Interaction of investor trades and market volatility: Evidence from the Tokyo Stock Exchange

This paper examines the relation between market volatility and investor trades by identifying who supplies and demands market liquidity on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Because the different trading patterns of various investor types such as individual investors, institutional investors, and foreign investors affect market liquidity differently, we find that market volatility fluctuates significantly depending on which investor types participate in trade. We show that market volatility increases by more than 50% from the average level when there are greater buy trades by momentum investors that demand liquidity and there are less sell trades by contrarian (or profit-taking) investors that supply liquidity. On the other hand, volatility dampens by more than 57% when there are greater sell trades by profit-taking investors, mostly by domestic investors, while there are less momentum buy trades.     

Do institutional investors play hide-and-sell in the IPO aftermarket?

We document a robust buy/sell asymmetry in the choice of the broker in the IPO aftermarket: institutions that sell IPO shares through non‑lead brokers tend to have bought them through the lead underwriters in the IPO aftermarket. This trading behavior is consistent with institutional investors hiding their sell trades and presumably breaking their laddering agreements with the lead underwriters. The asymmetry is the strongest in cold IPOs and is limited exclusively to the first month after the issue, when the incentives not to be detected are the strongest. We show that the intention to flip IPO allocations is not an important motive for hiding sell trades from the lead underwriters. We find that hiding sell trades is an effective strategy to circumvent underwriters' monitoring mechanisms: the more institutions hide their sell trades, the less they are penalized in subsequent IPO allocations.     

Are the Insider Trades of a Large Institutional Investor Informed?

We use a unique data set to consider whether a large institution's (Fidelity funds) insider trades are informed. Theoretical studies of large informed traders suggest that their information advantage could be greater for buy trades than sell trades, be short‐ or long‐lived, and be exploited by varying the pace of trade execution. Although there is evidence of each of these, Fidelity seems to be informed only for quickly executed buy trades. Other trades outperform a stock market index but not a four‐factor return model. This performance profile is consistent with Fidelity's fees, which depend on performance compared to an index.     

Firm specific and macro herding by professional and amateur investors and their effects on market volatility

We find a herding tendency among both amateur and professional investors and conclude that the propensity to herd is lower in the professionals. These results are obtained both when we consider herding into individual stocks and herding into stocks in general. Herding depends on the firm’s systematic risk and size, and the professionals are less sensitive to these variables. The differences between the amateurs and the professionals may be attributable to the latter’s superior financial training. Most of the results are consistent with the theory that herding is information-based. We also find that the herding behavior of the two groups is a persistent phenomenon, and that it is positively and significantly correlated with stock market returns’ volatility. Finally, herding, mainly by amateurs, causes market volatility in the Granger causality sense.     

Institutional herding and its price impact: Evidence from the corporate bond market

We examine the extent to which institutional investors herd in the U.S. corporate bond market and the price impact of their herding behavior. We find that the level of institutional herding in corporate bonds is substantially higher than what is documented for equities, and that sell herding is much stronger and more persistent than buy herding. The price impact of herding is also highly asymmetric. While buy herding facilitates price discovery, sell herding causes transitory yet large price distortions. Such price destabilizing effect of sell herding is particularly pronounced for speculative-grade, small, and illiquid bonds, and during the financial crisis.     

Do Domestic Investors Have an Edge? The Trading Experience of Foreign Investors in Korea

We investigate whether domestic investors have an edge overforeign investors in trading domestic stocks. Using Korean data,we show that foreign money managers pay more than domestic moneymanagers when they buy and receive less when they sell for mediumand large trades. The sample average daily trade-weighted disadvantageof foreign money managers is 21 basis points for purchases and16 basis points for sales. There is also some evidence thatdomestic individual investors have an edge over foreign investors.The explanation for these results is that prices move more againstforeign investors than against domestic investors before trades.     

The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Whose money is smart? Individual and institutional investors’ trades based on analyst recommendations

This study explores how institutional and individual investors respond to analyst recommendations. Using a unique account-level trading dataset taken from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we obtain direct evidence to show that (1) active institutional investors are significantly net buyers (net sellers) on “strong buy” and “buy” (“hold” and “sell”) recommendations; (2) active institutional investors condition their trades based on the buy-side pressure of analysts; (3) institutional investors earn abnormal returns by incorporating analysts’ buy-side pressure into their trading reactions to analyst recommendations; and (4) individual investors, in contrast, exhibit abnormal trade reactions opposite to those of active institutional investors. Our results are robust to alternative measures and different specifications. This study provides evidence that active institutional investors are more sophisticated processors of information and provides support for regulators’ concerns about the sub-optimal investment decisions made by individual investors who are unaware of the potential conflicts of interest analysts may face.     

Capacity constraints,investor information,and hedge fund returns

To identify capacity constraints in hedge funds and simultaneously gauge how well-informed hedge fund investors are, we need measures of investor demand that do not affect deployed hedge fund assets. Using new data on investor interest from a secondary market for hedge funds, this paper verifies the existence of capacity constraints in hedge funds. There is more mixed evidence on the information available to hedge fund investors. Buy and sell indications arrive following fund outperformance. While buy indications have little incremental power to predict hedge fund performance over and above well-known forecasting variables, sell indications do somewhat better.     

Ex-dividend day trading: Who,how, and why? : Evidence from the Finnish market

This study examines the ex-dividend day trading behavior of all investors in the Finnish stock market. Consistent with dynamic dividend clientele theories, investors with a preference for dividend income buy shares cum-dividend and sell ex-dividend; the reverse is true for investors with the opposite preference. Investors also engage in overnight arbitrage, earning on average a 2% overnight return on their invested capital. Trades at the investor-level reveal that idiosyncratic risk is an important determinant in the choice of stock for short-term ex-day trading. Furthermore, transaction costs and dividend yield jointly determine whether the volume of short-term trading activity is nonzero.     

