A survey of models for determining optimal audit strategies

The problem studied in this survey is how to optimize the allocation of audit resources over an auditee population with respect to available population statistics. The auditees are assumed to optimize their expected utility based on information about the audit strategy. This survey is limited to models where the auditee can vary the fraud amount along a continuous scale.If the auditor is not able or willing to announce the audit strategy, a Nash equilibrium can be derived in which the auditor and auditee correctly anticipate each other's strategies. If the auditor announces the audit strategy in advance, the problem is formulated as a sequential game with perfect information which is solved as an optimization problem.Early models in the literature resulted in unrealistically high degrees of fraud. Later models have incorporated a split into one group of inherently honest auditees and another group of potentially dishonest auditees. The fraction of inherently honest auditees is exogenous.In this paper, the four combinations of non-announcing/pre-announcing the strategy and all potentially dishonest/some inherently honest auditees are studied. For the case of pre-announcing the strategy with some inherently honest auditees, two new solution methods are presented.Two main conclusions are as follows. First, models with some inherently honest auditees have greater external validity. Second, when a pre-announced strategy is feasible, as it often is with tax and benefit audits, the pre-announced strategy is preferred by the auditor over the non-announced strategy.     

Business risk auditing: A regressive evolution?—A research note

Business risk auditing (BRA) has been much publicised as revolutionary. The essence of the phenomenon, and the actual impact on practice, however, are unclear. This note revisits some pre-BRA interview evidence investigating auditor engagement with business risk. The evidence suggests that, pre-BRA, big-six auditors were already familiar with concepts of business risk although they were uncertain as to how precisely business risk informed the audit process. This suggests that BRA was evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, change and that the engagement of recent international standards with business risk is not significantly different from that of big-six auditors pre-BRA. The BRA era in audit methodology might be conceptualized as one of regressive evolution.     

The Regulation of Public Company Auditing: Evidence from the Transition to AS5

The replacement of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) by Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) creates a natural experiment that sheds light on (1) potential inefficiencies caused by regulatory responses to a political crisis and (2) audit efficiency and effectiveness improvements resulting from the risk‐based approach embodied in AS5. We study these effects by examining the impact of AS5 on audit fees. We find that AS5 audit fees are aligned with auditee fraud risk, but not AS2 audit fees. Second, relative to AS2 benchmark levels, AS5 audit fees are, on average, lower for all auditees. Third, relative to AS2 benchmarks, AS5 fees are lower for lower‐fraud‐risk auditees but greater for higher‐fraud‐risk auditees. Overall, the evidence is consistent with (1) initial overregulation (via AS2) followed by reform (via AS5) and (2) auditors deploying a risk‐based audit approach to obtain both efficiency and potential effectiveness gains in audit production.     

The Business Risk Audit Approach and Audit Production Efficiency

Essentially, this study asks: Does the business risk audit (BRA) approach increase audit production efficiency? To answer this question empirically, direct and indirect tests are employed using proprietary, working paper data from the larger clients of a major Australian public sector audit provider and an efficiency frontier analytic methodology, data envelopment analysis (DEA). Results based on this proprietary, audit hours data for audit engagements carried out just after BRA approach implementation show that they have high levels of production efficiency and are risk-adjusted, with no significant difference in production efficiency between higher and lower business risk audit engagements. Results based on audit fees data for audit engagements carried out shortly before and after BRA approach implementation show that overall production efficiency significantly improves. Importantly, while this improvement is significant for lower-risk audit engagements, there is no significant improvement for higher-risk audit engagements. In the context of this study's research site, this is consistent with the BRA approach addressing inefficiencies created when lower-risk audit engagements are being over-audited. That is, the BRA approach can result in both risk-adjusted and more efficiently produced audits. With the re-emergence of the BRA approach in the literature and in practice, this study provides empirical evidence to support the claim that this audit approach can lead to ‘creating auditing efficiencies’ (Bell et al., 1997, p. 1).     

