The Welfare Effects of Differential Tariff Rates

This paper considers a two-country, three-good economy in which one country imposes tariffs on import goods at a uniform rate, while the other country engages in free trade. In such an economy, we examine the welfare effects of changing tariff rates toward differential tariffs from uniform tariffs.     

The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power

We theoretically analyze the optimal tariff problem that arises in a large country with market power. By using a model with more than two traded goods, we derive (1) the condition for optimal import tariff rates to be ranked, and (2) the condition under which the optimum import tariff becomes uniform. These conditions are established in a three-good model and in an N-good model. The results are evaluated on the basis of compensated excess demand elasticity, and hence do not require information on income effects. I would like to thank Tatsuo Hatta, Makoto Okamura, Katsuhiko Suzuki and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Optimal Tariffs under a Revenue Constraint*

This paper examines the optimal tariff structure under a revenue constraint. When a fixed level of tax revenue has to be collected from the tariff alone, no adjustment in tariff rates can achieve an efficient resource allocation, even in a small open economy. Hence, the optimal tariff problem arises under a revenue constraint. We show that the revenue‐constrained optimal tariff structure is characterized by the following two rules: (i) the optimal tariff rate is lower for the import good that is a closer substitute for the export good, and (ii) the stronger the cross‐substitutability between imports, the closer the optimal tariff is to uniformity. This provides a theoretical explanation for the finding in empirical studies that the efficiency loss from a uniform tariff structure is negligible.     

Protection and commercial policy: Experiments with a general equilibrium econometric model

This paper analyzes the incidence of commercial policy by simulating the effects of an import tariff in the context of a general equilibrium econometric model of the U.S. It is found that in the long run the tariff protection given to importables is mainly at the expense of exportables, rather than the nontraded goods sector. The simulations also provide the general equilibrium responses of a number of other variables to changes in commercial policy, which may be of interest from a policy perspective.     

Impact of tariff rates on the probability of trade relationship survival: Evidence from ASEAN+6 manufactured goods

This article explores the links between imported trade relationships, their duration and tariff rates. We use survival analysis to investigate how the probability of trade relationship survival is affected by the difference in the tariff rates. We use the ASEAN+6 as the basis of our report and consider a total of 89 trading partners for manufactured goods from 1996 to 2011. Our findings are as follows. First, low‐tariff trade survives longer than high‐tariff trade of manufactured goods. Second, we find a significantly negative correlation between tariff rates and duration, and regional trade agreements help prolong the length of trade relationships. Third, the hazard ratios of intraregional differentiated goods and the parts and components trade are lower. We have also obtained robust results for distinct specifications through consideration of production networks and Rauch's product classification. Finally, we believe that these findings could be used as a reference for other economic organizations working toward the diminution of tariff rates.     

关税、货币政策与中国实际均衡汇率

加入WTO后 ,降低进口品关税等措施将影响人民币均衡汇率水平 ,同时开放经济下国内货币政策、财政政策等宏观经济政策调整也会改变均衡汇率水平。本文运用动态一般均衡的方法 ,探讨中国在加入世界贸易组织之后 ,关税税率调整、货币供应量增长率改变、财政政策调整等措施对实际均衡汇率的长期效应。把货币引入生产函数和消费者的效用函数 ,我们扩展了由Turnovsky提出的两商品资本积累模型 ,利用参数赋值(calibration)的方法进行了均衡状态下的比较静态分析。研究发现降低进口品关税使人民币面临贬值压力 ,而政府增加税收 ,减少对贸易品的消费则有利于人民币的保值和升值。实证研究结果表明 :国外实际利率水平下降 ,实际货币供应量增长率降低都将引起人民币均衡汇率贬值。     

Revenue‐enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly

Existing studies suggest that in developing countries, tax reforms that increase consumption taxes can compensate for shortfalls in revenue from a tariff reduction. However, these revenue‐enhancing tariff–tax reforms have a critical shortcoming—they generally reduce welfare under imperfect competition. This paper shows that tax reforms such as consumption tax reforms do not necessarily have to be implemented to make up for revenue shortfalls from tariff reductions under imperfect competition, because trade liberalization through tariff cuts leads to an increase in government revenue when domestic and imported goods have a high substitutability. This revenue‐enhancing effect of a tariff reduction occurs for a wider degree of product substitutability when initial tariff and consumption tax rates are high. More importantly, we show that even if initial tariff and consumption tax rates are sufficiently low, a tariff reduction still increases government revenue for a low degree of product differentiation under Bertrand competition.     

More on tariffs and non-traded goods

The general equilibrium effects of a small tariff on relative prices are analysed within a demand and supply model which provides further insights into Dornbusch's (1974) results. It is shown that the elasticity of the price of non-traded goods with respect to the tariff is a weighted average of the degree of substitutability between non-traded goods and importables on the supply side and that on the demand side. When complementarity is ruled out, the price of non-traded goods increases with the tariff, but less than proportionally.     

Cost‐reducing R&D Investment,Labor Market and Trade

This paper constructs a two‐country model in which oligopolistic firms export goods and undertake cost‐reducing R&D investment. Each country imposes tariffs. A decrease in the tariff rates in both countries decreases cost‐reducing R&D investment.     

