Shell games: On the value of shell companies

A reverse merger allows a private company to assume the current reporting status of another company that is public. This can be done quickly, without fundraising, road show, underwriter, substantial ownership dilution, or great expense. Private firms that go public via reverse merger are often motivated by the need to quickly secure financing through privately placed stock (PIPEs) and the desire to make acquisitions using stock as payment. In each of the last eight years reverse mergers have outnumbered traditional IPOs as a mechanism for going public, and reporting shell companies are providing fuel for much of this growth. We study 585 trading shell companies over the period 2006-2008. The purpose of most of these shell firms is to find a suitor for a reverse merger agreement. These companies have no systematic risk, operations, or assets, and their share price tends to decline over time. Yet, these firms have investors. When a takeover agreement is consummated, shell company three-month abnormal returns are 48.1%. We argue that this exceptional return is compensation to investors for shell stock illiquidity and the uncertainty of finding a reverse merger suitor. We show that shell company returns are much greater at the consummation of a merger than those of a similar entity that in dollar terms is more popular among investors — Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Ex-dividend day trading: Who,how, and why? : Evidence from the Finnish market

This study examines the ex-dividend day trading behavior of all investors in the Finnish stock market. Consistent with dynamic dividend clientele theories, investors with a preference for dividend income buy shares cum-dividend and sell ex-dividend; the reverse is true for investors with the opposite preference. Investors also engage in overnight arbitrage, earning on average a 2% overnight return on their invested capital. Trades at the investor-level reveal that idiosyncratic risk is an important determinant in the choice of stock for short-term ex-day trading. Furthermore, transaction costs and dividend yield jointly determine whether the volume of short-term trading activity is nonzero.     

Portfolio selection subject to experts' judgments

Since Markowitz [Markowitz, H. M. (1952). Portfolio selection. The Journal of Finance, 7, 77-91.], mean-variance theory has assumed that risky-asset returns to be random variables. The theory deals with this uncertainty by further assuming that investors hold homogeneous beliefs regarding the probability distribution governing return uncertainty. While the theory deals with return uncertainty, it fails to address measurement imprecision. In his original work, Markowitz recognized the need to combine randomness with heterogeneous expert judgment resulting in such imprecision. The main objective contributions of the paper are (i) to explore the implications of fuzzy return indeterminacy on mean-variance optimal portfolio choice, (ii) to use bid-ask spread as a proxy measure of the indeterminacy or “fuzzy” nature of random returns, and (iii) to introduce a brief, self-contained glimpse of empirical representations to practitioners unfamiliar with the fuzzy modeling field. Exposition, such as this one, is expected to open new collaborations between other branches of fuzzy mathematics and asset-pricing theories.     

Unsophisticated Arbitrageurs and Market Efficiency: Overreacting to a History of Underreaction?

Prior research has documented that arbitrage activity significantly reduces or eliminates stock market anomalies. However, if anomalies arise due to unsophisticated investors’ behavioral biases, then these same biases can also apply to unsophisticated arbitrageurs and thereby disrupt the arbitrage process. Consistent with a disruption in the arbitrage process for the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly, I document that the historically positive autocorrelation in firms’ earnings announcement news has become significantly negative for firms with active exchange‐traded options. For these easy‐to‐arbitrage firms, the firms in the highest decile of prior earnings announcement abnormal return (prior earnings surprise), on average, underperform the firms in the lowest decile by 1.59% (1.43%) at their next earnings announcement. Additional analyses are consistent with investors learning about the post‐earnings announcement drift anomaly and overcompensating. This study suggests that unsophisticated attempts to profit from a well‐known anomaly can significantly reverse a previously documented stock return pattern.     

Maxing out: Stocks as lotteries and the cross-section of expected returns

Motivated by existing evidence of a preference among investors for assets with lottery-like payoffs and that many investors are poorly diversified, we investigate the significance of extreme positive returns in the cross-sectional pricing of stocks. Portfolio-level analyses and firm-level cross-sectional regressions indicate a negative and significant relation between the maximum daily return over the past one month (MAX) and expected stock returns. Average raw and risk-adjusted return differences between stocks in the lowest and highest MAX deciles exceed 1% per month. These results are robust to controls for size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term reversals, liquidity, and skewness. Of particular interest, including MAX reverses the puzzling negative relation between returns and idiosyncratic volatility recently shown in 2 and 3.     

