Did the Market Signal Impending Problems at Northern Rock? An Analysis of Four Financial Instruments

The academic literature has regularly argued that market discipline can support regulatory authority mechanisms in ensuring banking sector stability. This includes, amongst other things, using forward‐looking market prices to identify those credit institutions that are most at risk of failure. The paper's key aim is to analyse whether market investors signalled potential problems at Northern Rock in advance of the bank announcing that it had negotiated emergency lending facilities at the Bank of England in September 2007. A further aim of the paper is to examine the signalling qualities of four financial market instruments (credit default swap spreads, subordinated debt spreads, implied volatility from options prices and equity measures of bank risk) so as to explore both the relative and individual qualities of each. The paper's findings, therefore, contribute to the market discipline literature on using market data to identify bank risk‐taking and enhancing supervisory monitoring. Our analysis suggests that private market participants did signal impending financial problems at Northern Rock. These findings lend some empirical support to proposals for the supervisory authorities to use market information more extensively to improve the identification of troubled banks. The paper identifies equities as providing the timeliest and clearest signals of bank condition, whilst structural factors appear to hamper the signalling qualities of subordinated debt spreads and credit default swap spreads. The paper also introduces idiosyncratic implied volatility as a potentially useful early warning metric for supervisory authorities to observe.     

Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help?

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.     

Has market discipline on banks improved after the Dodd–Frank Act?

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as too-big-to-fail (TBTF) or systemically important (SIFI). Using secondary market subordinated debt transactions we find that the size discount is reduced by 47% and TBTF discount is reduced by 94% after the DFA. The DFA has been effective in reducing, but not in eliminating the size and TBTF discounts on yield spreads. Market discipline of banks appears to have improved further after the rating criteria changes by Moody’s.     

Product market competition and the cost of bank loans: Evidence from state antitakeover laws

The extant literature documents a positive relationship between a firm’s takeover vulnerability and its agency cost of debt. Using state antitakeover laws as an exogenous measure of variation in takeover vulnerability, I investigate whether product market competition has a disciplinary effect that can lower a firm’s cost of bank loans. After taking into account the industry composition of borrowers, I find that banks charge higher spreads to borrowers that are vulnerable to takeovers, but only in concentrated industries. In the absence of disciplinary competitive pressure, the effect of takeover vulnerability on the cost of bank loans is mitigated for larger firms, firms followed by analysts, firms with existing credit ratings, non-family firms, and for borrowers with shorter maturity loans or loans with covenants and collateral in place. Taken together, the results suggest that the effect of governance on the cost of financing is not homogenous across all industries, and that concentrated industry firms may need to use supplementary governance mechanisms to mitigate debt holder agency problems.     

Monitoring and bank loan pricing

In this paper, we examine the influence of contract costs on the pricing of bank loans. We find that the loan spread depends on a bank's screening and monitoring incentives, which varies across differentially regulated classes of banks. This leads to significant price disparities in the loan market. In particular, the US branches of Japanese banks participate in syndicated lending to US firms that charge significantly higher spreads compared to syndicated loans to US firms without Japanese participation. This pricing disparity is primarily due to regulatory differences. We also find that as specialized intermediaries, banks price loans based primarily on their own monitoring.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

This paper examines market discipline in the credit default swap (CDS) market and the potential distortion of CDS spreads which arises when a bank is thought to be too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find evidence for market discipline in the CDS market. However, CDS prices are distorted by a size effect when a bank is considered to be too-big-to-fail. A 1 percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS spread of a bank by about 2 basis points. We further find that some banks have already reached a size that makes them too-big-to-be-rescued. While the price distortion for these banks decreases, the existence of banks that are considered to be too-big-to-rescue raises important new issues for banking supervisors.     

The impact of bank entry in the Japanese corporate bond underwriting market

The 1993 Japanese financial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empirically whether underwriting commissions and yield spreads on corporate straight bonds issued domestically fell as a result of this bank entry. The empirical results show that bank entry significantly lowers both underwriting commissions and yield spreads. Commissions charged by banks are significantly lower than those charged by investment houses. Lending and shareholding relationships between the issuer and underwriter are not important in determining commissions or yield spreads.     

The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post-FDICIA Period

In this article we examine whether the federal safety net is viewed by the market as being extended beyond de jure deposits to other bank debt and even the debt of bank holding companies (BHCs). We extend previous research by focusing on the post‐FDICIA period and by examining the risk‐return relation of bonds issued directly by banks, not BHCs. Our results provide evidence that both bank and BHC bonds are priced by the secondary market in relation to their underlying credit risk, particularly for less capitalized issuers, suggesting that proposals requiring banks to issue subordinated debt may enhance market monitoring and discipline and be useful in supplementing regulatory discipline.     

Market discipline of banks: Why are yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures not sensitive to bank risks?

