Robust monetary policy with imperfect knowledge

We examine the performance and robustness properties of monetary policy rules in an estimated macroeconomic model in which the economy undergoes structural change and where private agents and the central bank possess imperfect knowledge about the true structure of the economy. Policymakers follow an interest rate rule aiming to maintain price stability and to minimize fluctuations of unemployment around its natural rate but are uncertain about the economy's natural rates of interest and unemployment and how private agents form expectations. In particular, we consider two models of expectations formation: rational expectations (RE) and learning. We show that in this environment the ability to stabilize the real side of the economy is significantly reduced relative to an economy under RE with perfect knowledge. Furthermore, policies that would be optimal under perfect knowledge can perform very poorly if knowledge is imperfect. Efficient policies that take account of private learning and misperceptions of natural rates call for greater policy inertia, a more aggressive response to inflation, and a smaller response to the perceived unemployment gap than would be optimal if everyone had perfect knowledge of the economy. We show that such policies are quite robust to potential misspecification of private sector learning and the magnitude of variation in natural rates.     

Adaptive learning, forecast-based instrument rules and monetary policy

This paper argues that recently popular forecast-based instrument rules for monetary policy may fail to stabilize economic fluctuations. In a New Keynesian model of output gap and inflation determination in which private agents face multi-period decision problems, but have non-rational expectations and learn over time, if the monetary authority adopts a forecast-based instrument rule and responds to observed private forecasts then this class of policies frequently induce divergent learning dynamics. A central bank that correctly understands private behavior can mitigate such instability by responding to the determinants of private forecasts. This suggests gathering information on the determinants of expectations to be useful.     

异质预期条件下中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的影响

在外汇市场交易者预期异质性的假设条件下,以2005年7月至2015年12月中国人民银行沟通频数和人民币汇率数据为样本,采用异质预期汇率模型考察中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的总体影响。研究发现：在异质预期条件下,中央银行沟通通过信息机制和协调机制影响外汇市场交易者的异质预期,从而对人民币汇率波动产生较为显著的影响,但由于我国外汇交易者预期向基本面预期转换的发生概率小于技术分析交易者预期,中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的平稳作用效力受到一定的局限。     

Learning and the Effectiveness of Central Bank Forward Guidance

This paper examines the link between expectations formation and the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance. A standard New Keynesian model is extended to include forward guidance shocks in the monetary policy rule. Agents form expectations about future macro‐economic variables via either the standard rational expectations hypothesis or an adaptive learning model. The results show that the assumption of rational expectations overstates the effects of forward guidance relative to adaptive learning during an economic crisis. Thus, if monetary policy is based on a model with rational expectations, the results of forward guidance could be potentially  misleading.     

The Effects of the Sharing Economy: How Does Internet Finance Influence Commercial Bank Risk Preferences?

In this article, we provide an evidence on the effects of the sharing economy by studying internet finance. It aims to explore how internet finance affects the relationship between commercial bank risk preferences and monetary policy, and discusses whether this impact varies across heterogeneous banks. The results suggest that having a loose monetary policy encourages a preference for risk. In addition, internet finance alters the sensitivity of bank risk behavior to monetary policy. Internet finance has a heterogeneous influence, depending on a bank’s ownership (i.e., state or private) and size. At privately owned banks, internet finance has only a moderate impact on the bank risk-taking transmission channel of monetary policy, unlike the subsample of large banks.     

Stabilizing non-fundamental asset price movements under discretion and limited information

Inflation, output and interest rate stabilization are all potential central bank objectives. We explore whether monetary policy should respond to asset price fluctuations when they are driven by irrational expectational shocks to the future returns to capital. In our model, an optimistic shock to future returns generates both an increase in equity prices and physical investment. The increased investment is inefficient and, thus, a central bank optimally responds to this expectations shocks. This induces a trade-off between stabilizing nominal prices and non-fundamental asset price movements. We compare the optimal policy under different assumptions: full versus limited information and commitment versus discretion. If the central bank has limited information about whether an asset price movement has a fundamental or non-fundamental origin, then the central bank responds less aggressively to the non-fundamental exuberance shocks than under full information. Without commitment, a central bank responds more aggressively to non-fundamental exuberance shocks.     

西方中央银行沟通视角下的预期管理研究：渠道、手段及效果

近年来,中央银行沟通成为一种新型的货币政策工具。基于中央银行沟通视角,分析西方国家在预期管理中的渠道、手段及效果,结论表明中央银行沟通有助于预期管理。借鉴西方国家沟通经验,提出中央银行的有效沟通,需要中央银行独立性及问责制作保障;重视沟通的规律性,强调沟通信息的清晰和准确;注重对宏观经济运行认识水平,提高公众的经济学素养。     

经济政策不确定性与企业贷款成本

基于大样本微观银行信贷数据,本文研究经济政策不确定性对企业的银行贷款成本的影响。研究发现,经济政策不确定性升高导致企业的银行贷款成本增加,且使得在中小型银行贷款的企业成本增加更多。异质性分析表明,经济政策不确定性升高对受政策因素影响较大的企业如小微企业、私营企业等的银行贷款成本的影响更为明显。进一步,对企业的银行贷款违约风险的研究发现,随着经济政策不确定性升高,企业的银行贷款违约风险反而降低。这表明,经济政策不确定性升高使得银行选择风险评级更低的贷款,符合谨慎性动机。本文研究结论表明,经济政策不确定性升高时,银行“自我保险”动机的增强使得企业的银行贷款成本增加,这在中小型银行中表现得更加明显,同时也更多地转嫁给中小企业。本文为经济政策不确定性对企业投资、宏观经济波动等的研究提供了微观解释机制,并揭示了政府经济政策的一致性、稳定性对维护金融稳定的重要作用。     

嵌入投资银行后的银行危机传导模型

基于Sujit模型,通过在支付清算系统内构建嵌入投资银行的危机传导模型,同时考虑中央银行的两种政策对防范少数银行危机蔓延至系统危机的作用,结果发现,少数银行引发系统危机的主要原因在于危机银行影响了与其有着支付清算关系的债权银行的收益和它们的预期信心,中央银行政策对控制危机传导是有效的.     

