An examination of the psychological traits that affect the ability of tax experts to communicate their expertise

Expert systems have become important in taxation. Previous research indicates that the major bottleneck in the development of tax expert systems is the selection of an expert who is able to communicate his or her expertise. This study identifies the psychological traits most likely to affect the ability of tax experts to communicate their expertise and measures these traits in tax experts whose ability to communicate expertise was tested during previous expert systems research. The results of the personality trait and communication competence questionnaires indicate that experts who are introspective, secure and confident doing familiar work, more agreeable and accommodating, and honest with themselves communicate a greater amount of useful knowledge than those without these traits. The study also finds that cognitive style is not a significant factor. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investment in concealable information by biased experts

We study a persuasion game in which biased—possibly opposed—experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision maker may prefer to solicit advice from just one biased expert even when others—including those biased in the opposite direction (singular)—are available.     

Preparing for evil

How can you plan for every crisis that might occur, even for ones you can't imagine? The task seems so daunting and so limitless that many firms don't even start. In fact, as the authors' 20 years of research shows, three out of four Fortune 500 companies are prepared to handle only the types of calamities they've already suffered, and not even all of those. That's unfortunate because the research also shows that crisis-prepared companies fare better financially, have stronger reputations, and ultimately stay in business longer than their crisis prone counterparts. Crisis-prepared companies use a systematic approach to focus their efforts. In addition to planning for natural disasters, they divide man-made calamities into two sorts--accidental or "normal" ones, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and deliberate or "abnormal" ones, like product tampering. Then they take steps to broaden their thinking about such potential crises. They consider threats that would be common in other industries, for instance. And they seek input from outsiders such as investigative journalists and even reformed criminals. But if these companies think broadly about possible threats, they think narrowly about implementation. Each year, smart companies focus their resources and attention on a few facilities picked at random, just as airlines conduct detailed security checks on just a few passengers for each flight. That reduces the probability of an attack on the entire organization even as it allows the business to migrate steadily to a higher level of crisis readiness. Crisis-prepared companies know that disasters cannot be managed through cost-benefit analyses. It is precisely because the effects of a disaster cannot be predicted or controlled that smart companies focus their efforts on preventing crises rather than containing them after the fact.     

Fusion of expertise among accounting faculty: towards an expertise model for academia in accounting

This paper aims to portray an accounting faculty expert. It is argued that neither the academic nor the professional orientation alone appears adequate in developing accounting faculty expertise. The accounting faculty expert is supposed to develop into a so-called ‘flexpert’ (Van der Heijden, 2003) who is able to deploy practical accounting exposure in teaching and research. This ‘fusion’ (mix of expertise) resulting from gaining expertise in quite different occupational areas, is attainable at academic career start levels in accounting, where during one's career orientation a professor is both an academic and a professional by training. Fusion is also attainable in complementary competence building wherein the faculty member invests in training and development in the non-core competence domain. The so-called ‘fusion framework’ that is depicted in this contribution could be usefully applied in recruitment efforts of business schools in search of a promising accounting professor.     

Entrepreneurs and new ideas

We study how early‐stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea‐thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he should in turn steal the idea. Thus, stealing leads to incomplete screening and is unattractive if the information of the other expert is critical and highly complementary. In such cases, the entrepreneur can form a partnership with the experts, thus granting them the advantage of accessing each other's information. Yet, very valuable ideas cannot be shared because it is too tempting to steal them.     

