Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way.     

Lender deception as a response to moral hazard

The paper considers a principal–agent relationship between a borrower and lender based on a model from Bowles (Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, & evolution. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003). It expands the model by incorporating borrower collateral as an exogenous variable to partly assuage lender concerns about excessive risk, and a theory of lender deception is then developed. Deception is posited as a costly activity that effectively makes fraud undetectable and extracts the borrower’s economic rent arising from moral hazard despite the presence of third-party enforcement and borrower collateral. We identify under what conditions a lender may have sufficient incentives for employing deception and to what extent they would employ it. The likelihood of, and outcomes from, deception are compared between monopoly lenders those in competitive markets. The model suggests that competitive lenders have more incentive to deceive than a monopoly lender facing the same borrower.     

Financial Globalization,Social Exclusion and Financial Crisis

This paper suggests one set of mechanisms that ties financial globalization processes to local dynamics of financial inclusion or exclusion. Specifically, this paper explores the worldwide reconsideration of financial firms’ strategies that has accompanied financial globalization. It is shown that the neoliberal and asymmetric‐information approaches to credit markets and financial crises in developing economies overlook these dimensions of financial globalization because of their tendency to focus on representative credit markets. Banks’ strategic shift has led to the global homogenization and stratification of financial practices—and this in turn has been a key driver of processes of financial exclusion. Financial exclusion then involves bifurcation within financial markets, so that different markets serve different portions of the household and business population. This analysis suggests a reconstruction of Minsky’s microfoundational model of the origins of financial fragility and crisis, which shifts from Minsky’s emphasis on a representative borrower–lender relationship to a situation of borrower–lender relationships in bifurcated markets.     

Collateralized Debt as the Optimal Contract

In a multiple-good risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which collateralized debt is the optimal contract. The necessary and sufficient condition is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G10.     

Remittances and rural credit markets: Evidence from Senegal

This study investigates the relationship between remittances and credit markets in Senegal, focusing on rural areas where financial constraints are more challenging. Using a household fixed effects model, the findings show that remittances and credit markets are complements; namely, the receipt of remittances is positively associated with the likelihood of having a loan in a household. This means that migrants can increase the reliability of their family members and close relatives back home through their remittances, insuring them vis‐à‐vis lenders for their credit contracts. They are the collateral or the “element of trust” in the credit contract between the borrower and the lender, representing a potential alternative in case of non‐repayment. This result is robust to alternative models and various robustness tests mitigating the potential endogeneity of remittances. A detailed analysis also shows that the relationship between remittances and credit markets is mainly driven by loans taken for consumption and food, in particular, as well as loans provided by informal institutions.     

R&D INVESTMENT, CREDIT RATIONING AND SAMPLE SELECTION

We study whether R&D‐intensive firms are liquidity constrained, by modelling their antecedent decision to apply for credit. This sample selection issue is relevant when studying a borrower–lender relationship, as the same factors can influence the decisions of both parties. We find firms with no or low R&D intensity to be less likely to request extra funds. When they do, we observe a higher probability of being denied credit. Such a relationship is not supported by evidence from the R&D‐intensive firms. Thus, our findings lend support to the notion of credit constraints being severe only for a sub‐sample of innovative firms. Furthermore, the results suggest that the way in which the R&D activity is organized may differentially affect a firm's probability of being credit constrained.     

DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORROWING FROM A MONOPOLISTIC LENDER: STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LEADERSHIP*

We develop a two‐period model with endogenous investment and credit flows. Credit is subject to quantitative restrictions. With an exogenous restriction, we analyse the welfare effects of a temporary consumption tax. We then consider three scenarios under which a monopoly lender optimally decides the level of credit and a borrower country chooses a consumption tax: one in which the two parties act simultaneously and two scenarios where one of them is a Stackleberg leader. The equilibrium under the leadership of the borrower country is Pareto superior to the simultaneous move equilibrium but may or may not be to that under the leadership of the lender. If the sequence of moves is itself chosen strategically, leadership by the borrower emerges as the unique equilibrium.     

Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment

We study a continuous-time version of the optimal risk-sharing problem with one-sided commitment. In the optimal contract, the agent?s consumption is a time-invariant, strictly increasing function of a single state variable: the maximal level of the agent?s income realized to date. We characterize this function in terms of the agent?s outside option value function and the discounted amount of time in which the agent?s income process is expected to reach a new to-date maximum. Under constant relative risk aversion we solve the model in closed-form: optimal consumption of the agent equals a constant fraction of his maximal income realized to date. In the complete-markets implementation of the optimal contract, the Alvarez–Jermann solvency constraints take the form of a simple borrowing constraint familiar from the Bewley–Aiyagari incomplete-markets models.     

