Investor sentiment and the stock market’s reaction to monetary policy

This paper shows that monetary policy decisions have a significant effect on investor sentiment. The effect of monetary news on sentiment depends on market conditions (bull versus bear market). We also find that monetary policy actions in bear market periods have a larger effect on stocks that are more sensitive to changes in investor sentiment and credit market conditions. Overall, the results show that investor sentiment plays a significant role in the effect of monetary policy on the stock market.     

Strength of analyst coverage following IPOs

Firms with poor aftermarket performance are given higher target prices and are more likely to receive strong buy recommendations, especially by analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter. This favorable coverage is relatively short lived, typically lasting less than six months. Controlling for the quantity of coverage received, stock prices of newly public firms increase more when the target price ratio is high and recommendation is a strong buy. These results suggest that when a firm goes public, underwriter-affiliated analysts provide protection in the form of “booster shots” of stronger coverage if the firm experiences poor aftermarket stock performance.     

The impact of all-star analyst job changes on their coverage choices and investment banking deal flow

Using a sample of all-star analysts who switch investment banks, we examine (1) whether analyst behavior is influenced by banking relationships and (2) whether analyst behavior affects investment banking deal flow. Although the stock coverage decision depends on the relationship with the client firms, we find no evidence that analysts change their optimism or recommendation levels when joining a new firm. Investment banking deal flow is related to analyst reputation only for equity transactions. For debt and M&A transactions, analyst reputation does not matter. There is no evidence that issuing optimistic earnings forecasts or recommendations affects investment banking deal flow.     

Are there long-run implications of analyst coverage for IPOs?

Analyst coverage has been cited increasingly as an important attribute in the selection of an underwriter for a firm about to go public. However, it has also been alleged that affiliated analysts provide biased research. In this study, we examine these interrelated issues by examining the long-run performance of IPOs with coverage from their managing underwriters in a 1993–2003 sample. We find that (1) analysts’ research coverage from their managing syndicate is not related to long-run performance; (2) long-run performance is not different for firms that receive all-star analyst coverage; and (3) investors are not systematically worse off for following lead underwriter recommendations.     

Do analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights?

We examine whether sell-side analyst recommendations reflect shareholder rights. Our rationale is that analysts should be influenced by external governance only if market participants do not efficiently price its value. We find that stronger shareholder rights are associated with more favorable recommendations. Further analysis reveals that analysts favor firms with strong shareholder rights only when strong rights appear to be warranted, but do not penalize firms for having strong rights when not needed. These findings occupy middle ground in the debate on the pricing efficiency of shareholder rights. Moreover, we find that firm value is positively associated with the strength of shareholder rights regardless of the expected external governance structure. The latter result is consistent with a “one-size-fits-all” interpretation, and implies that firms across the board could increase share value by reducing their number of anti-takeover provisions.     

Research for sale: Determinants and consequences of paid-for analyst research

I examine the determinants and market impact of paid-for coverage using a hand-collected sample of paid-for reports over 1999–2006. More than five hundred publicly listed US companies paid for analyst coverage since 1999. Yet little is known about the informational consequences of this analyst research. Firms with greater uncertainty, weaker information environments, and low turnover are more likely to buy coverage as they have the most to gain from analyst coverage but are unlikely to attract sell-side analysts. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest, I find paid-for reports have information content for investors based on 2-day abnormal returns. After the initiation of coverage, companies experience an increase in institutional ownership, sell-side analyst following, and liquidity. In addition, the results are strongest for the fee-based research firm with ex ante policies that reduce potential conflicts of interest.     

Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets

This paper examines the relation between the stock price synchronicity and analyst activity in emerging markets. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that security analysts specialize in the production of firm-specific information, we find that securities which are covered by more analysts incorporate greater (lesser) market-wide (firm-specific) information. Using the R² statistics of the market model as a measure of synchronicity of stock price movement, we find that greater analyst coverage increases stock price synchronicity. Furthermore, after controlling for the influence of firm size on the lead–lag relation, we find that the returns of high analyst-following portfolio lead returns of low analyst-following portfolio more than vice versa. We also find that the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts in a high analyst-following portfolio affects the aggregate returns of the portfolio itself as well as those of the low analyst-following portfolio, whereas the aggregate change in the earnings forecasts of the low analyst-following portfolio have no predictive ability. Finally, when the forecast dispersion is high, the effect of analyst coverage on stock price synchronicity is reduced.     

Comovement and investment banking networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.     

Access to management and the informativeness of analyst research

We examine whether access to management at broker-hosted investor conferences leads to more informative research by analysts. We find analyst recommendation changes have larger immediate price impacts when the analyst?s firm has a conference-hosting relation with the company. The effect increases with hosting frequency and is strongest in the days following the conference. Conference-hosting brokers also issue more informative, accurate, and timely earnings forecasts than non-hosts. Our findings suggest that access to management remains an important source of analysts? informational advantage in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure world.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

Mandatory CSR disclosure and analyst forecast properties: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Based on a quasi-natural experiment that mandates a subset of listed firms to issue standalone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, we examine whether mandatory CSR disclosure improves analysts’ information environment. We focus on two properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts: forecast error and forecast dispersion. We find that the mandatory issuance of standalone CSR reports is related to less forecast error and less dispersed forecasts, and the effect varies with the firm-level information environment and province-level marketization. Additional tests show that the improvement in forecast properties is mainly driven by CSR reports that i) are of high quality and ii) contain more long-term-oriented information than other CSR reports. Our findings provide evidence that mandatory CSR disclosure plays an important informational role for financial analysts.     

