The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations

The use of the “principal–agent” model makes an implicit assumption about the existence of an underlying global optimum or “general will.” This assumption is debatable, and Besley does not defend it sufficiently or even seem to realize how strong an assumption it is. Still, it is standard in the literature, and Besley’s book is a very strong contribution to that literature. Its two greatest strengths are its solid microfoundations, and its use of the classical “comparative statics” approach to analyze dynamics.      

Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

Political entrepreneurs and electoral capital: the case of the Israeli State Economy Arrangement Law

This article looks at a specific institutional change in Israel. In 1985, Israeli politicians adopted the “State Economy Arrangement Law” (SEAL), commonly regarded as part of the budgetary legislation in Israel. This law became an alternative channel through which applicants could circumvent the necessity of applying to the Israeli parliament (the Knesset) for the implementation of certain policies. This law enabled an accelerated, flexible regulatory process that short circuited democratic discussion in the Knesset and obviated the intervention of Israeli consumer organizations. This article suggests that this institutional change should be analyzed as part of a process where institutional reality influences individual and collective beliefs, thus triggering an individual and collective learning process that eventually leads to institutional change, specific policies and outcomes in terms of economic performance. The article also claims that the SEAL legislation is an equilibrium that results from the actions of political entrepreneurs (or agents of change) who operate to maximize their own electoral capital against the backdrop of certain structural and cultural conditions, both local and international. They operate in an environment characterized by the inability of the government to function effectively (non-governability) and the development of an alternative political culture.

Of Carts and Horses: Regulation and Privatization in Telecommunications Reforms

In the early 1990s, many advocated quick privatization of state‐owned monopolies in developing countries, assuming that market institutions would develop once firms were privately owned. More recent thinking emphasizes establishing institutions conducive to promoting competition before privatization. To date little empirical work has informed the debate. This paper addresses this gap by testing whether establishing a regulatory authority prior to privatizing incumbent telecommunications firms matters. I find that countries that established regulatory authorities prior to privatization saw increased telecom investment and telephone penetration compared to countries that did not. Moreover, investors paid more for telecom firms in countries that established a regulator prior to privatization.     

Growth,inequality, and poverty reduction in developing countries: Recent global evidence

The study presents comparative global evidence on the transformation of economic growth to poverty reduction in developing countries, with emphasis on the role of income inequality. The focus is on the period since the early-mid-1990s when growth in these countries as a group has been relatively strong, surpassing that of the advanced economies. Both regional and country-specific data are analyzed for the $1.25 and $2.50-level poverty headcount ratios using World Bank Povcalnet data. The study finds that on average income growth has been the major driving force behind both the declines and increases in poverty. The study, however, documents substantial regional and country differences that are masked by this ‘average’ dominant-growth story. While in the majority of countries, growth was the major factor behind falling or increasing poverty, inequality, nevertheless, played the crucial role in poverty behavior in a large number of countries. And, even in those countries where growth has been the main driver of poverty-reduction, further progress could have occurred under relatively favorable income distribution. For more efficient policymaking, therefore, idiosyncratic attributes of countries should be emphasized. In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth. It would seem judicious, therefore, to accord special attention to reducing inequality in certain countries where income distribution is especially unfavorable. Unfortunately, the present study also points to the limited effects of growth and inequality-reducing policies in low-income countries.     

Commentary. Stuck in low GEAR? Macroeconomic policy in South Africa, 1996-98

Despite its ideology while in opposition, once in power theANC government implemented an orthodox macroeconomic policywhich stressed deficit reduction and a tight monetary policy,combined with trade liberalisation. The stated purpose of thispackage (the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution programme,or GEAR) was to increase economic growth, with a 4.2% rate programmedfor 1996-2000. At mid-term of the programme, growth remainedfar below this target. The GEAR's lack of success cannot beexplained by unfavourable external factors; rather, the disappointingperformance seemed the result of fiscal contraction and excessivelyhigh interest rates.     

Finance and politics: the wealth effects of special interest group influence during the nationalisation and privatisation of Conrail

Conrail, nationalised in 1976 and privatised in 1987, was themost significant nationalisation and privatisation by the USgovernment in recent years. It was created from six bankruptrailroads under the pressure of interest groups, formed by customers,existing claimants, employees and related companies. We documentthe gains and losses to these special interest groups at keypoints in the nationalised and privatised time periods. Overthis period, the US government had outlays of $6.59 billion,and cash inflow of $6.15 billion, and internal return of –6.4%.The paper provides evidence that a state-owned firm with goodgovernance could deliver superior performance.     

