Is there price discovery in equity options?

We use tick-by-tick quote data for 39 liquid US stocks and options on them, and we focus on events when the two markets disagree about the stock price in the sense that the option-implied stock price obtained from the put-call parity relation is inconsistent with the actual stock price. Option market quotes adjust to eliminate the disagreement, while the stock market quotes behave normally, as if there were no disagreement. The disagreement events are typically precipitated by stock price movements and display signed option volume in the direction that tends to eliminate the disagreements. These results show that option price quotes do not contain economically significant information about future stock prices beyond what is already reflected in current stock prices, i.e., no economically significant price discovery occurs in the option market. We also find no option market price discovery using a much larger sample of disagreement events based on a weaker definition of a disagreement, which verifies that the findings for the primary sample are not due to unusual or unrepresentative market behavior during the put-call parity violations.     

Specialists,Limit‐Order Traders,and the Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread

This study compares the components of the bid‐ask spread estimated from quotes that reflect the trading interest of specialists with those estimated from limit‐order quotes and all available quotes for a sample of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks. The results show that the adverse selection component of the spread estimated from specialist quotes is significantly smaller than the corresponding figures from limit‐order quotes and entire quotes. We interpret this as evidence that NYSE specialists transfer at least a part of adverse selection costs to outsiders through the discretionary use of limit orders. Our results show that the estimation/interpretation of the components of the spread using quote data that include both specialist and limit‐order interests is problematic.     

Pricing Efficiency in a Thin Market with Competitive Market Makers: Box Spread Strategies in the Hang Seng Index Options Market

Using a box spread arbitrage strategy, we examine the pricing efficiency of the emerging, thinly traded Hang Seng Index options market in Hong Kong, where market makers operate under a competitive open outcry system. In 20 months of tick‐by‐tick bid‐ask and transaction quotes we find very few arbitrage opportunities. Our examination of the reporting time of quotes shows that in effect, all the apparent mispricings are deceptive and could be explained by stale quotes. The absence of real arbitrage opportunities supports the pricing rationality hypothesis in the Hong Kong options market.     

Quote Competitiveness, 100‐share Quotes,and Decimalization

The finance literature documents a significant post‐decimalization decline in intermarket quote competitiveness. We show that this result is due primarily to the decline in 100‐share NBBO‐matching quotes posted by NASDAQ. After decimalization, such quotes decline by more than 90%. At that time, the intermarket trading system (ITS) regards 100‐share quotes as meaningless; these quotes are exempt from the trade‐through rule and are generally ignored by ITS participants. We therefore argue that the major decline in quote competitiveness observed by previous research is largely nominal, and that decimalization had a much lesser impact on quote competitiveness than previously believed.     

Price Movement Effects on the State of the Electronic Limit‐Order Book

This paper investigates public‐trader order‐placement strategies by examining the relations between the state of the limit‐order book and previous price movements. There is support for an information effect, as traders become more aggressive in buying and more patient in selling after previous positive stock returns. The widening of the bid‐ask spread also causes traders to place less aggressive orders. However, there is no evidence of the options effect on limit‐order trading. This study also reveals that orders at the best quotes react faster and complete the adjustment earlier than orders that are far away from the best quotes.     

END‐OF‐DAY PRICING IN THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET: A COMPARISON OF GovPX AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

We compare end‐of‐day indicative U.S. Treasury prices from GovPX and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). We find that the two sources rarely quote identical prices, and differences are not simply due to noise or rounding. The average bid price differential is 2 cents for notes and bonds, but it is only ¹/₁₀ of 1 cent for bills. Bid‐ask spreads in both sources appear to be largely artificial and contain limited information. Finally, we find that the end‐of‐day indicative FRBNY bid prices are closer to true intraday GovPX market quotes than end‐of‐day indicative quotes provided by GovPX itself.     

