THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AFTER THE COLD WAR

Political scientists and policy‐makers agree that democratic states were less likely to engage each other in militarized disputes than were other states during the Cold War. Most among them attribute this to their domestic political structures. Some, however, believe that the common and conflicting interests that the East–West conflict induced explain the relatively low democratic‐dispute rate. Evidence from the post‐Cold War world can help to arbitrate between these very different claims, as the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the bipolar system, precipitated a sharp rise in the number of democracies, and shifted dispute‐rate patterns. The analyses in this paper show that dyadic dispute rates converge after the Cold War, casting doubt on the existence of a democratic peace.     

A coming ‘Magnesian’ age? Small states,the global system,and the international community

Since Plato, we have considered that the ideal polis, or political community, is the small state, akin to the idyllic ‘Magnesia’ of the Laws. The Platonic ideal, however, generally has been considered unrealistic. Even in the ancient world, the Alexandrine model ‐ an expanding, pluralistic network of large trading cities under a single aegis ‐ came to contradict it. Subsequent history, especially the imperialism of the nineteenth century which swallowed up many small polities around the world, seemed to prove that only large and powerful entities were ‘fit’ to survive. Why, then, are there still so many small‐sized countries in the world today? Why is their number actually increasing? Decolonisation, the end of bipolarity, democratisation, trade liberalisation and the digital revolution are five factors that have given small states more freedom. Yet many are vulnerable, and the economics of their situations are precarious. The workings of the global system, particularly the globalisation of business, may harm them even while promoting their freedom. The international community, a large part of which is now in fact made up of small states, should be prepared to act, for the global public good as well as out of sheer political and also environmental self‐interest, to help safeguard the livelihood of the world's many and varied small states, whose ‘Magnesian’ venues and values can be of both functional and normative importance for mankind as a whole.     

Trans‐state entities: Postmodern cracks in the great Westphalian dam

With the seemingly sudden end of the Cold War and the succeeding disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 1990s opened as a decade promising structural change in a geopolitical system premised on the overall stability of superpower rivalry. Yet as the decade comes to a close, challenges to the structure of global politics have grown deeper and more pervasive than could have been conceived only ten years before. Postmodernist deconstructions of the meaning and viability of states have emerged throughout the course of the decade to challenge the very viability of the Westphalian state system upon which the fundamental principles of global politics have been based. Concurrent with these philosophical developments has been the institutional emergence of quasi‐political entities, herein referred to as ‘trans‐state entities’ (TSEs), comprised of the constituent parts of neighbouring states. It is argued that TSEs manifest themselves as the result of a convergence of the increased permeability of boundaries between states and the postmodern deconstruction of states themselves as their sub‐state political units seek closer co‐operation, even policy co‐ordination, to improve their collective economic, environmental, or other situation. Three TSEs, diverse in both geographical location and in institutional manifestation yet concurrently quite similar in their means, purposes and goals, will be examined.     

State limits in the early twenty‐first century: Observations on form and function

It is dangerous to draw too many conclusions about the form and function of state borders in the early twenty‐first century. Marked regional differences are developing and, with a few exceptions such as Europe, there is scarcity of empirical evidence about the changes taking place. Some trends, however, seem clear. There are likely to be more states and more land and maritime boundaries in future, and states will continue to regard the establishment and protection of their territorial limits as a priority. As the power and influence of states seem to diminish in response to globalisation, the reassertion of territoriality by governments is both legitimate and is often popular with the people. While many boundaries will become more permeable, some will remain as significant barriers to people and goods, although not to ideas and information on the Internet. Attention is drawn to the emerging political and economic blocs that may create striking regional contrasts in boundary form and function by mid‐century.     

