Seigniorage and EMU : The fiscal implications of price stability and financial market integration

Disinflation, especially if coupled with financial market liberalisation, has implications for public finances because it lowers the revenue from the inflation tax. There might thus be a trade-off between the criteria on inflation convergence and public finances that were set at Maastricht. This paper measures the effects of lower inflation and financial market integration on the revenue from seigniorage for the EC member countries that have in the past relied most heavily on this source of revenues. The main result is that disinflation alone will reduce the revenue from seigniorage by over 2% of GDP in Greece, but much less than 1% of GDP in the other countries considered here. The overall impact of EMU (i.e. disinflation plus financial market integration) is a loss of seigniorage revenues of 2.9% of GDP in Greece and a little over 1% of GDP in Portugal and Spain. Two different measures of seigniorage yield similar results regarding the overall change, but differ regarding the transitional period and the level.     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

How much do tariffs matter? Evidence from the customs union of Belarus,Kazakhstan and Russia

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the early impact of the formation of the customs union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, and associated changes in import schedules on the structure of imports. Relying on an original data-set of statutory tariffs we find that trade creation effects were significant only in trade between Russia and third countries, but that there was some trade destruction, with a significant negative impact on imports from China to Kazakhstan and Russia, and on imports from the EU to Belarus. However, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small, suggesting that the benefits of the new tariff policy per se are limited at best.     

Can growth-enhanced monetary policy improve welfare when people seek social status?

This paper examines the growth and welfare effects from an increase in the rate of money supply in an Ak type growth model with a relative wealth-enhanced social status motive, production externalities, and liquidity constraints. When only consumption is constrained by liquidity, fast money supply can hasten output growth unless seigniorage revenue is wasted and production externalities do not exist. We find that even though money growth normally promotes economic growth, it does not improve welfare when capital stock is over-accumulated. In general, an optimal monetary policy minimizes seigniorage. Our results also conclude that the optimal monetary policy rarely follows the Friedman rule.     

Seigniorage and public good in an OLG model with cash-in-advance constraints

This paper is a contribution to the theory of the optimal monetary policy in overlapping generations models with a cash-in-advance constraint applying on old age consumption purchases. We are particularly interested in the study of seigniorage when the latter is used to finance public goods valued by consumers. Assuming that a public good enters the utility function and the existence of cash-in-advance constraints, we find a Laffer curve of seigniorage at steady-state. We also analyze the dynamic optimal monetary policy when the government maximizes an intertemporal social welfare function and can only resort to seigniorage to finance the purchases of the public good. We show that the optimal rate of money growth may be strictly higher than the one which maximizes steady-state seigniorage: the optimal amount of seigniorage may lie on the decreasing part of the Laffer curve of seigniorage. We finally suppose that the government can use lump-sum taxes in addition to seigniorage. Then, the Friedman rule prevails and public expenditures are only financed through lump-sum taxes.     

Political instablility and seigniorage: An inseparable couple — or a threesome with debt?

In the literature, political instability is shown to raise seigniorage and/or debt, but there is no debt‐seigniorage trade‐off. However, what happens when the IMF gets involved? Based on a political economy model of intertemporal public finance this paper presents qualitatively new and robust results. First, political instability causes myopic government behaviour and produces more debt, not more seigniorage. Second, IMF policies requiring debtor countries to achieve both monetary and fiscal stability at the same time are ineffective. Third and surprisingly at first sight, debt conditionality aiming at monetary stability is particularly effective in heterogeneous societies with unstable governments.     

Cash-in-advance constraint,optimal monetary policy,and human capital accumulation

This paper investigates optimal monetary policy in an overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth fueled by the accumulation of human capital and under a cash-in-advance constraint. We consider the case where the government finances public education fully by seigniorage. Three main results are obtained. First, there exists an optimal money growth rate that maximizes the economic growth rate along the steady growth path. Second, on this path, the Laffer curve of seigniorage takes the maximum. Finally, the money growth rate for maximizing seigniorage along the steady growth path, which also leads to maximization of the economic growth rate, is lower than that for maximizing seigniorage in the present period.     

Financial development,institutional quality and maximizing-growth trade-off in government finance

This paper studies monetary and fiscal policies in an endogenous growth model with transaction costs. We show that the relation between long-run economic growth and both monetary and fiscal policies is subject to threshold effects, a result that gives account of a number of recent empirical findings. Furthermore, the model shows that, to finance public expenditures, growth-maximizing governments must choose relatively high seigniorage (respectively income taxation), if “institutional quality” and “financial development” indicators are low (respectively high). Thus, our model may explain why some governments resort to seigniorage and inflationary finance, and others rather resort to high tax rates, as a result of growth-maximizing strategies in different structural environments (notably concerning institutional and financial development contexts). In addition, the model allows examining how the optimal mix of government finance changes in response to different public debt contexts. A short empirical section confirms our theoretical results.     

