Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff

This paper explores how a government officer enacts “optimum” import policy when confronting lobbies on trade policies from both domestic and foreign firms in a transition economy. Two results are found: firstly, if the inducement from the foreign firm on the government officer works, then the optimum tariff is negative, that is, import subsidy. However, this subsidy will turn to a positive tariff rate with the increasing lobbying inducement from domestic firms. Secondly, zero tariff duty is not an optimum choice under most circumstances. Besides, an asymmetric result is that when these two firms’ marginal costs are different, the optimum policy is to levy an import tariff on the one whose marginal cost is relatively small, while the other firm will get an import subsidy.     

Capitalism,Territory and “Marxist Geopolitics”

This response traces the importance of ideas and politics versus economic determinism in developing a critical approach to geopolitics particularly in questioning the necessary relationship between territory and capitalism. From this perspective, and contra to “Marxist geopolitics,” spatial-political form does not follow from economic function. To argue so leads to an intellectual and political dead end.     

Inflationary expectations,“endogenous money,” and economic growth

This paper introduces a neoclassical growth model with money in which (1) money is explicitly treated as both a consumer and a producer good, and (2) the money supply is an endogenous factor resulting from real sector changes rather than an exogenous factor determined by the wisdom of the central bank. The major findings include, first, the effect of an increase in money on growth is positive if a real balance effect on production is greater than on consumption, and second, for the economy to stay in the golden-rule path, the rate of growth of per capita real money balances should be equal to the rate of growth of nominal money.     

A “penalty” discount rate,bank behavior,and price and output stability

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the implications of the adoption of a penalty rate discount window policy for bank behavior and for price and output stability. A basic model of the banking firm is used to show that adoption of a penalty rate policy alters the sensitivity of bank portfolio demands to changes in the open market rate, to which the penalty discount rate is deterministically related. In the context of a macroeconomic model that takes into account this interaction of discount window policy and bank behavior, it is demonstrated that adoption of a penalty rate policy generally would have ambiguous implications for the variability of real output and the price level.     

Detrimental externalities, pollution rights, and the “Coase theorem”

This paper, which builds on Chipman (The economist’s vision. Essays in modern economic perspectives, 131–162, 1998), analyzes a simple model formulated by Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) of two agents—a polluter and a pollutee—and two commodities: “money” (standing for an exchangeable private good desired by both agents) and “pollution” (a public commodity desired by the polluter but undesired by the pollutee). There is also a government that issues legal rights to the two agents to emit a certain amount of pollution, which can be bought and sold with money. It is assumed that both agents act as price-takers in the market for pollution rights, so that competitive equilibrium is possible. The “Coase theorem” (so-called by Stigler (The theory of price, 1966) asserts that the equilibrium amount of pollution is independent of the allocation of pollution rights. A sufficient condition for this was (in another context) obtained by Edgeworth (Giorn Econ 2:233–245, 1891), namely that preferences of the two agents be “parallel” in the money commodity, whose marginal utility is constant. Hurwicz (Jpn World Econ 7:49–74, 1995) argued that this parallelism is also necessary. This paper, which provides an exposition of the problem, raises some questions about this result and provides an alternative necessary and sufficient condition.     

Sector-specific capital, “Bang-bang” investment,and the Filippov solution

Bang-bang investment in a two-sector growth model with immobile capital is rational and leads to a unique and globally stable long-run equilibrium along a sliding trajectory. This steady state coincides with the stationary equilibrium in the traditional model with non-sector-specific capital.This article was written while the authors were visiting scholars at Cornell University. We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the Erasmus University Trust Fund and the Netherlands Scientific Organization. We would like to thank, without implicating, two anonymous referees, Martijn Herrmann, Jean-Marie Viaene, Claus Weddepohl, and the participants of seminars at the University of Maryland, the University of Montreal, and Erasmus University Rotterdam for perceptive remarks and useful comments. Jeroen Hinloopen and Rien Wagenvoort provided able graphical assistance. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank.     

Finding a Civilisational Idea: “West,” Eurasia,” and “Euro-East” in Russia's Foreign Policy

Civilisations are imagined, ratherm than real, and nations undergoing identity crises typically represent themselves through multiple civilisational visions. Scholars of geopolitics can hardly understand foreign policy without analysing those visions and social contexts, in which they rise and fall. This article selects for analysis three distinct civilisational ideas of Russia – “West,” “Eurasia” and “Euro-East” – associated with Boris Yeltsin, Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin, respectively. Russia's foreign policy is best understood as reflecting those civilisational ideas rather than merely material power conditions.     

“Bad” Decisions,Poverty, and Economic Theory: The Individualist and Social Perspectives in Light of “The American Myth”

Social outcomes are analyzed either by placing responsibility for those outcomes on the individual or to locate the cause in a specific social factor – discrimination. Here, I argue that individual decision-making cannot be the cause of poverty, illustrative of one outcome, and that commentary specifying a particular social factor is insufficient to address the fundamental, underlying cause of poverty. Rather, one must examine the nature of the economic system that lies at the root of such issues. In the process of developing the argument, it is shown that the individualist explanation of poverty is linked to the neoclassical framework, and that this individualist explanation is a product of the (capitalist) economic system itself which then induces an ideology both privileging such an explanation and preventing the development of satisfactory theory that would inform proper policy. An example of this point is drawn from the 1960’s “war on poverty” program.