Shatterbelts and conflict behaviour: The effect of globalisation on ‘high risk’ states

This article ties together seemingly disparate literatures (those of globalisation and ‘shatterbelt states') as a means of investigating the changing conflict behaviour of high‐risk states. The objective of this research is to ascertain empirically whether the circumstances that generate aggression by high‐risk states are the same as those for others. In addition, by examining how conflict behaviour has changed over time, and in conjunction with trade openness, these tests speak to the importance of economic interdependence as a mitigating counterforce to aggressive tendencies. The results indicate that domestic instability and fragmentation are more directly tied to high‐risk state behaviour than are systemic influences. In contrast, the probability that low‐risk states originate or participate in conflicts, and resort to violence, is tied to international factors. Surprisingly, increased repression seems to result from the opposite circumstances. For high‐risk states, changes in repressive behaviour are tied to the external environment while low‐risk states seem prone to change levels of repression in conjunction with their internal conditions. Lastly, and most importantly, trade openness has an important pacifying effect on high‐risk states, but appears to be irrelevant to the conflict behaviour of all others. Globalisation, it appears, mitigates the violence that is often initiated by high‐risk states. These results offer important preliminary evidence for understanding high risk‐states and the strategies that may reduce their aggressiveness.     

The fraying modern map: Failed states and contraband capitalism

Inter‐relationships between markets and states are re‐making the world political map but in some instances these interactions have created zones of political conflict where the world political map is fraying and coming undone. In certain ‘wild zones’ of the world, state failure and illegal exchange are the prevalent processes conditioning civil and nationalist wars. This paper considers the general relationships between turbo‐globalisation, contraband capitalism, and failed states. Using the case of Russia and Chechnya, it seeks to illustrate and describe the illegal and illicit forms of governance that are fraying the ‘modern map’ and contributing to the complexity of the story of ‘nationalism in a globalising world.’     

The Ephemeral Borders of Revolutionary Spaces

From the Paris Commune to the Red Shirt uprising in Bangkok, revolutionaries lacking the power to overthrow their states or depose unpopular politicians have captured parts of major cities and formed their own temporary enclaves of resistance. These groups create intraurban borders by building barricades, arming themselves, and fighting to protect their space. The borders, while temporary and usually ineffective, are powerful symbols as they separate a sphere of active resistance from territory under state control. While these borders stand, they are challenges to state power – lines marking the limits of what states can control. This essay looks at how these borders arise and how they relate to more familiar types of borders. Revolutionary borders are shaped by many of the same forces as national borders, most notably globalisation, but have a distinct character that is closely linked to the changing geography of urban areas.     

The impacts of advanced information and communication technologies on international actors and the international system

New infomation and communication technologies have the potential to play a significant role in changing today's major international actors and in shaping the international system that is emerging after the end of the Cold War. This paper assesses the impacts that secen different information and communication technologies may have on specific types of actors in the international system, including states international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations. The paper then assesses the impact that these technologies might be expected to have on the international system itself.     

National borders,the global economy and geopolitics: A view from Yemen

The wider geographic scales of the new interdependencies called ‘globalisation’ are not new to peripheral states such as Yemen. In the colonial and post‐colonial world sensitivity to international developments has always been important in the course of local events. What is new is the particular configuration of political and economic institutions at various levels including, critically, the national level. This paper argues that, on the one hand, the new geography of economic and political ‘globalisation’ has left Yemen with distinctly ‘old’ forms of economic integration into world markets, but that, on the other hand, regional geopolitics have opened certain opportunities for Yemen's political elite to refashion itself as a strategic geopolitical player so as to maintain international flows of military and economic aid. The end result is the continued national dominance of these same elite. ‘Globalisation’ in this sense is a national political project.     

