The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Selected Economic Analysis at the Antitrust Division: The Year in Review

Of the many activitiesof the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice, we havesummarized some that raise interestingeconomic issues. We describe recentimprovements in the methodology to beused in ``coordinated effects' analysisof mergers. We also discuss four casesbrought by the DOJ that raise issues ofmarket definition, the influence ofcommon partial ownership of competitors,and the effects of fringe suppliers inconstraining collusion by large firms.     

The Year in Economics at the FCC: A National Plan for Broadband

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has focused on encouraging the adoption and deployment of high capacity Internet access and the associated networks, commonly termed “broadband.” Our article sketches important economic themes in the FCC’s National Broadband Plan to show how the application of basic principles of regulatory economics takes account of rapid technological change. We discuss natural monopoly regulation, externalities and cross-subsidies, network effects and interconnection, the allocation of scarce inputs, protecting and fostering competitive markets, and consumer protection and transparency as they apply to the development of broadband.     

Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity

This paper focuses on the implications of multi-agency review of electricity mergers. It highlights fundamental differences between regulatory and antitrust merger enforcement procedures–ranging from standards of review to data collection, economic analysis, and remedies. Such disparities potentially introduce costly and potentially conflicting redundancy into the merger review process. Illustrative examples are drawn from a number of cases, including apparent inconsistencies across applicant-filed analyses in FERC merger cases. Absent the delegation of competition analysis to the antitrust agencies, the paper makes the case for harmonizing review across regulators and antitrust enforcers.     

Economics at the FCC, 2008–2009: Broadband and Merger Review

This article focuses on the topic of the National Broadband Plan, which the FCC is mandated to provide to Congress February 17, 2010, the FCC Merger Review process, and the determination of optimal penalties for violations of FCC rules or orders.     

Economics at the FTC: Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Settlements and Behavioral Economics

Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) supports both the competition and consumer protection missions of the agency. In this year’s essay we discuss two issues, one from each of the agency’s missions. First, we focus on intellectual property issues in pharmaceuticals. Specifically, we discuss the principal rationale for antitrust concerns about certain patent dispute settlements in the ethical drug industry. Then, we discuss consumer economics, our recent behavioral economics conference, and how behavioral economics influences our thinking about consumer policy.     

The Revival of Economics at the FTC in the 1960s

This paper examines the declining role of economists at the Federal Trade Commission between 1914 and 1960 and the subsequent growth in their role in the 1960s, including the unique role accorded the Chief Economist as advisor to the Commission and individual Commissioners. It discusses in detail five major contributions of the Bureau of Economics in the 1960s:(1) origins and evolution of a Line-of-Business Reporting Program; (2) contributions to a National Commission on Food Marketing; (3) report on Corporate Mergers; (4) affirmative Disclosure of the Octane Ratings of Gasoline; and (5) FTC Premerger Notification Programs.     

沧海横流 谁是真英雄?

经济大潮迭起的年代,怎能少得了迎风斗浪的商界人物?在中国机电行业,也有这么一批企业家,他们或高歌猛进、或低调潜行。正是因为他们及他们团队的不断进取,才推动了整个行业的发展、才成就了一段又一段的商业传奇。为了彰显这些进取者的业绩,为了给更多的企业家提供参考,中国机     

2000年电力板块回顾与展望

一、2000年电力板块回顾所以，2000年也是1998年以来电力(能源)板块表现比较活跃的一年，出现了不少股价翻番的个股，如凯迪电力、东方电子、思达高科、国电电力、粤电力、申能股份、岁宝热电、粤华电、乐山电力等等。究其原因主要可以分为四类：一是在大股东的支持下，进行较大力度重组的个股，如计划通过高配注入优质资产的国电电力，计划大量收购母公司优质资产的粤电力，以及大力向新能源、金融高科技领域拓展的申能股份；二是一些电力上市公司为了寻找新的利润增长点，同时也为了摆脱市盈率偏低的状况，纷纷调整产业结构，向高科技网…     

The Tenacity of Antitrust Mythology: Dissenting from Mueller

This comment registers the author's reservations about Professor D.C. Mueller's proposals for revising federal merger policy and about the arguments that he advances in support of them. The comment especially questions the validity of the practice of using concentration data as the basis for inferring the presence or absence of monopoly power. It is argued that the analytical foundation for this practice is non-existent and that the purely statistical foundation is weak. The author finds persuasive Mueller's argument that, in recent decades, the merger activity of large firms has done little or nothing to increase the efficiency of the American economy. He believes that, right or wrong, what drives antitrust is fear of corporate size and power, not fear of textbook monopoly. Therefore, he believes consideration should be given to Mueller's proposal that the ambitious merger projects of large firms should not be allowed to go forward unless they promise some gain in efficiency.     

Economics at the Federal Communications Commission

This article reviews several issues confronted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses some of the economic analysis employed by the FCC in examining these issues. The article also identifies areas in which future academic research would be valuable to the agency.Thanks are due to Heather Dixon, David Fiske, Evan Kwerel, Jonathan Levy, and Larry White (the editor) for useful comments. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the FCC, its staff, or commissioners.