Accelerated share repurchases

Accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) are credible commitments by firms to repurchase shares immediately. Including an ASR in a repurchase program reduces the flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in response to subsequent changes in the price and liquidity of its shares, unexpected shocks to cash flow and/or investment, etc. Thus, we investigate whether firms' decisions to include ASRs in their repurchase programs are associated with factors expected to influence the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of enhanced credibility and immediacy. We find robust evidence consistent with the costs of lost flexibility and the benefits of credibility and immediacy being important determinants of ASR adoption. Additionally, we find that ASR announcements are associated with positive average abnormal stock returns.     

Voluntary disclosures around share repurchases

Managers increase the frequency and magnitude of bad news announcements during the 1-month period prior to repurchasing shares. To a lesser extent, they also increase the frequency and magnitude of good news announcements during the 1-month period following their repurchases. These results are consistent with Barclay and Smith's [1988. Corporate payout policy: Cash dividends versus open-market repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics 22, 61–82.] conjecture that share repurchases, unlike dividends, create incentives for managers to manipulate information flows. We further show that managers provide downward-biased earnings forecasts before repurchases and that managers’ propensity to alter information flows prior to share repurchases increases with their ownership interest in the firm.     

Financial constraints and share repurchases

We examine how the financial constraints of repurchasing firms affect their post-buyback performance. By every constraint measure we use, a set of constrained firms repurchase. They display significantly poorer post-buyback abnormal return and operating performance than unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are more important in explaining the performance of share buybacks for firms with high actual repurchase ratios. Constrained firms, especially those with high actual repurchase ratios, experience a significantly greater increase in post-buyback distress risk than unconstrained firms. Managerial hubris could explain why constrained firms buy back shares even if the buybacks do not improve shareholder wealth.     

Long-run returns following open market share repurchases

Past studies find abnormal returns to buying after repurchase program announcements. We analyze the profitability of trading after both program announcements and individual repurchase trade publication using different trading strategies – market and limit orders. The analysis of trades is possible because of a unique Canadian data set. The highest abnormal returns are earned by companies on their own repurchase trades which benefits the non-tendering shareholders. For the public investor, we find no strategies that, in practice, would earn abnormal returns to buying after program announcements. However, there is qualified evidence of abnormal returns to a limit order strategy following publication of individual repurchase trades.     

Controlling shareholders and market timing in share issuance

We examine market timing in the equity issuance of firms controlled by large shareholders using a hand-collected data set of controlling shareholders' ownership stakes in Chile between 1990 and 2009. When a firm issues shares, the controlling shareholder can either maintain or change his ownership stake depending on how many of the new shares he subscribes. Issuance predicts poor future returns and is preceded by high returns, but only when the controlling shareholder's stake is significantly reduced. Consistent with market timing, the results are stronger in the absence of institutional investors and in hot issuance markets.     

Mimicking repurchases

We study the tendency of firms to mimic the repurchase announcements of their industry counterparts. We argue that a firm, by repurchasing its shares, sends a positive signal about itself and a negative one about its competitors. This induces the competing firms to mimic the behavior of the repurchasing firm by repurchasing themselves. Using a broad sample of US firms from the period 1984–2002, we show that, in concentrated industries, a repurchase announcement lowers the stock price of the other firms in the same industry. The other firms react by repurchasing themselves to undo these negative effects. Repurchases are chosen as a strategic reaction to other firms’ repurchase decisions and are not motivated by the desire to time the market, i.e., to take advantage of a significantly undervalued stock price. Therefore, repurchasing firms in more concentrated industries experience a lower increase in value in comparison with their counterparts in less concentrated industries in the post-announcement era. Alternative methodologies used to estimate long-term performance confirm that it is only the repurchasing firms in low concentration industries that outperform the market, their non-repurchasing peers, and their counterparts in more concentrated industries by amounts that are economically and statistically significant.     

Information disclosure,CEO overconfidence,and share buyback completion rates

An open market share buyback is not a firm commitment, and there is limited evidence on whether firms repurchase the intended shares. Unlike US studies, we use data from unique UK regulatory and disclosure environment that allows to accurately measure the share buyback completion rates. We show that information disclosure and CEO overconfidence are significant determinants of the share buyback completion rate. In addition, we find that large and widely held firms that conduct subsequent buyback programs and have a past buyback completion reputation exhibit higher completion rates. Finally, we assess whether other CEO characteristics affect buyback completion rates and find that firms with senior CEOs who hold external directorships and have a longer tenure as CEO are more likely to complete the buyback programs. In sum, our results suggest there is a clear relationship between information disclosure, CEO overconfidence, and buyback completion rates.     

