Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects

In the assignment problem of indivisible objects with money, we study social ordering functions which satisfy the requirement that social orderings should be independent of changes in preferences over infeasible bundles. We combine this axiom with efficiency, consistency and equity axioms. Our result is that the only social ordering function satisfying those axioms is the leximin function in money utility.     

Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

We study a private-values buyer–seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.     

Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects

Subsidy-free VCG mechanisms assign p identical objects to n agents. The efficiency loss is the largest ratio of budget surplus to efficient surplus, over all profiles of non-negative valuations. The smallest efficiency loss satisfies . If is bounded away from , converges to zero exponentially in n.Participation is voluntary in the optimal mechanism achieving if p=1, but not if p?2. Among voluntary mechanisms, the optimal efficiency loss is not significantly larger than if . But it does not converge to zero in n if .     

A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game

To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agents on the same class are ordered to be consecutive, the related exact assignment market is defined by a partitioned matrix, each block of the partition being a glove market.     

Predicting early adoption of successive video player generations

Early adopters play an important role in the innovation diffusion process. Over the past decades, many factors have been identified as predictors for early adoption of innovations. Less attention has been paid to the relationship between the early adoption of one generation of a specific product and the early adoption of successive product generations. This paper analyzes how early adoption of a new product generation depends on ownership, purchase experience and adoption times for previous generations of the same product. The paper develops predictive models of early adoption for four generations of video player products, based on a survey among 815 Australian consumers. The model allows the testing of various hypotheses. It is shown that previous generation variables outperform conventional socio-demographic and psychographic variables in predicting early adoption but also that the two variable types complement each other. The best predicting models include both previous generation and socio/psychographic variables. It is concluded that previous generation models have substantial merits for new product forecasting as they are more parsimonious than conventional models and the data required to estimate them is relatively easy to obtain.     

A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain

We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is critical to their algorithm. Our main contribution is an analogous algorithm for the full preference domain in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our algorithm is based on a reinterpretation of the PS mechanism as an iterative algorithm to compute a “flow” in an associated network. In addition we show that on the full preference domain it is impossible for even a weak strategyproof mechanism to find a random assignment that is both ordinally efficient and envy-free.     

Optimal policies to promote efficient distributed generation of electricity

Regulations are frequently based on a uniform standard, which applies to all facilities within a single industry. However, implementation of many of these regulations does not lead to uniform limits due to considerations of local conditions in real policy settings. In this paper, we theoretically examine the relationships among the stringency of effluent limits imposed on individual polluting facilities by permit writers, environmental protection agencies’ monitoring decisions, and the ambient quality of the local environment. In particular, we explore the establishment of effluent limits when (1) the national emission standard represents only an upper bound on the local issuance of limits and (2) negotiation efforts expended by regulated polluting facilities and environmentally concerned citizens play a role. We find that the negotiated discharge limit depends on the political weight enjoyed and the negotiation effort costs faced by both citizens and the regulated facility, along with the stringency of the national standard and local ambient quality conditions.     

Optimal design of experiments to identify latent behavioral types

Bayesian optimal experiments that maximize the information gained from collected data are critical to efficiently identify behavioral models. We extend a seminal method for designing Bayesian optimal experiments by introducing two computational improvements that make the procedure tractable: (1) a search algorithm from artificial intelligence that efficiently explores the space of possible design parameters, and (2) a sampling procedure which evaluates each design parameter combination more efficiently. We apply our procedure to a game of imperfect information to evaluate and quantify the computational improvements. We then collect data across five different experimental designs to compare the ability of the optimal experimental design to discriminate among competing behavioral models against the experimental designs chosen by a “wisdom of experts” prediction experiment. We find that data from the experiment suggested by the optimal design approach requires significantly less data to distinguish behavioral models (i.e., test hypotheses) than data from the experiment suggested by experts. Substantively, we find that reinforcement learning best explains human decision-making in the imperfect information game and that behavior is not adequately described by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our procedure is general and computationally efficient and can be applied to dynamically optimize online experiments.

     

A micro-analytic threshold model for the timing of first purchases of durable goods

A micro-analytic threshold model to describe the timing of household purchases of consumer durable goods is developed and tested. The model incorporates unobserved heterogeneity via a generalized gamma distribution and accounts for time varying covariates. Further, we employ estimation methods applicable or purchase data observed at periodic intervals of time. The model outperforms other competing models for predicting the timing of purchase of durable goods in terms of fit and predictive ability. In particular, this model outperforms the logit model and the diffusion model. The generalized gamma timing model predicts well the time to purchase the durable good; we show how it can be employed for micro-segmentation of households. Several research directions and applications are described.     

Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates

This paper derives optimal income tax formulas using compensated and uncompensated elasticities of earnings with respect to tax rates. A simple formula for the high income optimal tax rate is obtained as a function of these elasticities and the thickness of the top tail of the income distribution. In the general non-linear income tax problem, this method using elasticities shows precisely how the different economic effects come into play and which are the key relevant parameters in the optimal income tax formulas of Mirrlees. The optimal non-linear tax rate formulas are expressed in terms of elasticities and the shape of the income distribution. These formulas are implemented numerically using empirical earning distributions and a range of realistic elasticity parameters.     

Optimal divisibility of money when money is costly to produce

There is wide agreement that currency was not available in conveniently small denominations prior to the 19th century. Here, estimates of the costs of providing and maintaining money (coins) in 15th century Europe and parameterized versions of a matching model of money are used to find the optimal degree of divisibility. Although the optima are sensitive to the specification of the matching model, the optimal sizes we find agree in order of magnitude with the sizes of the most common coins in 15th century Europe.     

社会保障基金最优持股比例研究

在不考虑信息不对称和外部性的条件下,在无穷期生命期限模型中,中央计划经济和竞争性均衡经济的结果是完全等价的;但是在有限生命期限模型中(如代际交叠模型等),中央计划经济和竞争性均衡经济的等价关系就不一定成立,而且在"动态无效率"的情况下,竞争性均衡是帕累托无效的,这时就有必要引入政府来调节经济效率。本文在代际交叠模型中引入国有股形式的社会保障来研究最优社会保障基金持有国有股的比例。研究发现:通过调节社会保障基金的持股比例可以实现中央计划经济和竞争性均衡经济的等价,实现最大的社会福利,从这个角度出发就可以确定最优的社会保障基金的持股比例。本文的结论对全国社会保障基金在未来的实际运作有指导意义。     

The core of an m-sided assignment game

A generalization of Shapley-Shubik's (1972, Int. J. Game Theory, 1, 111–130) housing market in which there are m types of agents instead of two is considered. These games can have empty cores. A subclass of such games with nonempty cores is presented.     

对扩展我国海员外派劳务产业的思考

通过对世界海员劳务市场以及我国海员外派现状和存在问题的分析和研究,提出发展我国海员劳务输出的应对措施和解决办法.     

The dynamics of open-market operations and the assignment problem

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of expansionary monetary policy financed by open-market purchases and to reconsider the assignment problem. We present a strict definition of open-market operations: a swap of money against bonds is achieved by just buying or selling bonds in the open market all through the adjustment process. Under this definition the open-market paradox given by Blinder and Solow is avoided. Even in the case of zero capital mobility, the assignment problem has an important economic meaning.