Now or later? The political economy of public investment in democracies

This paper explores the impact of elections on public investment. Working with a sample of 67 presidential and parliamentary democracies between 1975 and 2012, we find that the growth rate of nominal public investment is higher at the beginning of electoral cycles and decelerates thereafter. The peak in public investment growth occurs 28 months before elections, and each month closer to the next election the growth rate of public investment declines by 0.7 percentage points. Other political variables, such as cabinet ideology and government fragmentation have less influence on short-term public investment dynamics. Fiscal rules and stronger institutions seem to attenuate the impact of elections on investment, but available information is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. These results are robust to a number of controls, including for fixed elections.     

Political uncertainty and labour investment efficiency

ABSTRACT

We examine the impact of political uncertainty on the labour investment efficiency (LIE) of a firm. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we test the market discipline and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Our findings suggest that political uncertainty adversely affects LIE. The results are consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. That is, firms hire more labour in a period of increased information asymmetry due to the political uncertainty, which deteriorates LIE. Our findings are robust to a battery of alternative measures of LIE and estimation methods. We conduct several additional analyses and document that the adverse impact of political uncertainty is stronger when the newly appointed government official is older, the firm is state-owned, the firm belongs to a politically sensitive industry or the firm operates in locations with stringent labour protection. By contrast, when the firm locates in a region with weak Chinese government intervention or after President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, the adverse impact of political uncertainty on LIE is less pronounced. Last, we document that after hiring more labour, firms receive tangible and intangible benefits in terms of receiving more loans, collect more government subsidies, and able to re-establish some political connection but at the cost of lower performance.     

政治关联断损、研发投入与企业创新效率

政治关联断损现象逐渐引起学者重视，但少有研究涉及政治关联断损对企业创新的影响。基于中组部“18号文”导致上市公司大量官员独立董事强制辞职事件，通过使用双重差分模型对2012-2016年沪深A股上市公司相关数据进行实证研究发现，官员独立董事辞职造成的政治关联断损能够显著促进企业增加研发投资，虽然对提高企业创新效率无显著影响，却能够增强研发投资对创新效率的正向影响。政治关联断损层级与企业研发投资间具有显著负向关系，虽然对创新效率无显著影响，却对研发投资与创新效率间关系起显著负向调节作用。政治关联断损和断损层级对企业研发人员投入强度无显著影响，也不能显著调节研发人员投入强度与创新效率间的关系。     

政治关联、制度环境与家族企业创新绩效

基于社会情感财富理论,以2012-2015年中国A股上市家族企业为研究样本,从研发投入与研发产出两个方面实证检验政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的影响,以及制度环境对该影响关系的调节作用。实证结果表明,无论是从研发投入还是研发产出看,政治关联都与家族企业创新绩效显著负相关,而好的制度环境则会削弱政治关联对家族企业创新绩效的抑制作用。家族企业应该权衡社会情感财富损益及政治关联得失而避免企业战略短期导向,政府则应为家族企业创新及其绩效提升营造良好的金融、法制、经营等制度环境,减少政治寻租空间。     

政策不确定性如何影响企业绩效——一项基于Meta分析的检验

企业发展与宏观政策环境密不可分,关于政策不确定性与企业绩效的关系仍有诸多未解之惑。根据企业绩效的具体内容将其细分为企业经营绩效、创新绩效以及投资绩效,采用Meta分析方法,揭示政策不确定性对企业绩效3个方面的不同影响,并分析二者关系的调节因素。结果发现：政策不确定性能够抑制企业经营绩效和投资绩效,但能够显著提升企业创新绩效。由于存在企业性质、企业规模、市场化程度和政治关联等调节因素差异,导致政策不确定性与企业绩效关系研究存在分歧。结论能够为政策不确定性环境下企业创新发展战略实施提供借鉴,并为地方政府官员更替、公共政策制定等提供参考。     

Political uncertainty and corporate debt financing: empirical evidence from China

We examine the influence of political uncertainty on corporate debt financing under the Chinese highly specialized political system. A new reasonable and effective alternative indicator, official turnover reason, is constructed to measure different political uncertainty level. Robust results suggest that listed companies will keep low debt financing level and smooth debt financing volatility under political uncertainty, which will be weakened during the global financial crisis. We also find that the listed company will raise equity financing level while overall financing is significantly reduced. In addition, SOEs are more sensitive to political uncertainty than non-SOEs, as they have stronger political connections with government officials.     