Co-movements of index options and futures quotes

We report evidence that the co-movements of index options and index futures quotes differ sharply from perfect correlation in periods with option trades. In half-hour intervals with (without) option trades 25% (12%) of call option quote changes have either the opposite sign or are larger in magnitude than the corresponding index futures quote changes. We calibrate a stochastic volatility model that allows for trade and no-trade periods using real data and simulate the joint co-movements of index quotes and option quotes in this model. We show that for trade intervals the observed co-movements differ from the benchmark case established by our simulations approximately three times too often. We provide empirical evidence that market microstructure effects – specifically, stale quotes and aggressive quotes – explain the majority of the deviations from the benchmark. Our findings are relevant for techniques that use estimates of local co-movements as inputs to price or hedge options.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY QUOTES ON NASDAQ: A STUDY OF DEALER QUOTATION BEHAVIOR

We show that the majority of quotes posted by NASDAQ dealers are noncompetitive and only 19.5% (18.4%) of bid (ask) quotes are at the inside. The percentage of dealer quotes that are at the inside is higher for stocks with wider spreads, fewer market makers, and more frequent trading, and lower for stocks with larger trade sizes and higher return volatility. These results support our conjecture that dealers have greater incentives to be at the inside for stocks with larger market‐making revenues and smaller costs. Dealers post large depths when their quotes are at the inside and frequently quote the minimum required depth when they are not at the inside. The latter quotation behavior leads to the negative intertemporal correlation between dealer spread and depth.     

DO DEALERS INFER INFORMATION FROM ORDER FLOW?

I examine strategic behavior among dealers in the NASDAQ market and document that there is a lead quote‐setting dealer in each security and that the quotes posted by this leader are informative. Other dealers free‐ride this information by following the lead quote‐setting dealer. The lead dealer can be identified by two information signals: (1) percentage of time spent on the inside market (i.e., posting inside quotes), and (2) trade volume transacted. Dealers that free‐ride the leader's quotes quickly update their posted quotes in the same direction as the leader's quote change. My findings suggest that directing trade to the lead dealer may be more advantageous than randomly routing trade.     

Pinning in the S&P 500 futures

We show that Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 futures are pulled toward the at-the-money strike price on days when serial options on the S&P 500 futures expire (pinning) and are pushed away from the cost-of-carry adjusted at-the-money strike price right before the expiration of options on the S&P 500 index (anti-cross-pinning). These effects are driven by the interplay of market makers' rebalancing of delta hedges due to the time decay of those hedges as well as in response to reselling (and early exercise) of in-the-money options by individual investors. The associated shift in notional futures value is at least $115 million per expiration day.     

Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

Basel-2 capital adequacy: Computing the ‘fair’ capital charge for loan commitment ‘true’ credit risk

This research makes two contributions: (i) to price analytically put option and extension premium embedded in a borrower-extendible commitment, and (ii) to compute the ‘fair’ capital charge that corresponds to the commitment ‘true’ credit risk. In doing so, the procedure replaces the BIS accounting-based concepts of credit-conversion factor, principal-risk factor, and initial term to maturity of irrevocable commitments with the market-based concepts of exercise-cum-takedown proportion and put value implicit in the borrower-extendible commitment, respectively. Finally, the approach is developed one step further to account for the borrowers' risk ratings by public credit agencies; this results in a two-dimensional (time-state of nature) risk-weighting system that applies to all commitment types.     

Urban planning: an ‘undisciplined’ discipline?

The need for cross disciplinary boundaries appeared in scientific research at least twenty years ago. Since its foundation, at the beginning of the 20th Century, urban planning has been claiming the assets of multidisciplinarity. It is particularly concerned with transgressing disciplinary boundaries. However, multidisciplinarity may weaken urban planning as a discipline, because it is a recent knowledge domain that has borrowed without questioning from the knowledge acquired in both the social and engineering sciences. Urban planning may forget to formulate an inventory and to build its own theoretical and practical assets. This article argues that it is only when a dsicipline has acquired its own identity that it can implement a fertile transdisciplinarity contribution.     

Liquidity and valuation in an uncertain world

During the 2007–2009 financial crisis there was little or no trading in a variety of financial assets, even though bid and ask prices existed for many of these assets. We develop a model in which this illiquidity arises from uncertainty, and we argue that this new form of illiquidity makes bid and ask prices unsuitable as metrics for establishing “fair value” for these assets. We show how the extreme uncertainty that traders face can be characterized by incomplete preferences over portfolios, and we use Bewley's (2002) model of decision making under uncertainty to derive equilibrium quotes and the nonexistence of trading at these quotes. We then suggest alternatives for valuing assets in illiquid markets.     

