The liquidity of bank assets and banking stability

This paper shows that an increased liquidity of bank assets, paradoxically, increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking failures. This is because even though higher asset liquidity directly benefits stability by encouraging banks to reduce the risks on their balance sheets and by facilitating the liquidation of assets in a crisis, it also makes crises less costly for banks. As a result, banks have an incentive to take on an amount of new risk that more than offsets the positive direct impact on stability.     

Explaining banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa

The study examined banking stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results reveal that banking spread (Net Interest Margin – NIM) is the main determinant of stability and the major means to achieve stability during crises periods. We however find the existence of a threshold effect in NIM.Crises in the banking sector consistently showed to reduce stability. While the results show that high percentage of foreign banks reduce stability, we find foreign banks help stabilize the banking sector in periods of crises. The results show that diversification could also have a positive impact on stability (Z-score) even though this relationship was not robust enough. The results also largely support the competition-fragility view. Particularly, we find that less competition during crises periods can help improve stability. Again, we find evidence for both concentration-stability and concentration-fragility hypotheses depending on the stability measure used. We however find that when large banks in concentrated markets are well regulated, stability could be improved. Weak regulatory environment reduces stability (Z-score) directly and matters during crises periods. Our results are robust to the use of different indicators of stability and estimation methods.     

Failed bank takeovers and financial stability

Current discussion about the design of bank resolution frameworks suggests that the takeover of a failed bank by an incumbent one has two effects on financial stability. First, the incumbent takeover may boost financial stability by providing bankers with incentives to be solvent so as to profit from their competitors’ failure. Second, the incumbent takeover may spoil financial stability by creating “Systemically Important Financial Institutions”. The innovation of this paper is to capture these two effects in a theoretical model. We show that when incumbent bankers are impatient enough (i.e., they have high discount rates), the second effect prevails over the first one. We discuss the implications of this result for the design of bank resolution policies.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.     

Bank pay caps,bank risk,and macroprudential regulation

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.     

Market structure, consumer banking, and optimal level of service quality

In this article, we use a very simple game theoretic model to investigate the influence of differing market structures, or competitive conditions, on a bank's decision to increase the level of quality of the retail, or consumer, services that it markets. The results from our model suggest that the optional level of a bank's service quality depends critically on the competitive structure of the market in which the bank operates, the degree of demand interaction between banks, and the ease of imitation of competitors' service quality innovations.We find that banks in low demand interaction markets will adopt different strategies, inducing each bank to develop its own “unique” brand of quality. It is not necessarily the case that the leading banks will lead in quality improvements. This may partially explain why some of the largest banks do not have the highest levels of consumer service quality.     

The influence of managerial incentives on the resolution of financial distress

This study investigates the influence of managerial incentives on the resolution of financial distress. Our model predicts that when creditors and equityholders prefer different resolution methods, the likelihood of choosing Chapter 11 over private renegotiation is related to the ownership structure of the distressed firm. Empirical test results using a sample of 81 voluntary Chapter 11 firms and 65 private workout firms support the model’s prediction. We show that managerial ownership is positively related to the incidence of Chapter 11 filing when there is conflict between equityholders and creditors over the choice between Chapter 11 and a private renegotiation. Consistent with prior literature, we also find that the choice of resolution methods depends on the extent of creditor holdout problems and the level of economic distress. We also performed the analysis of a subsequent 5 years of post-distress performance for all sample firms. The majorities of firms that file for Chapter 11 lose their independence and are either acquired or liquidated. However, more than half of firms in private workouts survived as independent firms.

Securities class actions in the US banking sector: Between investor protection and bank stability

This paper investigates whether securities class actions (SCAs) can play a role in banking supervision, both as a warning signal of insolvency and as an instrument of market discipline to encourage bank managers to carefully evaluate risk. Two groups of US banks are compared over the 2000–2008 period. One includes banks that have faced at least one SCA, while the other is composed of non-targeted banks (control group). Results indicate that collective private litigation procedures are more frequently directed at financially fragile intermediaries exhibiting inadequate governance standards. Furthermore, banks which have been subjected to SCAs are likely to reduce their excessive risk positions. This supports the idea that SCAs could be efficiently employed as a complement to public supervisory activity in the banking sector.     

Financial networks,bank efficiency and risk-taking

Networks with a core–periphery topology are found in many financial systems across different jurisdictions. Though the theoretical and structural aspects of core–periphery networks are clear, the consequences that core–periphery structures bring for banking efficiency stand as an open question. We address this gap in the literature by providing insights as to how the structure of financial networks can affect bank efficiency. We find that core–periphery structures are cost efficient for banks, which is a characteristic that encourages the participation of banks in financial networks. On the downside, we also show that core–periphery structures are risk-taking inefficient, because they imply higher systemic risk levels in the financial system. In this way, regulators should be aware of the excessive risk inefficiency that arises in the financial system due to individual decisions made by banks in the network.     