Non-Gaussian diversification: When size matters

Classical portfolio theory informs investors that they should have a large number of assets in their portfolios in order to diversify risk. We show that the non-Gaussian features of stock return distribution may not allow for this risk protection in times of crisis. Moreover, we demonstrate empirically that, if investors are risk-averse and consider higher order moments, they have numerous incentives not to diversify their portfolios fully. This is caused by the evolution of both large losses and asymmetry of returns when the numbers of assets in a portfolio change.     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Socially responsible investment funds: Investor reaction to current and past returns

This paper investigates and compares the determinants of fund flows for socially responsible investment (SRI) funds and conventional funds. We consider the impact of current and past measures of monthly and annual return on fund flow. The results suggest SRI fund flows are less sensitive to returns than conventional funds. Our model also shows that flow is persistent and SRI investors are more likely to invest in a fund they already own relative to conventional investors. These results reflect the difficulty SRI investors face in finding alternative investments that meet their non-financial goals.     

Global private information in international equity markets

This paper studies international equity markets when some investors have private information that is valuable for trading in many countries simultaneously. We use a dynamic model of equity trading to show that global private information helps explain US investors’ trading behavior and performance. In particular, the model predicts global return chasing (positive co-movement of US investors’ net purchases with returns in many countries) which we show to be present in the data. Return chasing in our model can be due to superior performance of US investors, not inferior knowledge or naive trend-following. We also show that trades due to private information are strongly correlated across countries. A common (global) factor accounts for about half their variation.     

Framing Effects in Stock Market Forecasts: The Difference Between Asking for Prices and Asking for Returns

Studies analyzing return expectations of financial market participantslike fund managers, CFOs or individual investors are highlyinfluential in academia and practice. We argue and show thatthe results in these surveys above are easily influenced bythe elicitation mode of return expectations. Surveys that askfor future stock price levels are more likely to produce meanreverting expectations than surveys that directly ask for futurereturns. Furthermore, we conduct a questionnaire study thatexplicitly analyzes whether the specific elicitation mode affectsreturn expectations in the above direction. In our study, subjectswere asked to state mean forecasts for seven time series. Usinga between subject design, one half of the subjects was askedto state future price levels, the other group was directly askedfor returns. We observe a highly significant framing effect.For upward sloping time series, the return forecasts statedby investors in the return forecast mode are significantly higherthan those derived for investors in the price forecast mode.For downward sloping time series, the return forecasts givenby investors in the return forecast mode are significantly lowerthan those derived for investors in the price forecast mode.We argue that this finding is consistent with behavioral theoriesof investor expectation formation based on the representativenessheuristic.     

What Drives ETF Flows?

The value of exchange traded fund (ETF) assets has increased from $66 billion in 2000 to almost a trillion dollars in 2010. We use this massive expansion in ETF assets to study what drives ETF flows. Using a data set of over 500 ETFs from 2001 to 2010, we show that ETF investors chase returns in the same way as mutual fund investors. While there is an active debate about whether return chasing by mutual fund investors represents the pursuit of superior talent, the existence of return chasing in this passively managed environment should not represent a search for skilled managers. We also show that ETF flows increase following high volume, small spreads, and high price/net asset value ratios. Finally, we find little evidence of superior market timing in ETF flows. Our results suggest that return chasing in both mutual funds and ETFs is more likely the result of naïve extrapolation bias on the part of investors that has contributed to the growth of the ETF industry.     

Bank M&A: A market power story?

This paper analyzes capital market reactions to international bank M&A. We investigate the combined stock return patterns of targets, bidders, and their peers upon takeover announcement, and closing or withdrawal. We distinguish five common M&A hypotheses and relate characteristic and mutually exclusive abnormal stock return patterns to each hypothesis. The findings show that there are more investors who believe in gains through the exploitation of market power by the post-merger entity than investors who believe in any of the other motives tested in the paper. In a multinomial logistic model we show that patterns related to market power significantly concur with large relative target size, intra-industry mergers, and increasing market concentration, suggesting a substantial lessening of competition through M&A.     

Informed momentum trading versus uninformed “naive” investors strategies

We construct a zero net-worth uninformed “naive investor” who uses a random portfolio allocation strategy. We then compare the returns of the momentum strategist to the return distribution of naive investors. For this purpose we reward momentum profits relative to the return percentiles of the naive investors with scores that are symmetric around the median. The score function thus constructed is invariant and robust to risk factor models. We find that the average scores of the momentum strategies are close to zero (the score of the median) and statistically insignificant over the sample period between 1926 and 2005, various sub-sample periods including the periods examined in [Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993] and [Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001] . The findings are robust with respect to sampling or period-specific effects, tightened score intervals, and the imposition of maximum-weight restrictions on the naive strategies to mitigate market friction considerations.     

