Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

Resource-rich countries have tended to be autocratic and also have tended to use their resource wealth badly. The neoconservative agenda of promoting democratization in resource-rich countries thus offers the hopeful prospect of a better use of their economic opportunities. This paper examines whether the effect of democracy on economic performance is distinctive in resource-rich societies. We show that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous: Resource rents could either enhance or undermine the economic consequences of democracy. We therefore investigate the issue empirically. We first build a new dataset on country-specific resource rents, annually for the period 1970-2001. Using a global panel dataset, we find that in developing countries the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems has been growth-reducing. Checks and balances offset this adverse effect. Thus, resource-rich economies need a distinctive form of democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. Unfortunately, this is rare: Checks and balances are public goods and so are liable to be undersupplied in new democracies. Over time they are eroded by resource rents.     

Export Product Diversification and Public Revenue’s Dependence on Resource Revenue

ABSTRACT

This article tries to reconcile two major priorities for countries, notably resource-rich countries on the international development agenda: export product diversification with a view to helping them better integrate into the multilateral trading system and tax reforms with a view to reducing the dependence of total public revenue on resource revenue, and therefore developing a more sustainable stream of public revenue. The analysis therefore involves examining empirically the impact of export product diversification on countries’ overall public revenue dependence on resource revenue, this dependence being measured by the share of resource revenue in total public revenue. The empirical analysis shows that export product diversification exerts a negative and significant impact on resource revenue share of total public revenue, and therefore could help facilitate tax reforms towards lower resource revenue dependence. Hence, while tax policy is the main policy tool to conduct tax reforms, export product diversification would likely contribute to facilitating the implementation of these reforms.     

Natural resources and international labour mobility

We study the relationship between natural resource wealth and (skilled and unskilled) emigration. The source data for international migration rates come from Brücker, Capuano, and Marfouk (2013) and measures of resource wealth from the World Bank database. We find that natural resource abundance reduces skilled emigration regardless of countries’ natural wealth, but that natural resources reduce unskilled emigration only in resource-rich countries.     

被挂靠企业公司法人人格之否认——以利益冲突为视角

公司法人人格否认制度最早渊源于英美法国家,实践中有其严格适用条件。中国新《公司法》第20条引入了公司法人人格否认制度,但在民商事和公司法实践中如何具体适用,却没有相对具体的司法解释。特别是挂靠经营中发生的债权债务纠纷能否适用公司法人人格否认制度以及如何适用,以平衡各方利益冲突,体现公平正义,最大限度地保护债权人、案外人和社会公共利益,是民商事和公司法理论和实践都应面对的一个课题。     

The geography of natural resources,ethnic inequality and civil conflicts

We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries causes spatial inequality and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geo-coded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the spatial distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality. Moreover, a spatially unequal distribution of natural resources induces rent-seeking behaviour and thus increases the risk of civil conflicts. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in income inequality and the onset of civil conflicts.     

Trade and civil conflict: Revisiting the cross‐country evidence

We revisit and expand the evidence on the impact of trade shocks on intra‐state conflict by using a large sample of developing countries in the 1960–2010 period. The results suggest that increases in the price of a country's exported commodities raise the country's risk of civil conflict and its duration. The effect on conflict risk is mainly driven by the price of point‐source commodities, in line with the rapacity effect theory of conflict. Intense trading with contiguous countries is associated with lower duration of conflict, consistent with the idea that such trade reduces the incentive of these countries to fuel conflict in their neighbor. Trading with neighbors is also associated with a lower risk of conflict when such trade occurs under trade agreements. On the other hand, we find no support for the opportunity cost theory via exported and imported commodities, nor via the economic cycle in export markets. We also identify a number of conditions under which the changes in the value of exported commodities cease to matter for conflict probability.     

