The determinants of bank margins in European banking

Most of the theoretical and empirical literature on bank margins has dealt solely with interest margins. Applying the seminal Ho–Saunders model (JFQA, 1981) to a multi-output framework, we show that the relationship between bank margins and market power varies significantly across bank specializations. In this context, European banks are a better laboratory than US banks, since they have generally enjoyed a more flexible regulatory environment in which to provide a wider range of services. Using accounting margins and New Empirical Industrial Organization margins, we find that market power increases as output becomes more diversified towards non-traditional activities in European banking.     

Deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the Mexican banking system: Effects on competition

This paper analyzes the evolution of competition in the Mexican banking system in the period 1993-2005, a period of deregulation, liberalization and consolidation of the sector. For this purpose we use two indicators of competition from the theory of industrial organization (the Lerner index and the Panzar and Rosse’s H-statistic). The empirical evidence does not permit us to reject the existence of monopolistic competition. The Lerner index shows a decrease in competitive rivalry in the deposit market and an increase in the loan market, a cross subsidization strategy being observed. The results obtained call into question the effectiveness of the measures implemented hitherto, aimed at increasing the competition of the Mexican banking system.     

Competition in fragmented markets: New evidence from the German banking industry in the light of the subprime crisis

Of all of the EU member states, Germany has the largest banking market. However, not all German banking institutions necessarily face fierce competition. Because the industry is highly fragmented, strict separation of the three existing banking pillars may impede competition, with negative effects on financial stability. We assess the competitive stances of 1,888 universal banks from 2001 to 2009 by using the Panzar–Rosse revenue test. We find evidence that measuring competition at an average country level does not necessarily generate valid evaluations of fragmented markets. In addition, we find no clear indication that either the particular objectives of cooperative and savings banks or the legal protection of these institutions impedes competition or discriminates against private banks. Therefore, as long as the relationship between competition and financial stability is dubious, the overall effect and the social costs or benefits of political measures that influence the structure of the German banking market are at least questionable.     

The cost of market power in banking: Social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency

This paper analyses the relationship between market power in the loan and deposit markets and efficiency in the EU-15 countries over 1993–2002. Results show the existence of a positive relationship between market power and cost X-efficiency, allowing rejection of the so-called quiet life hypothesis [Berger, A.N., Hannan, T.H., 1998. The efficiency cost of market power in the banking industry: A test of the ‘quiet life’ and related hypotheses. Review of Economics and Statistics 8 (3), 454–465]. The social welfare loss attributable to market power in 2002 represented 0.54% of the GDP of the EU-15. Results show that the welfare gains associated with a reduction of market power are greater than the loss of bank cost efficiency, showing the importance of economic policy measures aimed at removing the barriers to outside competition.     

The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure,ownership and competition in Indian banking

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.     

Bank consolidation and new business formation

As the trend of bank consolidation activities continues to grow in the US and globally, the debate on the impact of such consolidation on small business credits and activities are still inconclusive. Building on the existing research [Berger, A.N., Saunders, A., Scalise, J.M., Udell, G.F., 1998. The effects of bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending. Journal of Financial Economics 50, 187–229]; [Black, S.E., Strahan, P.E., 2002. Entrepreneurship and bank credit availability. Journal of Finance LVII (6), 2807–2833], this paper investigates the effects of the actual intensity of bank consolidation on the formation of new businesses in the US local markets. Evidence portrays that in the short-run, the overall intensity of bank consolidation is negatively related to the rate of new business formation, and this negative relationship is primarily driven by consolidations initiated by large acquirers. On the contrary, consolidations between small-to-medium sized banks show a positive impact on new business development and these results are consistent even when the M&As are distinguished with respect to in-market or out-of-market acquirers initiating the deals. However, two years after the consolidations, the evidence reveals a positive and significant impact on the rate of new business formation in the local markets for consolidations initiated by large in-market acquirers.     

Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives’ trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.     

Commitment, banks and markets

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers’ assets can be seized. Limited enforcement reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and thus individuals subject to liquidity shocks face borrowing constraints. We show how banks endogenously overcome these borrowing constraints by pooling resources across several depositors, and increase the liquidity provided by financial markets.     

Endogenous screening, credit crunches, and competition in laxity

A simple model of lending with endogenous screening predicts that risk-neutral banks tend to adopt tighter lending standards under several conditions commonly seen in recessions: lower interest rates (or spreads), higher default rates, or a smaller fraction of good borrowers. Historical data support these predictions. In addition, better information about borrower types encourages tighter lending standards, and competition in laxity can arise with multiple banks. Within the class of symmetric screening decisions, endogenizing the interest rates disrupts the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, just as when screening decisions are assumed to be exogenous.     

Economic value,competition and financial distress in the European banking system

In this paper we examine the impact of a large number of factors at the bank level (liquidity and credit risks, asset size, income diversification and market power), at the industry level (banking concentration) and macro-level (real GDP growth) on bank financial distress using an unbalanced panel of 308 European commercial banks between 1996 and 2009. The observations falling below a given threshold of the empirical distribution of the Shareholder Value Ratio proxy bank financial distress. We employ a panel probit regression and, given the presence of overlapping data giving rise to residual autocorrelation, we use the Bertschek and Lechner (1998) robust estimator of the covariance matrix of parameters. We show that credit risk, liquidity risk and bank market power are the most influential determinants of distressed Shareholder Value Ratio. Finally we evaluate the model out-sample forecasting performance over the 2008–2009 crisis period.     

