The impact of government intervention on stock returns: Evidence from Hong Kong

In August 1998, the Hong Kong government, in her effort to restore investors' confidence, purchased shares of the 33 stocks that constitute the Hang Seng Index (HS). We find that the government's action not only reverses the declining trend of the stock market but also reduces the volatility of the market. The main beneficiaries of the action are the shareholders of the stocks that are purchased by the government during the intervention period, and the increase in stock prices persists. Although the shareholders of non-Hang Seng stocks also gain from the intervention, their gain is smaller and does not last.     

Labor protection and government control: Evidence from privatized firms

In this paper, we examine whether labor protection determines the decision to retain a golden share in privatized firms. Using a sample of firms privatized in developing and industrialized countries, we find a negative relation between the likelihood of observing a golden share and labor protection. However, we find that this relation does not hold in the post-financial crisis period, suggesting that the recent crisis is associated with an increase in government control. Furthermore, we show that privatized firms in countries with strong labor protection are penalized with a higher cost of equity. Overall, our results underline the importance of labor protection for an important government control mechanism, namely golden shares, as well as for equity financing costs of privatized firms.     

Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: Evidence from Swiss cantons

Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that among other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. This paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of government using a data set of Swiss cantons. We first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy. Further panel regressions of Swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. We also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing, for the Swiss case, the gender education gap.     

Nonlinear effects of government debt on private consumption: Evidence from OECD countries

This paper investigates nonlinear effects of government debt on private consumption. The estimated consumption function shows smooth regime switching depending on the debt-to-GDP ratio, and a higher level of government debt crowds out private consumption to a greater extent.     

Effects of free textbooks on academic performance: Evidence from China's compulsory education

Since little is known about the effects of free textbooks on compulsory school students in China, this paper examines the effects of free textbooks on the academic performance of Chinese middle school students. It combines propensity score matching and difference-in-difference estimation to control for both observable and unobservable factors that affect the probability of obtaining free textbooks as well as students' academic performance. Results indicate that free textbooks significantly improve the midterm scores of girls and rural students, and the effects vary across different subjects. Moreover, the impact mechanisms of free textbooks are different for different groups and different subjects.     

Natural resource windfalls and efficiency in local government expenditure: Evidence from Peru

We study the role of natural resource windfalls in explaining the technical efficiency of public expenditure. Using a rich dataset of expenditure and public good provision for 1836 municipalities in Peru for the period 2001–2010, we estimate a nonmonotonic relationship between the efficiency of public good provision and the level of natural resource transfers. Local governments that were extremely favored by the boom in mineral prices were more efficient in using fiscal windfalls, whereas those that only benefited from modest transfers were more inefficient. These results can be explained by the increase in political competition associated with the boom. However, the fact that increases in efficiency were related to reductions in public good provision casts doubts on the beneficial effects of political competition in promoting efficiency.     

Participatory budgeting and the pattern of local government spending: Evidence from South Korea

We use a panel of Korean municipalities to examine the impact of participatory budgeting on local government expenditures. We find that participatory budgeting systematically alters the pattern of local spending. Municipalities using participatory budgeting reallocate resources toward more immediate and visible expenditures and away from long-term development expenditure. We also find evidence that participatory budgeting affects the municipal budget by a greater amount than the expenditures directly allocated through participatory budgeting. Our findings indicate that participatory budgeting leads to the reallocation of local public spending by increasing information flows between policymakers and service users.     

Social interaction and children's academic test scores: Evidence from the National Child Development Study

We explore the relationship between educational attainment and social interaction using individual level data from the British National Child Development Study. To be specific, we analyze whether an intergenerational aspect to this relationship exists by examining the relationship between the educational attainment of children and the degree of formal social activity undertaken by their parents. Our results suggest that children's scores in reading, mathematics and vocabulary tests are positively associated with the extent of their parents’ formal social interaction, and this relationship is robust to alternative definitions of social interaction.     

Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

Economic reform, voting, and local political intervention: Evidence from India

This paper uses the Indian tariff reforms of the early nineties to estimate how voters hurt by economic reforms respond. Regions more hurt by the tariff reform increased their support for both the party that initiated their suffering and parties with similar preferences in favor of poverty-centric policies. This response is surprisingly sophisticated, where voters did not simply punish incumbents for negative income shocks and correctly discounted initial anti-reform stances by opposition parties that later turned out to be false. Furthermore, the strength of this voting response varied with both geography and local political incentives, suggesting that the economic effects of reforms might vary substantially in large and decentralized democracies.     

Parties,divided government,and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence from U.S. states

This paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.     

Optimum government size and economic growth in case of Indian states: Evidence from panel threshold model

This paper investigates the relationship between optimum government size and economic growth using data of Indian states during 1990-91 to 2017–18. Our results derived from panel threshold regression model show a positive and significant impact of government size on economic growth within the estimated thresholds for both aggregate and sub-panels based on income and regions. Once the government size moves above the upper threshold level, then its impact declines and turns to be insignificant. Thus, our findings suggest the policymakers for maintaining the government size within the thresholds limit.     

