Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71.     

Social welfare,parental altruism,and inequality

When individuals have heterogeneous and persistent degrees of one‐sided parental altruism, inequality may grow large and standard social welfare criteria are problematic. If the planner selects Pareto optimal allocations based on some target level of consumption inequality, the solution implies an aggregation of individuals' utilities that is strongly asymmetric and biased toward the less altruistic dynasties. If instead, the planner uses a symmetric utilitarian criterion, the solution is likely to generate a large degree of long‐run inequality (even relative to laissez‐faire competitive equilibria), it can only be decentralized with negative estate taxes or lower bounds on bequests, and it is time‐inconsistent.     

EQUITY-EFFICIENCY PREFERENCES IN Poland AND THE SOVIET UNION: ORDER-REVERSALS UNDER THE ATKINSON INDEX

In this paper, the relation between inequality and welfare index "reversals" is characterized. By the identification of these reversals, upper and lower bounds are established for Atkinson's parameter of inequality aversion. This exercise shows that a level of inequality aversion high enough to show welfare improving over the "egalitarian decline" of 1978–81 in Poland is too high to show improvement over the "elitist growth" of 1981–86 in the Soviet Union. However, even if the lower bound of inequality aversion is assumed, plausible projections on Soviet growth and distribution still show social welfare declining.     

Vertical Foreign Direct Investment versus Outsourcing: A Welfare Comparison from the Perspective of a Host Country

In the offshoring literature, there is a huge disconnect between the alternative modes of organizing offshore production and their relative welfare impact on a host country. We bridge this gap by comparing the welfare of a host country from vertical foreign direct investment (VFDI) vis‐à‐vis international outsourcing. Our model finds that the ability to maximize welfare in the alternative modes of organizing offshore production is contingent on the absorptive capacity of the host country. If a host country's absorptive capacity is above a critical threshold, outsourcing is more welfare enhancing vis‐à‐vis VFDI; while even with an absorptive capacity lower than this critical threshold, outsourcing being welfare improving over VFDI cannot be ruled out.     

An algebraic theory of multi-product decisions

Summary. We exploit the existence of matrix group symmetries on a production possibility set to identify group symmetries on the profit function. The groups are isomorphic, and provide a pre-ordering on firm preferences over prices. Together with additional structure on the technology, symmetries generate comparative statics on price responses. Linear and other invariances place bounds on firm choice vectors. Reflection group asymmetries on the feasible choice set also support welfare rankings over prices. The methods are adapted to study consumer decisions.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 30 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D21, C60, L23. Correspondence to: David A. Hennessy     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

Social evaluations when populations differ in size

Assessments of “social welfare” do not usually take into account population sizes. This can lead to serious social evaluation flaws, particularly in contexts in which policies can affect demographic growth. We develop in this paper a little‐known though ethically attractive approach to correcting the flaws of traditional social evaluations, an approach that is sensitive to population sizes and that is based on critical‐level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU). Traditional CLGU is extended by considering arbitrary orders of welfare dominance and ranges of “poverty lines,” as well as values for the “critical level” of how much a life must be minimally worth to contribute to social welfare. We apply these social evaluation methods to rank Canada across 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006 and to estimate normatively and statistically robust lower and upper bounds of critical levels over which these rankings can be made.     

Environmental Protection and Urban Unemployment: Environmental Policy Reform in a Polluted Dualistic Economy

This paper explores sufficient conditions for the welfare‐improving environmental policy reform in the Harris–Todaro economy. A rise in the pollution tax rate in the urban manufacturing has spillover effects on the two labor market distortions: the less‐than‐optimal manufacturing employment and the urban unemployment. If both are weakened the welfare improves. Otherwise, we need to develop an alternative sufficient condition. It is shown that there exists a range of welfare‐improving pollution tax rates, and that it corresponds to the lower values of tax rate. This range may shrink by the wage subsidy policy and the technological change toward less pollution‐intensive techniques.     

On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost

This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements – including an equal per capita allocation – we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.     

The social cost of living index

Household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences; analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences. In this paper I investigate the ‘social cost of living index’, a group index based on the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. I first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function; I then examine the ‘maximizing society’ and the ‘independent society’, two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions. In these two cases a Laspeyres index (i.e. the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern) is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index. In general, however, the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household's cost of living index.     

Specific vs Ad Valorem Strategic Export Subsidies with Taxation Distortion

This paper employs a model to compare the welfare between optimal specific and ad valorem export subsidies if the subsidy payment is financed by distortional taxation. It is found that the welfare under the specific subsidy regime is higher (lower) than that under the ad valorem subsidy regime if the social cost of taxation distortion is low (high). Moreover, the signs of the two optimal subsidies are also crucially dependent on this social cost. They are positive (negative) if the social cost is low (high).     