The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration

The paper formulates hypotheses and reports on individual attitudes towards immigration based on data for 24 countries on socioeconomic position, sociodemographic characteristics and political attitudes. The results are consistent with the predictions of factor proportions trade theory, but also suggest that a range of other economic and cultural factors influence attitudes towards immigration.     

The twilight of the setter? Public school budgets in a time of institutional change

We use a policy change that occurred in Oregon in the late 1980s to re‐visit the budget‐maximizing agenda setter theory of local public expenditure. Prior to 1987, Oregon school districts held operating levy elections with an exogenous, often zero or very low, spending reversion. From 1987 through 1990, districts experienced a “safety net” regime where the reversion was at least the previous year's nominal spending. We find that the “safety net” sharply limited the agenda setter's ability to use the reversion as a threat to obtain voter approval of relatively large expenditures.     

Corruption and public finance: an IMF perspective

Public finance should be a means whereby governments in low-income countries are able to increase economic growth and end poverty. Corruption, however, reduces tax revenue and makes public expenditure policies ineffective for achieving social objectives. The papers in this volume, which is sponsored by the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), describe how corruption makes public finance ineffective in promoting economic development.     

Did public wage premiums fuel agglomeration in LDCs?

This paper develops the idea that wage premium jobs cause nearby agglomeration. We show that spatial mobility costs enable wage premiums to cause agglomeration, whereas previous studies crucially assume that wage premium jobs are allocated to favor nearby residents (Harris–Todaro (H–T)). This extends the idea to LDCs, such as Egypt, Ethiopia and Kenya, which have had centralized job allocation mechanisms that do not give a search advantage to locating near public jobs. We show that high public jobs' growth in Egypt has altered regional mobility and population shares in a way that is consistent with agglomeration due to wage premiums and mobility frictions.     

Environmental policy, fuel prices and the switching to natural gas in Santiago, Chile

In this study I analyzed the role of environmental policies and energy cost savings on the pattern of switching to natural gas by stationary sources in Chile. According to the data most of the switching was induced by the lower cost of natural gas, although environmental policies played a small role and showed that sources were more sensitive to the cost of energy than to the environmental regulation.     

Clientelism and aid

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyze the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider politicians with mixed motives: they are interested in promoting social welfare but also value the benefit of holding office. We label as clientelistic the politician who most values the benefit of being in power. We find that the impact of aid on the political equilibrium and therefore on the quality of policy in the recipient country (using utilitarian social welfare as a benchmark) ultimately depends on the value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. When elasticity is low, the expected policy outcome gets further away from the socially desirable policy set. This substitution of policy quality for aid can help to explain the poor performance of aid in improving policy. Perhaps more surprising is the opposite case, which arises for high values of elasticity of marginal utility: an increase in aid tilts the equilibrium policy towards the welfare-maximizing policy set.     

Valuing cultural heritage in developing countries: comparing and pooling contingent valuation and choice modelling estimates

A substantial part of the United Nation’s World Heritage Sites (WHSs) can be found in developing countries, but many of them are in a bad state. Thus, there is a need to document the social benefits of these global goods in order to justify the costs of restoration and preservation programmes (RPPs). This study adds to the scarce literature on economic benefits of WHSs in developing countries, and reduces the need to perform very uncertain benefit transfers from European or US valuation studies. We apply Contingent Valuation (CV) and Choice Modelling (CM) to estimate the social benefits of RPPs for the My Son world cultural heritage site in Vietnam; both to foreign visitors and the local residents. We then compare the estimates from the CV and CM methods, and pool the results from the two methods. The results show that both CV and CM are suited to estimating the economic benefits of preserving cultural heritage of My Son. The two methods produce very similar results, which can be interpreted as a test of convergence validity. The pooling results give evidence to show that the CV and CM models have the same underlying preference structures. Thus, these valuation models can be successfully used in cost-benefit analyses to assess the benefits to cultural heritage of measures to reduce air pollution, soil erosion, climate change and other causes to deterioration of cultural heritage sites.

遵循公共财政原则:事业单位改革的基本思路

本文从公共财政的角度论述了事业单位改革的必然性，以及运作中应遵循的原则。指出，改革目标是建立一个能够与市场经济体制相适应的精简高效、结构合理的现代事业组织体制，并提出了与此配套的财税措施。     

积极创新财税制度推动河南产业升级

入世以后，以农业和加工业为主的传统的河南经济结构模式，严重制约着河南经济的发展速度。调整产业结构，促进产业升级，是加快河南经济发展步伐的必要途径。这放要求创新现行的财税制度，采取一系列相关的优惠政策，如财政担保、政府购买等，加大对高新技术产业的投入力度，推动河南的产业升级。