A model of unconventional monetary policy

We develop a quantitative monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance sheet constraints. We then use the model to evaluate the effects of the central bank using unconventional monetary policy to combat a simulated financial crisis. We interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermediation to offset a disruption of private financial intermediation. Within our framework the central bank is less efficient than private intermediaries at making loans but it has the advantage of being able to elastically obtain funds by issuing riskless government debt. Unlike private intermediaries, it is not balance sheet constrained. During a crisis, the balance sheet constraints on private intermediaries tighten, raising the net benefits from central bank intermediation. These benefits may be substantial even if the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not binding. In the event this constraint is binding, though, these net benefits may be significantly enhanced.     

货币政策对流动性风险的影响——基于银行信贷行为视角

本文基于我国现实背景和《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,利用2008年至2017年间194家商业银行的相关数据,对我国银行净稳定资金率进行了度量,并在此基础上,检验了货币政策对我国商业银行流动性风险的影响,探究了其影响机理和传导渠道。研究表明:扩张型货币政策会提高商业银行的流动性风险;不同经济环境下,货币政策对流动性风险的影响存在差异但不具备异质性;不同类型的商业银行中,货币政策对流动性风险的影响不具有异质性;在货币政策对流动性风险的影响中,银行信贷行为是重要的传导渠道。因此,央行可基于货币政策对流动性风险的影响差异进行相机抉择;商业银行则要加强信贷规模和质量的管理,优化资产结构,通过弱化信贷渠道作用来降低货币政策对银行流动性风险的不良影响。     

Do Central Bank Forecasts Influence Private Agents? Forecasting Performance versus Signals

Focusing on a set of central banks that publish inflation forecasts in real time, this paper aims to establish whether central bank inflation forecasts influence private inflation forecasts. The response is positive in the five countries studied: Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, and Japan. Three hypotheses may explain this central bank influence: central bank forecasts are more accurate than private ones, are based on different information sets, and/or convey signals about future policy decisions and policymakers’ preferences and objectives. We provide evidence that the source of these central banks’ influence is not linked to their forecasting performance.     

异质性通胀预期对通货膨胀形成机制的动态影响-基于混合新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线的实证分析

通过对异质性通胀预期与实际通货膨胀动态关系的实证研究,证实了不同微观经济主体的预期都会对实际通货膨胀产生影响,并且适应性预期所占比例远远大于理性预期.更进一步,适应性预期与理性预期对实际通货膨胀的影响力不同,理性预期对实际通货膨胀的即期影响力大于适应性预期,但是影响的持久性却小于理性预期.所以央行在调控通货膨胀的时候,应关注微观经济体的通胀预期异质性,适时引导各种异质性预期,从而锚定微观经济体的预期,使得货币政策能够顺利实施.     

Discretionary monetary policy and inflation persistence

Rational expectations models of staggered price/wage contracts have failed to replicate the observed persistence in inflation and unemployment during disinflationary periods. The current literature on this persistency puzzle has focused on augmenting the nominal contract model with imperfect credibility and learning. In this paper, I re-examine the persistency puzzle by focusing on the discretionary nature of monetary policy. I show that when the central bank is allowed to re-optimize a quadratic loss function each period, imperfect credibility and learning, even in the absence of staggered contracts, can generate a significant amount of inflation persistence and employment losses during a disinflationary period.     

Robustly optimal monetary policy in a microfounded New Keynesian model

We consider optimal monetary stabilization policy in a New Keynesian model with explicit microfoundations, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-consistency. We show how to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candidate policy rules. We show that robustly optimal policy can be implemented through commitment to a target criterion involving only the paths of inflation and a suitably defined output gap, but that a concern for robustness requires greater resistance to surprise increases in inflation than would be considered optimal if one could count on the private sector to have “rational expectations.”     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

The Fed,the Bond Market,and Gradualism in Monetary Policy

We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: the central bank has private information about its long‐run target rate and is averse to bond market volatility. In this setting, the central bank gradually impounds changes in its target into the policy rate. Such gradualism represents an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort is partially undone in equilibrium, as markets rationally react more to a given move when the central bank moves more gradually. This time‐consistency problem means that society would be better off if the central bank cared less about the bond market.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the "New Keynesian" model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E-stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.     

The bank loan distribution effect of government spending expansion: Evidence from China

Rather than focusing on the spread of enterprises' bank loans, we focus on the impact of government spending expansion on the amount of bank loans obtained by enterprises. We first build a theoretical model to show that there are the demand effect and loan cost effect of government spending expansion on the bank loans and then use the fixed effects approach to analyze the bank loan distribution effect of government spending expansion by using the data of enterprises listed on the China Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2019. Empirical results show that the demand effect plays a leading role for the central government state-owned enterprises (SOEs), helping them obtain more bank loans from banks. In contrast, for private enterprises, the loan cost effect plays a leading role, hurting them in obtaining bank loans from banks. Further research shows that government spending expansion's crowding-in or crowding-out effect differs from Neoclassicism and (new) Keynesianism. This paper provides a new explanation for why the financing problem of private enterprises is getting worse in China. The policy implication is that when the government implements expansionary fiscal policies, it should also provide convenience for private enterprise financing through window guidance to prevent the expansionary fiscal policies from crowding out private enterprise bank loans.