Management letter comments: Their determinants and their association with financial reporting quality in local government

The issuance of management letters (MLs) as part of financial statement audits is a long-standing practice; however, previous studies of MLs are few and no previous research has tested the utility of MLs empirically. This paper reports a study of MLs issued by independent CPA firms pursuant to audits of Florida general purpose local governments. We investigate the determinants of ML comments, finding that such comments are influenced by auditee characteristics and auditor tenure but not by auditor specialization, a proxy for audit quality. Further, we explore the relationship between MLs and financial reporting quality. We observe a negative relationship between first-year ML comments and assessed financial reporting quality. When lagged one year, first-year ML comments bear a positive relationship with financial reporting quality. The absence of ML comments is positively associated with financial reporting quality. Our results suggest that MLs are beneficial to auditees. As such, our study should be interesting to policymakers, users of financial reports, auditees, and auditors.     

New Auditors’ Decisions for Released Firms from the Mandatory Auditor Designation Rule: Evidence From South Korea

This study examines the effect of the mandatory designation rule on audit fees charged and audit hours rendered by auditors for firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule in the Korean audit market. Under the mandatory auditor designation rule, which took effect in 1991, problematic firms are assigned new auditors by the Financial Supervisory Service. Previous studies suggest that this regulation positively affects the quality of audits by promoting auditor independence. Thus, this study hypothesises that firms that have been subjected to mandatory auditor designation improve the quality of their financial reporting, and that auditors hired after the mandatory designation period account for reduced audit risks when determining audit fees and audit hours. This study shows that audit fees and audit hours of firms released from the mandatory auditor designation rule are lower than those of other initial audit engagements. Taken together, this study's findings reinforce the notion that auditors’ perceptions of changes in audit risk yield corresponding changes in the audit fees they charge and audit hours they render.     

Explaining Variability in External Audit Fees

This study examines the effect of several factors on the level of external audit fees using a multiple regression model. Audit fee data were provided by 95 US publicly held companies for the years 1983 to 1985. Variables measuring client industry membership and auditor involvement in the security registration process were proxies for client regulatory aspects. These variables were significant and provide support for the hypothesis that scale economies and/or specialization effects accrue to audit firms in dealing with the regulatory complexities faced by clients. Variables measuring auditee size and complexity, auditee/auditor loss sharing risk, and audit firm size were also significant in explaining variability in external audit fees.     

Audit Market Structure and Competition in Australia

The purpose of this review is to synthesise the existing research literature regarding the underlying structure and competitiveness of the Australian audit market. We consider the findings of Australian academic research, which has examined audit fees, non‐audit fees, market concentration, auditor choice, auditor switching and audit firm mergers. We identify the key metrics used to evaluate market structure in the academic literature and then document changes in these metrics in the Australian audit market for listed company audits during the period 2000–2011. Our analysis shows that the audit market is both highly segmented and supplier‐concentrated. We find that audit fees in Australia have increased over this period, which can be attributed to increased regulation and resulting increased audit effort needed to complete audit engagements in times of regulatory change and more recently, the global financial crisis. We provide regulators, standard setters and the profession with an evidenced‐based perspective on the market for the listed company audits, which is an important input into any future proposals to regulate the Australian audit market.     

Regulating the Market for Audit Services: A Game Theoretic Approach

We apply game theory to model how alternative mandatory audit firm rotation regimes can affect the strategic interaction between auditee and auditor firms, and analyze potential consequences on detection risk and impairment of auditor scepticism. The major results suggest that: (1) relative to an initial state with no rotation requirement but high probability for impaired auditor scepticism, imposing either short-term or long-term mandatory audit firm rotation will remove the threat to auditor scepticism and lead to higher audit fees and lower detection risk; (2) relative to long-term mandatory audit firm rotation, imposing a short-term rotation will lead to lower audit fees and higher detection risk, resulting from greater informational frictions. We further find that imposing supplementary regulatory instruments, such as increased regulatory scrutiny of the auditee and/or auditor, can be used to lower the detection risk and increase audit quality. We discuss implications of these findings for empirical research.     

Audit Firm Tenure,Non‐Audit Services,and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality

We use data from internal assessments of audit quality in a Big 4 firm to investigate the impact of audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided non‐audit services (NAS) on audit quality. We find that first‐year audits receive lower assessments of audit quality and that quality improves shortly thereafter and then declines as tenure becomes very long. Partitioning our sample between SEC registrants and private clients, we find that the decline in audit quality in the long tenure range is attributable to audits of private clients. For audits of SEC registrants, the probability of a high quality audit reaches its maximum with very long tenure. We also find that audit fees are discounted for first‐year audits but auditor effort is higher than in subsequent years. We find no association, on average, between total NAS fees and audit quality in the full sample but observe that total NAS fees are positively associated with quality for SEC registrants and negatively associated with quality for privately held clients. Our findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided NAS.     

