Market Selection and Asymmetric Information

We consider a dynamic general equilibrium asset pricing model with heterogeneous agents and asymmetric information. We show how agents' different methods of gathering information affect their chances of survival in the market depending upon the nature of the information and the level of noise in the economy.     

Foreign Market Entry Strategies under Asymmetric Information*

A home firm signals her private cost information by expanding in a foreign firm’s country. Credible signaling to deter counter‐entry may occur through a direct investment (but not through exports), and may even entail entering an unprofitable market. While this produces social benefits, uninformative signaling may be welfare‐reducing. Hence, we argue that moderate to high location costs may be socially desirable. We also show that there are not simple monotonic relationships between technology/demand conditions and firms’ entry modes. Thus, the signaling interpretation of international expansion makes it possible to explain some controversial empirical findings on a theoretical ground.     

信息不对称与企业家报酬、企业市场价值分析

本文分析了信息不对称对企业家投资报酬、企业债务水平及企业市场价值的影响.分析表明,若企业项目是高质量的,信息不对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平提高;反之,若企业项目是低质量的,信息不对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平减少;外部知情投资者比例的变化与企业家报酬的变化之间的关系与企业质量有关.降低信息不对称程度有利于企业优胜劣汰,实现资源的最优配置.     

言息不对称与企业家报酬、企业市场价值分析

本文分析了信息不对称对企业家投资报酬、企业债务水平及企业市场价值的影响。分析表明，若企业项目是高质量的，信息不对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平提高；反之，若企业项目是低质量的，信息不对称程度的降低可使企业项目市场价值和债务水平减少；外部知情投资者比例的变化与企业家报酬的变化之间的关系与企业质量有关。降低信息不对称程度有利于企业优胜劣汰，实现资源的最优配置。     

中国医疗服务市场中的信息不对称程度测算

本文构建了一个医疗服务市场上信息不对称程度的测度模型,并基于"中国健康与营养调查"(CHNS)中微观个体调查数据,对医疗服务市场上医患双方的信息程度及其对最终的医疗服务价格的影响效应进行了实证测度。研究结果表明:(1)医患双方所掌握的信息因素对最终医疗服务价格的形成具有重要影响,同时医生相对于患者掌握着更多的信息并具有更强的议价能力;(2)几乎所有的患者都将被迫接受一个高于公正基准价格的价格,平均而言达成的医疗服务价格相对于公正的基准价格要高出26.61%;(3)年度效应分析发现,1989—2006年,各年度的医疗服务市场价格大致都高于公正基准价格26%左右,换言之,改革开放以来中国的医疗服务体制改革,并未有效起到解决"看病难、看病贵"的作用;(4)患者在城乡因素、医疗保险、工作状况、年龄以及受教育程度等因素上的异质性,对医患双方最终价格的作用是有限的。本文的政策含义是:强调通过引进竞争,强化市场机制在医疗服务市场中调节作用的改革思路,是否适合中国值得反思。解决现实中普遍存在的医疗服务价格虚高问题,回归医疗服务的公益性,需要政府更多地参与其中,并有效发挥价格规制、市场监管以及外部性矫正等功能。     

信息不对称、羊群行为与房地产市场中的居民破产

本文通过构建一个0-1决策博弈模型,分析了在信息不对称的情况下,房地产市场中羊群行为的形成机制、羊群行为如何导致房地产泡沫的生成、以及经济状况恶化时泡沫破裂后居民破产的可能性.结论显示,居民在房地产市场中的行为选择既受宏观经济基本面因素的影响,也受羊群行为的影响,而羊群行为的存在使得房地产市场产生价格泡沫,当房地产泡沫破裂时,居民破产的概率与信息不对称的程度和居民的预期相关.     

Mutual Insurance,Individual Savings,and Limited Commitment

We examine a dynamic model of mutual insurance when households can also engage in self-insurance by storage. We assume that there is no enforcement mechanism, so that any insurance is informal and must be self-enforcing. We show that consumption allocations satisfy a modified Euler condition and that an enhanced storage technology can either improve or diminish welfare. Furthermore we show that the ex ante transfers introduced into dynamic informal insurance models recently by Gauthier et al. (Gauthier, C., Poitevin, M., and González, P. (1997). Journal of Economic Theory76, 106–144) are only used here in the first period, with the role of ex ante transfers being replaced by differential individual storage. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, C73, D90, E21.     

Credit Rationing in Medium-small Enterprises Credit Market under Asymmetric Information

Credit rationing has been an objective phenomenon in medium-small enterprises credit market of China. By analyzing the present situation of medium-small enterprises credit market of China, this study gives a new credit rationing model fitting medium-small enterprises credit market of China well. It has been showed in the empirical study that different factor has each different influence on medium-small enterprises credit market; further more, only the change of chastisement factor can make the medium-small enterprises credit market achieve whole success, but other factors can merely get integrant success even though under the most ideal condition.     