Globalisation,Hegemony and Passive Revolution

Across the social sciences the last decade has witnessed a proliferating interest in the relationship between the state and globalisation. By the early 1990s a range of writers working within what we label a structuralist approach asserted that globalisation is, if not challenging the viability of the sovereign state, then at least forcing it to adapt its policies to conform to the new global reality‐being 'hollowed out', as the phrase had it. The pendulum then swung the other way when an 'agent-centric' backlash emerged, insisting that states have what we call agential power, such that they can mitigate and even shape global structures. In this article we build upon an emergent third way, or 'structurationist' perspective, between these two antinomies, in which we synthesise structuralist and agent-centric theory. We begin in Part I by taking stock of the central issues in the state/globalisation debate and examine the various structuralistand agent-centric approaches, while Part II sketches the theoreticaloutlines of a structurationis t approach and conceptualises what we call the spatial promiscuity of the state. In Part III we apply this approach to the case of Singapore. We choose Singapore only because it provides an excellent litmus test for critically appraising the various positions on globalisation, including our own, not least because Singapore is a small state that has perhaps the most globalised economy in the world.     

The Multiscalar Production of Borders

The present geopolitical situation has made the debate on borders and their functions, significance, and symbolism more prominent than at any time since the end of the Cold War. While the various processes of globalisation have challenged the traditional border concept, the scalar model of identity and society remains primarily anchored in national space. The understanding of the state as a multiscalar construction, constantly negotiated and reconfigured by its actors at different levels, allows us to broaden the scope of our analysis and rethink and transform the spatial formations previously taken for granted in assessing the impacts of globalisation more regionally. State borders continue to have considerable relevance today, yet as the articles brought together in this special section will demonstrate, borders must be understood as complex, multiscalar, multidimensional, yet dynamic entities that have different symbolic and material forms, functions, and locations. With examples from Europe, Southeast Asia and the global south, this section aims to advance our knowledge of the multiscalar dynamics of border politics. The articles investigate how borders are negotiated vis-à-vis questions of identity, belonging, political conflict, and societal transformation, and how they are re- and deconstructed through various institutional and discursive practices at different levels and by different actors.     

Responses: Geography as space and geography as place: The divide between political science and political geography continues

Steven Spiegel's article ‘Traditional Space vs. Cyberspace’ exemplifies the divide between political science and political geography. In trying to incorporate geographic factors into his consideration of post‐Cold War geopolitics, Spiegel equates his view with distance and less explicitly with territory. The attempt to position geography as central to international politics has failed once again because of the equation of spatial analysis with the field of geography. Ignorance and neglect of the place tradition, prominent in contemporary geography, is the most important factor in the continued failure of communication between Geography and International Relations.     

Pluralism or isolation of Civilisations? Russia's foreign policy discourse and the reception of Huntington's paradigm of the post‐cold war world

This paper studies the effects of Samuel Huntington's ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis on Russian foreign policy discourse. In response to Huntington's thesis, two major currents of Russia's foreign policy thinking ‐ Liberals and Nationalists ‐ are identified, both of which are critical of the thesis. The two groups offer diametrically opposed alternatives to Huntington's paradigm of the post‐Cold War world. The Liberal‐Nationalist controversy reflects Russia's debates about its own political identity and provides us with a rich and informative understanding of the process of identity formation. By identifying Russia's various reactions to the ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis, the paper identifies potential influences of various currents in Russian foreign policy thinking on the country's future foreign policy. It also suggests some implications for further studies of cultures/civilisations in international politics.     

The Importance of Northern Dimension Foreign Policies in the Geopolitics of the Circumpolar North

The end of the Cold War dramatically altered geopolitical relationships within the circumpolar North. Part of this change involved the development of a regionalised governance structure stressing the common issues faced by human populations within the circumpolar North, regardless of their national or ethnic origins. Signatories to a cadre of new circumpolar agreements include eight nation-states or the “Arctic states” (Canada, USA, Russia, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland) as well as indigenous peoples organisations and supranational organisations such as the European Union.

Equally important, although somewhat less tangible, is the fact that in addition to the new forms of international and regional governance now giving shape to an emerging circumpolar “northern” space, are several new discourses concerning the scale and nature of circumpolar regionalism and the critical new environmental, human security, and economic development challenges which it faces. Rather than using the rhetoric of tension and confrontation common throughout the Cold War era, these new northern discourses stress regional co-operation, human security and sustainable development.