Libor manipulation?

On May 29, 2008 the Wall Street Journal published an article alleging that several global banks were reporting Libor quotes significantly lower than those implied by prevailing credit default swap (CDS) spreads. While acknowledging that the “analysis doesn’t prove that banks are lying or manipulating Libor,” it nevertheless conjectures that these banks may “have been low-balling their borrowing rates to avoid looking desperate for cash.”In this paper we compare Libor with other short-term borrowing rates, analyze individual bank quotes, and compare these individual quotes to CDS spreads and market capitalization data during three periods: 1/1/07-8/8/07 (Period 1), 8/9/07-4/16/08 (Period 2), and 4/17/08-5/30/08 (Period 3). We find some anomalous individual quotes, but the evidence is inconsistent with a material manipulation of the US dollar 1-month Libor rate.     

The order flow of discount certificates and issuer pricing behavior

We analyze the order flow of discount certificates, its dependence on product age, and the implications for issuer pricing behavior. Based on a unique data set of exchange trades and issuer quotes, we find that for tax reasons investors prefer to buy products that mature in just over 1 year from the date of purchase. Furthermore, they tend to sell products back preferably close to maturity. These patterns in the trade direction allow us to separate the issuer pricing behavior from (i) the life cycle and (ii) the order flow. We find evidence that 7 out of 11 issuers anticipate the order flow and price in an additional margin in phases of positive expected net sales.     

VALUATION OF EVENT‐CONTINGENT OPTIONS

I study a new class of investment options, event‐contingent options. These are options to invest and divest in projects that are dependent on other projects of the same firm or that are conditioned by projects of other firms in its value chain. I construct payoff functions and derive closed‐form solutions for the value of options to invest contingent on investment (OICI), options to invest contingent on divestment (OICD), options to divest contingent on divestment (ODCD), and options to divest contingent on investment (ODCI). I also derive analytical comparative statics for these option valuation equations and examine their implications on the firm's wealth. I offer examples of event‐contingent options in a global context.     

The territorial futures of Europe: ‘Trends’, ‘Competition’ or ‘Cohesion’

The ESPON 2006 scenario project generated three integrated roll-forward scenarios (A roll-forward scenario is a scenario in which the hypotheses define the parameters at the start of the covered time period and the scenario then explores the unfolding of events based on theses hypotheses. This is opposed to a roll-backward scenario in which the situation at the end of the time period is defined and the scenario then explores the path to reach this situation.). In the trend scenario renewed efforts are made for the Lisbon strategy, demanding extra investments in R&D and education. Regional policy will also be continued with vigour. In the Competition Scenario bold decisions are made regarding Europe's continued prosperity. The Lisbon strategy takes precedence over institutional reform and other sectoral policies. In the Cohesion Scenario Europe is confronted with the challenge of fully integrating the various regions in Europe. The budgets for Regional Policy and Rural Development Policy are enhanced and targeted to the most needy regions. The scenarios are described as stories about the future, supported by model calculations and visualised by various maps. They concentrate on urban and rural development and on territorial developments in different parts of Europe, like North-West Europe, the Alpine Space and Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, a proactive, roll-back scenario explores the possibilities to combine competitiveness, cohesion and sustainability. A message, derived from the scenarios, is that independent of the explored policy options the European territory will be confronted with large challenges like a (rapid) decline of fossil energy resources and increasing impacts of climate change. The scenarios appear particularly helpful in the context of the current paradigm shift in European regional policy from a policy for balance to a policy for aggregate growth.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.     

Index Options-Futures Arbitrage: A Comparative Study with Bid/Ask and Transaction Data

We can infer from bid/ask quotations and transaction prices that where options contracts are traded under a competitive open‐outcry market‐making system, the options and futures markets are dynamically efficient. Ex‐ante analysis shows that potential arbitrage opportunities disappear within five minutes. Transaction price data understate both the frequency and magnitude of arbitrage opportunities that are signaled by bid/ask quotes. Quotes stale fast, so opportunities are short‐lived and some of the arbitrage opportunities are deceptive. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that bid/ask quotes provide valuable trading signals to arbitrageurs. Profitability from exploiting the quotes is negatively related to execution delay and execution risk.