Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies

We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.     

Penny Stock IPOs

We examine underpricing, long-run returns, lockup periods, and gross spreads for penny stock IPOs over the 1990–1998 period. We find that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns than ordinary IPOs, but significantly worse long-run underperformance. We also find that penny stock IPOs have longer lockup periods and larger gross spreads. To explore the effect of potential market manipulation, we examine IPOs led by a group of underwriters that were the subject of SEC enforcement actions and/or other penalties. Penny stock issues led by these banks are particularly underpriced and underperform ordinary IPOs led by other underwriters.     

Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues

We estimate the long-run stock performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) in the German capital market with a larger sample than prior studies and alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks). In addition we present the first results on the long-run performance after seasoned equity issues (SEOs) in Germany. We conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios. Using buy‐and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988–1990 IPO cohort discussed by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size instead of market portfolios.     

Debt Structure Adjustments and Long-Run Stock Price Performance

We examine the long-run implications of debt structure adjustments using a sample of U.S. bond IPOs from 1971 to 1994. Bond IPOs result in simultaneous and pronounced changes in both debt maturity and debt ownership structures. We document that firms engaging in debt IPOs substantially underperform their size-and-book-to-market-matched benchmarks by 33.39 and 55.99% over the 3- and 5-year post-offer periods. Our results are strikingly similar to those reported for equity offers but contrast the evidence for seasoned debt offers. We find evidence that debt IPOs are timed to coincide with the market having the highest expectations concerning firms' prospects. A negative relation is documented between debt maturity and future growth opportunities. In part, the underperformance can be attributed to significantly reduced growth opportunities following the offering. Post-offer underperformance is more pronounced for (a) longer maturity issues and (b) firms that do not experience an increase in bank monitoring. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G12, G24, G30, D82.     

Initial and Long-Run IPO Returns in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT

This article provides original evidence on IPO underpricing and long-run underperformance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and compares results to the European Union’s developed capital markets from 2000 to 2009. Using both index-adjusted and CAPM-adjusted returns, we find significant underpricing that is significantly higher than underpricing of comparable IPOs in the European Union’s developed capital markets. We show that the CEE’s initial IPO returns also exhibit significantly higher volatility. In line with the asymmetric information theory, we indicate that smaller IPOs in the CEE region have greater underpricing than the larger IPOs. Contrary to the literature, we unambiguously confirm long-run underperformance toward the benchmarks. In some model specifications, we also find that IPO long-run underperformance in the CEE region is less present than in the European Union’s developed capital markets.     

Initial Public Offerings in Australia 1994 to 1999, Recent Evidence of Underpricing and Underperformance

This paper analyses whether financial and non financial characteristics of Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain observed underpricing and long term underperformance over the period 1994 to 1999. A number of previous Australian studies have investigated initial day underpricing and longer term underperformance of IPOs and this study updates those papers. We find that initial day underpricing can in part be explained by market sentiment, forecast dividend per share yields, underwriter options and share options. Our longer term analysis supports the finding of previous studies in that IPOs on average, underperform the market in the first year following their listing.     

Value versus growth in IPOs: New evidence from Finland

This paper focuses on the underpricing and the short- and long-run performance of Finnish initial public offerings (IPOs). More specifically, we examine whether there are differences between the performance of value and growth stock IPOs in the Finnish stock market. Our results indicate that growth stock IPOs are slightly more underpriced and have marginally higher short-run returns. However, value stock IPOs are better long-run investments and provide higher returns during the first three years in the aftermarket. We also document that the apparent long-run underperformance of Finnish IPOs can be largely explained by size, book-to-market, and momentum effects.     

Diversification benefits and persistence of US-based global bond funds

This paper examines diversification benefits and performance persistence of 188 US-based global bond funds that survived and were defunct during the period of 1993–2004. Consistent with managed fund literature, global funds underperform broad-based benchmark indexes; however, the underperformance is less than the funds’ expense ratio. The results using both simple and time-varying frameworks suggest that global funds provide higher total return and comparable risk-adjusted return to domestic bond funds. For US investors specializing in domestic bond funds, global funds can enhance return by 0.5–1% per year without increasing risk. Global funds also provide incremental diversification benefits to equity fund investors. The funds exhibit short-run performance persistence, but this is difficult for investors to exploit, especially in long-run. Global funds show no return seasonality during the sample period. On a risk-adjusted basis, larger and newer funds and funds with long maturity and low expense ratio perform well.     

Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.     

Post-listing underperformance: Is it really bad to move trading locations?

We reexamine the post-listing puzzle by studying the stock performance of 2103 firms that moved from NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX, or from AMEX to NYSE during 1973–1999. The matched four-factor regressions demonstrate that the listing firms do not underperform. Size-and-book-to-market matched factor regression finds that the “post-listing drift” is confined to the small set of firms moving from NASDAQ to AMEX during 1981–1990, within size deciles 3–6 and book-to-market quintiles 1–3. A further control of the industry effect is able to resolve the remaining abnormal returns. Our results are consistent with the pseudo market timing hypothesis in Schultz, (2003) [Schultz, P., 2003. Pseudo market timing and the long-run underperformance of IPOs. J. Fin. 58, 483–517.].     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

Are IPOs really overpriced?

