Forming and Dissolving Partnerships in Cooperative Game Situations

A group of players in a cooperative game are partners (e.g., as in the form of a union or a joint ownership) if the prospects for cooperation are restricted such that cooperation with players outside the partnership requires the accept of all the partners. The formation of such partnerships through binding agreements may change the game implying that players could have incentives to manipulate a game by forming or dissolving partnerships. The present paper seeks to explore the existence of allocation rules that are immune to this type of manipulation. An allocation rule that distributes the worth of the grand coalition among players is called partnership formation‐proof if it ensures that it is never jointly profitable for any group of players to form a partnership and partnership dissolution‐proof if no group can ever profit from dissolving a partnership. The paper provides results on the existence of such allocation rules for general classes of games as well as more specific results concerning well‐known allocation rules.     

A New Approach for Regulating Information Markets

Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. They have the potential to improve decision making and policies throughout the economy. At the same time, there are regulatory hurdles to establish such markets, largely arising from state prohibitions on Internet gambling. This paper reviews the current regulatory structure for information markets in the United States and offers recommendations for reform. We argue that the authority for regulating many information markets should be shifted from the states to the federal government. In addition, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission should administer an “economic purpose test”. That test would only allow information market contracts that are likely to provide significant financial hedging opportunities or valuable information for improving economic decisions.     

Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries

We present a dynamic game of search and learning about the productivity of competing fishing locations. Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information, and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem, as each coop member prefers that other members undertake costly search for information. Pooling contracts among coop members may mitigate, but are not likely to eliminate free-riding. Our results explain the paucity of information sharing in fisheries and suggest regulators use caution in advocating cooperatives as a solution to common pool inefficiencies in fisheries.     

国内外合作创新研究述评

合作创新作为一种重要的技术创新模式和一个新兴的研究领域 ,日益受到企业管理理论界与实践界的关注。 90年代以来 ,国内外关于企业合作创新的研究大量涌现。本文从合作创新的概念界定、动机和优势、冲突、经济学分析以及合作创新过程中的技术学习与核心能力等几个方面评述了国内外合作创新的研究进展 ,为该领域的研究建立了一个理论框架 ,并提出深入研究的若干设想     

不完全信息合作博弈的值：一个很有说服力的例子

一、导言合作博弈理论提出了各种模型来解释合作的收益如何在参与者之间分配。Shapley值在为可转移效用(TU)博弈定义的公平解组中起十分重要的作用。它给出了大量的公理的和非合作的证明。后来,为了把Shapley值扩展到非可转移效用博弈(NTU)中各种技术被开发出来了。比如Shapley     

创业网络中信息交互行为的协作博弈分析

设计了基于预期和规范规则的合作竞争博弈模型,并利用仿真方法进一步分析创业网络中的信息博弈协作行为。仿真结果显示:在创业网络中,采取合作策略的创业者的成功率一直大于采取不合作策略的创业者。指出在创业网络中有效利用和管理创业者的信用度会使创业网络中的信息交互行为更为规范和有效。     

Cooperative Production: A Comparison of Welfare Bounds

In the production model with a one-input–one-output technology, we study welfare lower bounds that give a guarantee of welfare to each agent independent of the others' preferences. We obtain characterizations of egalitarian-equivalent allocation rules on the basis of two weak lower bounds, in striking contrast with Moulin's characterization of the equal budget Walrasian solution on a slightly smaller domain with a more demanding lower bound.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, D63.     

Compensations as signaling devices in the political economy of reforms*

We propose an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers can block their implementation and compensations are feasible. In our model, a government tries to sequentially implement two efficient reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and different governments care differently about distortions. Governments use low compensations to discourage losers who just want to receive transfers from organizing. This comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses, resulting in a bias against payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms.     

股票发行认购不足的理论分析

股票发行认购不足,是指投资者认购股票的数量低于公司实际发行的股票数量.这种现象主要存在于公司配股过程中,而且投资者完全放弃认购的现象是非常少见的,通常是部分投资者认购股票,而部分投资者放弃认购股票.为什么不同的投资者选择不同的股票认购比例?文章以完全市场为假设前提,运用证券组合理论,分析了投资者选择认购股票比例的内在经济动机,研究结果表明,在完全市场条件下,投资者根据原有的投资组合以及股票风险,选择不同的认购比例.因此,确定合理的发行价格,允许配股权的转让,都可以有效降低股票发行认购不足的风险.     