The impact of sell-side analyst research coverage on an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume

Using NASDAQ reported individual stock level trading volume, we find that analyst research coverage on a stock increases the level of an affiliated broker’s market share of trading volume in that stock by 0.8 percent, on average, which corresponds to an additional annual volume of about one million shares in an average stock. Optimistic recommendations increase the level of market share by an additional 0.3 percent, on average, which is consistent with the notion that analysts have an incentive to issue optimistic recommendations. Also, a broker’s market share of volume increases on average when an affiliated analyst changes his/her recommendation, and decreases with the length of time during which an analyst maintains the same recommendation on a stock. The latter findings suggest that sell-side institutions are rewarded for providing new information to the market and for ongoing research services.     

Short selling in initial public offerings

Short sale constraints in the aftermarket of initial public offerings (IPOs) are often used to explain short-term underpricing that is subsequently reversed. This paper shows that short selling is integral to aftermarket trading and is higher in IPOs with greater underpricing. Perceived restrictions on borrowing shares are not systematically circumvented by “naked” short selling. Short sellers, on average, do not appear to earn abnormal profits in the near term and our findings are not driven by market makers. Short selling in IPOs is not as constrained as suggested by the literature, implying that other factors may be responsible for underpricing.     

Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior investment recommendations?

We find that analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more profitable stock recommendations. The average factor-adjusted return associated with the recommendations of analysts in the highest accuracy quintile exceeds the corresponding return for analysts in the lowest accuracy quintile by 1.27% per month. Our findings provide indirect empirical support for valuation models in the accounting and finance literatures (e.g., Ohlson, 1995) that emphasize the role of future earnings in predicting stock price movements. Our results also suggest that imperfectly efficient markets reward information gatherers, such as security analysts, for their costly activities in generating superior earnings forecasts.     

Regulation of credit rating agencies

Financial regulators recognize certain credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes. However, it is often argued that credit rating agencies have an incentive to assign inflated ratings. This paper studies a repeated principal-agent problem in which a regulator approves credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies may collude to assign inflated ratings. Yet we show that there exists an approval scheme which induces credit rating agencies to assign correct ratings.     

Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism

This paper extends the literature on analyst optimism. Our analysis of a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 through 2006 indicates that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent and favorable ratings to a stock after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock. Controlling for a number of variables, including the ties between analysts and investment banks, we find that the greater the portfolio weight of a stock in the fund family, the more optimistic the stock ratings from affiliated analysts become. Since 2002, analysts’ optimism on stocks held by affiliated mutual funds has declined. However, an analyst's decision of upgrading a stock to a “strong buy” rating is still significantly associated with the portfolio weight of that stock in the fund family.     

CDS trading and analyst optimism

This paper investigates whether and how the initiation of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) trading affects analyst forecast optimism. First, we document that the initiation of CDS trading curbs analyst forecasts optimism. Second, we find that the dampening effect of CDS on analyst optimism is stronger for firms with negative news and for firms with poorer financial performance or higher leverage, supporting a “correction effect” of CDS on non-strategic optimism. Moreover, we find that CDS also has a “disciplining effect” on strategic optimism that arises from incentives to cultivate relation with management or to please institutional investors. Overall, our evidence shows that the CDS market not only provides important information for analysts, but also alters analysts’ reporting incentives and enhances their objectivity. Additional analysis shows that this effect has disappeared after the Dodd-Frank Act.     

A theory of the transition to secondary market trading of IPOs

We develop a model in which investment banks and institutional investors collaborate in smoothing an initial public offering's (IPOs) transition to secondary market trading. Their intervention promotes welfare under the assumption that significant new information arrives in the market in the immediate aftermath of the IPO. Under this assumption, it is optimal to stage the offering and suboptimal to commit to selling shares at a uniform price. The optimal strategy yields an economic rationale for secondary market price stabilization for IPOs carried out via a well-coordinated network of repeat institutional investors.     

Accruals quality and analyst coverage

We provide evidence that analyst coverage increases as accruals quality decreases. This finding is consistent with the services of financial analysts becoming more valuable and in greater demand as accruals provide weaker signals about future cash flows. Further, it is accruals quality associated with innate uncertainty in the firm’s operating environment that attracts analysts even after controlling for operating uncertainty associated with cash flow and stock return volatility. This suggests that low quality accruals provide an opportunity for analysts to benefit from generating private information. Consistent with analysts providing compensating information, we find that forecasts for firms with lower accruals quality contain more private information.