International Integration, Risk and the Welfare State

How does international integration affect the welfare state? Does it call for a leaner or an expanded welfare state? International integration may affect the distortions caused by welfare state activities but also the risks motivating social insurance mechanisms. This paper addresses these potentially counteracting effects in a fully specified intertemporal two–country stochastic endowment model, focusing on the implications when product market integration reduces trade frictions across national product markets. It is shown that lower trade frictions may increase the marginal costs of public funds, which gives an argument for reducing (steady–state) public consumption. However, tighter integration of product markets unambiguously leads to more variability in private consumption, and this gives a case for expanding the social insurance provided via state–contingent public sector activities (automatic stabilizers). JEL classification: E30; F10; H11     

Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition

We analyze price and quality competition in a mixed duopoly in which a profit-maximizing private firm competes against a state-owned public firm. We first show that the welfare-maximizing public firm provides a lower quality product than the private firm when they are equally efficient. In order to maximize social welfare, government manipulates the objective of the public firm that is given by a convex combination of profits and social welfare. It is demonstrated that an optimal incentive of the public firm is welfare maximization under the absence of quality competition, but it is neither welfare maximization nor profit maximization under the presence of quality competition. The result supports a completely mixed objective between welfare and profit maximizations or partial privatization of the public firm.      

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.     

The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced Growth Equivalent: An Application of <Emphasis Type="Italic">FUND</Emphasis>

The Stern Review added balanced growth equivalents (BGE) to the economic climate change research agenda. We first propose rigorous definitions of the BGE for multiple regions and under uncertainty. We show that the change in the BGE is independent of the assumed scenario of per capita income. For comparable welfare economic assumptions as the Stern Review, we calculate lower changes in BGE between a business as usual scenario and one without climate impacts with the model FUND than the Stern Review found with the model PAGE. We find that mitigation policies give even lower changes in BGE and argue that those policy choices should be the focus of the research effort rather than total damage estimates. According to our results, the current carbon tax should be below $55/tC. Sensitivity analyses show that the Stern Review chose parameters that imply high impact estimates. However, for regionally disaggregated welfare functions, we find changes in BGE that are significantly higher than the results from the Stern Review both for total damage as for policy analysis. With regional disaggregation and high risk aversion, we observe fat tails and with that very high welfare losses.      

Trade,Strategic Environmental Policy,and Global Pollution

This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs.     

WELFARE REFORM AND CHILDREN'S EARLY COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

In this paper, we use a dynamic structural model to measure the effects of (1) single mothers' work and welfare use decisions and (2) welfare reform initiatives on the early cognitive development of the children of the NLSY79 mothers. We use PIAT‐Math scores as a measure of attainment and show that both the mothers' work and welfare use benefit children on average. Our simulation of a policy that combines a time limit with work requirement reduces the use of welfare and increases employment significantly. These changes in turn significantly increase children's cognitive attainment. This implies that the welfare reform was not only successful in achieving its stated goals, but was also beneficial to welfare children's outcomes. In another policy simulation, we show that increasing work incentives for welfare population by exempting labor income from welfare tax can be a very successful policy with some additional benefits for children's outcomes. Finally, a counterfactual with an extended maternal leave policy significantly reduces employment and has negative, though economically insignificant, impact on cognitive outcomes. (JEL I38, J22, J18)     

Unprivatizing the pension system: the case of Poland

In many countries, the fiscal tension associated with the global financial crisis brings about the discussion about unprivatizing the social security system. This article employs an Overlapping Generations model to assess ex ante the effects of such changes to the pension reform in Poland from 1999 as implemented in 2011 and in 2013. We simulate the behaviour of the economy without the implemented/proposed changes and compare it to a status quo defined by the reform from 1999. We find that the changes implemented in 2011 and in 2013 are detrimental to welfare. The effects on capital and output are small and depend on the selected fiscal closure. Implied effective replacement rates are lower. These findings are robust to time inconsistency. The shortsightedness of the governments imposes welfare costs.     

Choices and Constraints over Retirement Income Streams: Comparing Rules and Regulations*

The new Simplified Superannuation regulations for Australian superannuation provide tax concessions to retirement income streams which comply with legislated minimum drawdown rules. We evaluate these new drawdown rules against four alternatives, including three formula‐based ‘rules of thumb’ used by financial planners. We find that the new regulations are a substantial improvement on the previous rules for allocated pensions and, when compared with the formula‐based rules, are a good compromise in terms of simplicity, adequacy and risk. We also find that welfare is lower for most individuals who follow the Simplified Superannuation rules compared with welfare under an optimal path or a simple fixed percentage drawdown rule, but that outcomes could be improved through a further simplification of the new rules.     

Optimal research and development and the cost of business cycles

While research and development (R&D) investment has been procyclical in the post-war period, recent literature suggests that the optimal path for R&D is countercyclical, and that the economy would be better off by subsidizing R&D in recessions. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effects of distortions in the intertemporal allocation of R&D resources and to compare diverse policy interventions so as to improve social welfare. To this end, we introduce a calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with Schumpeterian endogenous growth that is capable of explaining the observed procyclicality of R&D. Our results show that the cost of business cycles is lower in the decentralized economy with procyclical R&D than in the efficient allocation with countercyclical R&D. This is because the suboptimal propagation of shocks in the decentralized equilibrium offsets some of the existing steady-state distortions. In this second-best context, countercyclical R&D subsidies have no positive effect on welfare. In contrast, fiscal policies aimed at restoring the optimal steady-state produce large welfare gains.