Natural resource extraction and civil conflict

Based on evidence linking natural resources to civil conflict, this paper studies two armed groups fighting to control a resource and possibly a second prize. Labor is used in the agricultural, resource extraction and conflict sectors, and the groups also buy a capital input to conflict subject to the constraint that capital spending cannot exceed resource earnings. I find that exogenous shocks can have different effects on conflict intensity depending on whether the credit constraint binds. In particular, international policies to ban natural resource exports from conflict zones (e.g. ‘blood diamonds’), raise agricultural productivity or limit the import of weapons will limit conflict intensity if the credit constraint binds. However, if the credit constraint does not bind, then the first two policies promote conflict, and so could even the third policy. The results therefore suggest some caution in international policymaking.     

Natural Resources and Missing Inputs in International Productivity Comparisons*

Standard theory for cross-country productivity comparisons assumes all countries use the same factor inputs in production. This assumption is violated when including natural resources, such as oil, gas and gold, because countries do not extract the full set of resources. In this paper we propose a solution by viewing it as a “missing goods” problem and assigning missing inputs a reservation price equal to the world resource price. We show that this has a substantial impact on relative productivity levels for countries heavily reliant on natural resources for generating their income. Under our new productivity measure, resource-rich countries are no longer uncommonly productive.     

Chinese resource demand and the natural resource supplier

This article provides empirical evidence on the effects of Chinese resource demand on the resource-rich natural resource supplier using the example of Australia. A structural VAR model is used to examine the effects of Chinese resource demand, commodity prices and foreign output on the macroeconomy with a formally specified mining and resource export sector. The key findings of the article are that shocks to Chinese demand and commodity prices result in a sustained increase in commodity prices and mining investment and a positive impact on the resource sector. However, these shocks eventually lead to lower real domestic output with factors of production moving out of the nonresource sectors and into the resource sector, resulting in a fall in nonresource sector output which is not fully offset by the rise in resource sector output. The results also indicate some market power by the natural resource supplier.     

Did rainfall shocks cause civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa? The implications of data revisions

In their seminal paper, Miguel et al. (2004) found that negative rainfall shocks (measured as negative year-on-year rainfall growth) had caused civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa over the 1981–1999 period. Since then, the rainfall and conflict data they used had undergone multiple revisions. We show that rainfall shocks are no longer statistically significant for civil conflict when the revised data are used. This is true whether we employ a different functional form for rainfall, extend the sample to include more recent observations, use longer lags for rainfall shocks, employ dynamic panel regression, or panel regressions that take into account of cross-sectional dependence. Using rainfall shocks as instruments for growth, we also find that growth is insignificant for civil conflict if the revised data are used. Upon further investigation, we find that updates in the rainfall and conflict data for one or a few countries may alone cause rainfall shocks to lose statistical significance.     

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.¹ As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).     

Political freedom and the response to economic incentives: labor migration in Africa, 1972-1987

This study examines the thesis that political institutions and the freedoms and civil rights generated by these institutions affect migration decisions. The hypothesis is based on one stated by Adam Smith in 1776, that economic conditions that reflect greater political freedoms and civil liberties harbor higher levels of resource mobility in response to economic incentives. Pooled cross-sectional and time-series analysis is based on data from the World Bank for 32 African countries during 1972-87. Findings support the hypothesis that migration rate is more affected by the expected returns ratio to labor in countries where civil liberties are greater than in nations with fewer civil liberties. The implication, from the inclusion of institutional factors in the model, is that civil liberties have an indirect impact on the rate of labor migration out of agriculture in Africa. The impact is a mix of economic incentives and civil liberties. In the political rights model, the most free countries had the largest migration elasticity. The findings on political rights impacts support findings by Friedman and McMillan that civil liberties are a more important determinant of economic growth than political rights. Further testing for measurement error confirmed that the data were flawed, but not so greatly that the basic findings were overturned. The migration out of African agriculture was found to be sensitive to the effect of price signals, which were conditioned by the degree of political rights and civil liberties. Policy makers are urged to consider both changes in pricing and institutions.     