DETERMINANTS OF AUDIT FEES FOR QUOTED UK COMPANIES

This study reports further evidence as to the determinants of the audit fees paid by quoted companies in the UK. It outlines a framework based on the findings from semi-structured interviews with partners in four large audit firms and the results of previous research, and tests this framework by means of multivariate analysis using 1987 data for a large sample of quoted UK companies. A model explaining 87 per cent of the variation in audit fees is constructed. The principal explanatory variables are found to be auditee size, return on shareholders equity, the number of subsidiaries, the lag between the year end and the date of the audit report, the size of the auditor, a measure of auditee diversification, the ownership structure of the auditee, and whether the auditor was based in London, with the last three being new variables introduced in this study.     

Group audits: Are audit quality and price associated with the Lead auditor’s decision to accept responsibility?

Lead auditors frequently rely on work performed by Other auditors, especially when auditing clients with operations in multiple countries. The PCAOB has expressed concern that the quality of such group audits may differ depending on whether the Lead auditor accepts or declines responsibility for work done by Other auditors. The PCAOB also has been concerned with the venue through which Lead auditors and Other auditors disclose their participation in group audits, including disclosure of whether Lead auditors accept or decline responsibility. To investigate these issues, we employ a sample consisting entirely of group audit engagements. We identify Lead auditors taking responsibility from PCAOB Form 2, filed by Other auditors of U.S. registrants for fiscal years 2009 to 2017. We identify Lead auditors not accepting responsibility from audit report disclosures during the same period. The results suggest that Lead auditors accepting responsibility charge higher audit fees but provide audits of no higher quality, and possibly of even lower quality. These results are robust to various additional analyses. Our research contributes to the ongoing debate over how the participation of Other auditors affects audit quality.     

Audit market structure,fees and choice in a period of structural change: Evidence from the UK – 1998–2003

This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998–2003). Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level and by industry sector. There is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees. Audit fee income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients. A decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the period identifies the impact of four distinct consumer-based reasons for change: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; and (only for the audit fees measure) audit fee changes. Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality among the top tier firms but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On switching to the new auditor, former Andersen clients experienced an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation, with no evidence of fee premia or discounting. They also reported significantly lower NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and auditees responding to public concerns about perceptions of auditor independence. There is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS. The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concerns remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the governance and accountability of audit firms.     

Determinants of audit fees in Bangladesh

This paper reports the results of an analysis of the determinants of audit fees of both financial and non-financial companies in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi audit services market is unusual in that there is no direct involvement of international audit firms in it. The results of the regressions show that the size of the auditee has the greatest influence on audit fees. Whilst there was no international Big Six grouping, it was possible to construct a group of Bangladeshi audit firms which commanded a price premium, based on their size and whether they had a link with an international firm of auditors. Financial services companies were found to have higher audit fees relative to non-financial companies. Subsidiaries of multi-national holding companies also had higher audit fees. The surprising result was that auditees which employed at least one qualified accountant had higher audit fees.     

Audit firm tenure and financial restatements: An analysis of industry specialization and fee effects

This study investigates the relation between audit firm tenure and clients’ financial restatements. Specifically, we extend the audit tenure literature by assessing restatement-based reporting failures using dimensions of auditor expertise and independence previously assumed to underlie short and long audit tenure problems. Short tenure expertise and independence effects are hypothesized using audit firm industry specialization and audit fees as proxies. Long tenure independence effects are hypothesized using nonaudit fees as a proxy. Using matched-sample logistic regression and 382 companies with and without financial restatements during 2000–2004, the results support prior findings by indicating a negative relation between the length of the auditor–client relationship and the likelihood of restatement. For short tenure engagements, we find that auditor industry specialization and audit fees are negatively related to the likelihood of restatement. This result is consistent with concerns about reduced audit quality due to a lack of client-specific knowledge and low audit fees on new audit engagements. Alternatively, the long tenure results indicate an insignificant relation between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of restatement. This finding contradicts independence concerns about nonaudit fees paid to entrenched auditors.     