Impact of economic uncertainty in a small open economy: the case of Chile

We construct the first news-based economic uncertainty index for Chile, which allowed us to rebuild 23 years of the history of economic uncertainty in the country and quantify its impact on the economy. We find that an increase in economic uncertainty conveys a fall in GDP, investment, and employment, even after accounting for the small open economy nature of Chile. In contrast to previous studies for big and developed economies, we do not find evidence of an overshooting effect when uncertainty dissipates; therefore, increases in economic uncertainty have negative effects on the economy, even in the long-run. Our estimates suggest that these impacts range from 10% to 20% for aggregate investment, 2.5% to 5% for GDP, and 1.3% to 4.2% for employment. Extensions suggest that economic uncertainty affects both mining and non-mining investment, with the former showing a more pronounced decline. We also find that the bulk of effect of economic uncertainty on aggregate investment is via private investment, with some short-run impacts on public investment. Moreover, compared to the GDP response, aggregate consumption responds in almost the same way to an economic uncertainty shock.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

外部资源、技术决策偏好与政治关联企业研发投资

在政治关联—外部资源—研发投资作用机制中融入技术决策偏好的调节效用,采用2012-2015年创业板非金融保险类上市公司数据,通过结构方程模型（SEM）,探究上述4个变量间关系及其理论模型。结果发现,在控制企业部分特征的影响后,政治关联对企业研发投资具有消极作用,但是引入外部资源会对该消极作用起到遮掩效用,而高管技术决策偏好能够反向调节政治关联对研发投资的消极作用,并且外部资源的遮掩效用与技术决策的调节效用互不干涉,进而揭示出政治关联影响企业研发投资的理论机制。     

Political institutions and economic volatility

We examine the effect of political ‘institutions’ on economic growth volatility, using data from more than 100 countries over the period 1960 to 2005, taking into account various control variables as suggested in previous studies. Our indicator of volatility is the relative standard deviation of the growth rate of GDP per capita. The results of a dynamic panel model indicate that democracy reduces economic volatility. We also find that some dimensions of political instability and policy uncertainty increase economic volatility.     

‘Adaptive accumulation’ and US political economy

According to popular and academic understandings of political economy, the United States is characterised by the most open forms of free market production. From Marxist to institutionalist to liberal analyses, the US is said to exhibits a governance model in which state structures are minimally intrusive to capitalist civil society. There is a need for political economy that re-positions the US state as more than just a willing facilitator, lender-of-last-resort or minimal regulator of capitalist dynamics. This paper argues that ‘adaptive accumulation’ has normalised in the US context, wherein capital actively allies itself with public state objectives (and mechanisms) to seek new or enhanced profit streams, by transforming or rerouting public revenues, such that they afford private accumulation. The robust entry of capital in areas such as health, education and incarceration are highly notable, inasmuch as they harness public objectives for private but not-so-competitive ends. By shedding light on such domains, the paper contributes to our understanding of capital and its ongoing efforts to stay ahead of investment crises by actively shaping its operative environment – in this case, maintaining both the credibility and regularity of publicly inspired (and often financed) revenue streams while, ultimately, transforming their utilisation and purpose.     

Education policy and inequality: A political economy approach

Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is.     

Effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints: new evidence from privatization in China

Taking advantage of the SOEs privatization events in China, our research looks to identify the causal effect of political connections on corporate financial constraints. In a difference-in-differences framework, we demonstrate that after the transfer of control from state to private owners, privatized SOEs hoard more cash, save more cash from incremental cash flow, and exhibit higher cash flow sensitivity of investment.     

论政府供给偏好的短期决定:政治均衡与经济效率

本文以财政支出为主体,研究了我国政府供给偏好(规模与结构)短期决定问题。政治均衡而非经济市场均衡是理解这一问题的关键。在“有管理的竞争性政治市场”和政府追求政治支持最大化等假定下,我们考察了政治均衡决定政府供给偏好的过程及其效率属性,以及“政治价格”在两级“政治市场”上的形成机制。结论表明:政治均衡决定资源配置固有的低效率属性,因政府供给范围的“越位”和“缺位”而加剧。当前改革的重点应是推动经济市场化转轨的完成和公共财政的转型,而非完全的民主化。权威因素对“政治价格”的管理在利益分化严重的当前形势下具有建设性作用。推动渐进民主化,完善权力对等的“二级政治市场”则是长远之策。     

