A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

Migration Policy in a Small Open Economy with a Dual Labor Market

The paper uses a two–sector efficiency–wage model to analyze the consequences of immigration for a small open economy with a dual labor market. Immigrants are characterized by an (exogenous) return probability. Legal regulations impose preferential hiring of natives or "old" immigrants. As a result, there is sectoral segregation between natives and immigrants, leading to discrimination of the type equal pay for equal work,but unequal "work." In the short run (with sector–specific capital), immigration has a positive first–order impact on natives' welfare if migration policy favors segregation through high return rates or restrictive hiring practices ("guest–worker system"). In the long run, its effect is only determined by factor intensities (2 ¥ 2 model). Finally, the improved integration of migrants yields efficiency gains and improves aggregate welfare of all residents.     

Fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a professional sports league

Motivated by aspects of European soccer club governance (members' clubs supporters' trusts), a first formal analysis of fan welfare maximization as a club objective in a sports league is provided, with comparisons to objectives studied previously (profit and win maximization). Positive comparisons focus on team qualities, ticket prices, attendances and the impact of capacity crowds; empirically observed ticket black markets and inelastic pricing are consistent only with fan welfare maximization. Normatively, social welfare (aggregate league surplus) is well-served by a league of fan welfare maximizers, or sometimes win maximizers, but not profit maximizers; leagues should not normally make profits.     

Commitment to a strategy of uniform pricing in a two-period duopoly with switching costs

This paper studies decisions by firms of whether to attempt “behavior-based” price discrimination in markets with switching costs by using a two-period duopoly model. When both firms commit themselves to a pricing policy and consumers are “sophisticated” and have rational expectations, there is a dominant strategy equilibrium with both firms engaging in uniform pricing. Both firms are better off in the uniform pricing equilibrium, compared with the discriminatory equilibrium.      

Divorce as a risky prospect

In 1910, the divorce rate per 1000 members of the US population stood at 0.9. ^{1 1}Histroical divorce rates can be found in the Statistical Abstract for the US (1981). . This rate showed a slow upward trend for the next 50 years, and by 1960 had more than doubled to 2.2. It took only 20 years for the rate to more than double again so that by 1980, the rate was 5.3. For the last 20 years, the marriage rate, by contrast, has experienced mild fluctuations between 10.0 and 11.0 per 1000 in the population with no discernible trend. If the same pattern for both rates holds until the year 2000, the annual number of divorces will exceed the annual number of marriages.

Although sociologists have researched divorce extensively, only a few economic studies exist. This is unfortunate since divorce is likely to have considerable impact on economic vaiables such as hours of work, labour force participation, human capital accumulation, work performance and earnings. ^{2 2}For a recent study of hours at work and labour supply, see Green and Quester (1982); for studies on earnings and work performance, see Santos (1975) or Hoffman and Holmes (1976). King (1982) argues that couples anticipating divorce will individually invest more heavily in human capital since the costs of any current investment are at least partially absorbed by the spouse. Without denying the influences of peer groups, social norms and role models, it seems reasonable to suggest that pecuniary considerations may also help to explain divorce.

A search through the economics literature uncovered only two studies of the determinants as opposed to the implications of divorce: one by Orcutt, Caldwell and Wertheimer (1976) and another by Becker, Landes and Michael (BLM) (1977). The study by BLM is by far the most widely cited of the two. The authors of both studies argue that the current state of marriage is the primary determinant of divorce. BLM, for example, assert that ‘the probability of divorce is smaller the greater the expected gain from marriage, and the smaller the variance of the distribution of unanticipated gains from marriage’. BLM, in other words, view marriage as a risky investment with a distribution of returns. The alternative is divorce which, by implication in BLM, involves a certain return.

The first contribution of this study is to draw the implications for an alternative view in which the investment in marraige is certain, but the investment in divorce is risky.

The second contribution lies in presenting formal expected utility-maximizing models of an individual and/or a couple contemplating divorce which can be tested empirically. The thrid contribution is the method developed to test the predictions of the models.

The paper of follows a simple format. Section I presents the models. Section II provides an explanation of the data used in the empirical tests. Methodology and results are presented in sections III and IV. Caveats are observed in section V. The final section closed with a summary of the arguments and evidence.     

On a probabilistic model of forecasting

One of the methods of studying complex objects is the construction of a mathematical model, containing such information about the object that is necessary to solve a definite problem connected with it.Mathematical modeling, based on the construction of models of various kinds can be used in forecasting. Let a forecasting object A(X) be described by vector X = (X₁, X₂,…,X_n) whose coordinates are parameters characterizing this object. The work presents a probabilistic model of forecasting and gives the example of a forecast of the object described by a set two parameters.     

