Foreign currency debt,financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view

Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term growth and long-run output effects in both 1880–1913 and 1973–2003 for 45 countries. Greater ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt are associated with increased risks of currency and debt crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country's reserve base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern Europe.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

On the importance of indirect banking vulnerabilities in the Eurozone

This paper investigates banking and sovereign distress in the Eurozone and the importance of direct and indirect financial exposures. We use BIS cross-border banking claims to link member states in a GVAR framework and jointly model sectoral CDS premia. Based on balance sheet positions of an intermediate debtor country, we calculate indirect exposures and asses how the level of interconnectedness is impacted when indirect links are accounted for. We notice a general slowdown in financial integration and a reduction in cross-border assets in the hope of limiting international contagion. By differentiating between direct and indirect links, we show that the impact of reduced weights on core member states is mostly insignificant and that deleveraging strategies are not generally able to successfully reduce risk.     

Financial contagion and the real economy

This paper studies the spread of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 from the financial sector to the real economy by examining ten sectors in 25 major developed and emerging stock markets. The analysis tests different channels of financial contagion across countries and sectors and finds that the crisis led to an increased co-movement of returns among financial sector stocks across countries and between financial sector stocks and real economy stocks. The results demonstrate that no country and sector was immune to the adverse effects of the crisis limiting the effectiveness of portfolio diversification. However, there is clear evidence that some sectors in particular Healthcare, Telecommunications and Technology were less severely affected by the crisis.     

A note on foreign bank ownership and monitoring: An international comparison

This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.     

When and how US dollar shortages evolved into the full crisis? Evidence from the cross-currency swap market

This paper investigates when and how the US dollar shortages evolved into the full crisis in the cross-currency swap market between major European currencies and the US dollar during the turmoil of 2007-2009, using the dynamic factor model with regime-switching β coefficients of each swap price with respect to the latent common factor. The 1-year market entered the high-β crisis regime soon after the onset of the subprime problem in August 2007. The 10-year market entered that regime following the collapse of Bear Sterns in mid-March 2008. Financial credit spreads have significant predictive power for switches between high and low-β regimes.     

Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups

We investigate the functioning of internal capital markets in Indian Business Groups. We document that intragroup loans are an important means of transferring cash across group firms and are typically used to support financially weaker firms. Evidence suggests that an important reason for providing support may be to avoid default by a group firm and consequent negative spillovers to the rest of the group. Consistent with such spillovers, the first bankruptcy in a group is followed by significant drops in external financing, investments and profits of other firms in the group and an increase in their bankruptcy probability.     

Current account imbalances and financial integration in the euro area

While the current account of the euro area as a whole has remained almost balanced in the past two decades, several member countries have sizeable deficits or surpluses. In this paper, we interpret these imbalances as indicators of net capital flows among the euro-area countries. We distinguish between balances against the euro zone and the rest of the world and examine these for the EU-15 countries. We find that for euro members the net flows follow differences in per-capita incomes, even before the introduction of the euro. Our results show further that with the introduction of the common currency the elasticity with respect to per-capita incomes of net capital flows within the euro area has increased for the members of the euro zone. This increase can neither be observed for the flows between the euro members and the rest of the world nor for the flows between the countries that stayed outside the monetary union and the euro zone. We interpret this as evidence for increasing financial integration in the euro area. There is also some evidence suggesting that the introduction of the euro has led to some financial diversion.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Financial liberalization,bureaucratic corruption and economic development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalization which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalization is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may coexist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.     

Stock market liberalization and operating performance at the firm level

I use firm-specific measures of openness to foreign investors to study the impact of stock market liberalization on firm-level operating performance. In a sample of over 1,100 firms from 28 countries, firms with stocks that are open to foreign investors experience higher growth, greater investment, greater profitability, greater efficiency, and lower leverage. Strategies to address potential endogeneity suggest that the observed relation reflects, at least in part, a causal effect of openness on operating performance.     

