即流通权价值,所以股票的内在价值中应当有流通权价值.     

上市公司股权分置改革之中小非流通股股东会计处理探讨

股权分置的基本含义是上市公司的全部股份由于政策限制被分为两类性质不同的股份，一类是可以在证券交易所挂牌交易的流通股，一类是只能在场外协议转让的非流通股。目前，非流通股约占上市公司总股份的三分之二。股权分置破坏了上市公司利益机制一致性的基础，导致流通股股东和非流通股股东的利益发生冲突。股权分置改革的实质是通过非流通股股东向流通股股东支付对价取得相应的流通权，从而实现所有股东股份的同质化，并以此希求股东价值取向的一体化、决策基础的一致性，在此基础上完善资本市场的功能发挥和促进上市公司的健康发展。     

定向增发对相关利益体财富的影响分析

本文运用合理假设，对上市公司定向增发行为进行了分析，从理论上论述了定向增发对该上市公司、非流通股股东和流通股股东等相关利益体财富的影响。本文认为，定向增发将在一定程度上“牺牲”非流通股股东利益，流通股股东利益损害的情况有所减弱。文中以成功实施定向增发的武钢股份为例，检验了分析结论，提出了相关建议。     

我们如何面对股市

据悉证监会确实有意在2005年进行试点，试点名单尚未最后确定。但几乎可以肯定的是，这次试点将包括市场上最为关注的对流通股股东的补偿方案，试点公司将各有各的具体操作方案，补偿程度和方式将取决于流通股股东和非流通股股东之间的谈判和博弈。目前在市场上流传的名单包括了一些银行股和钢铁股。     

股权分置改革中流通股股东的民事诉讼机制

非流通股股东为获得市场流通与流通股股东之间达成的承诺是有效的民事合同法律行为,承诺的履行与否关系到股权分置改革中流通股股东的切身利益.在追究违反承诺的非流通股股东责任的民事诉讼中,让最有利害关系冲突的的双方作为原告与被告参与诉讼,使判决的既判力扩张具有重要意义.     

股权分置改革试点评价:基于博弈论的分析

股权分置改革试点使上市公司非流通股股东和流通股股东围绕改革中的利益分割展开激烈的博弈。基于各自利益最大化的选择，非流通股股东将倾向提供素质一般或较差、发展前最不明朗或暗淡、股票价格对公司内在价值存在显著高估的公司进行试点；流通股股东期望同非流通股股东裁上述公司的试点博穿中获得最大的利益补偿。稳妥推进股权分置试点，需要改变市场不合理预期．积极鼓励蓝筹类上市公司先行试点。     

对价和信息不对称在股权分置改革中对投票结果的影响

本文总结分析了中国股权分置改革中投票机制的特征,并研究了对价水平、信息不对称等影响投票结果的因素。研究发现,分组投票的机制和流通股股东的理性有效制约了占多数投票权的非流通股股东,并保障了对价方案总体处于双方认为合理的水平。数据显示,流通股的投票率只有33%,而非流通股的投票率将近其三倍;双方的支持率则比较接近,且都处于较高水平。结果表明,对价水平较低的提案能引起流通股较高的投票率;同时伴随着流通股较低的支持率和较高的反对率。此外,流通股股东和非流通股股东之间信息不对称程度的改善能有效增加具有信息劣势的流通股股东投票率,并促使股东双方在对价提案的意见上取得一致,从而得到较高的支持率和较低的反对率。     

全流通市场中的股东行为与市场格局趋势分析

本文通过一个经典的动态不完全信息信号博弈模型,分析当前中国股票市场解禁的非流通股股东与现存普通流通股股东的博弈行为。基于此,本文认为当前针对“大小非”减持的信息披露有其积极意义,同时允许上市公司回购股份等也有助于估值信息的传递;本文认为,市场逐步走向更加合理的产业资本与金融资本互动的估值体系的预期有利于资本市场分离均衡的实现,并由此结合股权分置改革后市场的相关特征,对我国股票市场未来即将出现的分化格局进行了判断,中国资本市场在经历后股权分置时代的深刻变革之后经济“晴雨表”的功能将逐步增强。     

股改对流通股股东财富影响的实证研究

我国股市的二元制结构在长期中对证券市场造成了很多的困扰,其中最大的问题是使得证券二级市场的风险增高,从而流通股股东承担着相对过高的成本.2005年4月开始,股权改革开始坚决地实施,本文就股改的结果做出实证检验,发现在股改改后的一段时间里流通股股东利益得到了补偿,并且股改的对价方案对流通股股东的利益影响是最大的.     

股权质押下的控股股东增持:“价值信号”还是“行为信号”？

在股权质押的背景下,理性的控股股东会利用投资者的有限理性,通过增持向市场发送行为信号来提振股价,以缓解控制权转移风险。研究发现:股权质押下控股股东更有可能增持;短期内增持公告产生了正向的市场反应,其程度在非质押组和质押组间无显著差异;而长期来看,增持后质押组的长期股价以及经营绩效表现弱于其对照组,而非质押组则好于其对照组,说明股权质押下的增持并不是价值信号,而是行为信号。进一步研究发现,质押对增持的正向效应在高平仓压力组、低公司质量组、监管环境较宽松的欠发达地区更显著。拓展性检验表明,在考虑减持影响后,股权质押下控股股东更倾向于通过二级市场买卖和竞价交易实施净增持,并且管理层与其他大股东也会在一定程度上迎合控股股东的增持行为。最后本文排除了传统增持动机假说对上述结论的替代性解释。     