Negotiating the credibility of performance auditing

This paper reports the results of a longitudinal field study of a performance audit which used in-depth interviews and observation to examine the process by which auditees and auditors in the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) negotiated their relationship. The findings enhance understanding of auditee reactions to both the practice of performance auditing and the auditors themselves and the impact that these have on the credibility of performance auditing. Using the lens of Oliver's typology of strategic responses, the study confirmed the prevalence of auditee responses to performance auditing by the ANAO which ranged from co-operative acquiescence and co-operation to confrontational defiance. The paper addresses recent and ongoing calls for more studies of public sector auditing in action to deepen our understanding of the responses or manoeuvring of auditors and auditees during the process of performance auditing. A key contribution of the paper is confirmation that performance auditing continues to be a contested activity and its credibility in practice remains uncertain. The empirical (and historical) evidence suggests that audits that are perceived as especially politically sensitive can provoke active forms of resistance, including avoidance and defiance.     

Audit market concentration,audit fees,and audit quality: A cross-country analysis of complex audit clients

Regulators around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit market concentration on audit pricing and quality. However, results in the overall literature have failed to reach consensus on this issue. We contribute to this debate by arguing that the audit market is segmented and that concentration in the Big 4 segment of the market leads to higher audit pricing. Accordingly, our analyses use international data and focus on concentration within the Big 4 group of firms across countries. We find that audit fees are increasing in our concentration measure for clients where the barriers to entry by competing auditors are higher, as proxied by client size, international operations, and IFRS use. Finally, we find evidence that audit quality is decreasing in Big 4 market concentration for these types of engagements. This indicates a wealth transfer from shareholders to audit firms when auditor concentration is high because these complex clients are charged more, but receive audits that are of lower quality.     

The impact of audit penalty distributions on the detection and frequency of fraudulent reporting

We investigate how the distribution of the penalties incurred by auditors for failing to detect fraud influences their effort to detect fraud and auditees’ commission of fraud. We compare a probabilistic, skewed audit penalty to a penalty that automatically imposes the expected penalty of the probabilistic distribution (hereafter, a deterministic penalty). Our experiments show that a deterministic penalty with the same expected value of a probabilistic, skewed penalty increases audit effort to detect fraud and decreases fraudulent reporting by auditees and that these benefits hold in a game involving both auditee and auditor players.     

UK Auditor Concentration: A Descriptive Note

This note describes supplier concentration in the UK market for audit services. It extends previous research, which has focused on listed markets, by examining auditor concentration ratios across all corporate (quoted, unquoted plc and private) sub-markets. Individual and combined Big Six supplier concentration (CR6) ratios are calculated with reference to the number of clients audited, corporate size and disclosed audit fees. Compared with previous studies, the analysis is based on a larger number (171,799) of corporate audits, and indicates that, inter alia, corporate size (across different sub-markets) is a key determinant of supplier concentration. However, variations are reported in relation to individual auditors, auditee size and corporate sub-sectors. Other key findings are that the CR6 ratio in the quoted market has continued to rise in recent years, from 72.3% in 1991 (Beattie and Fearnley, 1994) to 78.4% in 1994/95, and that the Big Six currently audit a substantial proportion (58.2%) of companies in the UK middle market, which they appear to be targeting, as the large auditee sub-sector becomes saturated, to increase market share.     

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants,recovery, and future audit quality

Prior research on the link between lowballing (LB) of audit fees and audit quality is inconclusive. Using more recent data and an innovative design, we define LB engagements as those where the audit fee discount is at least 30 percent. We consider three research questions to understand the possible link between LB and audit quality. First, we investigate whether the two variables that are often associated with auditor independence in the literature—non-audit fees and client importance—are related to LB. Second, we test whether lowballing auditors recoup initial audit fee discounts in the future period. Lastly, we investigate the relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. We find that non-audit fees in the first year of engagement are negatively related to the propensity to LB. LB is significantly positively related to client importance for client firms switching from a non-Big N to another non-Big N auditor while the relation is insignificant for client firms switching from a Big N to another Big N auditor. The results of non-audit fees and client importance indicate that economic dependence does not motivate audit firms to lowball. Further, lowballing auditors tend to recoup their initial fee discounts in subsequent periods via increases in audit fees. Using multiple measures of audit quality, we do not find a significant relation between recovery of audit fees and future audit quality. Overall, contrary to regulators’ concerns, our results suggest that LB does not impair audit quality.