Impact of government intervention in the housing market: evidence from the housing purchase restriction policy in China

In 2010, a housing purchase restriction policy was announced by China’s central government and implemented gradually by several prefecture governments. In this article, we empirically investigate this policy’s effect on the housing market. Using a difference-in-difference framework, we show that the housing purchase restriction policy reduces housing prices and transaction amounts but does not influence the housing investment or construction markets. Moreover, upstream industry suffers more than downstream industry. The results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Heterogeneity exists across cities. We find that first- and second-tier cities as well as highly urbanized cities experience great declines in housing prices after the policy’s implementation, especially cites that had high housing prices in 2010 and cities with high real estate investment as a proportion of fixed asset investment. However, the housing policy is less effective in curbing speculative demand.     

Does contracting out increase the efficiency of government programs? Evidence from Medicaid HMOs

State governments contract with health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to coordinate medical care for nearly 20 million Medicaid recipients. Identifying the causal effect of HMO enrollment on government spending and health care quality is difficult if, as is often the case, recipients have the option to enroll in a plan. To estimate the average effect of HMO enrollment, this paper exploits county-level mandates introduced during the last several years in the state of California that required most Medicaid recipients to enroll in a managed care plan. The empirical results demonstrate that the resulting switch from fee-for-service to managed care was associated with a substantial increase in government spending but no corresponding improvement in infant health outcomes. The findings cast doubt on the hypothesis that HMO contracting has reduced the strain on government budgets.     

Changes in officials,total factor productivity fluctuation and government transformation: Evidence from Chinese prefecture cities

This paper investigates the interrelationships between changes in officials and total factor productivity (TFP) in China. The tournament competition for promotion results in a series of predicaments, such as excessive investment, duplicate construction, split regional markets and misallocations; these negative effects further inhibit local TFP. Local government transformation from driving investment to providing services can promote TFP. We use data from 230 prefecture cities between 1999 and 2013 and find the following: (a) in recent years with the process of government transformation, changes in officials have typically had less impact on TFP fluctuation than in previous years; (b) changes in officials mainly affect technology efficiency (TE) in TFP; and (c) the mediation model reveals that changes in officials' positions influences TFP through economic spillovers and tax competition. Overall, our paper offers novel evidence for the impact of government administration on productivity and technology development, which is significant for policy decisions during government transformation.     

Promotions and wage discrimination in the federal government: Evidence from H.E.W.

This paper extends previous empirical studies of racial and sexual wage differentials in the federal government by analyzing the role of promotions in the creation of these wage differentials. It is found that in the subsample of federal workers analyzed, differences in promotion rates are a significant factor leading to wage differences by race and sex.     

Do rival political parties enforce government efficiency? Evidence from Canada 1867–2021

This paper investigates the role of inter-party rivalry in enhancing federal government efficiency in post-Confederation Canada. It tests and finds confirmation in the data for two hypotheses. The first is that the ex post size of the first versus second seat share margin is a useful metric for the ineffectiveness of political parties in policing the incumbent's spending behaviour over its period of tenure. The second is the hypothesis that shirking by the incumbent governing party is decreased by greater expected electoral contestability and expected contestability is related to the effective number of competing parties (ENPSeats) nonmonotonically. In this regard the results suggest that contestability in Canada reaches a maximum when the incumbent faces a value of ENPSeats that is closer to 2.5 than Duverger's 2.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.     

How to eliminate the uncovered market: A duopoly model with government intervention

To eliminate poverty, government intervention is critical for addressing uncovered markets. To assess how this can be done effectively, this study constructs a two-firm model with government intervention. The study focuses on the preconditions, methods, and effects of different government intervention strategies. There are three main findings. (1) When consumer income levels fall below a certain threshold, an uncovered market segment is created, and government intervention should be introduced. (2) Government intervention strategies can be divided into subsidy-type, production-type and mixed-type, and each type achieves a different level of consumer surplus. Given a level of consumer surplus, the optimal strategy is affected by production costs. (3) For production-type and mixed-type intervention strategies, when the market is covered, lower intervention costs can achieve higher consumer surplus if government production costs are low. Furthermore, the optimal subsidy-type intervention strategy varies with the changes in product quality if relaxing the precondition of market coverage.     

Variation in the effects of government spending shocks with methods of financing: Evidence from the U.S.

Using annual data for the United States, the paper investigates the evidence of variation in the fiscal multiplier with the method of financing government spending. The fiscal multiplier varies in the face of positive and negative shocks and across methods of financing. In general, fiscal expansion appears insignificant on aggregate demand and economic activity. In contrast, the evidence presents a number of significant negative multipliers in the face of fiscal contraction. The combined evidence challenges the effectiveness of fiscal policy and supports arguments to restrain fiscal expansion in an effort to stimulate the economy.