审计委员会财务专家监督作用的多维透析

本文从政策规范、学术研究和运行机制等多个维度剖析了审计委员会财务专家的公司治理角色,认为财务专家在公司治理中发挥了积极的监督作用,但实务中对财务专家的定义和财务专家有效监督基理的认识还存在一定的差异性和模糊性。本文还认为,确保兼具独立性和专业胜任能力的财务专家以及完善财务专家市场和财务专家的职业声誉机制,是财务专家发挥有效监督作用的关键所在。     

Auditor Expertise and the Estimation of Dollar Error in Accounts

A major task that auditors undertake in formulating their audit opinion is to estimate the dollar error that might exist in accounts in light of their evaluation of internal control strengths and weaknesses. The research that has been undertaken to evaluate the quality of auditor performance on this task, however, has produced mixed results. The current study tries to overcome some theoretical limitations and measurement limitations that have undermined prior studies. Forty practising auditors rated their abilities on fourteen characteristics derived from a model of expertise. They then undertook an experiment where they judged the extent of dollar error that might exist in the inventories of a manufacturing company. They based their judgments on working papers provided to them that contained, among other information, an evaluation of the company's internal control system. An estimate of the 'true' dollar error in the inventories was calculated using a program that simulated the company's internal control and accounting system. This estimate was then used to calculate the accuracy of the auditors' judgments. Their ratings on the expertise characteristics were not related to their judgment accuracy. Their ratings were related, however, to their confidence in their judgment accuracy. Auditors who considered themselves more expert at the task were more confident in their judgment accuracy but they were, in fact, no more accurate than auditors who considered themselves to be less expert at the task.     

Sense and reliability. A conversation with celebrated psychologist Karl E. Weick. Interview by Diane L. Coutu

Most of us see the organizations we operate in--our schools or companies, for instance--as monolithic and predictable, subjecting us to deadening routines and demanding dehumanizing conformity. But companies are more unpredictable and more alive than we imagine, according to Karl Weick, a psychology professor at the University of Michigan and an expert on organizational behavior. Weick says executives can learn a lot about managing the unexpected from organizations that can't afford surprises in the workplace--nuclear plants, firefighting units, or emergency rooms, for instance. In this conversation with HBR senior editor Diane Coutu, Weick examines the characteristics of these high-reliability organizations (HROs) and suggests ways that other organizations can implement their practices and philosophies. The key difference between high-reliability organizations and other companies is the mindfulness with which people in most HROs react to even very weak signs that some kind of change or danger is approaching. For instance, nuclear-plant workers Weick has studied immediately readjust dials and system commands when an automated system doesn't respond as expected. Weick contrasts this with Ford's inability to pick up on weak signs in the 1970s that there were lethal problems with the design of the Pinto gas tank. HROs are fixated on failure. They eschew plans and blueprints, looking instead for the details that might be missing. And they refuse to simplify reality, Weick says. Indeed, by cultivating broad work experiences and enlarging their repertoires, generalist executives can avoid getting paralyzed by "cosmology episodes"--events that make people feel as though the universe is no longer a rational, orderly system.     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

Limited disclosure and hidden orders in asset markets

Opacity assumes at least two prominent forms in asset markets. Dark exchanges and over-the-counter markets enable expert investors to hide their orders while originators carefully control the disclosure of fundamental information about the assets they source. We describe a simple model in which both forms of opacity – hidden orders and limited disclosure – complement one another. Costly investor expertise gives originators incentives to deliver assets of good quality. Keeping expert orders hidden generates the rents investors need to justify investing in expertise in the first place. Limiting disclosure mitigates the resulting adverse selection issues. Originators prefer to restrict the information they can convey to experts because it encourages the participation of non experts. This optimal organization of asset markets can be decentralized using standard financial arrangements.     

Goodwill valuations certified by independent experts: Bigger and cleaner impairments?

If firms disclose the use of independent valuation experts to assess the magnitude of goodwill impairments, should investors rationally condition their values on that disclosure? This research shows that firms that disclose the use of an independent valuation expert are more likely to report a higher impairment charge in an impairment year but, critically, after controlling for other determinants, the disclosing firms are less likely to have impairments in following years. Thus, when the use of an independent expert is disclosed, while it is rational for investors to downgrade firm value on the basis of the disclosed (higher) impairment charge in that year, there is simultaneously a reduced need to add an additional discount to anticipate further (strategically) delayed impairment charges. The investors need to consider the likely multi-period time series properties of impairments, and firms may benefit from using an expert if in anticipation of future related impairments, investors significantly reduce the discount applied.     