“Hot Hands” in bond funds

We investigate persistence in the relative performance of 3549 bond mutual funds from 1990 to 2003. We show that bond funds that display strong (weak) performance over a past period continue to do so in future periods. The out-of-sample difference in risk-adjusted return between the top and bottom decile of funds ranked on past alpha exceeds 3.5 percent per year. We demonstrate that a strategy based on past fund returns earns an economically and statistically significant abnormal return, suggesting that bond fund investors can exploit the observed persistence. Our results are robust to a wide range of model specifications and bootstrapped test statistics.     

Prospect theory and trading patterns

Reference dependence, loss aversion, and risk seeking for losses together comprise the preference-based component of prospect theory that sets its value function apart from the standard risk-aversion model. Using an elasticity analysis, we show that this distinctive preference component serves to underpin negative-feedback trading propensities, but cannot manifest itself in behavior directly or holistically at the individual-choice level. We then propose and demonstrate that the market interaction between prospect-theory investors and regular CRRA investors allows this preference component to dominate in equilibrium behavior and hence helps to reestablish the intuitive link between prospect-theory preferences and negative-feedback trading patterns. In the model, the interaction also reconciles the contrarian behavior of prospect-theory investors with asymmetric volatility and short-term return reversal. The results suggest that prospect-theory preferences can lead investors to behave endogenously as contrarian noise traders in the market interaction process.     

Sell on the news: Differences of opinion,short-sales constraints,and returns around earnings announcements

Miller [1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] hypothesizes that prices of stocks subject to high differences of opinion and short-sales constraints are biased upward. We expect earnings announcements to reduce differences of opinion among investors, and consequently, these announcements should reduce overvaluation. Using five distinct proxies for differences of opinion, we find that high differences of opinion stocks earn significantly lower returns around earnings announcements than low differences of opinion stocks. In addition, the returns on high differences of opinion stocks are more negative within the subsample of stocks that are most difficult for investors to sell short. These results are robust when we control for the size effect and the market-to-book effect and when we examine alternative explanations such as financial leverage, earnings announcement premium, post-earnings announcement drift, return momentum, and potential biases in analysts’ forecasts. Also consistent with Miller's theory, we find that stocks subject to high differences of opinion and more binding short-sales constraints have a price run-up just prior to earnings announcements that is followed by an even larger decline after the announcements.     

International portfolio diversification is better than you think

Using aggregate data on bilateral cross-border equity holdings, we investigate whether investors correctly hedge their over-exposure to domestic risk (the well-known equity home bias) by investing in foreign stock markets that have low correlation with their home stock market. To deal with the endogeneity of stock return correlations, we instrument current correlations with past correlations. Controlling for many determinants of international portfolios, we find that, all else equal, investors do tilt their foreign holdings towards countries, which offer better diversification opportunities. The diversification motive that we uncover is stronger for source countries exhibiting a higher level of home bias.     

A dynamic model of active portfolio management with benchmark orientation

This paper studies optimal dynamic portfolios for investors concerned with the performance of their portfolios relative to a benchmark. Assuming that asset returns follow a multi-linear factor model similar to the structure of Ross (1976) [Ross, S., 1976. The arbitrage theory of the capital asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Theory, 13, 342–360] and that portfolio managers adopt a mean tracking error analysis similar to that of Roll (1992) [Roll, R., 1992. A mean/variance analysis of tracking error. Journal of Portfolio Management, 18, 13–22], we develop a dynamic model of active portfolio management maximizing risk adjusted excess return over a selected benchmark. Unlike the case of constant proportional portfolios for standard utility maximization, our optimal portfolio policy is state dependent, being a function of time to investment horizon, the return on the benchmark portfolio, and the return on the investment portfolio. We define a dynamic performance measure which relates portfolio’s return to its risk sensitivity. Abnormal returns at each point in time are quantified as the difference between the realized and the model-fitted returns. Risk sensitivity is estimated through a dynamic matching that minimizes the total fitted error of portfolio returns. For illustration, we analyze eight representative mutual funds in the U.S. market and show how this model can be used in practice.