香港股市与内地股市的联动性研究

本文分3个阶段考察了香港回归以来,香港股市和内地股市之间的联动关系及其变化。协整分析表明,香港股市和内地股市之间存在长期的均衡关系,这种均衡关系在内地资本市场实行股权分置改革后更趋于稳定。Granger因果检验表明,香港回归以来香港股市和内地股市之间的引导关系在经历B股开放和股权分置改革后发生了变化。脉冲响应函数分析从动态的角度进一步验证了香港股市和内地股市之间的引导关系及其变化,并深入分析了单个变量的波动或冲击对其自身及另一变量的影响程度。     

Market efficiency,managerial compensation,and real efficiency

We examine how an exogenous improvement in market efficiency, which allows the stock market to obtain more precise information about the firm's intrinsic value, affects the shareholder–manager contracting problem, managerial incentives, and shareholder value. A key assumption in the model is that stock market investors do not observe the manager's pay-performance sensitivity ex ante. We show that an increase in market efficiency weakens managerial incentives by making the firm's stock price less sensitive to the firm's current performance. The impact on real efficiency and shareholder value varies depending on the composition of the firm's intrinsic value.     

CAN STOCK MARKET LIBERALIZATION IN EMERGING ECONOMIES MITIGATE LEGAL SYSTEMS DEFICIENCIES?

We document positive valuation effects around the time of stock market liberalization. We find that the valuation effects are larger for countries with civil law traditions compared with countries with common law origins. Similarly, we find that countries with weaker shareholder protections exhibit greater market valuation increases compared with countries with stronger shareholder protections. The results reinforce the importance of country legal systems and of shareholder protections in determining the quality of corporate governance systems and financial market outcomes. The findings suggest that stock market liberalization may mitigate deficiencies in the existing institutional environments not supportive of effective corporate governance systems.     

Public Trading and Private Incentives

This article studies the link between public trading and theactivity of a firm's large shareholder who can affect firm value.Public trading results in the formation of a stock price thatis informative about the large shareholder's activity. Thisincreases the latter's incentives to engage in value-increasingactivities. Indeed, if he has to liquidate part of his stakebefore the effect of his activity is publicly observed, a moreinformative price rewards him for his activity. Implicationsare derived for the decision to go public, capital structure,and security design.     

经营利润率、股东收益与股票价格的价值相关性研究

本文以沪、深两市A股上市公司为研究对象,在F-O模型(剩余收益定价模型)的基础上,进一步探讨了分解后的会计信息:经营利润率和股东收益与股价的价值相关性。研究结果表明,上市公司的经营利润率和股东收益对股价有显著的解释能力。本研究的贡献在于进一步拓展了市场定价模型,为证券投资提供具有实用价值的参考。     

The Nature of Corporate Income Tax Under a Full Imputation Tax Regime: A Test of Functional Fixation

This paper tests two competing hypotheses describing investors' behavior: the efficient market hypothesis and the functional fixation hypothesis. In particular, this study examines how Taiwan's stock market interprets the nature of corporate income tax after the 1998 Tax Reform, which switches from the classical tax system to the integrated tax system. This Tax Reform changes the nature of corporate income tax from a pure operating expense to an individual shareholder's tax credit, but current GAAP still treats it as an operating expense in the income statement. The empirical results show that Taiwan's stock market perceives the change in nature of corporate income tax and responds accordingly.     

The Effect of Shareholder Approval of Equity Issuances Around the World

Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies considerably across and within countries. In the United States and a few other countries, management typically needs the approval of only its board of directors to issue common stock. In most countries, however, by law or stock exchange rule, shareholders must vote to approve equity issuances when using certain methods or contemplating offers that exceed a specified fraction of outstanding shares. In some countries, shareholders must approve all equity issuances. Even in the United States, shareholder approval is mandatory under certain circumstances. The differences in the stock market reaction to shareholder‐approved equity issuances and to issues undertaken unilaterally by management are strikingly and consistently large. When shareholders approve stock issuances, whether public or rights offerings, or private placements, the average announcement returns are significantly positive, on the order of 2%. But when managers issue stock without shareholder approval, as in the case of U.S. public offerings, returns are significantly negative and 4% lower, on average, than for shareholder‐approved issues. What's more, the closer in time the shareholder vote is to the issue date, and the greater the required plurality (say, two‐thirds instead of half the vote required for approval), the more positive is the market reaction to the issue—and these findings hold for each of the three main kinds of offerings that take place in all 23 countries in the author's sample. Also telling, in countries where shareholder approval is required, such as Sweden and Malaysia, rights offers predominate over public issues. But in countries like the U.S. and Japan, where managers may generally issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate over rights issues. These findings suggest that agency problems—the tendency of corporate managements to put their own interests before their shareholders'—play a major role in equity issuances. Such findings are also largely inconsistent with the adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations that currently dominate academic thinking about equity issuances by public corporations.     

资本市场流动性与股东积极主义的扩展式博弈研究

通过应用扩展式博弈分析方法,研究市场流动性与股东积极主义之间的关系,并探讨不同股东积极主义形式问的选择.研究发现:市场流动性与股东积极性之间并不存在简单的线性关系.而在不同的股东积极主义形式的选取上,单位成功几率成本低的股东积极主义形式更有可能被大股东所采用,但市场流动性的提高会减弱大股东对单位成功几率成本低的策略的偏好.