Environmental Management: A Non-Traditional Approach

India's wastelands have been classified as both over utilized and underutilized. Perplexingly, an apparent tragedy of the commons exists alongside extensive official management powers. In this paper, I argue that the complexity of governance structures may be inadvertently worsening the situation. Looking to recent work on contested property and the anticommons concept, I suggest that an anticommons amongst those officially controlling the lands is casting a long and unexpected shadow by encouraging the emergence of open-access de facto resource exploitation and discouraging de facto management. This extension of the anticommons concept implies that the effects of anticommons are not necessarily limited to under exploitation, as most commonly used in the developing anticommons literature. It points to a wider examination of the harmful effects of anticommons situations.     

Pigouvian Taxes: A Strategic Approach

This paper analyzes the problem of designing mechanisms to implement efficient solutions in economies with externalities. We provide two simple mechanisms implementing the Pigouvian Social Choice Correspondence in environments in which coalitions can or cannot be formed.     

在合作博弈中实现高效供给农村信息服务

以政府为主导的"政府+市场"供给农村信息服务方式,实际上是在多方不同利益和目标下的合作博弈的结果.它的实现不仅能通过市场信息服务企业的作用来强化政府对信息资源的利用和配置效率,还能实现政府在农村信息服务供给职责的转变.该方式的实施有利于发挥市场信息服务企业在农村供给上的优势作用的同时,还有利于政府与市场实现各自供给方式的优势互补,从而确保新农村建设对信息服务需求的针对性和及时性的持续不断的满足.     

Aging and Savings in Korea: A Time-Series Approach

Thanks to numerous empirical research studies, a general consensus has been reached on the effects of an aging population on the economy, particularly in terms of economic growth and savings. However, most of the previous research examines the effects of the aging on economically advanced countries. Furthermore, rarely have those studies used the time-series properties of the data. By applying two popular time-series statistical tools (multivariate cointegration analysis and vector error correction model) to Korean data, this paper finds: (1) There is a long-run equilibrium linkage among the aging, medical expenditure and savings; however (2) there is no Granger-causality present between aging and national savings in the short run in Korea.     

生产者服务贸易：一个基于赫克歇尔——俄林模型的方法

一、前言 　　最近,关于服务的作用及重要性的讨论（如参见,Gershuny and Miles 1983;Inman1985）对这方面的关注的高涨的部分原因是有着大量的美国代表表达的把服务贸易列为GATT谈判的一部份的愿望.但是尽管服务部门的重要性被量化,可是令人惊奇的是几乎没人去注意这方面的理论,特别是国际贸易理论.     

Fiscal limits in developing countries: A DSGE Approach

This paper studies fiscal limits in developing countries using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach. Distributions of fiscal limits, which measure a government’s capacity to service its debt, are simulated based on macroeconomic uncertainty and fiscal policy. The analysis shows that expected future revenue plays an important role in explaining the low fiscal limits of developing countries, relative to those of developed countries. Large devaluation of real exchange rates can significantly reduce a government’s capacity to service its debt and lower the fiscal limits. Temporary disturbances, therefore, can shift the distribution of fiscal limits and suddenly change perceptions about fiscal sustainability.     

Estimating Macroeconomic Models: A Likelihood Approach

This paper shows how particle filtering facilitates likelihood-based inference in dynamic macroeconomic models. The economies can be non-linear and/or non-normal. We describe how to use the output from the particle filter to estimate the structural parameters of the model, those characterizing preferences and technology, and to compare different economies. Both tasks can be implemented from either a classical or a Bayesian perspective. We illustrate the technique by estimating a business cycle model with investment-specific technological change, preference shocks, and stochastic volatility.     

Portfolio Composition Choice: A Behavioral Approach

This experimental study investigates portfolio composition choice for different types of financial assets and different levels of wealth. For a group of financially sophisticated executive MBA students with work experience in capital markets, the findings of this study indicate that the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets increases with wealth for all portfolio compositions examined, and increases with the degree of asset risk. This proportion is found to be as much as three times higher for common stocks than for options: For stock portfolios, it increases from 33% to 44% over the five wealth levels examined, and for options it increases from 11% to 17%. These results may imply a decreasing rel w proportions of their wealth in risky assets possess the following characteristics: they do not invest in options in real life; they sometimes buy lottery tickets; they assign a higher risk level to options than to common stocks; they are female; and they are employed.