Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options

This paper considers a model of bargaining in which the seller makes offers and the buyer can search (at a cost) for an outside option; the outside option cannot be credibly communicated, and the seller's offer is recallable by the buyer for one period. There are essentially two equilibrium regimes. For sufficiently high search cost, the game ends immediately; otherwise the search occurs in equilibrium. Compared to the case where the buyer can communicate his outside option, the seller is worse off, and the game results in search for a smaller set of values of the search cost, i.e., less equilibrium delay.C72.     

On Perceptions of Fairness: The Role of Valuations, Outside Options, and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining Games

This study examines fairness perceptions in ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric payoffs, outside options, and different information states. Fairness perceptions were dependent on treatment conditions. Specifically, when proposers had higher chip values, dollar offers were lower than when responders had higher chip values. When responders had an outside option, offers were higher and were rejected less often than when proposers had an outside option. However, a given offer was rejected more often when responders had an outside option. Therefore, similar to the first mover advantage, the “advantaged” or “entitled” player received a higher monetary payoff than they would otherwise. When there was complete information about payoff amounts (payoff conversion rates and outside options), rejections occurred more often, and given offer amounts were rejected more often than when there was incomplete information. When there was incomplete information, offers were higher in the initial rounds than in the final rounds. These results suggest that proposers made offers strategically, making offers that would not be rejected, rather than out of a concern for fairness.     

Wage Bargaining, Inventories, and Union Legislation

This paper analyses a strategic bargaining game where the firm may or maynot be able to sell out of its inventory of finished goods during astrike. Firms and the union are both risk neutral and have the same discountrate. It is shown that the wage equilibrium corresponds to the axiomaticNash bargaining solution where the threatpoints are the agents' payoffsshould bargaining continue indefinitely. We use the 1980 and 1982 EmploymentActs to test this theory, interpreting that legislation change as changingthe firm's threatpoint but not its bargaining power. This allows us toidentify the value of the firm's threatpoint post-1982. Formal testssupport the theory. Also consistent with the theory, it is found that unionwages decrease with inventories after 1982, but not before, and that theunion wage gap is smaller after 1982.     

Prudence, Justice, Benevolence, and Sex: Evidence from Similar Bargaining Games

Most learning experiments involve repeated play of exactly the same situation and, hence, can not discriminate between learning to use a deductive principle and other forms of routine learning. In this paper, subjects confront a sequence of similar, but not identical, bargaining games all of which can be solved using the same deductive principles. Conventions based on these deductive principles emerge within 70 periods in 5 of 26 eight-person cohorts. We found no economically significant differences between all male and all female cohorts. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, C92, D83.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

Willingness to Pay for Car Safety: Evidence from Sweden

This study estimates a marginal willingness to pay (WTP) function for a road-mortality risk reduction. Observed marginal WTP from the Swedish car market is used and found to be positively correlated with the baseline risk of the cars. No statistically significant relationships between examined owner attributes, e.g. wealth and background risk, and marginal WTP are found. When comparing the estimated monetary value of a non-marginal risk reduction derived from the integral of the marginal WTP-function with an estimate based on marginal WTP we find, in line with expectations, that the difference between the estimates is negligible for smaller risk reductions and small, 4–10%, also for relatively large risk reductions.      

Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: Evidence from India

We evaluate empirically the impact of the dramatic 1991 trade liberalization in India on the industry wage structure. The empirical strategy uses variation in industry wage premiums and trade policy across industries and over time. In contrast to most earlier studies on developing countries, we find a strong, negative, and robust relationship between changes in trade policy and changes in industry wage premiums over time. The results are consistent with liberalization‐induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed on to industry wages. We also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India. This is consistent with the magnitude of tariff reductions being relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers.     

Markups of Exporters and Importers: Evidence from Hungary

In this paper, we study the relationship between different proxies of firm‐level markups and trade status, using balance sheet information linked to detailed trade data from Hungary between 1995 and 2003. We find that importing is strongly positively correlated with markup measures, both across and within firms. We argue that this correlation can reflect three channels: self‐selection, higher physical productivity resulting from access to a larger variety of inputs, and quality upgrading based on high‐quality imported intermediate inputs. We present evidence for the relevance of the third channel by showing that importers’ markup premium is higher when inputs arrive from developed countries, and that importing is correlated with higher‐quality (price‐adjusted revenue) exports. We find no robust evidence for exporter premium when controlling for importing. We argue that the non‐existent exporter premium might result from the stronger competition in export markets relative to domestic markets.     

Understanding the Determination of Severance Pay: Mandates,Bargaining, and Unions*

A substantial share of severance payments derives from private contracts or collective agreements. In this paper, we study the determination of these payments. We analyze joint bargaining over wages and severance payments in a search-and-matching model with risk-averse workers. Individual bargaining results in levels of severance pay that provide full insurance, but also depend on unemployment benefits and job-finding rates. Unions also choose full insurance. Because their higher wage demands reduce job creation, this requires higher severance pay. Severance pay observed in eight European countries, to which we calibrate the model, lies between predictions from the bargaining and union scenarios.     