INDEPENDENT EXPERT'S REPORTS IN TAKEOVER BIDS

This paper reports an empirical examination of independent expert reports in takeover bids using the 170 reports that were issued in the 364 cash-based bids that occurred between January 1988 and December 1991. It was found that bid premia offered in takeover bids where an expert's report was issued were not significantly lower than bid premia in other bids. This may be attributable to independent experts acting as a countervailing influence on bidders holding a superior pre-bid bargaining position. Next, some dimensions of the “fair and reasonable” criterion that experts are required to use are examined. These are the single-test and dual-test interpretations of the phrase, the relation between offer price, market price and the expert's valuation of the target, the cost and length of expert's reports and, finally, the influence an expert has on the outcome of a bid.     

The founder's dilemma

Why do people start businesses? For the money and the chance to control their own companies, certainly. But new research from Harvard Business School professor Wasserman shows that those goals are largely incompatible. The author's studies indicate that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, new hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. More often than not, however, those superior returns come from replacing the founder with a professional CEO more experienced with the needs of a growing company. This fundamental tension requires founders to make "rich" versus "king" trade-offs to maximize either their wealth or their control over the company. Founders seeking to remain in control (as John Gabbert of the furniture retailer Room & Board has done) would do well to restrict themselves to businesses where large amounts of capital aren't required and where they already have the skills and contacts they need. They may also want to wait until late in their careers, after they have developed broader management skills, before setting up shop. Entrepreneurs who focus on wealth, such as Jim Triandiflou, who founded Ockham Technologies, can make the leap sooner because they won't mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures. Such founders will often bring in new CEOs themselves and be more likely to work with their boards to develop new, post-succession roles for themselves. Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job.     

Reputational cheap talk

We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truth telling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others.     

A Case Study of Long QT Regulation: A Regulatory Tennis Game Across the Atlantic

This paper has been written in a context of vivid transatlantic discussions about regulation and precaution. The study is looking at a specific and topical issue of drug safety regulation, the so‐called QT interval. The QT interval is commonly described as a reflection of how long it takes to “recharge” heart cells after they have been stimulated to beat, and it has been argued that both natural and drug induced lengthening of this interval may lead to a increased risk of death. The paper is based on interviews with all the major regulatory bodies responsible for the regulation of QT prolongation. The research focused on a number of key questions, starting with the “story” behind present QT regulation. It describes the debates that emerged in the 1992s about the significance of QT variations, and the existing level of uncertainty, on whether long QT is something we should worry about or not. Looking at the QT regulation story, no doubt the regulator answered this question by “yes”. However, there are still some divergences about the magnitude of the risk between experts and non experts, between Europeans and Americans, between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, which the paper explores in its complexity. Finally, the paper is introducing a conceptual model to analyse these developments, the so‐called “regulatory tennis game” that shaped the present regulation. It is also stressing some of the intrinsic problems of the “expert driven bi‐partite model” for making evidence based decisions about risk.     

Expert reports in Australian takeovers: fees and quality

Target firms in Australian takeovers are required to commission the preparation of an independent expert report in circumstances where there is a perceived conflict of interest with the bidder. As approximately half of these reports are prepared by firms with which the target has other business dealings, concern has been expressed over the quality of these reports due to the suggestion that such reports are provided at lower fees. We examine the 191 independent expert reports provided in all 649 Australian takeover bids initiated in the period 1990 to 2000 inclusive. Using an expert-fee model, we find that the fees for reports by experts with other business dealings with the target are not lower than those of unrelated experts. In addition, the results indicate that experts with other dealings with the target provide reports with a significantly smaller valuation range, consistent with these reports being of higher, rather than lower, quality. Our findings are inconsistent with the U.S. and New Zealand experience of prohibiting audit firms from providing valuation advice in takeovers.     