Taxes,tenders and the design of Australian off‐market share repurchases

In designing off‐market (self‐tender offer) share repurchases, Australian companies must consider the resulting potential tax benefits for different investor groups with consequent effects upon the supply of stock tendered by holders and the ultimate tender outcome. We develop and estimate a model of the stock supply curve that demonstrates less than perfect elasticity and incomplete tax arbitrage arising from ‘participation risk’ for potential arbitrageurs. We are able to estimate the extent of disequilibrium in prices involved in fixed‐price repurchases and show that it is substantial. We show that Australian Tax Office restrictions on the tender price range for Dutch auctions have meant that non‐participating shareholders have foregone some potential benefits through the transfer of tax benefits to (primarily institutional, low tax rate) successful tender participants. The results provide support for legislative changes proposed in 2009 (but not implemented as of mid 2011), which removed constraints on the allowable range of repurchase prices.     

Cash holdings and share repurchases: International evidence

In this study, we examine the patterns and determinants of share repurchases using firm-level data from seven major countries—Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.—over the period 1998–2006. We find that while non-U.S. firms do not repurchase shares as much as U.S. firms do, both U.S. and non-U.S. firms display a common set of share repurchase behaviors. For example, across countries, firms use share repurchases as a flexible means of distributing cash. More importantly, large cash holdings are significantly associated with the amount of share repurchases in all countries. There is evidence that large cash holdings held by repurchasing firms represent excess cash. Firms tend to experience substantial increases in cash holdings prior to share repurchase as a result of reductions in capital expenditures. Overall, our evidence lends support to two hypotheses: (i) firms discharge excess capital to reduce agency conflicts and (ii) firms use repurchases to distribute temporary cash flows.     

Corporate financing decisions, managerial market timing, and real investment

Both market timing and investment-based theories of corporate financing predict under-performance after firms raise capital, but only market timing predicts that the composition of financing (equity compared with debt) should also forecast returns. In cross-sectional tests, we find that the amount of net financing is more important than its composition in explaining future stock returns. In the time series, investment-based factor models explain abnormal stock performance following a variety of corporate financing events that previous studies link to market timing. At the aggregate level, the amount of new financing is also more important for future market returns than its composition. Overall, our joint tests reveal that measures of real investment are correlated with future returns and measures of managerial market timing are not.     

The evolving relation between earnings,dividends, and stock repurchases

This paper examines how the relation between earnings and payout policy has evolved over the last three decades. Three principal groups of payers have emerged: firms that pay dividends and make regular repurchases, firms that make regular repurchases, and firms that make occasional repurchases. Firms that only pay dividends are largely extinct. Repurchases are increasingly used in place of dividends, even for firms that continue to pay dividends. While other factors help explain the timing of repurchases, the overall level of repurchases is fundamentally determined by earnings. The results suggest that repurchases are now the dominant form of payout.     

Uncertainty,market structure,and liquidity

In this study we show that market uncertainty [measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX)] exerts a large market-wide impact on liquidity, which gives rise to co-movements in individual asset liquidity. The effect of VIX on stock liquidity is greater than the combined effects of all other common determinants of stock liquidity. We show that the uncertainty elasticity of liquidity (UEL: percent change in liquidity given a 1% change in VIX) has increased around regulatory changes in the US markets that increased the role of public traders in liquidity provision, reduced the minimum allowable price variation, weakened the affirmative obligation of NASDAQ dealers, and abolished the specialist system on the NYSE.     

BOND MARKET REACTION TO STOCK REPURCHASES: IS THERE A WEALTH TRANSFER EFFECT?

We reexamine the bondholder wealth impact of stock repurchases with a focus on the wealth transfer effect. We do not detect any transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders surrounding open market stock repurchases. For the overall sample (1994–2002), using daily data we document a significant decrease in bond yields surrounding repurchase announcements. Subsamples classified by attributes that capture wealth transfer propensity also do not reveal evidence consistent with a wealth transfer effect. Correlation analysis between bond and stockholder wealth effects similarly is not supportive of a wealth transfer effect. Contrary to the wealth transfer hypothesis, we document a greater proportion of bond rating upgrades than downgrades in the three months following a repurchase announcement. Our results are robust to alternate bond price data and event return methodology.     