Elections,political competition and bank failure

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.     

International diversification gains and home bias in banking

This paper studies international diversification in banking, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers the operations of 38 global banks and their subsidiaries overseas during 1995–2004. The paper finds that banks with a larger share of assets allocated to subsidiaries in emerging market countries were able to attain higher risk-adjusted returns. These gains were somewhat reduced by the concentration of bank subsidiaries in specific geographical regions, which is typical of the observed international expansion strategies. The paper also finds a substantial home bias in the international allocation of bank assets relative to the results of a mean–variance portfolio optimization model.     

Shareholder value efficiency in European banking

This paper advances the studies of [Hughes, J.P., Lang W.W., Mester L.J., Moon C.G., Pagano M.S., 2003. Do bankers sacrifice value to build empires? Managerial incentives, industry consolidation, and financial performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 417–447] by developing a new measure of bank performance which we refer to as “shareholder value efficiency” – a bank producing the maximum possible Economic Value Added (EVA), given particular inputs and outputs, is defined as “shareholder value efficient”. This new efficiency measure is estimated using the stochastic frontier method focussing on the French, German, Italian and UK banking systems over the period 1997–2002 and includes both listed and non-listed banks. We find that European banks are, on average, 36% shareholder value inefficient. Shareholder value efficiency is found to be the most important factor explaining value creation in European banking, whereas cost and profit efficiency only have a marginal influence.     

On the implications of market power in banking: Evidence from developing countries

This paper investigates how different degrees of market power affect bank efficiency and stability in the context of developing economies. It sheds light on the competition-stability nexus by documenting and analyzing the complex interactions between a tripod of variables that are central for regulators: the degree of market power, bank cost and profit efficiency, and overall firm stability. The results show that an increase in the degree of market power leads to greater bank stability and enhanced profit efficiency, despite significant cost efficiency losses. The findings lend empirical justification to the traditional view that increased competition may undermine bank stability, and may bear significant implications for stressed banking systems in developing economies.     

Government, taxes and banking crises

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of different government policies to prevent the emergence of banking crises. In particular, we study the impact on welfare of using taxpayers money to recapitalize banks, government injection of money into the banking system through credit lines, the creation of a buffer and taxes on financial transactions (the Tobin tax). We illustrate the trade-off between these policies and derive policy implications.     

The determinants of shareholder value in European banking

This paper examines the determinants of shareholder value creation for a large sample of European banks between 1998 and 2005. As the recent turmoil in global banking systems has illustrated, bank performance can have a substantial influence on efficient capital allocation, company growth and economic development. We use a dynamic panel data model where the bank’s shareholder value is a linear function of various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. We show that shareholder value has a positive relationship with cost efficiency changes, while economic profits are linked to revenue efficiency changes. Credit losses, market and liquidity risk and leverage are also found to substantially influence bank performance. These results are robust to a variety of different model specifications.     

The contribution of product mix versus efficiency and technical change in US banking

Similar to a Du Pont analysis, this paper divides the changes in returns on assets of US commercial banks for the period from 2000 to 2005 into conventional measures of bank performance. The contribution of product mix is significant and offsets losses from technical change and operating efficiency. Banks respond to changes in the business environment by switching towards more lucrative traditional and nontraditional products. Large banks are found to benefit more than community banks from the switch to an optimal output portfolio mix including new products spawned by recent financial innovations and deregulation.     

Investment,internal funds and public banking in Germany

Previous studies supposed that low investment-cash flow sensitivities of German firms may be caused by a dominance of public banking. The paper addresses this assumption and applies a unique accounting dataset of German firms. Results from a dynamic version of the sales accelerator model show that the dependence of investment spending on internal funds does not significantly differ among firms attached to savings banks, cooperative banks or commercial banks. Thus, the importance of the public banking sector in Germany may not explain the rather low dependence of German firms on internal funds, and public ownership of banks does not seem to be important for reducing financing constraints.     

Money, intermediation, and banking

The business of money creation is conceptually distinct from that of intermediation. Yet, these two activities are frequently—but not always—combined together in the form of a banking system. We develop a simple model to examine the question: When is banking essential? There is a role for money due to a lack of record-keeping and a role for intermediation due to the existence of private information: both money and intermediation are essential. When monitoring costs associated with intermediation are sufficiently low, the two activities can be separated from one another. However, when monitoring costs are sufficiently high, a banking system that combines these two activities is essential.     

Managers and efficiency in banking

This paper presents evidence on the impact of managers on cost efficiency in banking. Stochastic frontier analysis is applied to a unique Finnish data set. Manager age and education have strong yet complicated effects on efficiency. The impact of age on efficiency depends on education. A university degree is useful mainly in the largest banks of the sample. Educational background seems to be less important for young managers than for mature ones. Managing director changes are systematically followed by efficiency changes. Retirement typically causes an efficiency improvement whereas other manager changes can either improve or weaken efficiency. However, in many cases mature managers outperform their young colleagues.