Adverse selection as an explanation of credit rationing and different lender types

An adverse selection model is utilized to demonstrate that informational asymmetry may make it wealth optimal for the financial intermediary (FI) to credit ration and to rationalize the existence of different lenders in the credit market. The crucial assumption is that borrowers differ in their tolerance for a lender-imposed default penalty, the severity of which also varies with the lender. The credit rationing portion proves that the FI will: 1) be forced by a binding regulatory constraint to overinvest in capital; 2) ration its worst risk class borrowers; 3) establish its optimal loan interest rate on the basis of the average quality of its loans and the interest rate elasticity of the borrower demand in its best risk category; and 4) decrease the total loan volume and increase the loan interest rate due to an increase in the capital requirement, but the effect on the default risk quality of its loan portfolio is ambiguous. The existence result is that if a lender has a high default penalty, he can charge a lower rate and attract only “good” borrowers, i.e., heterogeneous lender types encourage the screening of borrowers and vice versa.     

THIRD PARTIES, INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND MONITORING INCENTIVES

Within an incomplete contract setting, the paper analyses the role of third parties in ameliorating incentive problems arising in the context of financial contracts with costly verification and lender's bargaining power. Contrary to the findings of the bilateral lender–borrower relationship, characterised by no information revelation and possibly a breakdown of the market, it is shown that, in the presence of third parties, an optimal contract exists featuring partial information revelation and random monitoring. The importance of third parties is therefore not limited to improving efficiency, as it is when the contract offer comes from the informed party, but to ensure project realisation, and thus to ensure that the surplus that can arise from the project does not get lost.     

Federal lending and aggregate economic activity

Attention to federal activity in credit markets is typically focused on the government's role as a borrower. In contrast, scant attention is paid to its equally large and dominant role as a lender. This paper evaluates the aggregate impact of federal lending activity within the framework of a vector autoregressive representation of the US macroeconomy. The empirical regularities uncovered suggest that aggregate federal lending activity does not have a net positive impact on output.     

LES DÉTERMINANTS DE LA PERFORMANCE DE REMBOURSEMENT DES MICROCRÉDITS EN TUNISIE

Our work is part of the quest for sustainability of MFIs. To ensure sustainability, an MFI must be effective. It must, among others, face many risks and in particular the default risk. A question arises: what are the determinants of portfolio quality of MFIs? In other words, what are the determinants that influence delays in payment of MFIs? The interest of this research is twofold. The first is practical: knowing the importance of performance measures of microcredit as a precondition for the efficiency and financial performance of MFIs, this study identified determinants of the reimbursement rate in an MFI of Tunisia. It may even give an evidence for banks to intervene on the market of micro credit. The second is methodological: to find the determinants of reimbursement behaviour in MFIs, a binary logistic regression is used, while differing in explanatory variables between key variables and moderators’ ones, which was not met previously in the literature. The results showed that among the variables related to the characteristics of the loan, the loan amount and the borrower's experience with the MFI affect the rate of reimbursement. The credit increases the likelihood of default. Unlike, when borrower's experience with the MFI increases, the risk of default decreases. A relationship between the industry and the repayment rate has not been verified. For variables related to the characteristics of the borrower, age, educational level and marital status of the borrower appear to affect the relationship between the risk of default and the amount of credit. The effect of the credit amount on the default risk decreases as age and level of education increases. In addition, this effect is more important for married compared to the unmarried. For gender, we found that the effect of maturity on the risk of default is not the same for men or women borrowers. It seems that when the maturity increases, men provide reimbursement rates lower than women.     

The impact of public ownership in the lending sector

We examine the effects of increased government ownership of suppliers in the lending sector, which induces increased concern with total welfare and reduced concern with profit. Such increased ownership of a lender can have unanticipated effects. For instance, it can increase lender profit. Furthermore, borrower welfare often declines as government ownership increases in a lender with a relatively limited ability to discern the true quality of borrowers’ projects. In addition, there are settings in which increased government ownership of a lender has no impact on either lender profit or borrower welfare.     

