领导力的双要素与沟通

本文分析了以往学者们提出的领导力的概念和内涵．提出了“领导力的双要素内涵”的主张,即领导力具备着由对“事”的决策力和对“人”的凝聚力这两个要素的内涵。进而建立领导力的双要素模型,通过模型分析双要素决策力与凝聚力之间的关系。本文指出．提高领导力的一个重要因素为沟通．通过加强信息沟通可提高领导对“事”的决策力、通过加强情感沟通可提高领导者对被领导者的凝聚力．进而提高领导力。     

服务型领导供求匹配一致性与创造力：内在动机与主动性人格的作用

服务型领导有效性取决于领导者和下属双方匹配的一致性,但现有研究局限于仅从领导或下属单一视角考察服务型领导的影响。基于个体-环境匹配理论,对服务型领导供求匹配一致性与创造力的关系进行分析,探讨追随者内在动机的中介作用与追随者主动性人格的调节作用。通过对200个领导与726个员工的配对数据进行多项式回归与响应面分析,结果发现：与服务型领导低匹配（低供给-低需求）相比,追随者的内在动机在服务型领导高匹配（高供给-高需求）时更高;服务型领导供求匹配通过追随者内在动机影响创造力;追随者主动性人格在服务型领导供求匹配与追随者内在动机之间并不存在显著调节作用。     

Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments

We examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments. Leadership is implemented by letting one group member contribute to the public good before followers do. Such leadership increases contributions in comparison to the standard voluntary contribution mechanism, especially so when it goes along with authority in the form of granting the leader exclusion power. Whether leadership is fixed or rotating among group members has no significant influence on contributions. Only a minority of groups succeeds in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader.     

值得关注的管理学前沿:追随问题研究

企业怎样才能得到更好的发展,学术界一直致力于领导者和领导力的研究,认为领导对企业的发展起着至关重要的作用,却忽视了与领导力相对应的追随者和追随力的研究.事实上,追随者同样能对企业产生巨大的影响.国外对追随问题的研究,已经出现了很丰硕的研究成果,而在我国则还处于初级阶段.国外有关追随问题的研究文献,主要就追随力的定义、组织中的追随者类型、优秀追随者行为、追随者与领导者之间的关系等方面进行了深入的探讨,并取得了丰硕成果.     

追随者视角下的领导过程研究

在关于领导的相关研究中,领导者一直处于研究的主导地位,自Meindl和他的同事正式提出追随者为中心的研究视角以来,追随者在领导研究中的地位逐渐突显出来。分析了追随者视角下领导研究的发展历程,辨析了追随者的概念界定,归纳出已有研究中的两大研究取向。最后,提出了追随者视角下领导研究的框架,探讨了该项研究深化的方向,提出了中国本土领导研究的需求。     

HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*

This article investigates the relationship between the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) and welfare in multiple‐leader Stackelberg models. We formulate two long‐run models of free entry of followers; in the first (second) model, leaders select their output before (after) the entry of the followers. We find that in both models, in contrast to the short‐run models, the Stackelberg model yields a larger welfare and HHI than the Cournot model does regardless of the number of leaders; that is, beneficial concentration always occurs.     

从领导到追随:领导力的一个整合研究框架

没有追随就没有领导已成为一种共识,追随者和追随行为与领导者和领导行为对于理解领导力同等重要。回顾了从领导者为中心到追随者为中心,再到过程为中心的领导力研究文献,基于领导过程模型整合了领导者为中心和追随者为中心两个流派,从近端和远端两个视角概括了领导者特征和追随者特征对领导行为、追随行为及领导力结果的影响,并对领导力构建过程以及"预测变量—近端影响—远端影响"路径中存在的调节机制进行了梳理,在此基础上构建了一个领导力研究整合框架,以明确领导力的未来研究方向。     

Innovation by Heterogeneous Leaders*

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model in which leaders and followers conduct research and development (R&D) activities and in which leaders have different‐sized quality leads over their followers, and thus have different profit flows. We show that leaders with larger quality leads make smaller R&D investments; this result is consistent with the actual behaviors of some previous leader firms, such as Sony and Eastman–Kodak. Moreover, we show that subsidizing the R&D of followers can promote the aggregate R&D of leaders, because promotion of followers' R&D decreases (increases) the number of leaders with larger (smaller) quality leads and smaller (larger) R&D investments.     

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.     

领导行为如何影响领导自身？综述与未来方向

在领导研究领域中,领导行为的影响效应是一个极其重要的研究话题。然而,现有文献大多关注领导行为对员工、团队或组织产生的影响,很少关注其对领导者自身的影响。近年来,部分新兴的领导研究开始从行为者视角出发,关注领导行为对领导者（行为者）自身的影响,这些研究为理解领导行为产生的动因提供了新的理论见解,为领导行为培训提供了新的实践启示。基于此,本文梳理了目前关于领导行为对自身影响的研究,理清相关研究的主要脉络及发展方向。具体地,首先根据领导行为性质（建设型或破坏型）和影响效果（积极或消极）两个维度,将领导行为对自身影响研究划分为四大类：(1)建设型领导行为对领导者的积极影响研究;(2)建设型领导行为对领导者的消极影响研究;(3)破坏型领导行为对领导者的消极影响研究;(4)破坏型领导行为对领导者的积极影响研究。进一步,根据以上分类,系统回顾关于领导行为对自身影响的研究文献,提炼背后的理论机制和作用路径。最后,在此基础上,提出该领域的未来研究方向。     