The influence of political fragmentation on public enterprises: Evidence from German municipalities

This study investigates the influence of politically fragmented municipal councils on the investment behaviour of municipally owned public enterprises. We argue that common public choice theories can also be applied to public enterprises. For our observation period (2002–2014), we use a data set encompassing 8,685 municipally owned enterprises subject to commercial accounting located in 3,237 municipalities drawn from all 13 German federal area states. On average, our results point to a negative effect of fragmentation on investment per capita, supporting a war of attrition or veto player approach. Effects are heterogeneous among different sectors, possibly due to higher visibility to voters. Thus, veto players might actively try to block prestigious and publicly perceivable investment projects to hinder their opponents. Political budget cycles additionally influence this effect for some sectors. However, testing non-linearities reveal that the common-pool hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out.     

A MODEL OF AN OPPORTUNISTIC-PARTISAN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLE

According to political business cycle theory, separate opportunistic and partisan approaches exist. It is obvious, as seen from theoretical and empirical points of view, that politicians aim for both opportunistic as well as partisan goals. This paper presents a model of a pre‐election political business cycle that manifests an indication of competence and a post‐election political business cycle that occurs because of the uncertainty of an election's winner monetary policy. In the pre‐election period competent governments expand the economy. The post‐election cycle depends on whether a leftist or a conservative government is in power in the pre‐election period, and if they are re‐elected or not.     

Political Business Cycles,Elections and Entrepreneurial Finance: A Framework

Political processes affect the real economy. An important channel through which politics affects economics is uncertainty. It has been observed that political uncertainty is high around national elections and negatively affects corporate investments and foreign capital inflows. If national elections affect corporations and foreign investors, we should expect them to also affect entrepreneurial finance provided by investors like venture capitalists (VCs). To add to that, in a complex federal democracy, state level politics is a significant source of political uncertainty. This is the first paper to examine the impact of national and state elections on entrepreneurial finance and provides a framework of VC investment behavior in the face of political uncertainty. We find that VC investments decrease significantly due to political uncertainty around national and state elections. VCs respond strongly to national elections by decreasing the total investment value and the number of deals in election years. However, they give a softer response to regional political uncertainty around state elections by decreasing only the average deal size. The findings have important implications for governments, regulators and policymakers, and open up an opportunity to examine a variety of new questions which can provide a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the impact of elections on VC investments.

     

风险投资对企业研发投入的影响

如何有效发挥风险投资对企业研发投入的促进作用,是当前研究的热点。以2010-2017年北京上市公司为实证样本,发现风险投资对研发投入的影响在面板数据中不显著,但在截面数据中正向显著。在截面回归中引入年度虚拟变量或行业虚拟变量后,发现面板数据中的行业异质性是导致风险投资对研发投入影响不显著的重要原因。为此,对样本数大于30的12个行业进行实证检验,结果显示风险投资对制造业、计算机通信及其它电子设备制造业等3个行业研发投入的影响为正,而对租赁和商务服务业等2个行业研发投入的影响为负,该结论在引入正向影响虚拟变量D1和负向影响虚拟变量D2的回归中仍然成立。进一步分析发现,政治关联在风险投资对企业研发投入的影响中具有反向调节作用。最后,根据研究结论提出政策建议。     

媒体治理、政治关联与研发投资

以深圳证券交易市场2009-2013年创业板上市公司为样本，检验了媒体治理、政治关联与研发投资之间的关系。实证分析结果显示，媒体治理作用越强，公司的研发投资就越多。这表明，媒体能够有效发挥监督治理作用，促进公司创新。进一步分析显示，政治关联对媒体治理与研发投资之间的关系具有明显的反向调节作用。这意味着，政治关联抑制了媒体的治理作用。     

Bankruptcy costs,economic policy uncertainty,and FDI entry and exit

In this paper, we examine how the effect of economic policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and exit varies with the cost of bankruptcy resolution. Using a sample of bilateral FDI entry and exit for 23 countries and areas from 2004 to 2012, we find that an increase in bankruptcy costs in a country exacerbates the dampening effect of economic policy uncertainty on both FDI entry and exit. Subsample analysis reveals that the bankruptcy resolution channel only exists in high political risk countries. We also find that the bankruptcy resolution channel does not exist for foreign portfolio investment, which is consistent with real option theory. Broadly put, our contribution is at the nexus of institutional theory and FDI, as we identify the bankruptcy resolution channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects FDI entry and exit.