Price-cap regulation of congested airports

This paper investigates price-cap regulation of an airport where the airport facility (e.g. runway) is congested and airlines have market power. We show that when airport congestion is not a major problem, single-till price-cap regulation dominates dual-till price-cap regulation with respect to optimal welfare. Furthermore, we identify situations where dual-till regulation performs better than single-till regulation when there is significant airport congestion. For instance, when the airport can cover the airport costs associated with aeronautical services simply through an efficient aeronautical charge then dual-till regulation yields higher welfare.     

Regulation, privatization, and airport charges: panel data evidence from European airports

This paper examines the determinants of airport aeronautical charges by employing a unique panel dataset covering sixty-one European airports over an eighteen-year period. We are able to extend the literature on the role of airports as an essential element in transport infrastructure by offering the first analysis of the impact of different regulatory policies and privatization on airport charges in a panel data setting where fixed effects can be employed to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Our main empirical results indicate that aeronautical charges are lower at airports when single-till regulation is employed, when airports are privatized, and??tentatively??when ex post price regulation is applied. Furthermore, hub airports generally set higher aeronautical charges, and it appears that price-cap regulation and the presence of nearby airports do not affect aeronautical charges.     

The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation

This paper examines the role of price-cap regulation in influencing the relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly. Based on a simple model of mark-up pricing, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to show how cost increases among the firm's products can cause a divergence of prices from the Ramsey structure if the cost increases are non-uniform or if the demand elasticities for the products are non-uniform. However, in the absence of additional cost changes, profit-maximising prices which are subject to a price-cap constraint converge to the Ramsey structure if the previous period's quantities are used as weights in the firm's price-cap constraint. Consequently, given this formulation of the firm's price-cap constraint, only in situations of recurring cost changes are prices likely to show on-going divergence from the Ramsey structure.This paper reports on research funded by the Australian Electricity Supply Industry Research Board. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions.     

Asymmetric equilibria under price cap regulation

This study analyzes the effects of a price-cap regulation on market outcomes in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies. Although two firms are ex-ante identical, there are asymmetric Cournot equilibria as well as the symmetric equilibrium under the price-cap regulation, when the price-cap level is binding. By contrast, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique and equivalent to the most asymmetric Cournot equilibrium under a binding price-cap level. We present several comparative statics results with respect to the equilibrium outcomes. The main concern of this study is the welfare effect of a change in a price-cap level. We show that when asymmetric Cournot equilibria or the Stackelberg equilibrium are focused on, a reduction in a price-cap level may be socially harmful even if the price-cap level is more than the competitive price.     

Allocative inefficiency properties of price-cap regulation

The paper deals with the argument that a price-cap regulated firm maximizing profits under the price-cap constraint will set prices that over time approach the Ramsey structure. My analysis explores the effects of price caps on the structure of prices. The results are in important aspects at variance with the claim of convergence to a Ramsey structure.     

Price-cap regulation and market definition

One of the merits claimed for certain types of price-cap regulation is the possible long-run convergence of the prices of multi-product firms to Ramsey prices. Typically such regulated firms define commodities by such devices as dividing the day into discrete periods, customers into age-groups, distances into ranges, and so on. Allowing that such division is endogenous throws doubt on the ability of Laspeyre quantity-based price-caps to encourage an efficient market definition and hence to generate an efficient price structure.     

Rent extraction and incentives for efficiency in recent regulatory proposals

Building on a simple model proposed by Schmalensee (1989), this paper uses simulation techniques to analyze and compare various regulatory schemes including Schmalensee's family of (linear) good regulatory regimes, a price-cap regime allowing for downward price flexibility, and a regime that combines price-cap and profit sharing. The quantitative analysis pays particular attention to measuring the trade-off between rent extraction and incentives for efficiency. The main findings of this study can be summarized as follows. First, it appears that pure price-cap regulation leaves substantial rent to the firm relative to the other regimes. Second, introducing room for downward price flexibility improves efficiency of price-cap over Schmalensee's linear regulatory regimes. Finally, by correcting in part for the distributional distortion of price-cap, the profit-sharing mechanism often yields levels of welfare comparable to optimal regulation levels.     

Welfare Consequences of Tight Price-Cap Regulation

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price-cap regulation of a multi-product monopolist when the price index has fixed weights. A tight cap can result in welfare below the level associated with an unregulated monopoly. This does not occur if the weights are based on lagged quantities and the level of the cap exceeds the previous period's total cost. In a two-period model the welfare problem is alleviated in the second period but first-period performance can be worse if the firm is not myopic.     

Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies

This paper considers methods of price structure regulation of electricity transmission in the context of an independent transmission company (TRANSCO). The focus is on two-part tariffs where the variable part would reflect congestion charges (and ancillary services) while the fixed part would reflect capacity costs. The two-part tariffs form a price-cap index, and the firm could rebalance prices, as long as the index satisfies the price-cap constraint. The firm would then have incentives to trade off congestion against capacity expansion in such a way that it becomes profitable to expand, whenever the costs of congestion on average exceed the costs of expansion. However, with chained Laspeyres weights in the price-cap index expansion may be suboptimal. We therefore discuss ways to improve the expansion factor. Implementing the regulatory schemes considered suggests a hybrid approach combining a TRANSCO with an independent system operator (ISO).     