Information acquisition,coordination, and fundamentals in a financial crisis

This paper reconciles the two explanations of a financial crisis, the self-fulfilling prophecy and the fundamental causes, in an empirically-relevant framework, by explicitly modeling the costly voluntary acquisition of information about fundamentals in a variant of Diamond and Dybvig [Diamond, D., Dybvig, P., 1983. Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity. Journal of Political Economy 91, 401–419]. The model exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition. In the “partial run” equilibrium investors engage in costly evaluation of projects, so that banks with lower-return projects fail. There also exist the classic “full-run” and “no-run” equilibria in which there is no project evaluation. Investors’ coordination on a specific equilibrium is triggered by a self-fulfilling prophecy. So, financial crises are seen as both fundamentals-based and self-fulfilling prophecies-based phenomena.     

Stock returns’ sensitivities to crisis shocks: Evidence from developed and emerging markets

We consider three “crisis shocks” related to key features of the 2007–2008 crisis, for emerging and developed economies: (1) the collapse of global trade, (2) the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms’ equity. Using an international cross-section of firms, we find that returns’ sensitivities to these shocks imply large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns). Similar analysis for several placebo periods shows that these effects are generally less severe or absent in non-crisis periods. Relative to developed economies, emerging markets are more responsive to global trade conditions (in crisis and in placebo periods), but less responsive to selling pressures. An analysis of portfolios of firms during various placebo periods indicates that investors are not compensated for the risks associated with the crisis shocks. Finally, a month-by-month analysis of returns during the crisis period shows that the time variation of the importance of each of the sensitivities to shocks tracks related changes in the global economic environment.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

The European Union,the Euro,and equity market integration

We use industry valuation differentials across European countries to study the impact of membership in the European Union as well as the Eurozone on both economic and financial integration. In integrated markets, discount rates and expected growth opportunities should be similar within one industry, irrespective of the country, implying narrowing valuation differentials as countries become more integrated. Our analysis of the 1990–2007 period shows that membership in the EU significantly lowered discount rate and expected earnings growth differentials across countries. In contrast, the adoption of the Euro was not associated with increased integration. Our results do not change when the sample is extended to include the recent crisis period.     

Capital structure choice and company taxation: A meta-study

This paper provides a quantitative review of the empirical literature on the tax impact on corporate debt financing. Synthesizing the evidence from 48 previous studies, we find that this impact is substantial. In particular, the tax rate proxy determines the outcome of primary analyses. Measures like the simulated marginal tax rate (Graham, 1996) avoid a downward bias in estimates for the debt response to tax. Moreover, econometric specifications and the set of control-variables affect tax effects. Accounting for misspecification biases by means of meta-regressions, we predict a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of about 0.27.     

Gross capital flows: Dynamics and crises

This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreign and domestic agents, dubbed gross capital flows, over the business cycle and during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. When foreigners invest in a country, domestic agents invest abroad, and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners invest more domestically and domestic agents invest more abroad. During crises, total gross flows collapse and there is a retrenchment in both inflows by foreigners and outflows by domestic agents. These patterns hold for different types of capital flows and crises. This evidence sheds light on the sources of fluctuations driving capital flows and helps discriminate among existing theories. Our findings seem consistent with crises affecting domestic and foreign agents asymmetrically, as would be the case under the presence of sovereign risk or asymmetric information.     

The global financial crisis: Explaining cross-country differences in the output impact

What explains differences in the crisis impact across developing countries and emerging markets? Using cross-country regressions to assess the factors driving the growth performance in 2009 (compared to pre-crisis forecasts for that year), we find that a small set of variables explain a large share of the variation in the growth impact. Countries with more leveraged domestic financial systems, stronger credit growth, and more short-term debt tended to suffer a larger effect on economic activity, although the relative importance of these factors differs across country groups. For emerging markets, this financial channel trumps the trade channel. For a broader set of developing countries, however, the trade channel seems to have mattered, with more open countries affected more strongly and those exporting food commodities being less hard hit. Exchange-rate flexibility helped in buffering the impact of the shock, particularly for emerging markets. There is also some evidence that countries with a stronger fiscal position prior to the crisis were impacted less severely. We find little evidence for the importance of other policy variables.     

Subsidiary divestiture and acquisition in a financial crisis: Operational focus, financial constraints, and ownership

We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.