This paper examines the political structures and actors which give shape to emerging geopolitical versions of the international “North”. It explores the relationship between the new international geopolitical space of this circumpolar region and the northern dimension policies of constituent states, in order to identify links between the geopolitical consensus which has become the potential basis for the international structure and goals of governance within the circumpolar region. Particular emphasis is placed upon Canada, the USA and the European Union, where northern dimension policies are most developed.     

The Transformation of Europe and the German Contribution - Critical Geopolitics and Geopolitical Representations

The geography of political units has been rapidly transformed over the past two decades. Along with increasing globalisation a worldwide re-ordering of power set in the 1980s. It accelerated to such an extent after the end of the Cold War as to dramatically and permanently change the postwar order established for many decades. With the cessation of East-West confrontation, much more came to an end than merely the geopolitical constellation of the two power blocs that for more than forty years had determined the 'security discourse' and the global geographies of power and fear, of rivalry and alliance.     

The ‘West’ against the ‘Rest’: Geopolitics after the end of the cold war

With the end of the Cold War, it seemed that we had reached the ‘end of geopolitics’. Since the mid‐1990s, however, the term ‘geopolitics’ has experienced a revival, and even regional groupings which have so far abstained from any kind of power politics, such as the European Union, have started to claim geopolitical interests for themselves. But it is not clear what constitutes this kind of power politics in the 1990s and what drives ‘the West’ to pursue geopolitics, directed against what Huntington has labelled so plainly and provocatively the ‘Rest’. The article addresses this question by analysing Western capital's need for access to markets in the South and the EU's and US’ growing dependence on oil imports. The article will argue that a Western geostrategy based on Huntington's civilisational model would be counterproductive in the long run, manoeuvring the Western states into a situation where these geopolitical goals would have to be enforced by military means instead of being pursued through a strategy of political and economic support.     

Japanese nationalism and geographical thought

There has been simultaneous emergence in many countries of the world of political disputes over aspects of national history in the 1990s. Geographical knowledge has political implications. Hence it is concerned with the formation of national identity as well as historical knowledge. This paper examines the relationships between Japanese modernisation and geographical thought, the characteristics of school textbooks and geopolitics in Japan during the Asia Pacific War, and recent disputes about views of history and the meaning of views of geography in the post‐Cold War era. Consequently, it is shown that the view of geography promoted the formation of national identity in the same way as that of history through geographical education and geopolitics. Taking the roles of geography into consideration, it can be said that an imaginative geography based on an ethnocentric view plays an important role in the time of rethinking national history. We should be aware of such an ethnocentric view of geography and make an effort to overcome differences in views between nations.     

国际产业转移与危机冲击的关系研究

通过纵向比较分析认为:二战后的前三次全球性产业大转移,与之相对应的分别是50年代的冷战、60年代的美元危机、70年代的石油危机,最近的一次产业转移亦有亚洲金融危机的影子。因此,国际产业转移的根本动因是世界生产力的发展和国际分工的深化,但危机作为一个外部性因素,始终伴随全球性产业转移的全过程。由美国次贷危机所引发的新一轮国际金融危机和世界经济波动,亦可能带动新一轮产业转移。有鉴于此,我国需要做好承接新一轮国际产业转移的准备工作。     

Between mathematical formalism,normative choice rules,and the behavioural sciences: The emergence of rational choice theories in the late 1940s and early 1950s

Abstract

This paper discusses why mathematical economists of the early Cold War period favored formal-axiomatic over behavioral choice theories. One reason was that formal-axiomatic theories allowed mathematical economists to improve the conceptual and theoretical foundations of economics and thereby to increase its scientific status. Furthermore, the separation between mathematical economics and other behavioral sciences was not as clear-cut as often argued. While economists did not modify their behavioral assumptions, some acknowledged the empirical shortcomings of their models. The paper reveals the multifaceted nature of rational choice theories reflected in the changing interpretations and roles of the theories in those early years.