A re-examination of Verdoorn's law and its application to the manufacturing industries of the UK,West Germany and the USA

This paper examines recent theoretical justification of Verdoorn's law and suggests a derivation of Verdoorn's law in the form P?=aQ?+b which requires only the assumption K?=γ a constant. This derivation is generalised to include the effect of the efficient use of labour on productivity change. The manufacturing industries of the United Kingdom, West Germany and the United States are analysed on the basis of the theory.     

Consistent conjectures and voluntary contributions to public goods: why the conventional theory does not work

The conventional theory of voluntary contributions to public goods assumes that each person maximises his utility taking other people's behaviour as given (Nash conjectures). It is now coming to be recognised that this theory is inconsistent with observed behaviour. This paper argues that the problems of the theory are compounded — and not, as some economists have argued, resolved — by relaxing the assumption of Nash conjectures. If individuals' conjectures are consistent, each person will hold the (correct) belief that other people's contributions are inversely related to his own. Under most reasonable assumptions, equilibrium is a state in which no-one contributes anything.     

The macroeconomics of unbalanced growth and the expanding public sector: Some simple tests of a model of government growth

A now classic model of public sector growth is Baumol's (1967) ‘Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth’. That model implies that one cause of public sector expenditure growth is a low or zero rate of productivity growth in the public sector relative to the private sector. Previous studies have tested, and partially confirmed, the Baumol hypothesis by computing productivity indices for various public sector activities. In this paper I attempt to test that model in a more direct manner. The unbalanced growth model is used to predict growth rates of per capita government expenditures, government's share of GNP and the pattern of government expenditure growth. These predictions are compared with observed growth rates of aggregate government expenditures. The model predicts the growth rate aggregate government expenditures, the growth rate of government's share of GNP, and the pattern of government expenditure growth reasonably well, and the data tend to support the Baumol model.     

The intertemporal externality in the dynamic common property renewable resource problem

We develop a model in which agent i's ‘catch’ in time t affects his and all other agents' ‘catches’ in time t + 1. There is no static externality in this dynamic model of the common property, only an intertemporal externality. We demonstrate that common property regimes correspond to lower steady-state stocks and lower welfare as compared to the competitive solution with no externalities.     

Entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior and long-run equilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to derive some interesting results on long-run equilibrium by considering entrepreneurs' capital accumulation behavior explicitly. Our framework is a two class, two production sector model in order to analyze the dynamic stability properties in the cases of Kaldor's saving assumption and Pasinetti's saving assumption. We shall introduce a further adjustment mechanism: the speeding up (slowing down) of capital accumulation in that sector in which the rate of profit is higher (lower).     

Quesnay's model of economic development

The article examines François Quesnay's ideas on economic growth and technical progress in agriculture. It formalizes these ideas as a dynamic model which describes the relationship between a shift to high yielding capital-intensive methods of production and growth and income distribution, taking into account Quesnay's understanding of the institutional aspects of land tenure in his days.     

Tax subsidies,the rational demand for insurance and the health care crisis

An individual's optimal insurance coverage depends on balancing his gain through avoiding risk against his loss through the distortion of demand. The U.S. tax system subsidizes the purchase of excessive health insurance by excluding employer premium payments from employees' taxable incomes and by permitting the deduction of a portion of individual premiums. The current operational model of demand for health insurance shows that the tax subsidy does substantially increase insurance coverage. Since much of the rise in health care costs can be attributed to the growth of insurance, the tax subsidy is responsible for much of what is widely perceived as a health care crisis.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Overlapping expectations and Hart's conditions for equilibrium in a securities model

Hart (J. Econ. Theory9 (1974), 293–311) gave conditions for equilibrium to exist in a securities model where each agent undertakes asset transactions to maximize expected utility of wealth. These conditions rule out agents wanting to undertake unbounded balanced transactions to reach a Pareto superior allocation given their expectations. With mild extra assumptions to make agents unwilling to risk incurring unbounded losses on their portfolios, Hart's conditions become equivalent to an assumption of “overlapping expectations,” which is comparable to a much weaker form of Green's “common expectations” (Econometrica41 (1973), 1103–1124).     

Women's lib explanation of paradoxical results in estimations of the value of travel time and subsequent biases in cost-benefit studies

Estimates of the value of time derived from differences in the value of residential locations lead to valuations much below the wage rate. Estimates of valuation for recreational travel time are often equal to the wage rate. This paradox is explained by appealing to a model in which time spent at home must partially be used for household work, and therefore time spent traveling saves the traveler, but not his family, some costs. This evidence can be explained if it is the traveler who chooses the location of his family's residence.     