Bank liquidity,the maturity ladder,and regulation

We investigate the liquidity management of 62 Dutch banks between January 2004 and March 2010, when these banks were subject to a liquidity regulation that is very similar to Basel III’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). We find that most banks hold more liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, such as demand deposits, than strictly required under the regulation. More solvent banks hold fewer liquid assets against their stock of liquid liabilities, suggesting an interaction between capital and liquidity buffers. However, this interaction turns out to be weaker during a crisis. Although not required, some banks consider cash flows scheduled beyond 1 month ahead when setting liquidity asset holdings, but they seldom look further ahead than 1 year.     

Convertible bond arbitrage,liquidity externalities,and stock prices

In the context of convertible bond issuance, we examine the impact of arbitrage activity on underlying equity markets. In particular, we use changes in equity short interest following convertible bond issuance to identify convertible bond arbitrage activity and analyze its impact on stock market liquidity and prices for the period 1993 to 2006. There is considerable evidence of arbitrage-induced short selling resulting from issuance. Moreover, we find strong evidence that this activity is systematically related to liquidity improvements in the stock. These results are robust to controlling for the potential endogeneity of arbitrage activity.     

Managerial motivation and timing of open market share repurchases

There are two major mechanisms by which managers distribute cash to shareholders: through dividends and share repurchases. Historically, dividends have been the preferred method, but in recent years, share repurchases have become more popular, with more firms using repurchases than dividends to distribute cash. During the sample period of 2004–2006, 6.5 billion shares were repurchased for a total dollar volume amount of $222 billion. Using a unique dataset on actual monthly share repurchases, this paper investigates when and why managers repurchase shares in the open market. The paper finds evidence that firms which make repurchases are jointly timing their repurchases to perceived undervaluation and the presence of discretionary cash flow. In addition, the paper finds evidence which supports that (1) firms in competitive industries tend to repurchase less, (2) firms tend to substitute repurchases for anti-takeover provision adoption, and (3) firms attempt to manage earnings upward through the use of repurchases.     

The timing of financing decisions: An examination of the correlation in financing waves

Why do corporate financing events occur in waves? We challenge recent evidence of the importance of valuation cycles in driving financing waves by documenting that the aggregate pattern of stock repurchases mirrors that of equity issuance and mergers, despite repurchases involving an opposite transaction. We then show that trends in financing decisions result from differing responses to the same economic stimulus: growth in GDP. Specifically, economic expansion reduces the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt, inducing firms to issue equity, and increases cash flow and also causes varying degrees of uncertainty, increasing stock repurchases. We document similar trends and provide similar motivation for merger waves.     

Asset liquidity,corporate investment,and endogenous financing costs

We analyze how the liquidity of real and financial assets affects corporate investment. The trade-off between liquidation costs and underinvestment costs implies that low-liquidity firms exhibit negative investment sensitivities to liquid funds, whereas high-liquidity firms have positive sensitivities. If real assets are not divisible in liquidation, firms with high financial liquidity optimally avoid external financing and instead cut new investment. If real assets are divisible, firms use external financing, which implies a lower sensitivity. In addition, asset redeployability decreases the investment sensitivity. Our findings demonstrate that asset liquidity is an important determinant of corporate investment.     

Economic valuation of liquidity timing

This paper conducts a horse-race of different liquidity proxies using dynamic asset allocation strategies to evaluate the short-horizon predictive ability of liquidity on monthly stock returns. We assess the economic value of the out-of-sample power of empirical models based on different liquidity measures and find three key results: liquidity timing leads to tangible economic gains; a risk-averse investor will pay a high performance fee to switch from a dynamic portfolio strategy based on various liquidity measures to one that conditions on the Zeros measure (Lesmond et al., 1999); the Zeros measure outperforms other liquidity measures because of its robustness in extreme market conditions. These findings are stable over time and robust to controlling for existing market return predictors or considering risk-adjusted returns.     

Firm characteristics and long-run stock returns after corporate events

The well-documented abnormal long-run buy-and-hold returns to firms issuing equity in initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings, firms bidding in mergers, and firms initiating dividends can be attributed to imperfect control-firm matching. In addition to firm size and market-to-book ratio, event firms on average differ from control firms in terms of idiosyncratic volatility, liquidity, return momentum, and capital investment, each of which also explains returns. We propose a simple regression-based approach to control for differences in firm characteristics across event and control firms, and we show that long-run abnormal returns do not differ significantly from zero for event firms in the 1980 to 2005 period. The returns to event firms are, therefore, consistent with patterns known to exist for the broad stock market and do not require event-specific explanations.