A Global Approach to Identifying Expert System Applications in Compensation Practice

This paper reports the results of a study to determine the most cost-effective expert system application for the compensation practice of a large employee benefits consulting firm. The purpose of the expert system would be to help assure quality and consistency in practice and to assist in the training of less experienced experts. The study utilized a questionnaire to solicit input from experts in several locations. The questionnaire included a comprehensive listing of firm compensation tasks. Evaluation characteristics selected for the study emphasized business-related characteristics. Because of adverse economic circumstances in the consulting firm, the decision concerning an initial expert systems application was deferred.     

Leading by feel

Like it or not, leaders need to manage the mood of their organizations. The most gifted leaders accomplish that by using a mysterious blend of psychological abilities known as emotional intelligence. They are self-aware and empathetic. They can read and regulate their own emotions while intuitively grasping how others feel and gauging their organization's emotional state. But where does emotional intelligence come from, and how do leaders learn to use it? In this article, 18 leaders and scholars (including business executives, leadership researchers, psychologists, an autism expert, and a symphony conductor) explore the nature and management of emotional intelligence--its sources, uses, and abuses. Their responses varied, but some common themes emerged: the importance of consciously--and conscientiously--honing one's skills, the double-edged nature of self-awareness, and the danger of letting any one emotional intelligence skill dominate. Among their observations: Psychology professor John Mayer, who co-developed the concept of emotional intelligence, warns managers not to be confused by popular definitions of the term, which suggest that if you have a certain set of personality traits then you automatically possess emotional intelligence. Neuropsychologist Elkhonon Goldberg agrees with professors Daniel Goleman and Robert Goffee that emotional intelligence can be learned--but only by people who already show an aptitude for it. Cult expert Janja Lalich points out that leaders can use their emotional intelligence skills for ill in the same way they can for good. "Sometimes the only difference is [the leader's] intent," she says. And business leaders Carol Bartz, William George, Sidney Harman, and Andrea jung (of Autodesk, Medtronic, Harman International, and Avon respectively) describe situations in which emotional intelligence traits such as self-awareness and empathy have helped them and their companies perform at a higher level.     

How the best of the best get better and better

What is the real key to elite performance? According to sports psychologist turned executive coach Graham Jones, star athletes and businesspeople share one defining trait: mental toughness. People who become champions aren't necessarily more gifted than others; they're just masters at managing pressure, meticulously tackling goals, and driving themselves to stay ahead of the competition. Jones, who has advised Olympic medalists and Fortune 500 executives, sees many parallels between the arenas of business and sports, especially in the behavior of people who rise to the very top. These stars have learned to love pressure because it spurs them to achieve. Inner-focused and self-directed, they concentrate on their own excellence and forget the rest. They don't get distracted by others' victories or failures--or even by a personal tragedy off the field of competition. Like Darren Clarke, the golfer who inspired his team to a Ryder Cup victory shortly after the death of his beloved wife, elite performers are masters of compartmentalization. Superstars rebound from defeats more easily, Jones observes, because they don't engage in self-flagellation. One of the keys to their success is a relentless focus on the long-term and the careful planning of short-term goals that will help them attain major milestones. Competition doesn't daunt elite performers; they just use it to challenge themselves--and they never stop striving. Even after becoming benchmarks in their fields, stars keep their edge by reinventing themselves. Star business people and athletes also recognize the importance of celebrating their wins. It's not just the emotional reward that's important, however: The very best performers also analyze the factors underpinning their success. That helps them build their expertise and their confidence.     

The 'Independence' of Expert Opinions in Corporate Takeovers: Agreeing With Directors' Recommendations

Abstract:   The impact of non‐audit services on auditor independence has been the recent focus of regulators worldwide. Using expert reports provided in Australian takeovers, this study investigates a context where the audit independence issue is reversed. As approximately a quarter of expert reports are prepared by the target firm's auditor, concerns have been expressed over the independence of the opinion provided. This paper finds that, relative to other experts, there is no difference in the rate at which experts with other business dealings with the target, including the target's auditor, provide an opinion that agrees with that of directors. However, the capital market reaction around the release of the report indicates that reports produced by auditors are viewed as non‐independent.