Technology and social change: William Fielding Ogburn revisited

This paper reviews William Fielding Ogburn's work on technology and social change. An overview of his basic theory is presented, as well as later refinements found in such works as Recent Social Trends in the United States, Technological Trends and National Policy, The Social Effects of Aviation, and other books and articles. It is suggested that while Ogburn is most widely remembered for his thesis of cultural lag, some of his later work on technology and social change is actually more important and deserves reconsideration and extension. One kind of extension might follow the lines of a systems approach rather than continuing the technological primacy strategy that Ogburn is normally considered to have used. The paper also surveys Ogburn's important work in the areas of technology, planning, and social policy, including materials on technology assessment. Ogburn's nontechnocratic approach to these questions, as well as his insistence that social scientists have a great deal to offer to the formulation of technological and social policies, are some of his most important contributions. Questions of technology and social change remain important contemporary issues, yet there is a surprising paucity of social science work on these crucial topics. Further study, extension, and reformulation of Ogburn's pioneering ideas offer fruitful means of embarking on new social science analyses of technology and society.     

An algorithm of game theory applied to the duopoly problem

In this note, an algorithm of Game Theory — Fictitious Play — is applied to a duopoly model: at each step of the algorithm, each duopolist chooses a quantity which maximizes his expected payoff, given the frequency distribution of his opponent's past choices. The algorithm is interpreted as a dynamic learning process and compared to Cournot's process. The successive pairs of quantities announced by the duopolists are proved to converge to a pair of non-cooperative equilibrium quantities. A more sophisticated version of the algorithm also has the same convergence properties.     

A new approach to the incorporation of attributes into consumer theory

A framework is developed which can be used to analyze a large class of consumption situations which cannot be handled by Lancaster's model. To achieve this end, a certain “expansion” of attribute space is performed. Subsequently, we formally define the notions of mixability and effective number of goods$\text{n}$. This new model degenerates into Lancaster's model for the special case when $\text{n}\text{= 1}$.     

Information,motivation, and control in decentralized planning: the case of discretionary managerial behavior

A simple piecewise-linear managerial incentive scheme is analyzed in a decision-making environment in which a manager is allowed some discretionary activity (effort). Initially, he must report to the planner a target that will be used subsequently to evaluate his performance. If managerial effort is chosen after the random production components are realized, this predicted target will be more realizable than one reported in the absence of such discretionary adjustment. The sensitivity of target and performance to the parameters of the incentive scheme and the manager's utility function is examined to study the planner's ability to both acquire information and motivate performance. J. Comp. Econ., Sept. 1979, 3(3), pp. 235–253. Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts.     

Schumpeter and the theory of capitalist economic development

This paper gives a centenary appreciation of the contributions to economic thought of Joseph A. Schumpeter, with special focus on his work, The Theory of Economic Development (TED) it proceeds, first, by providing (in section 1) an overview of Schumpeter's life and works; second, by giving an interpretative exposition of the main themes of TED (in section 2) and Schumpeter's broader ‘economic sociology’ (in section 3) in terms of the place of these ideas in the history of economic thought; third, by examining the reception to TED and the impact of it and Schumpeter's dynamic methodology on the discipline (in section 4).     

Testing the shift adjustment in the federal reserve's new shift adjusted M1-B

The Federal Reserve's estimates of the shift into M1-B from savings and other non-demand deposit sources following the legalization of NOW accounts nationwide in January, 1981 are tested formally. The results indicate that the Fed's estimates cannot be rejected on formal statistical grounds. However, there is some evidence that the Fed may have overestimated the shift.     

The control of inflation: A suggested policy

Much of the debate over the relative merits of Keynesian or Monetarist approaches to inflation policy is based on the presumption that the individual policy-maker's model of the economy is correct. It is argued here that this is an undesirable assumption, given that there is no concensus as to which of the models more accurately describes ‘reality’. The paper attempts to take this problem into account by suggesting a policy for the control of inflation which does not rely on the assumption that a specifically Keynesian, or Monetarist, model is the appropriate one.     

A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties

A simple mechanism for reallocating holdings is described, in which no auctioneer is required: outcomes are determined solely from traders' actions and without any requirement that the mechanism be in equilibrium. The mechanism is shown to exactly duplicate the performance of the Walrasian auctioneer (both in its equilibria and in its disequilibrium path) if individuals are price takers, and, if the number of individuals is large, to approximately duplicate the auctioneer's performance even when individuals behave strategically, each taking account of his own influence on prices.     

On the existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities and without ordered preferences

The present paper deals with the existence of equilibria in economies whose commodity space is L_∞(M, M, μ) and where the agents' preferences need not be complete or transitive. Applying a fixed point theorem of Browder, an equilibrium existence theorem for abstract economies (generalized qualitative games) is proven where each agent's choice set is contained in an arbitrary topological vector space. With the help of this theorem the existence of Walrasian general equilibrium for a suitably specified economic model is obtained. The final result is a generalization of T. F. Bewley's (J. Econ. Theory4 (1972), 514–540) equilibrium existence theorem to the case of non-ordered preferences.     

Credibility and determinism in a game of persuasion

This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the listener, and commented that the binary nature of the decision was important for the commitment result. In this paper, I show that concavity is the critical assumption for both results: no value to commitment and no value to randomization. Specifically, the key assumption is that the listener's utility function is a concave transformation of the speaker's utility function. This assumption holds vacuously in the binary model. The result that concavity implies credibility allows us to dispense with the assumption that the listener's decision is binary and significantly broadens the scope of the model.