Asymmetric Information and Annuities

The standard Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) analysis of adverse selection economies is extended to a particular model of annuity market which features both elements of moral hazard and adverse selection. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to time preferences and they make investments in health care that affect their survival probabilities. The main case considered is that where both preferences and investments (and hence the endogenous survival probabilities) are unobserved. Thus, the model captures a further source of inefficiency that is particular to annuity market: an endogenous correlation between the desire for annuities and the survival probabilities. The basic insights of Wilson (1977) —as worked out by Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985) —are worth also in this new setting. When the equilibrium is separating, the government intervention may yield Pareto improvements. If the equilibrium is pooling, the government intervention may improve the well‐being of individuals affected by the inefficiencies and the negative externalities caused by the asymmetric information.     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

信息不对称与政府规制经济

在经济生活领域,信息不对称是普遍存在的现象。信息不对称对市场运行效率有着深刻的影响,会降低市场运行的效率。因此,应弥补信息不对称缺陷,加强政府的经济规制。     

Self-Reporting and Ex Post Asymmetric Information

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions are reduced for self-reporting individuals. Violators get private signals about their individual probabilities of apprehension after they committed a crime. Since violators will self-report if and only if the signal is above a specific threshold, the possibility of self-reporting has an option value that leads to a higher crime rate if the authority's effort remains unchanged. We demonstrate that self-reporting nevertheless increases social welfare even under the restriction that the crime rate must not be higher than without self-reporting. Received June 15, 2001; revised version received December 19, 2001     

不对称信息与凯恩斯主义投资理论

有效市场理论认为资本资产价格只不过是一幅面纱，实际经济活动是由经济主体的偏好和技术决定的。在凯恩斯主义体系中，金融市场在决定经济的路径中起到核心的作用。通过对金融市场上不对称信息的考察，可以得出这一结论。企业在外在融资的提供者即贷款者能够获取的信息是不同的，这种信息不对称导致金融约束的出现，在这种情况下，对投资的限制来自金融市场而不是来自技术或者偏好。     

投资者搜寻信息行为的非对称信息范式分析

本文在论述投资者信息搜寻的内容、渠道的基础上,分析了信息搜寻的成本和收益,及其所确定信息搜寻的最佳规模,并运用研究结论,对中国投资者的信息搜寻行为进行了分析.由于中国机构投资者数量少、规模小,信息搜寻成本高以及投资者搜寻信息的激励不足等原因,致使中国投资者搜寻信息的效果差、扩散效应弱,融资市场非对称信息问题严重.     

Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

Abstract. This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.     

Stock,Energy and Currency Effects on the Asymmetric Wheat Market

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of financial and currency indicators on wheat futures prices. The results suggest that the stock market, and particularly the S&P 500, positively influence the wheat market, a fact that is attributed to the wealth effect and the modern portfolio management in the context of international markets’ integration. There is also evidence that the energy markets affecting the supply and demand side exert significant impact on the wheat market. Furthermore, the results show that the shocks of the U.S. dollar/yen exchange rate are transmitted to the wheat market. Finally, the structural analysis of wheat prices’ volatility support the hypothesis of the asymmetric conditional variance, as it appears to be more volatile in response to positive shocks caused by higher wheat prices, contrary to the respective results of the equities market.     

Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information

An infinite sequence of elections with no term limits is modelled. In each period a challenger with privately known preferences is randomly drawn from the electorate to run against the incumbent, and the winner chooses a policy outcome in a one-dimensional issue space. One theorem is that there exists an equilibrium in which the median voter is decisive: an incumbent wins re-election if and only if his most recent policy choice gives the median voter a payoff at least as high as he would expect from a challenger. The equilibrium is symmetric, stationary, and the behavior of voters is consistent with both retrospective and prospective voting. A second theorem is that, in fact, it is the only equilibrium possessing the latter four conditions — decisiveness of the median voter is implied by them.     

Multidimensional Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information

A buyer with private information regarding marginal valuation bargains with a seller to determine price and quantity of trade. Depending on parameter values, a high‐valuation buyer wants either to reveal information to create value or to conceal it to capture value. In the first case, equilibrium trades are efficient. In the second case, the low‐valuation buyer purchases less than her efficient quantity, and there can be a one‐period delay in trade. The quantity distortion is the only inefficiency that persists when time between offers approaches zero. There exist equilibria that are independent of the seller's prior beliefs.     

Repeated Contests with Asymmetric Information

The same contestants often meet repeatedly in contests. Behavior in a contest potentially provides information with regard to one's type and can therefore influence the behavior of the opponents in later contests. This paper shows that if effort is observable, this can induce a ratchet effect in contests: high ability contestants sometimes put in little effort in an early round in order to make the opponents believe that they are of little ability. The effect reduces overall effort and increases equilibrium utility of the contestants when compared with two unrelated one-shot contests. It does, however, also introduce an allocative inefficiency since sometimes a contestant with a low valuation wins. The model assumes an imperfectly discriminating contest. In an extension I show that, qualitatively, results are similar in a perfectly discriminating contest (all pay auction).     

积累性创新、信息不对称和激励

在积累性创新链中,创新收益在序贯创新者之间的分配是一个重要的激励问题,一个良好的创新激励机制应该使得积累性创新的利益在序贯创新者之间进行合理的分配。本文基于信息不对称的假定,研究了积累性创新中最优专利许可费大小和时序决定问题。与Green＆Scotchmer、Scotchmer的结论不同,我们发现,事前专利许可并不一定能够解决先期创新者对后续创新者的敲竹杠行为。本研究为现实中观察到的一些产业中事后专利许可现象提供了理论上的解释。