Privatization,regulation and airport pricing: an empirical analysis for Europe

This paper examines factors determining airport charges. Using data for 100 large airports in Europe, we find that they charge higher prices when they move more passengers. Additionally, competition from other transport modes and nearby airports imposes some discipline on the pricing behavior of airports. Low-cost carriers and airlines with a high market share seem to have a stronger countervailing power. We also find that private airports not regulated charge higher prices than public or regulated airports. Finally, the regulation mechanism does not seem to influence substantially the level of airport charges.     

Regulating prices for shifting between service providers

The price that a regulated access provider charges for shifting customers between service providers has significant welfare implications. Typical regulatory approaches to pricing, such as pricing based on fully allocated cost or incremental cost, ignore the characteristics of consumer demand. A theoretical alternative, Ramsey pricing, considers only the elasticity of demand for given products. This paper directs attention to the competitive process. Using US long-distance telephone services as an example, this paper shows how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service providers can help to inform price regulation.     

Pricing incentives under price-cap regulation

In many price-cap regulation plans, such as those of AT&T and British Telecom, a weighted average of the prices for multiple services (baskets) must not exceed a specified level. This analysis demonstrates that the weighting scheme most commonly employed is subject to intertemporal manipulation. This investigation provides specific demand conditions under which weight manipulation can arise, shows the manipulation to reduce social welfare, and proposes a simple alternative weighting scheme that is less prone to manipulation. The alternative weighting scheme can help in designing more effective price-cap plans, especially if new plans have longer terms than current ones.     

机场环境管制探讨

机场环境管制的重点是噪声和排放物污染。除直接管制外,收费是国外机场环境管制中应用得最多且最有效率的经济管制方式。我国除继续强化已有的直接管制方式外,还可以从收取以保护环境为目的的噪声费和排放物费、限制机场土地的使用、采取国际机场协会提出的短期和长期机场环境保护措施三个方面进一步加强机场环境管制。     

Price cap regulation: A case study of some pitfalls of implementation

There has been considerable discussion of price-cap regulation as an alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation. This paper examines some of the practical pitfalls of price-cap regulation. First, a model of a terminating price cap is developed. Next, this model is used to propose some problems of implementation. These problems are evaluated in the context of a case study of the Tucson Electric Power Company, which faced a type of price cap for several years in the 1980s. Extensions of the specific case to more general lessons about price-cap regulation are considered.     

机场博弈与中国起降费规制改革——一个合作博弈论评价

本文通过在机场博弈中使用的合作博弈论中两个成本分摊工具——Shapley值和Owen值，用厦门高崎机场2002至2005年（预计）的全年起降数据，计算了以合作博弈论为基础的机场起降费标准。本文将理论值与中国机场起降费用改革历程中的三个收费标准作出了比较，同时对民航总局提出的起降费上限改革进行了分析，并提出相应的政策建议。另外，本文还对即将在中国各大机场起降的最大型飞机A380的起降费用进行了理论上的估算。     

Social Preferences and Price Cap Regulation

This paper analyzes the allocative properties of price cap regulation under very general hypotheses on the nature of society's preferences. We propose a generalized price cap that ensures the convergence to optimal (second best) prices in the long-run equilibrium for virtually any form of the welfare function. Hence, the result of the convergence to Ramsey prices of Laspeyres-type price cap regulation is a particular instance of our more general result. We also provide an explicit and relatively easy to calculate and implement generalized price cap formula for distributionally weighted utilitarian welfare functions, as suggested by Feldstein (1972a).     

The determinants of market share for the `dominant firm' in telecommunications

The present study examines the factors affecting the market share of the dominant firm in long-distance telecommunications, AT&T. A theoretical model is specified which includes competing long-distance rates (e.g., those of MCI and U.S. Sprint), price-cap regulation and advertising expenditures as determinants of the dominant firm's market share. Using intercity long-distance carrier charges for 1984–1994, this study points out the importance of AT&T's own rate structure, those of its major competitors, and government regulations in determining AT&T's market share over time.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap Regulation Plans

Despite the popularity of price-cap regulation in practice, the economic literature provides limited guidance on how to determine the X factor, which is the rate at which inflation-adjusted output prices must fall under price-cap plans. We review the relevant basic principles, and then determine how to set the X factor: (1) when only a subset of the firm's products are subject to price-cap regulation, and when product-specific costs and productivity cannot be measured; (2) when changes in regulated prices affect the economy-wide inflation rate; and (3) in the presence of such structural changes as strengthened competitive forces.     

Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming

Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. Although the network connection switches frequently between available networks, the choice of network is largely independent of wholesale prices. As a consequence, we show that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent European price-cap regulation forces firms to reduce wholesale and retail roaming prices, but does not solve the underlying problem. There may thus be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call termination. Furthermore, we show that there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.