The Role of Banks in Monetary Policy Transmission: Empirical Evidence from Russia

This paper focuses on the role of the banking sector in monetary policy transmission in an emerging economy with a rapidly developing financial system. Specifically, we examine whether the central bank's monetary policy stance affects banks' lending behavior. Based on a comprehensive quarterly dataset on all Russian banks from 1Q1999 to 1Q2007, we find evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel in Russia. Contrary to several studies on developed economies, the level of a bank's capitalization matters for the transmission process. Better capitalized banks are less likely to adjust their lending practices following a change in the monetary policy stance.     

铸币税:基于不同视角的理解

本文讨论了不同货币体系下铸币税对政府和中央银行的含义,同时也讨论了铸币税对收入再分配和政府宏观经济政策的意义。本文着重指出,铸币税收入与通货膨胀税是存在差异的。在对我国中央银行资产负债表进行分析的基础上,本文还估算了2003年我国政府从货币发行中获得的铸币税收入的规模。     

Autocracies and regional integration: the Eurasian case

The establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, succeeded by the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, constituted an important discontinuity in the development of post-Soviet regionalism: while the preceding organisations remained cases of ‘ink-on-paper’ regional integration, in the case of the Customs Union the members actually implemented their commitments. This creates an important theoretical challenge: the literature (which the previous experience of Eurasian regionalism was very much in line with) conjectures that authoritarian states are unable to successfully implement an economic regional integration agreement (RIA). The aim of the article is to explore the conditions under which implementation of economic RIAs by autocracies happens. We argue that the implementation is influenced by the extent of economic, social and political ties between member states, and suggest that, unlike democratic states, which are more likely to implement a RIA where there are strong economic ties, non-democracies are more likely to do so in the case of intermediate economic dependence.     

ELIMINATING THE INFLATIONARY FINANCE TRAP IN A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRY: DOMESTIC POLITICS VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992) , it is shown that political instability causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them, seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the instability increases.     

Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain,who might lose,and why?

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33     

Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The distribution of seigniorage wealth in EMU

The European Monetary Union (EMU) will involve socialization of the existing seigniorage wealth of the national central banks. This socialization will create windfall gains for countries with relatively low monetary bases such as France and the UK and it will be disadvantageous for countries like Germany, Austria, Spain or the Netherlands which will suffer per capita wealth losses of between 406 and 182 ecus. The paper quantifies the gains and losses in seigniorage wealth under alternative membership and bank regulation scenarios.     

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960–1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.     

Floor systems for implementing monetary policy: Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. We construct a general equilibrium model to study the properties of these systems. We find that a floor system is weakly optimal if and only if the target rate satisfies the Friedman rule. Unfortunately, the optimal floor system requires either transfers from the fiscal authority to the central bank or a reduction in seigniorage payments from the central bank to the government. This is the unpleasant fiscal arithmetic of a floor system. When the central bank faces financing constraints on its interest expense, we show that it is strictly optimal to operate a channel system.     

货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

作为国家竞争战略的货币国际化:美元的经验证据——兼论人民币的国际化问题

布雷顿森林体系解体后,国际货币体系进入了多元储备货币时代。货币发行国可能获得的各种利益,或许是对现代信用货币竞相国际化的最好解释。作者认为,除了在国际金融体系中的话语权等无法计量的好处以外,货币国际化利益主要表现为国际铸币税收益,以及运用境外储备投资的金融业收益。文中以实证研究表明,可计量的美元国际化利益至2 0 0 2年底已累计高达953 0亿美元。同时估算,若2 0 1 0年实现人民币区域国际化,则1 0年内可获得近750 0亿元人民币的货币国际化利益。     

Obesity of politicians and corruption in post-Soviet countries

We collected 299 frontal face images of 2017 cabinet ministers from 15 post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). For each image, the minister's body-mass index is estimated using a computer vision algorithm. The median estimated body-mass index of cabinet ministers is highly correlated with conventional measures of corruption (Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, World Bank worldwide governance indicator Control of Corruption, Index of Public Integrity). This result suggests that physical characteristics of politicians such as their body-mass index can be used as proxy variables for political corruption when the latter are not available, for instance at a very local level.