Credit risk transfer and financial sector stability

In this paper, we study credit risk transfer (CRT) in an economy with endogenous financing (by both banks and non-bank institutions). Our analysis suggests that the incentive of banks to transfer credit risk is aligned with the regulatory objective of improving stability, and so the recent development of credit derivative instruments is to be welcomed. Moreover, we find the transfer of credit risk from banks to non-banks to be more beneficial than CRT within the banking sector. Intuitively, this is because it allows for the shedding of aggregate risk which must otherwise remain within the relatively more fragile banking sector. Therefore, regulators should act to maximize the benefits from CRT by encouraging the development of instruments favorable to the cross-sectoral transfer of aggregate credit risk (including basket credit derivatives such as collateralized debt obligations). Finally, we derive the optimal regulatory stance for banks relative to non-bank financial institutions. We show that a level playing field approach is sub-optimal. Regulatory stances should be set to actively encourage cross-sector CRT, first because of the higher fragility of the banking sector and second to induce banks to incur the costs of CRT which otherwise lead them to undertake an insufficient amount of CRT.     

Monetary and financial stability in the euro area: Pro-cyclicality versus trade-off

This paper investigates the nexus between monetary stability and financial stability. We examine, in the experience of EMU between 1994 and 2008, first, the response of the term structure of interest rates, share prices, exchange rates, property price inflation and the deposit–loan ratio of the banking sector (our proxies for financial stability) to changes in the consumer price level and ECB policy rate (our proxies for monetary stability); second, whether and to what extent lower inflation has caused share price stability and how ECB policy rate has reacted to inflation. Using a sign-restriction-based VAR approach, we find that there is a pro-cyclical relationship between monetary and financial stability in the long-run. With a positive inflation shock, we find on average a 2% estimated decline in share prices. This suggests that the interest rate instrument used for inflation targeting is conducive to financial stability.     

Don’t Stand So Close to Me: The role of supervisory style in banking stability

With the establishment of an integrated Banking Union, the harmonization of supervisory styles (regulation being equal) plays a central role. Our paper addresses a central question: what supervisory culture has been demonstrated to be most effective at ensuring the stability of European banks? We identify six different supervisory cultures and observe to what extent the words used in public speeches by the deans of the national supervision authority reflect the national cultural values of the Hofstede framework (Hofstede et al., 2010). By analyzing a panel of banks operating in the EU-15 from 1999 and 2011, our paper provides empirical evidence that supervisory culture influences the stability of banks. Our results have important policy implications: our paper is the first to provide empirical evidence of heterogeneity in the supervision styles in Europe and its effect on banking stability.     

The relation between commercial bank profit rates and banking concentration in Canada,Western Europe,and Japan

This paper examines the relation between the profit rates of 60 banks and concentration in the ‘home’ banking market of each. Other explanatory variables found to be significant are whether the bank is government owned, a proxy for profit rates throughout each country, and the rate of growth of individual banks' assets. The evidence supports the view that greater concentration leads to higher profit rates. However the relatively small coefficients of the concentration variable indicate that relatively large changes in concentration are necessary to reduce profit rates by one percentage point.     

政策性负担、预算软约束与大型涉农金融机构激励机制设计

本文应用多任务委托代理模型,分析政策性负担下大型涉农金融机构的预算软约束问题。通过求解政府和代理人(经营者)的动态均衡,提出分离政策性业务和商业性业务、明确商业性涉农金融业务不补贴政策、加强监督等措施,可有效激发代理人的努力程度。     

Cross-border banking,bank market structures and market power: Theory and cross-country evidence

Patterns in cross-border banking have changed since the global financial crisis. This may affect domestic bank market structures and macroeconomic stability in the longer term. In this study, I theoretically and empirically analyze how different modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration and market power. I use a two-country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks developed by DeBlas and Russ (2010a) to grasp the effect of cross-border lending and foreign direct investment in the banking sector on bank market structures. The model suggests that both cross-border lending and bank FDI mitigate concentration. Empirical evidence from a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries supports the theoretical predictions: higher volumes of bank FDI and of cross-border lending coincide with lower Herfindahl-indexes in bank credit markets.     

Pandemics of the poor and banking stability

We first develop a theoretical model that shows that the likelihood of a collapse of the banking industry of a developing country increases, as the joint prevalence of large pandemics such as AIDS and malaria increases. We also show that the optimal bank reserves increase as the prevalence increases. In the empirical part of the paper, we consider a large dataset of developing countries, and we exhibit a causality effect from combined prevalence to deposit turnover, as well as causality effect from an increase of combined prevalence to an increase in bank reserves. Those empirical facts therefore support our theoretical findings.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in Croatia

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures.

Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.     

Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model,efficiency and stability

How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.