The growth of knowledge: Testing a theory of scientific revolutions with a formal model

Modern theories of science emphasize scientific revolutions rather than the traditional cumulative view of scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn, in particular, has formulated a theory of science based on the lifecycle of paradigms. Though Kuhn's theory is attractive, no calculus is offered by which the theory can be tested. This study tests the dynamic consistency of Kuhn's theory by formalizing the theory and testing it with a computer simulation model. The model plays the roles of the actors, tracing out the consequences of their day-to-day actions. Sensitivity tests are used to explore the importance of various hypotheses. Results show the theory to be dynamically consistent: The lifecycle of paradigms described by Kuhn can be accounted for by Kuhn's theory. Kuhn's theory thus passes a test to which few other theories of science have been subjected. The study shows how modeling can provide a method for testing theories even when those theories are stated entirely in qualitative terms, at a high level of abstraction, and in a context divorced from explicit dynamic analysis.     

Computing a quasi-perfect equilibrium of a two-player game

Refining an algorithm due to Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel, we show how to apply Lemke’s algorithm for solving linear complementarity programs to compute a quasi-perfect equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player extensive-form game of perfect recall. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is known to be sequential, and our algorithm thus resolves a conjecture of McKelvey and McLennan in the positive. A quasi-perfect equilibrium is also known to be normal-form perfect and our algorithm thus provides an alternative to an algorithm by von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman. For the case of a zero-sum game, we devise variants of the algorithm that rely on linear programming rather than linear complementarity programming and use the simplex algorithm or other algorithms for linear programming rather than Lemke’s algorithm. We argue that these latter algorithms are relevant for recent applications of equilibrium computation to artificial intelligence.     

Decentralized Management of a Fishery

We construct an economic mechanism to realize in Nash equilibrium an optimal consumption time path of a natural resource. For exposition convenience, the analysis is conducted within the model initiated by Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:322–334, 1980). This framework allows us to explicitely compute the consumption time paths of the resource, associated with an open-access regime, with a cooperative management and with a (stationary Markovian) Nash equilibrium of the difference game induced by the proposed mechanism.     

Tax evasion with a conscience

How do moral concerns affect fraud and detection, for example, tax compliance and the need for audits? We propose answers by exploring a psychological $2\times 1\times 2\times 1$ inspection game which incorporates belief-dependent guilt, unawareness, and third-party audience effects. Novel conclusions are drawn regarding whose behavior is affected by moral concerns (it's the inspector's more than the inspectee's) as well as the policy issue whether to allow the use of a principle of public access whereby tax returns are made public information.     

Economies with a two-sector representation

Summary In both theoretical and empirical research it is a common practice to partition the economy into (at least) two sectors in order to conduct partial-equilibrium analysis. One merely hopes that general-equilibrium consequences will not obviate all of the analysis of the sector or market in question. In this paper we consider market demand functions which have a two-sector representation. In such economies the aggregate compensated demands in any one sector depend only on prices in that sector, the vector of utilities, and a scalar aggregate which in turn may depend upon everything. In particular, prices in the other sector appear only through this aggregate. In a single-consumer economy this division into two sectors carries with it no further implications. However, when there are three or more consumers, economies with a two-sector representation, which may contain public as well as private goods, must fall into a small number of broad classes which are quite restrictive. This means that the two-sector assumption is far less innocuous than one might have previously believed and that there are some phenomena which simply cannot be investigated in this framework.This research has been supported by the SSHRCC with a research grant and by leave fellowships to all three authors for the year 1984–85. Since then all three authors have been in part supported by various SSHRCC grants. In 1989–90 Blackorby was also partly supported by a Senior Killam Fellowship. The first version was written while all three of us were at CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, 1984–85. Later versions were written at the University of British Columbia (Blackorby and Schworm), the University of Western Ontario (Schworm), Université Libre de Bruxelles (Davidson), Queen's University (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille II (Davidson), Université d'Aix-Marseille III (Blackorby) and finally GREQE-EHESS (Blackorby and Davidson). We thank all of them for their support. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 1986 Canadian Economic Theory Meetings, the Nuffield Conference on Measurement and Modelling in Economics-May, 1987, the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, the Université de Montréal, University of Saskatchewan, and the University of California at Riverside. We have benefited from the comments of the participants in these seminars, and from those of two anonymous referees.     

Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory. Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997     

Some unfamiliar dynamics of a familiar macro model a note

The idea that for small disturbances the full employment equilibrium is stable while for large disturbances it is unstable was coined by Leijonhufvud in the notion of a corridor. We discuss the existence of a corridor in the standard Keynesian-monetarist textbook macro-model. It turns out that though the full employment steady state of this model may be locally stable — which is the case when the well-known Cagan condition holds — the model is never globally stable. This is due to the inherent non-linearity in the demand for money function, arising from non-negativity of the nominal rate of interest. Thus, perhaps surprisingly, the Cagan condition is both necessary and sufficient for the existence of a corridor in the Keynesian-monetarist model.This note is adapted from a paper presented at the European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Bologna, August 1988. I would like to thank Søren Bo Nielsen and Peter Birch Sørensen (Copenhagen Business School), Thomas Lux (University of Bamberg), and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors and shortcomings are mine.     

CO2-Stabilization May Be a 'No-Regrets' Policy

Restricting CO₂ emissions requires changing today's consumption pattern away from energy and emission intensive commodities towards cleaner goods. The cost of stabilizing CO₂ emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000, say, as compared to a business-as-usual trend, is estimated by several researchers to be on the order of 1% of GNP. We will argue that the cost may be overestimated because of a too simple model describing the working of the economic system and the evaluation of welfare. We demonstrate that by expanding a model to include the actual tax system and negative externalities, the cost to present generations from restricting emissions by a CO₂ tax may be negative. That is, some reduction may actually correspond to a 'no-regrets' policy. The reasons are inefficiencies in today's tax system and non-optimal handling of negative externalities. Our analysis suggests that a CO₂ tax and reduced emissions will lessen such inefficiencies.     

Optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform with a one-sided congestion effect

This paper studies the optimal pricing of a two-sided monopoly platform when one side is affected by congestion. We show that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy (or skewed pricing) depends not only on the relative magnitude of the sides’ price elasticities of demand but it also depends on the marginal congestion cost that an agent imposes on the others. Compared with the no-congestion case, this pricing strategy gives rise to some interesting features that violate the results of Rochet and Tirole (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003, Rand J Econ 37:645–667 in 2006). In the case of equal price elasticities of demand, the no-congested side is charged the highest price. On the other hand, in the case of different price elasticities, the platform congestion pricing depends on a certain threshold of the marginal congestion cost. We show, under some conditions, that the divide-and-conquer pricing strategy is reversed. In the social context, the Rochet and Tirole’s (J Eur Econ Assoc 1:990–1029 in 2003) cost allocation condition is modified by the congestion cost. We show that the congestion does not only affect the buyers’ contribution to the sellers’ surplus, but it also affects the sellers’ contribution to the buyers’.     

Passive learning: a critique by example

In models of learning by experimentation that exhibit signal dependence, a benchmark using a passive learner has been proposed. The use of this benchmark is flawed – first, passive learning does not disentangle the effects of knowing that beliefs, as well as other state variables, might change, and we address this issue directly by introducing a naïve learner. Secondly, and more tellingly, passive learning does not do what it is supposed to do, namely help measure the gains from active experimentation; the naïve learner enables us to illustrate this point in the context of a particular example.     

Microfinance at a Crossroads

In this essay, we summarize the main features of Yunus' economic thought and discuss whether it is possible to conclude, as seems straightforward according to Yunus (1997) , that microfinance is good for the poor and that it exemplifies a typical activity of social enterprise. To do this, we review some of the contents of the 2006 World Bank/Brookings Institution conference on microfinance as summarized by Barr et al. (2007) .     

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. The core lower bounds require that no coalition should get less than the welfare it could achieve by using the water it controls. The aspiration upper bounds demand that no coalition enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. Exactly one welfare distribution satisfies the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds: it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D62, C71.     

Optimal Controls for a Large Insurance Under a CEV Model: Based on the Legendre Transform-Dual Method

The purpose of this paper is to consider the optimal proportional reinsurance and investment strategies for an insurance company. The insurer’s surplus process is approximated by a Brownian motion with drift. The insurance company can purchase proportional reinsurance and invest the surplus in a financial market which includes one risk-free asset and one risky asset whose price is modeled by a CEV model. The primary problem is changed to the dual problem by implying Legendre transform. When the objective of the insurance company is to maximize the expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth, the closed-form expressions for the optimal reinsurance-investment policy which is different to the Merton case to the primal optimal problem are obtained and numerical simulations are provided to demonstrate our results. Moreover, we find an interesting result that risk exposure is non-monotonic in the cost of reinsurance.

     

How Can a Cartel Be Detected?

There is a long history of analyzing the workability of markets regarding concentration ratios as indicators of workability. In this paper, we discuss a comparatively new concept, the Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) Concept, introduced by Grossekettler (1982, 1999, 2005, 2008). The CFD-concept analyzes real market processes by means of time series analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently or not. Furthermore, the concept can be used as a tool for detecting cartels. Therefore, we develop a System of Cartel Markers which can be used to analyze real markets. We analyze the German cement industry as an example of a cartel and find significant differences to the competitive benchmark.