变革型领导国内研究综述

变革型领导理论产生于社会环境越来越趋于全球化、企业所面临的经营环境信息化与多元化时代背景下,世界的急速变化给管理者和领导者带来了极其严峻的挑战和考验,变革型领导理论突破性地把领导者和下属的角色相互联系起来,领导者通过自身的行为表率,对下属需求的关心来优化组织内的成员互动,试图在领导者与下属之间创造出一种能提高双方动力和品德水平的理论。该理论的提出使整个领导学界产生了一次大的革命,成为了近二十年学界和企业界共同关注的焦点。由于该理论产生于西方文化背景下,而中国的领导过程与西方的领导过程既有相似的方面,也有独特的一面。变革型领导理论自传入国内以来,国内研究者们从不同角度进行了广泛而深入的理论探索和相关的实证研究。本文从变革型领导的概念、结构、测量以及作用机制等方面对变革型领导的相关国内研究进行梳理,并提出未来研究的展望。     

Borrowed Time: Sovereign Finance,Regime Type,and Leader Survival

This study explores the conditional influence of sovereign credit on leader survival. We specifically focus on credit's heterogeneous effect on leadership survival across regimes. We argue that non‐democratic leaders are more sensitive to credit access and cost than democratic leadership. We use event history analysis to test the conditional relationship between sovereign credit and leader tenure from 1981 to 2004. Examining both domestic and global determinants of credit access and costs, our findings are consistent with the assertion that non‐democratic leadership survival is linked to credit even when addressing issues of endogeneity.     

Bilateral Merger a Note on Salant-Switzer-Reynolds Model

The SSR (1983, QJE) paper shows that in an oligopoly industry of kfirms (k > 2) with linear demand and identical (constant) average cost of production, a bilateral merger is never profitable when all firms choose their quantities simultaneously. In this paper we re-examine the issue when some firms have first-mover advantage. We find that in a leader-follower structure a bilateral merger is always profitable when a leader and a follower merge together and the merged firm behaves like a leader. But, a bilateral merger between leaders or between followers may not be privately profitable.

     

Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising

Why do charities often begin new capital fund drives by announcing a large contribution by a single wealthy donor? This paper explores the possibility that such “leadership giving” provides a signal to all other givers that the charity is of high quality. The dilemma is that if the lead giver can deceive others to believe the charity is of higher quality than it truly is, then these followers will make larger contributions, which will benefit the leader. Hence, the leader must give an unusually large amount to convey a credible signal of the quality. This sets up a war‐of‐attrition game for who will pay the cost to signal the quality. Since the wealthy have the lowest opportunity cost of providing the signal, they, in equilibrium, move first to provide the signal of quality with exceptionally large gifts.     

What are good R&D investment strategies for leaders and followers?

Research and development (R&D) investment affects the growth of firms in the same industry differently according to their technological positions. This study empirically investigates differences in how R&D investment influences firm growth between technological leaders and followers. Additionally, this study investigates the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition on the relationship between R&D investment and firm growth. Using a sample of 2322 observations from 492 firms in the U.S. chemical and allied products industry for the period 2000–2009, we show that an increase in R&D investment leads to greater firm growth for technological followers than for technological leaders. We also find that the moderating effects of complementary assets and market competition vary depending on whether a firm is a technological leader or follower.     

The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence

Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.     

趣味相投能带来创新吗？领导幽默一致性对团队创新的影响

领导幽默作为一种新兴的领导行为方式，其对创新的促进作用已经得到相关文献证实。然而，以往研究大都关注下属对领导者幽默的评价，而忽视了领导者对自身幽默的评价。基于互动仪式链理论和资源保存理论，分析领导自评领导幽默与团队他评领导幽默的一致性对团队创新的影响及其作用机制。应用多项式回归与响应面分析技术，对174个团队的领导和团队成员配对样本数据进行分析。研究发现：相比“低自评—低他评”的情形,在“高自评—高他评”情形下,团队创新水平更高；相比“高自评—低他评”的情形，在“低自评—高他评”情形下，团队创新水平更高；领导幽默一致性能够通过团队凝聚力影响团队创新。最后，结合研究结论对领导如何恰当地表达幽默以促进团队创新提出对策建议。     

The role of transformational leadership and leaders’ skills for new agricultural cooperatives in post-soviet countries

Team leadership plays a crucial role in the management of agricultural cooperatives, especially in post-Soviet countries where farmers keep bad experiences from the collectivization of their farms. The main objective of the research was to investigate how important the role of leadership is in the process of establishing, initial sustaining of cooperation and members’ commitment among small farmers in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Leadership was analysed from multiple perspectives using an explanatory sequential mixed approach involving quantitative and qualitative methods. We interviewed 293 cooperative leaders and members. The partial least squares structural equation model was used to examine the relationship between multiple constructs and variables. We concluded that leaders do differ in some of their characteristics from other members. They are the most active in the group, influencing all major decisions, playing a crucial role in trust-building and group cohesion. Their skills and leadership style are significantly important for members’ commitment to the group's success. However, the dominance of group founders and lack of understanding of cooperative principles among members indicate some emerging challenges to the cooperatives’ sustainability and efficiency, and it is necessary to focus on the progressive professionalization and capacity building of leaders while maintaining a transformational leadership style.     

Free Trade Agreement with Endogenous Market Structure

We examine the incentives of free trade agreement (FTA) formation between two countries under endogenous market structure with leaders and followers. We demonstrate that establishing a FTA is neither an equilibrium outcome nor socially optimal when consumer demand and fixed cost are intermediate, products are close substitutes and countries are asymmetrical. This is because the FTA induces exit of followers, which makes the market less competitive and shrinks the leader’s production both in the domestic and foreign markets. We also show that large developing countries are less likely to establish a FTA than small developed countries.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.