The order flow of discount certificates and issuer pricing behavior

We analyze the order flow of discount certificates, its dependence on product age, and the implications for issuer pricing behavior. Based on a unique data set of exchange trades and issuer quotes, we find that for tax reasons investors prefer to buy products that mature in just over 1 year from the date of purchase. Furthermore, they tend to sell products back preferably close to maturity. These patterns in the trade direction allow us to separate the issuer pricing behavior from (i) the life cycle and (ii) the order flow. We find evidence that 7 out of 11 issuers anticipate the order flow and price in an additional margin in phases of positive expected net sales.     

Is the Aggregate Investor Reluctant to Realise Losses? Evidence from Taiwan

We ask whether the typical investor and the aggregate investor exhibit a bias known as the disposition effect, the tendency to sell investments that are held for a profit at a faster rate than investments held for a loss. We analyse all trading activity on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) for the five years ending in 1999. Using a dataset that contains all trades (over one billion) and the identity of every trader (nearly four million), we find that in aggregate, investors in Taiwan are about twice as likely to sell a stock if they are holding that stock for a gain rather than a loss. Eighty‐four percent of all Taiwanese investors sell winners at a faster rate than losers. Individuals, corporations, and dealers are reluctant to realise losses, while mutual funds and foreigners, who together account for less than 5% of all trades (by value), are not.     

Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider

Many theoretical papers suggest that large informed traders should make misleading or random trades to disguise their trading. Alternatively, informed traders may trade purely on their estimate of stock value. This paper examines the trading behavior of a large institutional insider that periodically trades in the wrong direction, i.e., makes occasional sell (buy) trades within packages of buy (sell) trades. Using a hand-collected data set, we find that three quarters of the trade packages include wrong-direction trades. Wrong trades appear to be used mostly to disguise right-direction trades. We find that the wrong-trade stocks are larger and have less noisy returns, hence, they lack natural disguise. Wrong trades are relatively small, used to accentuate return volatility, distributed evenly during a package of trades, and are not consistently profitable.     

The Weekend Effect: Trading Patterns of Individual and Institutional Investors

In this paper, we document regularities in trading patterns of individual and institutional investors related to the day of the week. We find a relative increase in trading activity by individuals on Mondays. In addition, there is a tendency for individuals to increase the number of sell transactions relative to buy transactions, which might explain at least part of the weekend effect.     

The flow-performance relationship around the world

We use a new dataset to study how mutual fund flows depend on past performance across 28 countries. We show that there are marked differences in the flow-performance relationship across countries, suggesting that US findings concerning its shape do not apply universally. We find that mutual fund investors sell losers more and buy winners less in more developed countries. This is because investors in more developed countries are more sophisticated and face lower costs of participating in the mutual fund industry. Higher country-level convexity is positively associated with higher levels of risk taking by fund managers.     

Rain or Shine: Where is the Weather Effect?

There is considerable empirical evidence that emotion influences decision‐making. In this paper, we use a database of individual investor accounts to examine the weather effects on traders. Our analysis of the trading activity in five major US cities over a six‐year period finds virtually no difference in individuals’ propensity to buy or sell equities on cloudy days as opposed to sunny days. If the association between cloud cover and stock returns documented for New York and other world cities is indeed caused by investor mood swings, our findings suggest that researchers should focus on the attitudes of market‐makers, news providers or other agents physically located in the city hosting the exchange. NYSE spreads widen on cloudy days. When we control for this, the weather effect becomes smaller and insignificant. We interpret this as evidence that the behaviour of market‐makers, rather than individual investors, may be responsible for the relation between returns and weather.     

Are investors consistent in their trading strategies? An examination of individual investor-level data

While it has been demonstrated that momentum or contrarian trading strategies can be profitable in a range of institutional settings, less evidence is available concerning the actual trading strategies investors adopt. Standard definitions of momentum or contrarian trading strategies imply that a given investor applies the same strategy to both their buy and sell trades, which need not be the case. Using investor-level, transaction-based data from China, where tax effects are neutral, we examine investors' buy-sell decisions separately to investigate how past returns impact differentially on the trading strategies investors adopt when buying and selling stock. After controlling for a wide range of stock characteristics, extreme price changes and portfolio value, a clear asymmetry in trading is observed; with investors displaying momentum behavior when buying stocks, but contrarian behavior when selling stocks. This asymmetry in behavior is not driven purely by reactions to stock characteristics or extreme stocks. We discuss behavioral and cultural explanations for our findings.     

Wealth Transfer Effects of Analysts' Misleading Behavior

We investigate a sample of 50 firm‐events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small‐size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large‐size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.     

The trading behavior of institutions and individuals in Chinese equity markets

This paper employs a unique data set to analyze the trading behavior of 4.74 million individual and institutional investors across Mainland China. Results show that groups of individual investors with varying trade values (as proxies for wealth levels) engage in different trading strategies. Chinese institutions are momentum investors, while less wealthy Chinese individual investors at large are contrarian investors. The results also indicate that a small group of wealthiest Chinese individuals tend to behave like institutions when they buy stocks, and behave like less wealthy individuals when they sell. Furthermore, only the trading activities of institutions and of wealthiest individuals can affect future stock volatility, but those of Chinese individual investors at large have no predictive power for future stock returns.