Comments on “The Corporate State,Economic Performance,and Social Policy”

This paper provides an introduction to the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a specific example of pluralist economic thinking in the context of the recent global economic crisis. It illustrates how pluralism can be applied to economic research. Specifically, the Minsky-Veblen Cycles combine three elements of institutional and post-Keynesian thought to explain key features of the current crisis. These elements are (1) John Maynard Keynes's postulate of effective demand, (2) Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis, and (3) Thorstein Veblen's concept of conspicuous consumption. In this paper, we have a two-fold approach to them: First, we systematize the connection between the Minsky-Veblen Cycles as a theoretical argument and the epistemological rationale of a pluralist approach to economics. Second, we contrast the implications of our approach for incorporating behavioral assumptions in macroeconomic arguments to mainstream claims for a "microfoundation" of macroeconomic theory.     

The origins,development, and fate of Clower's “stock-flow” general-equilibrium programme

Before becoming the hallmark of macroeconomics à la Wynne Godley, the “stock-flow” analysis was already developed in microeconomics and general-equilibrium theory. The goal was to study the formation of economic plans and the determination of market prices when individuals were supposed to consume, produce, and hold commodities. I show that since the early 1950s, Robert W. Clower used the “stock-flow” price theory to offer microfoundations to a Keynesian business cycle model. I analyse the origins of this microfoundation programme, trace its development, and discuss its fate.     

Why Meso? On “Aggregation” and “Emergence”, and Why and How the Meso Level is Essential in Social Economics

Simplistic aggregation in idealized “markets” versus structural emergence in complex and path-dependent processes have always marked a “continental divide” between neoclassical mainstream economics and all kinds of evolutionary and institutional social economics. This paper deals with institutional, or structural, emergence and argues that the meso level (to be specific) is the proper aggregate level for social economic analyses of complex systems and processes. Also, neo-Schumpeterian economists have stressed recently the issue of an “institutional trajectory” taking place on the meso economic level. This paper argues that the creative ideas of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur are not a sufficient explanation in this case. Using an evolutionary interpretation of a simple game-theoretic formalism (the Folk Theorem), the paper strives to demonstrate that the meso level, as the proper level of institutional emergence, must and can be endogenously explained from a process of interactive problem-solving of interdependent agents, in their struggle for coordination under strong uncertainty. It will be illustrated that a meso-sized socio-economic group co-evolves, and is constituted, together with the institution that in turn serves as the solution to the coordination problem. The practical and policy implications of the argument are discussed.

Pigou,Del Vecchio,and Sraffa: the 1955 International “Antonio Feltrinelli” Prize for the Economic and Social Sciences

In 1955, the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei awarded the inaugural International “Feltrinelli” Prize for the Economic and Social Sciences to Arthur Cecil Pigou. This paper considers Gustavo Del Vecchio's active role on the selection committee in recommending Pigou for the Feltrinelli Prize and the related correspondence between Pigou, Piero Sraffa, and Del Vecchio. One of the most significant discovery reported in this paper is Sraffa's contention, expressed in an unpublished letter to Del Vecchio, that Pigou had “never been honoured in proportion to his merits.”     

Tax Interaction Effects,Environmental Regulation,and “Rule of Thumb” Adjustments to Social Cost

Preexisting distortions in factor markets complicate the estimation of the social welfare effects of regulatory interventions. The existence of these tax interaction effects (TIEs) suggests that general equilibrium (GE) approaches should be used to evaluate regulatory policies. However, formal GE analysis is not always feasible for the numerous environmental regulations proposed by federal, state, and local agencies. The question addressed in this paper is whether an empirically based rule of thumb upward adjustment factor is appropriate to properly scale social cost estimates in environmental policy. We argue that such rule of thumb adjustments are significantly less reliable than estimates based on a detailed general equilibrium analysis because of the uncertainty about both the magnitude and sign of the social cost distortion. In addition to addressing this question, the paper gives an overview of TIEs and their relevance to environmental policy.     

彩信,“肥羊”

去年,奄奄一息的中国的门户网站们在无意中抓到了一棵救命稻草——短信息。捷报纷传,小小的短信让“.com”们大大地开心了一次。 总算找到“北”了！不过短信这道“小点心”只会更加强烈地刺激着SP(服务提供商)们的饥饿已久的胃,现在他们发现了一个新的目标——彩信,这可是一只大肥羊！     

再融资,“魔鬼”还是“天使”

中国股市在今年首季遭遇"再融资恐慌"。先是中国平安、浦发银行的巨额再融资计划引发金融股暴跌,紧接着,中国联通、中国石化等又因再融资传言导致股价放量下跌。上证指数从1月18日收盘的5180点,迅速跌至3月25日的3629点。投资者更是损失惨重。去年再融资还是利好消息,而今年投资者已闻之色变。大规模的上市公司再融资,业已成为近期最热门的话题,许多市场人士纷纷将股市近期的大跌归罪于再融资,将平安、浦发的再融资计划称之为"恶意圈钱";而对此观点持反对态度的人则不断为再融资开脱,认为再融资是上市金融企业发展壮大的重要条件,新老股东也能从中长期受益。一时间,关于再融资众说纷纭,莫衷一是。     

终端“跳水”,“锦书”何托?

最近,盛大宣布它风头正盛的"bambook"(锦书)全线降价,用户以499元就能将其收入囊中。在这波风潮中,汉王、纽曼等厂商也不甘落后,国内电子阅读器市场一路迈入"500元"的低价时代。     

“Remembrance of things past”: Gordon Tullock,the man and the bioeconomist

My tribute paper on Gordon Tullock (1922–2014) provides some memorable stories of Tullock as a person and as a founder of bioeconomics. I include my speech, “Toast and roast: Gordon Tullock,” delivered on the occasion of Tullock’s 80th birthday; also the same “Toast and roast....,” written in the form of a poem, “Ode to Gordon Tullock.” I also discuss Tullock’s contributions to bioeconomics. In a concluding section, I recall a couple of my poignant memories of Gordon Tullock.