投资者风险偏好、平台行为选择与P2P监管*

本文通过构造一个包含投资者、贷款者和P2P平台三方的网络借贷模型,关注投资风险偏好程度和平台中介费率对三方行为的影响,并分析了提高融资成功率和平台稳定运营的条件,同时指出了平台道德风险行为存在的可能。基于上述分析,本文提出：P2P运营风险不仅来自于贷款方,也与投资者的风险偏好相关,平台和监管机构应关注投资者的类型选择。平台企业的中介费率选择是平衡三方利益和融资成功率的有效手段,应赋予平台企业充分的定价权。作为监管机构的政府,强化资产隔离制度,提高对平台企业的审查和惩罚力度,是管理P2P行业的最根本的手段,但不应对P2P平台的定价和运营模式的创新设置过多限制。     

Progressive Lending in Microfinance—What about the Farmers?

Dynamic incentives have become a common measure in microfinance institutions (MFI) to counteract the risk of default and to strengthen the borrower's identification with his micro‐lender. This article focuses on progressive lending over the course of the bank–borrower relationship. As the agricultural sector is increasingly important for Azerbaijan's economy, this study differentiates between the lending policies faced by farmers and non‐farmers, and matches the findings with the repayment performances of both client groups. By means of a rich data set spanning from 2007 through 2012 provided by an MFI in Azerbaijan, it can be demonstrated that farmers face a higher degree of loan volume rationing that cannot be justified by our findings on repayment performances. Moreover, we find that repeated borrowing increases the default probabilities of both client groups. In conclusion, we deduce that the MFI and borrowers could benefit from reconsidering the current lending policies.     

Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets. We solve for the optimal level of exclusion, and link it to observed institutional arrangements. Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives. First, it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank. Second, and less obviously, it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans, and to honour their promises of future credit. We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt. Moreover, if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance. Our optimal regulation is robust, in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender. Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy–namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances–support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.     

Dependence of Informal Interest Rates and Level of Lenders’ Influence in the Informal Loan Market in Thailand

Informal finance with usurious interest rates seems to be the last resort for the poor in many developing countries. In Thailand, informal credit lenders can freely set up extortionate interest rates and use controversial enforcement actions to pressure borrowers to repay loans, because that legal enforcement is not practical due to the low punishment levels for those lenders. Despite widespread interest in the determinants of the informal interest rates, it remains a largely unexplored area. This study investigates whether level of lenders’ influence over the borrower, and some characteristics of the borrowers, are related to informal interest rates, enabling the rates to be classified into particular categories. Ordered logistic regression is used to analyze the data. The investigation was based on information collected in a survey presented to a sampled population of 694 participants from Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Phathum Thani, and Samut Prakan where the number of informal loans during the last seven years is highest when compared to other regions of the country. The results suggest that the level of lenders’ influence over the borrower in order to obtain a loan correlates with the informal interest rates applied. Moreover, some characteristics of a borrower, i.e., debt-to-income ratio and high level of familiarity between an informal lender and a borrower, also significantly affect the rates.     

Design and rating of risk-contingent credit for balancing business and financial risks for Kenyan farmers

Weather-related agricultural risks and limited access to credit are serious impediments to agricultural productivity and growth in developing countries. This paper describes a novel insurance linked credit model piloted in Kenya, where insurance markets are effectively absent, and farmers do not borrow because of the risk of losing their collateral. One of the challenges in deigning bundled credit products, in the absence of traded securities, is the actuarial pricing and risk rating of the insurance and the loan product. We develop a rainfall linked risk-contingent credit that transfers drought risk related perils from borrower to lender via insurance mechanism that provide a balance between business and credit risks for smallholder farmers. We describe the methodology used to design and rating of a risk-contingent structured operating agricultural credit instrument using CHIRPS rainfall data from 1981–2016 in Kenya. We illustrate the use of Monte Carlo methods to risk modelling that can be integrated within the general insurance and credit rating framework. The innovative design and methodology presented in this paper are as important as the product delivery mechanism and will be of interest to specialists in development economics and agricultural finance.     

Lending policies of informal, formal and semiformal lenders

This paper compares lending policies of formal, informal and semiformal lenders with respect to household lending in Vietnam. The analysis suggests that the probability of using formal or semiformal credit increases if borrowers provide collateral, a guarantor and/or borrow for business‐related activities. The probability of using informal credit increases for female borrowers. It also appears that the probability of using formal credit increases in household welfare up to a certain threshold, but at a decreasing rate. In addition, the paper discerns the determinants of probability of default across lender types. Default risk of formal credit appears to be strongly affected by formal loan contract terms, e.g., loan interest rate and form of loan repayment, whereas default risk on informal loans is significantly related to the presence of propinquity and other internal characteristics of the borrowing household. Overall, the study raises several important implications for the screening, monitoring and enforcement instruments that may be employed by different types of lenders.     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.