Wage and unemployment: Evidence from online job vacancy data

This paper examines the relationship between labour market conditions and wage dynamics by exploiting a unique dataset of more than one million online job vacancies. We find a weak trade-off between aggregate wage inflation and unemployment. This link becomes more evident when the wage inflation is disaggregated at the sectoral and occupational level. The examination, using vacancy-level data, shows a negative correlation between offered wage and unemployment. The degree of wage elasticity, however, is different across regions and skill segments. Our findings suggest the importance of micro-level data's unique dimensions in examining the wage – unemployment relationship.     

Real Wage and Nominal Shock: Evidence from Pacific-Rim Countries

This paper examines aggregate real-wage responses to nominal shocks in four Pacific-rim countries utilizing a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. In this study, positive real-wage responses are found in Japan and New Zealand whereas negative responses are found in Australia and Korea. In the transmission of nominal shocks to real economic activities, the findings show a sticky-price model to be more important in Japan and New Zealand, while a sticky-wage model plays the more dominant role in Australia and Korea.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 54th International Atlantic Economic Conference in Washington, D.C., October 10–13, 2002. The author would like to thank the conference participants and an anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are attributed to the author.     

最低工资标准与企业成本加成——来自中国制造业企业的证据

本文在搜集全国各市所有区县1999-2007年最低工资标准的基础上,将企业微观数据与最低工资标准数据合并,实证检验了最低工资对中国制造业企业成本加成的影响。本文研究发现,均值层面上,最低工资的提高显著提升了企业成本加成,这说明现阶段我国的最低工资制度是适宜的,对企业成本加成具有正面影响。进一步影响机制检验表明,最低工资可能通过影响企业资本劳动比等途径促进企业成本加成提升。虽然本文表明最低工资标准的提升不会抑制企业成本加成提高,但仍然需要关注最低工资对企业产生的其他影响,统筹处理好维护劳动者权益与促进企业发展的关系,使最低工资标准更好地与经济发展相协调。     

不对称雇主学习、外部选择与雇员谈判力

本文在非合作博弈（策略式）单边不对称信息讨价还价框架下,按照外部约束（而不是威胁点）的思路来模型化外部雇主的竞争,以分析不对称雇主学习的程度对处于信息劣势的通用性雇员谈判力的决定作用。本文提出的框架弥补了已有文献的一些不足,同时为不对称雇主学习这一劳动经济学概念提供了一个讨价还价理论基础。     

Compensating Wage Differentials with Unemployment: Evidence from China

We estimate the economic value of mortality risk in China using the compensating-wage-differential method. We find a positive and statistically significant correlation between wages and occupational fatality risk. The estimated effect is largest for unskilled workers. Unemployment reduces compensation for risk, which suggests that some of the assumptions under which compensating wage differentials can be interpreted as measures of workers’ preferences for risk and income are invalid when unemployment is high. Workers may be unwilling to quit high-risk jobs when alternative employment is difficult to obtain, violating the assumption of perfect mobility, or some workers (e.g., new migrants) may be poorly informed about between-job differences in risk, violating the assumption of perfect information. These factors suggest our estimates of the value per statistical life (VSL) in China, which range from approximately US$30,000 to US$100,000, may be biased downward. Alternative estimates adjust for heterogeneity of risk within industry by assuming that risk is concentrated among low-skill workers. These estimates, which are likely to be biased downward, range from US$7,000 to US$20,000.      

股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响

在对大股东的性质作出清晰界定的基础上,本文考察了中国上市公司的股权集中度和股权制衡情况及其对公司经营绩效的影响。研究发现:股权集中度和经营绩效之间有着显著的正向线性关系,而且这种关系在不同性质的控股股东中都是存在的。具体来说,在中央直属国有企业和私有产权控股的上市公司中股权集中度所表现的激励程度最高,地方所属国有企业控股的上市公司次之,而国有资产管理机构控股的上市公司最低。同时,过高的股权制衡程度对公司的经营绩效有负面影响。但是,不同性质外部大股东的作用效果有明显差别,而且其在不同性质控股股东控制的上市公司中的表现也不尽一致。     

International Trade and Gender Wage Discrimination: Evidence from East Asia

The paper explores how competition from international trade affects gender wage discrimination in two open economies. According to neoclassical theory, if discrimination is costly, then increased industry competitiveness from international trade lessens the incentive for employers to discriminate against women. This effect should be stronger in concentrated sectors, where employers can use excess profits to cover the costs of discrimination. Alternatively, increased international trade may reduce women's bargaining power to achieve wage gains. Results for Taiwan and Korea indicate that, in contrast to neoclassical theory, competition from foreign trade in concentrated industries is positively associated with wage discrimination against women.     

Pay Growth,Fairness, and Job Satisfaction: Implications for Nominal and Real Wage Rigidity

Theories of wage rigidity often rely on a positive relationship between pay changes and utility, arising from concern for fairness or gift exchange. Supportive evidence has emerged from laboratory experiments, but the link has not yet been established with field data. This paper contributes a first step, using representative British data. Workers care about the level and the growth of earnings. Below‐median wage increases lead to an insult effect, except when similar workers have real wage reductions or when firm production is falling. Nominal pay cuts appear to be insulting even when the firm is doing badly.