Study on the reform of resource tax and sustainable development of the underdeveloped resource-rich regions in China

The underdeveloped resource-rich region in China refers to the underdeveloped region with abundantnatural resources. The problem for these regions sustainable development cannot be negligible for its particularity innatural resources and environment. This paper mainly examines the issue about resource tax reform and the sustainabledevelopment of underdeveloped resource-rich regions. It first expatiates on regional characteristics of underdevelopedresource-rich regions, then analyzes the effect that resource tax has on the sustainable development of this type of regions,takes Yulin City as example to illuminate the negative influence on the sustainable development of those regions due to thedesign limitation of the existing resource tax, and put forward some suggestions, including to delegate tax legislativepower to lower levels, to increase resource tax rate, to expand its levied scope to give play to the potential main tax to localrevenue, to improve the design of resource tax, to enhance the its function of resource saving and environmentalprotection, to attach importance to regional interest of underdeveloped resource-rich regions and to improve of theinterest distribution system concerning the tax system and resource exploitation.     

Costs of civil war and fragile states in Africa

This paper provides an analysis of the costs of conflict for the countries that are most affected by it, namely low‐income and fragile countries in Africa. It provides an analysis of the impact of conflict on economic growth using a panel of African countries and investigates the differences between those categorized as fragile and others. It finds that there are significant differences, with fragile countries most affected by conflict. It also considers the potential spillover effects of conflict and finds that fragile states also suffer more from conflicts within neighboring states. Finally, it considers whether the results are robust to endogeneity of the conflict variable. Using instrumental variable estimation confirms the negative effect of conflict and the larger effects on fragile states and gives even larger coefficient estimates.     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

This water is all ours: Water demand and civil conflicts

This article provides the first assessment of the relationship between competition over water resources and water-related civil conflicts within countries. Pressure on water resources is a major concern and source of conflict. In recent decades, this pressure has been increasing due to rising water demand. This study examines the effect of three indicators of water demand that are likely to affect the occurrence of water-related civil conflicts: population density, international trade, and income per capita. We rely on a linear probability model with fixed-effects on a sample of 144 countries between 1961 and 2018. The results reveal that, among the three factors, demographic pressure is the only positive and robust determinant of the occurrence of water disputes. Furthermore, while pressure on water resources appears to be a relevant channel mediating population density's effect on the probability of water conflicts, this density effect is mitigated when populations' access to water resources for domestic consumption increases. Finally, it appears that population density is particularly relevant in explaining conflicts where the main issue is the access or control of water resources and where water is used as a weapon.     

Growth in fragile states in Africa: Conflict and post‐conflict capital accumulation

This article analyses the pattern of capital accumulation in Africa and its interaction with political fragility. Political fragility, defined as armed conflict or civil war, retards or reverses gains with respect to capital accumulation, slowing long‐term economic growth. Many countries experience negative rates of capital accumulation, particularly during periods of acute political instability. In post‐war periods, countries generally continue to experience capital destruction, lending support to the “war ruin hypothesis.” This has implications for long‐term economic growth in view of the strong association between capital accumulation and economic performance. The main policy implication of the analysis is that African countries and their international partners should pay more attention to capital accumulation, including capital reconstruction after periods of political instability, to lay the foundations for sustainable economic growth.     

Resource Curse: New Evidence on the Role of Institutions

This paper attempts to provide a probable answer to a longstanding resource curse puzzle; i.e., why resource-rich nations grow at a slower rate compared with less fortunate ones. Using an innovative threshold estimation technique, the empirical results reveal that there is a threshold effect in the natural resources–economic growth relationship. We find that the impact of natural resources is meaningful to economic growth only after a certain threshold point of institutional quality has been attained. The results also shed light on the fact that the nations that have low institutional quality depend heavily on natural resources while countries with high quality institutions are relatively less dependent on natural resources to generate growth.     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

RESOURCE CURSE,POLITICAL ENTRY,AND DEADWEIGHT COSTS

A simple model of political entry in a two‐sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent‐seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that “resource wealth enhances regime durability” and “resource wealth fuels conflict.”