Purnanandam and Swaminathan [Purnanandam, A., Swaminathan, B. 2004. Are IPOs really underpriced? Review of Financial Studies, 17, 811–848.] find that IPOs are overvalued at the offer price relative to value metrics based on industry peer price multiples. I discuss some possible problems in their valuation methodology and find that IPOs are not overvalued after steps are taken to address the problems. More importantly, when I examine the long-run performance of IPO firms and their industry peers, I find that IPOs do not underperform their industry peers in the 5 years after IPO. This casts doubt to the argument that IPOs are overvalued.     

Model specification and IPO performance: New insights from Asia

This study examines the post-issue stock price performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) from advanced and emerging Asian markets from 1991 to 2004. We provide a comparative assessment on the short- and long-term stock performance of Asian IPOs with comprehensive international evidence. We use several different methods to examine the robustness of IPO performance. Our results reveal that whilst there is initial underpricing in Asian IPOs, the existence of long-run underperformance for the Asian IPOs depends resoundingly on the methodology used for assessment.     

Re‐assessing the long‐term underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Previous work has identified that IPOs underperform a market index, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of this finding. We re‐examine the evidence on the long‐term returns of IPOs in the UK using a new data set of firms over the period 1985–92, in which we compare abnormal performance based on a number of alternative methods including a calendar‐time approach. We find that, using an event‐time framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the 5 years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns depends on the benchmark applied. Further if these returns are measured in calendar time, we find that the (statistical) significance of underperformance is even less marked.     

Long-run abnormal return after IPOs and optimistic analysts' forecasts

This empirical study examines whether the optimistic forecasts of analysts explain the long-run abnormal return following initial public offerings (IPOs). Consistent with prior research, this paper concludes that the analysis of earning forecasts for firms going public has an upward bias. While the usually calculated buy-and-hold abnormal return is not significantly negative on average, a proper control for risk confirms the long-run underperformance hypothesis for the 1-year period following IPOs. The risk-adjusted return is positively correlated to the surprise effect and earning forecast revisions, and appears to be the response to new information about the true earnings perspectives.     

Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from the British,French and Swedish Property Share Markets

This paper investigates the underpricing and long-run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs), using a unique sample consisting of 54 British, French and Swedish property companies, which became publicly listed during the period 1984–1999. Similar to common stock IPOs, the European property share IPOs in our sample outperformed the benchmark on the first day of trading, on average with 2.55 percent. However, these property share IPOs tend to underperform their benchmark over the twelve-month period subsequent to the initial offering. We also examine explanatory factors such as issue size, the degree of debt financing, ex-ante uncertainty, and the underlying property types of the companies involved. The results are in line with those previously found for common stocks.     

Greenness index: IPO performance and portfolio allocation

This study examines how the greenness of the firm affects the short- and long-term performance of IPOs. To measure the greenness of the firm, we develop the Greenness Index based on the emissions produced. We find that the greenness of the firms operating in services and financial sectors is higher than in other sectors. To examine the short- and long-run performance of IPOs, we classify our sample into high and low green firms. In the short-run, high green firms obtain a lower return than low green firms. However, high green firms perform better than low green firms in the long-run. This study also determines the factors that cause short- and long-run performance, and the results suggest that the firm’s greenness negatively influences initial returns and underperformance of IPOs. Finally, we develop a theoretical model in terms of the portfolio's allocation and assert that investors participate in high-green firms to optimize their portfolio.     

An empirical investigation of Yankee stock offerings

This paper examines the operating and investment performance of 100 foreign firms that conduct their initial public offerings (IPOs) in the U.S. (Yankee stock offerings). The uniqueness of these firms is that the U.S. IPOs are their first public equity issue in any market, including the home market. We find significant improvement in the operating performance subsequent to these U.S. IPO events and firms from countries with poor investor protection benefit more. Compared to various benchmarks, unlike the significant underperformance of IPOs documented in many countries, these firms show no significant abnormal long-run stock market performance after 1, 3, or 5 years of seasoning. The findings are consistent with signaling and selective entry hypotheses.     

Do Firms Knowingly Sell Overvalued Equity?

This article examines the relation between top executives' trading and the long-run stock returns of seasoned equity issuing firms. Primary issuers, who sell mostly newly-issued primary shares, significantly underperform their benchmarks, regardless of the top executives' prior trading pattern. However, top executives' trading is reliably associated with the stock returns of secondary issuers, who sell mostly secondary shares previously held by existing shareholders. On average, secondary issuers do not underperform their benchmarks. The results suggest that increased free cash flow problems after issue play an important role in explaining the underperformance of issuing firms.