An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

Poland's Accession to the European Union: Demand for Protection of Selected Sensitive Products

This paper analyses the expected changes in external tariffs and imports in Poland after accession to the European Union. We find that around 14% of all manufacturing commodity groups in the Harmonised System will experience tariff reductions of over 10 percentage points, while for agricultural goods tariff comparisons are complicated by very different tariff systems and may be overrated, since applied tariffs are often lower than those legislated. Based on gravity estimates we also find onlly few relatively narrowly defined commodities will experience import growth rates of above 20%. More widely defined sensitive commodities are subject to much smaller but still important import growth     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

A short-run econometric analysis of the demand and import supply of a horticultural good: tomatoes

This paper considers the problem of estimating the short-run effects of nominal tariff and domestic production levels on the levels of imports and final market prices of fresh tomatoes in the UK during the period 1959–1968. Prior to EEC entry, tariff production was used as the main policy instrument for horticultural support; horticultural goods being exempt from guarantee or intervention price schemes. In retrospect it would, therefore, seem useful to consider the theoretical requirements for its effective use in such a market situation. The paper consists of two parts. The first section discusses a simple comparative-static specification of a simultaneous equation market model determining the prices and import levels of a single horticultural good and goes on to derive measures of the effects of tariff rate and domestic production changes on market equilibrium. The second section presents several sets of alternative estimates of the specified market model and calculated effects for the specific case of fresh tomatoes during the period 1965–68     

Tariffs and Welfare In A Dynamic Differentiated Oligopoly*

Using a dynamic general-equilibrium environment with strategically interacting oligopolists, this paper demonstrates that dynamic elements will significantly alter the equilibrium effects of tariff policy. In particular, the tariff rate which maximizes aggregate steady state welfare is decreasing in the level of adjustment costs. Furthermore, when tariff rates change, there are short-run welfare losses along the dynamic transition path to the new steady state. Gradual implementation of policy can avoid these losses. This provides a justification for the gradual implementation of tariff reductions in the GATT rounds or in the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States.     

Why Free Trade May Hurt Developing Countries

This paper builds a general equilibrium trade model where a country produces two traded goods and one nontraded public consumption good. The government finances the provision of the public good by taxing the incomes of factors of production, and/or by imposing tariffs. Within this framework, the paper (i) shows that a small tariff or an income tax improves the country's welfare if there is an undersupply of public good, and (ii) identifies the circumstances in which an improvement in the country's terms of trade may reduce its welfare, and free trade can be inferior to autarky. A terms of trade improvement, or the movement from autarky to free trade, definitely improves the country's welfare if the government imposes a tariff that leaves the domestic relative price of the imported good unchanged.     

The Moral Hazard Play: A Review of The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF

We estimate the influence of trade preferences granted by Argentina on the origin of its imports. We try to identify if changes in Argentina's trade policy toward a set of countries had a differential effect, depending on whether goods were already traded, or on the contrary, if tariff changes affected mostly imports of new goods. We distinguish between the effects of changing tariffs and changing trade preferences. The econometric evidence shows that the effect of changes in tariff preferences on the probability of Argentina importing from other Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) members has been rather small, with most of the effect being explained by changes in tariff rates levied on imports from these countries. This result is stronger in the case of imports from Brazil.     

The Mercantilist Index of Trade Policy*

We introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff/quota structure. Our index overcomes the problems of the trade‐weighted average tariff: It avoids substitution bias, correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers, and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark. Empirical applications to international cross section and time‐series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results: Trade‐weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade‐volume‐equivalent index; this in turn always underestimates the welfare‐equivalent index.     

Optimal trade policy in tariff games with inside money

We construct a bilateral trade model incorporating two physical goods and a financial asset (inside money) to discuss the optimal trade policy that countries would choose to maximize their respective utilities. In this Nash tariff game, the trade of physical commodities only occurs geographically across countries, and the trade of inside money allows for intertemporal allocation of consumptions. When the preferences, present and future endowments for each country are given, according to our numerical analysis, trade surplus or deficit (inside money) and optimal tariff rates are endogenously determined when general equilibrium conditions hold. One country may purchase inside money to shift current consumption to the future, and the other may be willing to issue inside money for smoothing its consumptions in two periods. This imbalance trade contradicts traditional trade models which imply a balanced trade policy. We further find that the price of inside money as an implied interest rate also is determined by the trade intervention policies.     

Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

Flexible and welfare-consistent tariff aggregation over exporter regions

In this paper we improve on existing tariff aggregation techniques in applied equilibrium models (AEM) with the aim of correcting for two sources of bias in simulated welfare results: (1) aggregation over exporter regions with significant tariff dispersion and (2) variable tariff rates determined by Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) regimes. Both aspects seem important due to an increasing number of bilateral FTAs which drive up tariff divergence across countries and tend to apply TRQs, at least temporarily. We demonstrate that the proposed aggregation technique can handle both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade by combining a number of tariff indexes in a modified trade balance condition in a welfare-consistent manner. Additionally, different rent-allocation shares for TRQs can be easily introduced in our methodological extension. We also address the implications of some rather strict behavioral assumptions with regard to demand that welfare consistent aggregation requires. An empirical analysis of the Korean dairy market in the EU–South Korea FTA using the proposed method shows that simulated welfare gains are largely affected by the tariff aggregation technique over regions and trade policy instruments. Based on this finding we recommend the more widespread application of welfare consistent tariff aggregation in applied modeling and further research on that topic.