The default risk sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) decreased after banks started issuing trust-preferred securities (TPS). The too-big-to-fail (TBTF) discount on yield spreads is absent prior to the LTCM bailout, but the size discount doubles after the LTCM bailout. Prior to TPS issuance and the LTCM bailout, SND yield spreads are sensitive to conventional firm-specific default risk measures, but not after the bailout. We find paradigm shift in determinants of yield spreads after the LTCM bailout. Yield spreads on TPS are sensitive to default risks and can provide an additional source of market discipline.     

Market price accounting and depositor discipline: The case of Japanese regional banks

We examine the determinants of Japanese regional bank pricing-to-market decisions and their impact on the intensity of depositor discipline, in the form of the sensitivity of deposit growth to bank financial conditions. To obtain consistent estimates, we first model and estimate the bank pricing-to-market decision and then estimate the intensity of depositor discipline after conditioning for that decision. We find that banks were less likely to adopt market price accounting the larger were their unrealized securities losses. We also find statistically significant evidence of depositor discipline among banks that elected to price to market. Our results indicate that depositor discipline was more intense for the subset of banks that adopted market price accounting.     

Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?

Although accurate bond prices are difficult to come by, many have advocated that bank supervisors use subordinated debt spreads in the surveillance of large banking organizations. Our findings indicate that subordinated debt spreads are most consistent across data sources for the most liquid bonds (i.e., those of relatively large issuance size, relatively young age, issued by relatively large firms) traded in a relatively robust overall bond market. We also find a high degree of concordance in rankings of firms by their minimum spreads across bonds with especially strong agreement about which large firms are in the tails of the spread distribution at each point in time. Our time-series results further support and provide additional guidance for the use of subordinated debt spreads in supervisory monitoring, support the need for careful judgment when interpreting such spreads, highlight difficulties with currently available data sources, and motivate the need for further research.     

Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

Are Banks Affiliated with Bank Holding Companies More Efficient Than Independent Banks? The Recent Experience Regarding Japanese Regional BHCs

Few studies have investigated whether Japanese banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more efficient and profitable than independent banks. The present paper tests this hypothesis by using both a stochastic frontier approach and a market valuation approach. First, our results suggest that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are not more cost-efficient than are independent banks. Because of the brief history of Japanese BHCs, it is fair to conclude that the formation of regional bank holding companies has not achieved efficiency gains so far. Second, we find that banks affiliated with bank holding companies are more profit-efficient than are independent banks. This is particularly apparent when the establishment of the bank holding companies increases market power in regional markets. This supports the Financial Services Agency’s policy to increase the profitability of regional banks through bank consolidation. Finally, based on standard event study methodology, we find that the market did not regard news about the establishment of bank holding companies as significant events.JEL Classification: G21     

Heterogeneous Market-Making in Foreign Exchange Markets: Evidence from Individual Bank Responses to Central Bank Interventions

Using high-frequency data this article provides evidence that, on average, central bank interventions lead to increased volatility and a widening of bid–ask spreads in the intra-day market for foreign exchange. The results also show that there is dispersion in the bid–ask spread revisions posted by individual banks in response to the central bank entering the market. The findings are consistent with predictions from standard models of market microstructure with heterogeneous agents and have implications for the market power of central banks as well as the payoff generated by trading large amounts of international reserves.     

Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market

Direct bank ownership is a common practice in emerging markets. The current paper studies how bank ownership affects firm performance through corporate executive perquisites (perks) in China, a leading emerging economy. In addition to common factors known to influence the level of executive perks, we find a significantly positive link between bank ownership of company shares and executive perquisites. Further analyses suggest that higher level of executive perquisites hurt firm operating efficiency. Specifically, perks are positively associated with interest rate paid by the firms. We find some evidence consistent with the notion that the conflict of interests that banks face as both lenders and shareholders in the emerging markets induces banks to play less effective monitoring if they are concerned with the security of their loans or aim to obtain better arrangement for their loans. Our results reveal a particular mechanism through which bank ownership influences firm decisions and performance.     

Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Bank Debt

I propose a simple model with complete and perfect information on the relation between managerial incentive compensation and choice between public and bank debt. The empirical analysis offers considerable support to the model's predictions. I find that managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance prefer bank to public debt. Further, I find a positive relation between cost of public debt and managerial incentive compensation and no relation between loan spreads and incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the CEO's compensation is tied to firm performance.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.     

Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?

We study whether board structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) in banks relates to performance. Using a broad panel of large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–2011, we find that both board size and independent directors decrease bank performance. Although gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011). Finally, we show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power, if they are immune to the threat of external takeover and/or they are small. Our two-step system generalised method of moments estimation accounts for endogeneity concerns (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity). The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including alternative proxies for bank performance.